The rear of the armed forces. Glorious path of the rear

Ten years ago, the "second Chechen War"

On September 23, 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Counter-Terrorist Operations on the Territory of the North Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation." Almost on the same day, massive bombardments of the city of Grozny and other cities and towns in Chechnya began. On September 30, federal forces entered the republic.

About the events of ten years ago, which became the prologue to new bloodshed, most of the inhabitants of the republic have a vague idea. People remember the invasion of Basayev and Khattab's militants into Dagestan to help the "fighting Muslims", the bombings of houses in Moscow and Volgodonsk, Putin's promise to "wet the terrorists in the toilet."

However, even before the events in Dagestan and the apartment bombings that Moscow blamed on the Chechens, the Russian military actually seized part of the territory of the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

"Today it is not customary to talk about this, but the actual invasion Russian army on the territory of Ichkeria, despite the Treaty on peace and principles of relations between Russia and the CRI, signed in 1997 between Yeltsin and Maskhadov (Aslan Maskhadov - President of the CRI, note of the "Caucasian Knot"), according to which both parties refused "to apply or even threats to use military force in solving any contentious issues", happened at the end of July 1999. Then parts of the federal forces entered the territory of Ichkeria from the side of Dagestan, destroying the border and customs post, and deepened into the territory of the republic by 10-12 kilometers," says one of the former deputies of the parliament of Ichkeria, who wished remain unnamed.

Then this action was announced as "border leveling". "Maskhadov and his government repeatedly tried to contact Yeltsin and discuss the current situation, but everything was in vain," says the source of the "Caucasian Knot" correspondent.

"The issue of a new war in Moscow was resolved long before 1999 - one might say, immediately after the end of the first military campaign. Despite the signed peace treaty and the pending issue of the status of Ichkeria, the Russian special services were active in subversive activities in Chechnya. Everything was done to in order to discredit the leadership of Chechnya, primarily President Maskhadov, whom Moscow had previously recognized as the legitimate leader, to present the Chechens as bandits and terrorists, and so on," the former Ichkerian deputy noted.

According to him, these goals were achieved largely due to the lack of mutual understanding between Maskhadov's former associates.

"Fearing the possibility of starting in Chechnya civil war(in the summer of 1998, clashes took place in Gudermes between detachments of Wahhabis and government forces - approx. " caucasian knot"), Maskhadov lost sight of the fact that revanchist sentiments are strong in the military-political leadership of Russia. And when he tried to enter into a dialogue with the Kremlin, it was too late. The car was already running, and no one was going to stop it," the interlocutor says.

As a result, "we got what we got: a destroyed republic, tens of thousands of people killed on both sides, and mutual distrust and hatred."

"Those who say that the reason for the re-invasion Russian troops bombings of residential buildings in Moscow and other cities of Russia or the Basaev-Khattab campaign in Dagestan were deeply mistaken on the territory of the CRI," the interlocutor says.

According to Rizvan Madaev, a resident of Grozny, that new war in Chechnya is inevitable, it was known in advance. "Back in the summer of 1999, in one of Russian newspapers published an article "The war in Chechnya will begin in October." I personally read it and remember very well that it even indicated the numbers and names of the units and subunits of the Russian army that are planned to be used in the new war. So today you can talk and argue as much as you like, but no Basayev or Maskhadov started this war. It was started by the Kremlin," Madaev said.

Some associate the beginning of the second war in the republic with the name of the current Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. “Suffice it to recall 1999, when an unknown retired FSB lieutenant colonel Putin suddenly became first the director of this service, and then the prime minister of Russia. military operation in the Chechen Republic was conceived specifically to bring him to power," said an employee of one of the local public organizations Sultan.

According to him, Yeltsin initially staked on both Primakov and Stepashin, and ultimately chose Putin. "The first decree signed by Vladimir Putin, who became acting president of Russia, was a decree on the provision of guarantees of inviolability former president Russia and his family. In fact, Putin came to the Kremlin during the Chechen war,” says Sultan.

On September 23, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation", in accordance with which the United Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus (OGV (s)) was created to conduct a "counter-terrorist operation" on the territory of the Chechen Republic. Almost on the same day, massive bombardments of the city of Grozny and other cities and towns of Chechnya began. A week later, federal forces again entered the republic.

On October 5, 1999, Maskhadov signed a decree "On the introduction of martial law on the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria." large-scale fighting on the territory of Chechnya were fought until the middle of 2000, after which the war acquired a partisan character.

According to some Chechen political scientists, the "second Chechen", however, like the "first", could have been avoided. "If Yeltsin had met with Dudayev at the time (Dzhokhar Dudayev - the first president of the CRI, note of the "Caucasian Knot"), then there would have been no first military campaign in the Chechen Republic. If he or Vladimir Putin had met with Maskhadov, then there would have been no there would have been a second war," says a local political analyst who asked not to be named. "If Basayev had already invaded Dagestan, then why federal troops did they let him out? It was possible, in extreme cases, to simply block the militant detachments in the mountains of Dagestan and destroy them, and then, from the position of the victorious side, set conditions for Maskhadov. And I'm sure Moscow and Grozny would sooner or later come to a consensus."

“Any war is unleashed by the strongest. Well, how can you say that tiny Chechnya, whose territory is less than one Moscow region, attacked Russia, a nuclear power? Moscow really did not care about Dudayev, or Maskhadov, or Basaev or Khattab. "If they wanted to, the special services could liquidate them in exactly two hours, as Grachev once said. Instead, they staged a bloody massacre here, killed thousands of people and for ten years they have not been able to defeat some one and a half or a thousand militants. This is absurd," he says. teacher Umar Khankarov.

"The culprits of the two recent wars Yeltsin and Putin are in Chechnya. This is clear. Because they were presidents of Russia. Neither one nor the other did anything to avoid bloodshed, to end the suffering of hundreds of thousands of people. I very much hope that sooner or later all those involved in unleashing the war in Chechnya will be brought to justice. international tribunal, like the leadership of the former Yugoslavia in Soviet times," said Milan Akhmadova, a resident of Grozny, who lost several close relatives during two military campaigns.


The “Second Chechen War” (officially called the counter-terrorist operation (CTO) is the common name for hostilities in Chechnya and the border regions of the North Caucasus. It began on September 30, 1999 (the date Russian troops entered Chechnya). The active phase of hostilities lasted from 1999 to 2000 a year, then, as the Russian Armed Forces established control over the territory of Chechnya, it escalated into a smoldering conflict, which actually continues to this day.

NCFD - North Caucasian Federal District

The second Chechen war began

August 1999, Chechen fighters attacked the Republic of Dagestan of the Russian Federation, this is how the second Chechen war began, terrorist attacks, attacks and incidents also entered into new stage since that moment, many innocent Russians died in August of this year, becoming victims of terrorists.
link: http://russian.people.com.cn/31519/6735684.html


Living history: the beginning of the second Chechen war

It is difficult to name the starting point for the beginning of the war in Chechnya. What will it be? The first attacks of militants on Dagestan? Introduction by Maskhadov of martial law in CRI? The beginning of the bombing of militant bases by our aircraft? Explosions of residential buildings in Buynaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk? Or the start of a ground operation of the Russian army?
link: http://www.livejournal.ru/themes/id/21516


Dagestan. The beginning of the second Chechen war

On August 7, 1999, a 1,500-strong group under the command of Shamil Basayev invaded the territory of Dagestan. The militants immediately captured a number of villages in the Botlikh and Tsumadinsky districts. There were no Russian garrisons there, and the small local militia offered no resistance. The militants immediately began to fortify in the occupied territory, intending to use it as a springboard for a further offensive. Their next goal was to unite with their allies - the armed detachments of the Wahhabis, concentrated in the area of ​​​​the villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi.
link: http://www.warchechnya.ru/load


Second Chechen war. Beginning of the Chechen crisis

The Chechen crisis is a complex, multifactorial phenomenon. Many of its components are still difficult to assess objectively today. In general, such events cannot be unambiguous interpretation, each participant has his own truth. At the same time, the current degree of knowledge of the problem allows us to draw a number of conclusions. The August events of 1991 in Moscow, followed by the collapse of the USSR, provided multinational people CHIR is a unique chance to change the regime of the communist bureaucracy to a democratic system of power by constitutional means, to determine the status of the republic through a referendum, to find an acceptable form of relations with the Russian Federation, thereby gradually gaining real economic and political independence within the renewed federation.
link: http://www.seaofhistory.ru/shists-940-1.html


Causes of the second Chechen war from the point of view of Maskhadov

Ten years ago, the second Chechen war began. The war, which, contrary to the statements of officials, has not yet ended.


Below I publish excerpts from the transcript of an audio letter sent in 2000 by Aslan Maskhadov to his friend and colleague in the Soviet army, who asked not to be named.
link: http://01vyacheslav. livejournal.com/7700.html


Second Chechen War: Russia in the face of terror

After the tragedy at Dubrovka, the Kremlin hastened to announce the "success of a unique operation to free the hostages." Instead of serious organizational conclusions regarding the leadership law enforcement and special services that allowed the militants to Moscow were awarded. So the title of Hero of Russia was given to FSB generals V. Pronichev and A. Tikhonov. The first one is Deputy director of the FSB and head of the headquarters for the release of hostages on Dubrovka, the second - the head of the FSB special forces center (which includes the Alfa and Vympel units). In less than 2 years, these same people will “mark themselves” in Beslan - they won’t become Heroes twice, but they won’t bear responsibility for the failed assault and numerous victims among the hostages either. More on this below.
link: http://www.voinenet.ru/voina/istoriya-voiny/784.html


Second Chechen. For Putin?

On September 23, 1999, a presidential decree was signed "On Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Counter-Terrorist Operations on the Territory of the North Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation." According to the decree, the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus was created to conduct a counter-terrorist operation.
link: http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/1829292.html


The Second Chechen War as Part of Putin's PR Campaign

On September 14, 1999, shortly after the explosion of a second residential building in Moscow, Putin spoke at a meeting State Duma dedicated to the fight against terrorism.
link: http://www.razlib.ru/politika/korporacija_


The war against terrorists ended in Chechnya

On April 16, the regime of the counterterrorist operation (CTO), which has been operating in Chechnya since 1999, has been lifted, RIA Novosti reports with reference to the National Anti-Terrorism Committee.
link: http://lenta.ru/news/2009/04/16/regime/


"Second Chechen War" officially ended today

Today, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee issued the following statement: “From 00:00 Moscow time on April 16, the Chairman of the Committee, Director of the FSB Alexander Bortnikov canceled the order declaring the territory of the republic as a zone for conducting a counter-terrorist operation.” As a source from the presidential administration told The Morning News correspondent, the NAC made changes to the organization of anti-terrorist activities in the Chechen Republic on the personal instructions of Dmitry Medvedev. The source additionally told The Morning News that this decision was previously agreed with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
link: http://www.utronews.ru/news/politics/001239868105700/


3 years ago the second Chechen war ended

Three years ago, the abolition of the counterterrorist operation of the federal forces in Chechnya was announced.
link: http://www.rusichi-center.ru/e/2965905-3


10 years ago the second Chechen war began

Everyone has their own date for the start of this war. Dagestanis believe: since August 7, when Basayev's gangs invaded the republic. Muscovites - since September 9, when they blew up the house in Pechatniki. The military - from September 30: the official entry of troops into Chechnya. Everyone has their own date for the end of this war. For the dead, it is long gone. The living have not come from her so far ...
link: http://bosonogoe.ru/blog/1556. html

Second Chechen War and its aftermath

In December 1994, the Russian authorities for the first time made an attempt to suppress Chechen separatism by military means, but after two years of bloody fighting, the army was forced to leave the Chechen Republic. The stubbornness of the Russian authorities, who headed for a military victory in Chechnya, led to the death of at least 30 thousand Chechens and 4.3 thousand Russian soldiers. This war, the economic damage from which is estimated at 5.5 billion dollars, to a large extent caused the all-Russian economic crisis in August 1998, when the state was unable to meet its exorbitant debts.
link: http://old.nasledie.ru/politvnt/19_38/article.php? art=53

The dragon fight is over. The snake chase has begun.

I do not understand why. The second Chechen war was not necessary. The solution to this problem could be based on the agreements signed by General Lebed in Khasavyurt - they could become the basis for achieving long-term peace in Chechnya. I think there are serious doubts that it was the Chechens who blew up the houses in Moscow. As you remember, this was the reason for the start of the second war. However, there are suspicions that it was a provocation of the Russian special services. It is strange that hexogen was used in the explosions, which was produced at a factory controlled by the KGB, and then there were incomprehensible exercises in Ryazan. The Chechen war had a negative impact on the confidence in the Russian authorities and on the attitude towards Russia on the part of democratic states.
link: http://flb.ru/info/34480.html

The Chechen way of "seaside partisans"

The story of the “seaside partisans”, who have been unsuccessfully caught for the third week by hundreds of law enforcement officers with helicopters, and with today- and army units with armored vehicles, could have started 10 years ago. But the Second Chechen War and the petrodollar rain that hit Russia gave the country a reprieve. Now it is over, and it's time to pay old and new bills. If the preliminary information about the Roman Muromtsev group is correct, the Kremlin for the first time received an organized group of militants on Russian soil who believe ruling regime enemy and ready to kill his minions without hesitation.
link: http://www.apn.ru/publications/article22866.htm

The second Chechen war began exactly 10 years ago. And when did it end? And is it over?

By the time the second war broke out in October 1999, I was 26, with a wife and a two-year-old child who were completely dependent on me. We lived very hard and poor, and I had no time for politics. Then I thought to stay in St. Petersburg. Moreover, the news about the course of the war was rather reassuring: first they expanded the "cordon sanitaire", then they began to take control over the settlements of Chechnya, mostly without a fight. My city, Shali, peacefully let the federal troops in.
link:

From the history of creation

Logistic support of troops arose with the birth of armies slave states. First organizational forms it got in the army ancient rome, which had special bodies that gave out salaries to soldiers, supplied them with weapons, clothing, etc. There were special camp workshops for the manufacture and repair of weapons and military equipment. Food was purchased from the population or collected as a tribute from the conquered peoples. Small stocks of weapons, food, clothing and footwear were transported behind the troops in carts. For this, pack animals, wagons, and water vehicles allocated by the population at the request of military leaders were used. Great importance given to the construction of roads, bridges, exploration water sources along the lines of movement of troops. For the first time, treasurers, commissaries, persons in charge of road and fortification work, setting up camps and quartering troops appeared in the armies of slave-owning states.

In the 11th-15th centuries. there was no centralized support for the troops. In mercenary armies of the 15th-17th centuries. mercenaries were obliged to purchase weapons, equipment, clothing and food on a salary. The army was accompanied on campaigns by merchants (Markitants), who supplied the soldiers with foodstuffs and articles of soldier's use. With the increase in the number of regular armies, more and more difficulties arose in providing them with food and fodder during wars. In this regard, in the second half of the 17th century. in the French, and then in other European armies, the store supply system was adopted, and later mobile stores were introduced, which, although they were state-owned, were not subordinate to the armed forces. With the increase in the number of armies and the development of their organization (18-19 centuries), regular units intended for centralized logistic support troops and fleets. Since then, T. century began to take shape organizationally. with. in the modern sense. With the appearance in the 2nd half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. mass armed forces, built on the principles of a cadre army and navy, equipping the troops and navy with new military equipment of military technology. with. becomes more and more complex and diverse.

in Russia at the beginning of the 18th century. with the creation of a regular army, Peter I formed two services: provisioning - to provide troops with food and fodder, and commissariat - to finance, provide clothing, baggage, hand weapons. The regiments had economic units - permanent convoys with supplies material resources: bakery, drying of crackers, meat harvesting, tailoring and repair of uniforms and shoes were carried out. In the 18th century infirmaries and hospitals were created (See Hospital).

From the beginning of the 19th century The War Ministry had a commissariat and provisions departments that became part of the Main Quartermaster Directorate, which was formed in 1864. It was entrusted with functions that were previously performed by the troops themselves (supplying all types of materiel, organizing the tailoring of uniforms, etc.): positions of quartermasters were established from chief to divisional. In 1900, quartermaster courses were created in St. Petersburg (in 1911 they were transformed into the quartermaster's academy). By the beginning of the First World War of 1914-18 there were commissariat directorates - the main, district, serf, corps, division - as administrative bodies and various rear institutions (warehouses, workshops, bakeries, etc.). The troops included units and units of material, medical, veterinary, and in the fleet, in addition, emergency and rescue support.

In the German army in the early 20th century. subordinate to the chief quartermaster were the quartermasters of the armies, food stores in the theater of war (See Theater of War), food mobile stores in trains, on railways and on ships. Military quartermaster activities were in charge of army, corps and divisional quartermasters. Other armies also had a similar rear organization.

The use of tanks, aircraft, and road transport during World War I required the creation of forces and means of technical, road, engineering, airfield, and airfield technical support, the supply of fuel, tools, and other new property. Appearance chemical weapons caused the need to supply troops with means of protection against toxic substances. The difficulty of meeting the needs of the multimillion-strong armed forces during the war in a variety of military equipment led to a significant expansion of the communications of military equipment. with. with the state economy.

The rear of the Soviet Armed Forces was created simultaneously with the formation of units of the Red Army and Navy. In 1918 the Central Supply Administration was organized. The first detachments of the Red Army did not have full-time rear units, they received material resources from local Soviets and military commissariats, which were in charge of the warehouses of the former tsarist army. Since 1918, the supply of troops with material resources was in charge of the supply chief of the corresponding front, army, division, brigade, to whom various services were subordinate. Important measures for the organization of T. century. with. were adopted as a result of the Military Reform of 1924-25 (See Military Reform of 1924-25); material support is concentrated in a single body - the Office of the Chief of Supply of the Red Army; the order of mutual relations of bodies of T. of century is established. with. with national economic bodies; a supply scheme was adopted - center - district - part; reorganized the military bodies of logistic support. As the National economy and the technical re-equipment of the armed forces, units and subunits appeared that performed the functions of supplying aviation, armored, automotive equipment and property, fuel, etc. In March 1941, by decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Soviet government the leadership of the Main Quartermaster Directorate, the Sanitary, Veterinary Directorates of the Red Army, the department of material funds was entrusted to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny.

To the beginning of the Great Patriotic War 1941-45 TV s., in addition to rear units, units and institutions that were part of units, formations and associations of military branches and types of armed forces, it also had bases and warehouses with stocks of materiel, automobile, railway, road, evacuation, repair, engineering and airfield, aviation technical, medical, veterinary and other rear units and institutions of central subordination. GKO Decree August 1, 1941 introduced centralized system management of T. in. s.: the Main Directorate of the Logistics of the Red Army and the Logistics Directorates in the fronts and armies were created, as well as the positions of the chief of the rear of the Red Army and the chiefs of the rear of the fronts and armies were established. As part of the Main Directorate of Logistics, the Headquarters of the Chiefs of Logistics was formed, and organizational and planning departments were formed in the departments of the chiefs of rear services of the fronts and armies. In the center and associations there were, in addition, departments (departments) of military communications, the road service and the inspection of the chief of logistics. The Chief of the Rear of the Red Army was also subordinate to the Main Quartermaster Directorate, the Fuel Supply Directorate, the Main Military Sanitary and Veterinary Directorates; the corresponding departments and departments were subordinate to the chiefs of the rear of the fronts and armies. On August 19, 1941, the post of head of logistics of the Air Force was introduced, in May 1942 - head of logistics of the Navy; at the same time, the posts of chiefs of logistics in corps and divisions were established. The chiefs of the rear were endowed with rights: in the center - respectively, the deputy people's commissar of defense and the Navy, and in associations and formations - deputy commanders (commanders). They were responsible for the organization of the rear, the supply of materiel of all kinds, the evacuation and provision of troops for subordinate services; The head of the rear of the Red Army was also responsible for transporting all types of reinforcements to the fronts. In the course of the war, stationary warehouses in the fronts were replaced by field warehouses, and field army bases were created in the armies. In January 1943, the Main Automobile Administration was formed, and in June the Main Road Administration. In June 1943, the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army was abolished; the headquarters, administrations and departments that were part of it are directly subordinate to the head of logistics. Then it was accepted new system supply - "from oneself", according to which the responsibility for the delivery of materiel from supply stations (army warehouses) to the troops (to divisional exchange offices) was assigned to the chiefs of the rear of the army, and for the delivery from divisional to regimental warehouses - to the chiefs of rear of the divisions.

During the war years T. century. with. received more than 10 million tons of ammunition, more than 16 million tons of fuel from the national economy of the country, ensured the storage and delivery of more than 10 million tons of ammunition to the troops and forces of the fleet, a large number weapons, equipment, food and other material resources. Only by car 145 million tons of supply cargo was transported. Military rail transportation exceeded 19 million wagons. The road service built and restored about 100 thousand km of roads. About 120,000 km of railway lines have been restored and altered by the forces of the railway troops and special forces. Over 6,000 airfields have been equipped for aviation. The medical service returned to service after curing over 72% of the wounded and about 91% of the sick. The personnel of the army and navy received adequate nutrition. All the most important questions of logistical support for the armed forces were decided by the State Defense Committee through the General Staff, the head of the logistics of the Red Army, and the heads of other central government bodies. The centralization of rear management made it possible to effectively and economically use the available forces and means. The exploits of the warriors of T. v. with. during the Great Patriotic War, they were highly appreciated by the party and the government: 52 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and more than 30 - Hero Socialist Labor, many tens of thousands were awarded orders and medals; big number rear units and institutions were awarded orders, awarded the title of Guards and received honorary titles.

After the war, restructuring organizational structure and technical re-equipment of T. century. with. With the formation of new types of armed forces, their rear was simultaneously created. Full motorization of all links of TV is carried out. with., created new units and institutions for various purposes. In June 1958, the post of Deputy Minister of Defense - Chief of Logistics of the Ministry of Defense was established, which since 1962 has been called Deputy Minister of Defense - Head of Logistics of the Armed Forces; in associations, formations and units, the post of chief of logistics was transformed into the position of deputy commander (commander) for logistics. T. v. with. headed by: Lieutenant General (later Army General) A.V. Khrulev (August 1941 - January 1951), Colonel General V.I. Vinogradov (January 1951 - June 1958), Marshal of the Soviet Union I.Kh. Bagramyan (June 1958 - April 1968), General of the Army S.S. Maryakhin (April 1968 - June 1972). Since July 1972 T. v. with. headed by Army General S.K. Kurkotkin.

The modern rear of the Soviet Armed Forces includes: arsenals, bases and warehouses with stocks of materiel; special troops - automobile, railway, road and pipeline; auxiliary fleet; units, institutions, and subdivisions - engineering and aerodrome, aviation technical, emergency rescue, evacuation, repair, construction, medical, veterinary, etc. To ensure the activities of TV. with. it may also include units and subunits of engineering troops, communications, air defense and security troops. In terms of the scale and nature of the tasks performed, T. century. with. is divided into rear strategic, operational and military; by affiliation - to the rear of the center, district, naval, front-line, army, flotillas, fleet aviation, corps, naval bases, divisional, brigade, regimental, ship, battalion. The strategic rear includes the rear of the center (arsenals, bases and warehouses with stocks of materiel, units of special rear forces, and other rear units and institutions that are at the constant direct disposal of the Ministry of Defense and the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces). The operational rear consists of bases and warehouses with stocks of materiel, units of special rear forces, and other rear units and institutions that are part of all branches of the armed forces. The military rear is formed by warehouses with stocks of materiel, motor transport, repair, medical and other units and subunits intended for direct rear support of formations, units, ships and subunits. Each military formation, unit (ship) and subunit has its own rear, the composition of which is determined by the states. For example, the rear of a motorized rifle battalion consists of a supply platoon, a repair shop and a battalion medical center. Having the necessary motor transport, he is able to follow the battalion during the conduct of hostilities or on the march and perform his tasks in any situation.

Rear of the Armed Forces- these are the forces and means that carry out the rear and technical support army and navy in peacetime and wartime.

The rear is an integral part of the armed forces; a set of military units, institutions and subunits that transport materiel, material, transport, technical, engineering and aerodrome, aerodrome technical, medical, veterinary, commercial, residential, operational, financial, and in the Navy, in addition, emergency rescue support.

    The rear includes various units, institutions and subunits necessary to perform the following main tasks:
  • constantly maintain stocks of materiel and provide troops with them;
  • to carry out preparation, operation, technical cover and restoration of communication lines and Vehicle;
  • provide military transportation of all types;
  • restore military equipment and property;
  • create conditions for basing aviation and naval forces;
  • provide medical care to the wounded and sick;
  • to carry out anti-epidemic, treatment-and-prophylactic, sanitary-hygienic and veterinary measures;
  • to carry out trade and household, apartment and operational and financial support;
  • assist troops in restoring their combat readiness and eliminating the consequences of enemy strikes.

To perform these tasks, it has bases and warehouses with stocks of materiel for various purposes, special troops (automobile, road, pipeline, etc.), an auxiliary fleet, engineering, airfield, aviation technical, repair, medical, veterinary and other units, subdivisions. and institutions.

The rear of the Armed Forces is intended to provide the Armed Forces with all types of materiel and maintenance of their stocks, prepare and operate communications, ensure military transportation, repair weapons and military equipment, provide medical care to the wounded and sick, carry out sanitary and hygienic and veterinary measures and perform a number of other logistics tasks. The rear of the Armed Forces includes arsenals, bases, warehouses with stocks of materiel. It has special troops (automobile, railway, road, pipeline, engineering and airfield and others), as well as repair, medical, rear guards and other units and subunits.

    The rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AF of Russia) includes:
  • Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Ministry of Defense of Russia
  • Automobile and Road Administration of the Ministry of Defense of Russia
  • central administration rocket fuel and fuel of the Ministry of Defense of Russia
  • Central Food Administration of the Ministry of Defense of Russia
  • Central Clothing Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Russia
  • Fire, Rescue and Local Defense Service of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Veterinary and Sanitary Service of the Armed Forces of Russia
  • Department of Environmental Safety of the Armed Forces of Russia
  • Main Department of Trade of the Ministry of Defense of Russia
  • Directorate for Active Recreation of the Ministry of Defense of Russia
  • Control Agriculture Ministry of Defense of Russia
  • Military Scientific Committee of Logistics of the Armed Forces of Russia
  • Secretariat of the Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces of Russia
  • Human Resources Logistics Department of the Armed Forces of Russia
  • Department of Military Education Logistics of the Armed Forces of Russia
  • Logistics of the SV Armed Forces of Russia
  • Rear Air Force
  • Rear of the Navy
  • Rear KV (December 1, 2011, the Aerospace Defense Forces were formed on their basis)
  • Rear of the Strategic Missile Forces
  • Rear of the Airborne Forces
  • Rear of military districts (fleets) (groups of troops (flotillas)) of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Automobile Troops
  • Railway Troops of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Road Troops of the Armed Forces of Russia
  • Pipeline Troops of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Troops of the rear guard of the Armed Forces of Russia

Since 1991, the Russian Armed Forces have included a special service, represented by military formations, units, subunits and institutions, whose task is to provide logistics and technical support to the army and navy. It is designated as the Logistics of the Russian Federation (T. Armed Forces of the Russian Federation). With the help of this service, the effective life of the army is possible in the event of a military conflict. You will find information about the command, purpose and structure of the Rear in the article.

Acquaintance

The rear of the Armed Forces is a link between the army and the economy of the state, an integral part of the country's defense potential. In other words, T. Sun. is an effectively operating, well-coordinated mechanism: the products produced by the rear services are used directly by the army and navy. Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - August 1. T. VS functioned from 1991 to 2010. After the structural reorganization, the MTO system of the Armed Forces (Material and Technical Support of the Armed Forces) began its activity.

How it all began?

The first elements of the rear of the army appeared in the 17th century. Until the 1970s, the functions of the T. Armed Forces were carried out by various non-military departments and private entrepreneurs. According to experts, the organization of military campaigns was carried out by various merchants (Markitans). In the XVIII century, the supply was also carried out according to the store system. The formation of a regular army, the increase in the scale of hostilities, as well as the emergence of new methods of conducting them, became the impetus for the formation of special full-time units, units and institutions, whose task is to centrally provide troops separately by birth. Thus, state-owned warehouses appeared, of which state level supplied the regular army and navy of Russia. The experience of combat operations made a significant contribution to the development of the logistics support system. The system has been extensively improved. Soon the military command created a unified commissary service, developed new methods of transporting materiel from warehouses to military formations. By the First World War, several army bases, front-line distribution and unloading stations were created. In the 20th century, with the advent of tanks, there was a need for rear services responsible for delivering to the battlefield fuels and lubricants.

About the work of the rear in the Great Patriotic War

In 1918, the Central Supply Directorate was created in the Red Army. The management of units, institutions and rear services was carried out by the chiefs of supply. According to experts, a breakthrough in the improvement of T. VS took place during the Great Patriotic War.

A large number of tasks were set before the Rear, with which the rear services successfully coped. At the beginning of hostilities, a centralized rear was created. In 1942, the positions of corps and division chiefs appeared. Throughout the war, T. VS delivered ammunition to the Red Army, the total weight of which was at least 10 million tons, fuel - 16 million, food and fodder - 40 million, uniforms for personnel - 70 million units. have been restored car roads, with a length of at least 100 thousand km, railway tracks - 120 thousand km. available Soviet aviation there were airfields numbering more than 6 thousand. They were also equipped with employees of the Logistics of the USSR Armed Forces. military medical service and medical institutions 72% of the wounded soldiers were returned back to duty.

About the purpose of T. VS in peacetime

Subdivisions and units of the Logistics of the Armed Forces ensure the constant and mobilization readiness of the army. The rear structures are equipped with modern material and technical means, due to which it is possible to provide the army with the most necessary things in order to maintain the defense capability of the state in a timely and complete manner. Due to the fact that a rocket or an aircraft cannot be conditionally refueled, and a soldier cannot be equipped, in Peaceful time training tasks for the Logistics of the Armed Forces are not provided. In the absence of hostilities, the T. Armed Forces services carry out triune task: military units and formations are supplied with food and clothing for military personnel. In addition, the rear services monitor the health of soldiers.

On the tasks of services during hostilities

T. Armed Forces has arsenals, bases and warehouses, which store various materiel. The rear has at its disposal everything necessary for the performance of combat missions by military formations. Logistics employees deliver ammunition, fuel, organize medical, commercial, transport and technical support.

About controls

Until 2010, the Logistics of the Armed Forces was equipped with the following departments.

  • Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
  • Chief military medical.
  • Automobile and road management. Since 2009, it has been the Central Automobile and Road Administration.
  • Central Directorate of Rocket Fuel and Fuel.
  • Central clothing.
  • The service responsible for fire and rescue and local defense of the RF Armed Forces.
  • Veterinary and sanitary service.
  • management that provides environmental safety.
  • General trade department Russian Ministry Defense.
  • Active Recreation Authority.
  • Agricultural.
  • Military Scientific Committee T. VS.
  • Secretariat of the Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces
  • Personnel department.
  • Department of military education.

About the composition of T. SV

The Armed Forces had the following rear organizations.

  • The logistics of the Strategic Missile Forces were responsible for the technical and material support of the units.
  • Airborne Troops - Logistics of the Airborne Forces.
  • Air Force - Logistics of the Air Force.
  • Navy- employees of the Logistics of the Navy.
  • ground forces- Rear SV.
  • Space Forces - Logistics KV. In December 2011, this type of troops was renamed into VKO (military space defense).

About rear special services

Logistic support was carried out by the following special formations.

  • Automotive and railway troops personnel, fuel, ammunition, food and other materiel needed in combat conditions were delivered.
  • Pipeline. This formation of the Armed Forces lays field and main pipelines through which fuel is supplied to the warehouses of military formations and formations of the Armed Forces. The formation operated back in the years of the Soviet Union and was listed as TBV. Today it is part of the Russian Armed Forces and is subordinate to the Central Directorate of Rocket Fuel and Fuel. According to experts, several thousand tons of fuel and lubricants can be transferred by TbV military personnel in a short time period.

About command

For the entire period of existence of T. VS. (1991-2010) leadership was carried out by the following officers.

Today

Until 2010, the Headquarters of the Logistics of the Armed Forces, nine main and central departments, three services and administrative bodies provided the country's defense potential. At present, this task, under the leadership of D.V. Bulgakov, is being performed by the MTO of the Russian Armed Forces (Materials and Technical Support). Being integral part Armed Forces, the composition of the ITF is represented by:

  • Headquarters of the ITF Armed Forces;
  • Department of Transportation;
  • Department in charge of public utilities;
  • Food Administration of the Ministry of Defense;
  • Main Armored Directorate;
  • Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate;
  • Metrology Department;
  • Main Directorate of the Railway Troops.

Training of specialists is carried out at the Military Academy of Logistics named after. General of the Army Khrulev A.V.

The year 1700 was taken as the starting point for the history of the Logistics of the Armed Forces. Then, on February 18, Peter I signed the Decree "On the management of all grain reserves of military people to Okolnichi Yazykov, with the name of it for this part of the General Provisions." The first independent supply body was established - the Provisional Order, which was in charge of deliveries for the army of bread, cereals and grain fodder. He carried out centralized food supply, which, as you know, is today one of the types of material support for the troops.

On the same day, "in the second half of the bright day" - by his Decree, the autocrat established another Order - a Special Order, later called the Military Order (sometimes it is also called the Commissariat Order). This order was in charge of appropriations directed to the armament of the troops, allowance army, supplying it with uniforms and horses.

The regular army and navy created by the reforming tsar demanded further steps to centralize their provision, and in 1711, by decree of Peter I, the supply agencies became part of the active army. In her field administration, a commissariat was created that was in charge of all types of supplies, including food forage. In divisions, the organization of supply was entrusted to the chief commissars and chief food officers, and in the regiments, respectively, to the commissars and food masters. Moreover, the regiments acquired their own military facilities.

The structure of government bodies established at the beginning of the 18th century and accumulated during Northern war the experience of supplying the army in the field was enshrined in the Military Charter of 1716. Responsibility for providing the troops was assigned to the army commander (Field Marshal General), and the direct management of its supply - to the kriegs commissar, whose duties, in particular, included supplying the troops with money, clothing, provisions, weapons and horses. Medical support was provided by: in the army - a doctor at top generals, in divisions - a doctor and a staff doctor, in regiments - a doctor, in a company - a barber (paramedic).

It is curious to assess the status of the general-kriegs-commissar by today's standards. On the one hand, the management of finances made him the most important figure. But, on the other hand, he seems weaker modern boss rear in terms of available opportunities for organizing support. The main thing: there were no vehicles in his hands. The convoy in the army was subordinate to the Wagenmeister General. Above him stood the Quartermaster General. Along with the supply, the quartermaster general also supervised the deployment of troops and hospitals, that is, in fact, it was he who created the rear infrastructure field army, although at the same time he was not the organizer of material support.

The division of supply and transport powers between officials at that time had its own reasons. In particular, in case of urgent need, the convoy could turn into a kind of fortification and was used as a defensive line. But the situation when one chief determines the rear "disposition", and the other - its supply content, is internally contradictory. It's barely noticeable at first. The rear of the Petrovsky armies was decorated with Spartan modesty. However, with the development of military affairs and the complexity of the rear organization, the "worm" of contradictions became more dangerous. "Rear fragmentation" became like death at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

In the general supply system, food had the largest share. The provisions of the army were provided entirely from the reserves of the state. By 1705, food warehouses were opened in many cities. Products were delivered by carts or along the rivers on plows (large boats). In addition to permanent (stationary), temporary and mobile warehouses were also organized. Temporary troops were deployed during stops for a short time. In mobile warehouses, called shops, it was prescribed to have constant food supplies in the amount of a monthly requirement.

You can get an idea about these prototypes of modern material support brigades, for example, from the report of Admiral Apraksin dated March 11, 1711. He reported to Peter I on the organization of a camping store on 2609 carts, carrying 4160 quarters of crackers, 384 quarters of cereals, 1200 quarters of oats and 22713 pounds of hay. If we calculate it, then it is about 1300 tons. It is quite comparable with the carrying capacity of airborne transport of a separate battalion of material support of a modern division. Since the matter of supplying the army became entirely the concern of the state, rationing was inevitably required. On February 18, 1705, the Decree determined the exact size of the grain "salary" to everyone without exception. lower ranks. The "great-great-grandfather" of our food ration consisted of half an octopus of flour (about 24 kg) and a small quarter of cereals (about 3.5 kg) per month. Money was given for the purchase of other "welding" products.

Troops outside of Russia were to be given additional "portions": two pounds of bread (820 g), one pound of meat (410 g), two cups of wine (250 g) and one handful of beer (3.28 l) per person per day. In addition, two pounds of salt and one and a half handfuls of cereals were supposed for a month. As a rule, portions were given not in kind, but in money. Warriors could buy food at their discretion. Contemporaries argued that "the allowance was excellent, and the king himself experienced the soldiers' rations for a month before approving it."

Many aspects of modern logistics issues are rooted in history. For example, in the era of Peter the Great, proviantmeisters and commissars were subordinate only to higher commanders in their specialty and were not subordinate to the commanders of regiments and divisions. They were with the troops as representatives from the army, sometimes from the province. Commanders, in order to more reliably protect the treasury from theft, were removed from the direct disposal of material resources. The image of the "governor at feeding" was painfully tenacious.

And take the military economy. After the death of Peter I in 1730, the Provisional Military Commission stated that the troops were inadequately supplied. Decisions followed that gave the regiments the right to accumulate the funds allocated by the treasury. With "economic sums" (money saved) it was possible to buy everything you needed - up to horses. The well-known autonomy of the military economy was beneficial to the state: their own property is saved better than state property. And why not the "economic amount", say, the current form of 101, where funds from subsidiary farms, saving bread, etc. Obviously, the practice of extrabudgetary funds has a long history.

AT mid-eighteenth century for a uniform issued for wearing, up to 49 percent of the salary was deducted from the soldier. So, the state improved the saving of clothing property. By the way, what long time salaries and belongings were supervised by one official - the commissar, was determined precisely by this close relationship. AT modern concept clothing support for contract servicemen is a metamorphosis of the same idea. Compensation is due for the supply provided for by the norms, but not received.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of April 8, 1997 No. 305 "On priority measures to prevent corruption and reduce budget expenditures when organizing the procurement of products for state needs" introduced a competitive system of supplies for the Armed Forces. A logical step of the state, transferring the economy to a market economy.

How much effort and energy it took for the rear services specialists to adapt to the new requirements. But they're not really that new. From time immemorial, private contractors have been involved in supplying the regular army in Russia.

For example, with mid-nineteenth century, five methods of procuring material resources were legalized: a contract from an auction, commercial, commission, cash purchase, as well as the release of money to the shelves for the procurement of "own care".

The bidding contract was considered the most profitable. Moreover, the duality of the purpose of any government contract was officially recognized. It consisted: "1) in the acquisition of items necessary for procurement at prices that are not burdensome for the treasury and harmless to private individuals, and 2) in the development of all branches of private industry, opening up the way for it to sell its products for food allowance and supply of troops."

Together with the conditions (conditions) of the auction, the quartermaster's office set the "marginal price". It was impossible to pay more. The minimum price was also determined, and it was also forbidden to buy cheaper than it. The instructions to the procurers indicated that the treasury should not pursue the lowest possible contract price, but should always compare it with the minimum, for which the contractor's losses or unfair performance of obligations (bribery of inspectors, etc.) are inevitable. In both, harm was seen to the public interest, and therefore competition in contracts should have had certain limits.

The rear of the Russian army received significant development at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1802, Russia formed War Department, originally called the Ministry military ground forces. The first Minister of War was General of Infantry S.K. Vyazmitinov, who previously headed the Commissariat Department for some time. It was under him that in 1805 the Commissariat and Provision departments were merged into one Quartermaster department. ("Quartermaster" is a word of French origin, meaning: "manager, manager." Today, its English equivalent is heard by hearsay - "manager").

The quartermaster department then did not last long. Contemporaries were unable to appreciate the importance of having a body of centralized management of the material support of the troops. The main blame for the failures in the wars of 1807 with France and 1808-1809 with Sweden was assigned to the commissariat, although at that time the entire military mechanism of the state was stalling. There was no best tradition to see in the rear "scapegoat". True, in the armies, corps and divisions, the quartermasters were nevertheless retained.

Since 1812, the War Ministry included 7 independent departments, including food, commissariat and medical. There has been a significant shift in the field command of the troops. According to the new Regulation, called "Institution for the management of a large active army", the management of the rear was entrusted to the army headquarters. He was obliged, with the participation of the relevant chiefs, to develop plans for providing the army with weapons, ammunition, food, engineering and clothing equipment, salaries, plan the delivery of supply cargo, equip military roads and manage traffic along them, organize medical support, place and move shops, art parks, hospitals. The headquarters, as a governing body, planning both the combat operations of the troops and their supply, subordinated the entire organization of the rear to the interests of supply. The efficiency of the work of the rear was raised to a higher level.

And yet, the issues of organizing the rear and organizing supplies were still divided - now between the quartermaster general and the chief of the main headquarters, who were equally subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief. But important point: the post of duty general was introduced, reporting to the chief of the main staff of the army. This official united, on the one hand, the management of transport support: the director of military communications (also new position- ed.) and, through the general-wagenmeister, an army convoy. And, on the other hand, he was also responsible for organizing the evacuation of the wounded and sick and providing them with medical care.

Half a century later, the idea of ​​the closest consolidation of supply agencies was picked up by the outstanding Russian military reformer D.A. Milyutin. In 1864, the Commissariat and Provisional Departments were again merged into one department - the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Military Ministry. In 1868, the Committee for the Movement of Troops for railways, which by that time had received sufficient distribution. The convoy is replaced by the concept of "commander transport".

Truly a revolution in the theory and practice of military art can be considered the discovery of D.A. Milyutin and his associates, was the organization of the rear of the army in the course of Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878. Changes in the methods of warfare and an increase in the size of the army made it impossible effective organization supply without "rear" unity of command.

Then an extraordinary step was taken - the post of "chief of military communications of the army in the field and commander of the troops located in its rear" was introduced. The commander of the Kiev military district was appointed to this position. The headquarters of the head of the department, the quartermaster, artillery, military medical, engineering in the rear of the army, and the military medical department in the rear of the army were subordinate to him. The rights and obligations of the new official were set out in the "Temporary regulation on the management of military communications of the army in the field and the troops located in its rear." This was the first experience of a real centralization of the leadership of the rear. The territory where the troops "in the rear" were stationed received the status of a military district. The commander of the district, in fact, was the head of the rear of the army in the field. According to the Regulations of 1890 "On the field command of the troops", each active army was to be provided with "its own military district", that is, its own rear.

But still, "rear" as a special term, replenished the military lexicon only in Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905. They began to distinguish between "general" and "nearest" rear. In fact, the first is nothing more than the rear of the front, and the second is the rear of the army. General rear received a kind of autonomy - independence from other officials. The chief commander of the rear of the Manchurian armies was subordinate only to the commander in chief. He was in charge of the logistics department, which, located in Harbin, had at its disposal various units and institutions that performed the functions of supply and evacuation.

The rear, in an understanding close to the present, has developed in the operational-strategic link. The increased number of services, units and institutions of the rear, the volume of tasks for providing, moving personnel and cargo, the wounded and sick, led to a qualitative change in the management system. The headquarters of the operational-strategic association could not digest the rear information. In the person of the head of the rear and his apparatus, a new independent administrative body took place. Logistics, thus, self-determined.

But the new body was not yet in full measure the organizer of the provision of the unification troops. In the front, other bodies and officials were also involved in this. The territorial component in many respects still prevailed over the functional one.

However, the fact remains that an independent rear body has developed! From this moment on, the future can be viewed through the prism of the introduction of the rear - into all links of the military organism - the rear, permanently evolutionary.

The construction of the military and operational rear, in the image and likeness of the model acquired for the front, could not proceed smoothly, if only because of the multivariance possible solutions. For example, a set of armies (in a number of cases this is a "field army"), solving a common operational-strategic task, began to be officially called a front in the First World War. Its supply was managed by the chief supply chief of the armies of the front. Reporting directly to the commander, he, in essence, was the head of the independent rear of the front. But to call it so prevented looking back at the past, or rather, the backlog of the theory of military art. When a concept is vague, it is usually not possible to find the best form of expressing its content, including an organizational one. Not to mention the interpolation of this form to other levels. First World War - bright to that the confirmation. Other units of the rear have not yet gained independence. The management of the rear and supply of the army was concentrated in the stage-economic department of its headquarters. Which in itself is unprecedented! Although the headquarters were periodically in charge of vehicles, issues of the sanitary service, they gave separate instructions on the rear, but the supply services had never been directly subordinate to the headquarters. Also subordinate to the chief of staff was the chief field quartermaster at Headquarters Supreme High Command in the theater of operations, created already during the war.

Unfortunately, this link was not destined to establish a reliable supply link between the fronts and the center, where the complete disunity of the supply departments reigned.

A third scheme operated at the military level: neither at headquarters nor in the rear - the corresponding rear services were not united at all. Their chiefs autonomously closed directly to the commander.

Yes, and in the front-line link there was a retreat from the organization of the rear, suffered through several wars and enshrined in the Regulations on the field command and control of troops in wartime, on which on July 16, 1914, Emperor Nicholas II inscribed: "Be according to this." The head of the VOSO department and the head of the sanitary unit of the front were withdrawn from the Office of the Chief Head of Supply of the Front and reassigned directly to the Commander-in-Chief.

Thus, the advantages and effectiveness of combining supply services, military communications and sanitary services in a single independent rear in 1914-1918 were not realized. It should be noted that after the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917, the rear services were repeatedly reorganized. However, the first and second parts of the Charter of the rear of the Red Army (military and army rear) and the outlines regarding the front rear also differed significantly from the experience of the First World War. The organization of the rear and transportation were entrusted to the headquarters of the front, which was supposed to have a department of military communications (3rd) and a department of rear (5th). The supply services reported directly to the front commander. In the center, coordination of their actions was even less. Enlightenment came in the very first weeks of the Great Patriotic War.

June 30, 1941 Lieutenant General A.V. Khrulev reported in writing to the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov: “The organization of the rear services of the army in the field is in an exceptionally difficult situation. Neither I, as the Chief Quartermaster, nor the Logistics and Supply Directorate of the General Staff, today have any data on the provision of food and quartermaster property to the fronts ... There is also no transportation, since the Main Quartermaster Department does not have data on where and how much it is necessary and possible to deliver.

At the same time, A.V. Khrulev did not dramatize the situation at all. Management of the supply of troops was indeed lost, as well as the leadership of the troops themselves. G.K. Zhukov, at a personal meeting, answered the Chief Quartermaster something like this: "I can't tell you anything, since we don't have any connections with the troops and we don't know what the troops need."

A transport collision arose: operational and supply transportation went to the west, and evacuation from the west. Often the troops were sent what they themselves evacuated. Counter cargo flows kept railways and roads in great tension. By mid-July 1941, the lack of planning and unsystematic dispatch of supply transports, the untimeliness of their unloading, paralyzed many communications. July 14 at intermediate railway stations there were 465 actually abandoned trains without locomotives.

Something urgently needed to be done. The country became a single military camp. The best minds of the commissariat, headed by Andrei Vasilyevich Khrulev, having studied and analyzed the experience of organizing the supply of the Russian army in the First World War, the Red Army during the years of the Civil War and in subsequent hostilities, prepared proposals for the reorganization of the rear of the Red Army, which were initially reported to the Deputy Chairman of the Council People's Commissars USSR, member of the State Defense Committee A.I. Mikoyan, who was in charge of supplying the army.

“The next day,” wrote A.V. Khrulev, “comrade A.I. Mikoyan called me on the phone.

Comrade Khrulev, - he said, - the Supreme Commander-in-Chief has instructed you to prepare a draft decision of the State Defense Committee on organizing the rear of the Red Army.

Representatives of the General Staff and the best workers rear services. And already at the end of July, the draft resolution of the State Defense Committee (O) was ready. The leading employees of the State Defense Committee gathered at I.V. Stalin. After reading the document, Supreme Commander... immediately signed it."

August 1, 1941 he also signed the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 0257 "On the organization of the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army ...", which united the headquarters of the head of the Logistics, the VOSO Directorate, the road administration and the inspection of the head of the Logistics of the Red Army.

The post of Chief of Logistics of the Red Army was introduced, to whom, in addition to the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army, "in all respects" the Main Quartermaster Directorate, the Fuel Supply Directorate, the Sanitary and Veterinary Directorates were also subordinated. The position of chief of logistics was also introduced in fronts and armies. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Lieutenant General of the quartermaster service A.V. Khrulev, his chief of staff - Major General of the quartermaster service P.V. Utkin. Bringing under one head the entire set of supply, medical and transport structures made it possible to establish a complex process of logistical support for the army in the field.

It was this historical fact that was the basis for the preparation of the order of the Minister of Defense No. 225, which "... given the merits of the personnel of the Logistics of the Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War, effective activities in the logistics of combat training of troops and fleet forces in peacetime" on May 7 In 1998, the Day of Logistics of the Armed Forces was established. It is now celebrated annually on August 1st. The choice of date, no doubt, needs no explanation: on August 1, 1941, the actual self-determination of the Logistics of the Armed Forces took place. He appeared as an independent type or branch of the Armed Forces. The fifth anniversary of this event, in particular, was dedicated to the order of the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR dated August 25, 1946 No. 38, signed by I.V. Stalin.

May 1942 was marked by a new step in the development of the Logistics of the Armed Forces. The organizational and planning departments of the fronts and armies were reorganized into the headquarters of the rear management. The positions of deputy rear commanders were introduced in corps and divisions. For questions common organization logistics, supply planning, transportation and evacuation, supply services began to be subordinated to the chief of logistics: artillery, armored, engineering, communications, chemical and others.

Changes did not stop in the future. Under the jurisdiction of the head of the Logistics, they entered, then left various bodies, for example, the Financial Department of the Red Army. Subordinate content structures were reorganized. The number varied.

We had to fight for the integrity of the rear. So, in November 1944, the Fuel Supply Department was transferred to the subordination of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. It returned in 1946 and forever. But the VOSO bodies "got away" for only 36 days. They were resubordinated General Staff in January 1943. The supply began to "slip". And the rash decision was immediately canceled.

The end of the Great Patriotic War did not stop the search for optimal forms of rear organization. In 1946, the People's Commissariats of Defense of the Navy united. In 1953, after the "divorce" of 1950, their new association followed. The home front fully felt the vicissitudes of the restructuring of the top military leadership. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the head of the Logistics of the Armed Forces lost the status of Deputy Minister of Defense. Military communications services and apartment maintenance came out of his subordination. The rear headquarters was disbanded. On its basis, the Directorate of Logistics Services was formed, which returned its staff quality only in 1953.

There were also acquisitions. In 1947, the rear of the airborne troops was formed. He took his rightful place in the same ranks with the rear of the Air Force and Navy, which were formed in the first period of the war. Subsequently, they were joined by the rear of the Air Defense Forces and the Strategic Missile Forces.

In 1956, by decision of the Government, Glavvoentorg was transferred from the Ministry of Trade to the Ministry of Defense, which was merged into the Rear as the Main Department of Trade of the Ministry of Defense.

Completion period of adaptation to conditions peaceful life and overcoming the inevitable spontaneity accompanying it coincided with the coming to the leadership of the Rear of the Marshal of the Soviet Union I.Kh. Bagramyan. Since the end of the 1950s, research in the field of the theory of logistic support has developed widely. In 1964, the Operational Manual was published, and in 1965, on the military rear. The head of the rear again becomes the deputy commander (commander). The long-awaited event, determined by the logic of all previous transformations, is taking place - the concept of the rear is extended to the regimental (brigade) and battalion levels. In regiments (brigades) and battalions, the post of deputy commander of a regiment (brigade), battalion in the rear is being introduced.

Peacetime, in contrast to wartime, grants a certain impunity to the reformist fantasy. And often certain innovations occur not out of necessity, not on the basis of the conclusions of science, but on a whim, under the pressure of subjective factors, sometimes due to interpersonal relationships. That is how one can regard the withdrawal from the Rear of the Armed Forces in 1992 of the military communications and medical services.

By and large, military command and control bodies subordinate to the chief of the Logistics of the Armed Forces, as, indeed, to any other deputy minister of defense, in peacetime, with one degree or another, can function independently. Everything would be fine, but the return of any previously rejected organism takes time. Who can guarantee that it will be released? The Armed Forces must guarantee an immediate rebuff to any aggressor. That is why the governing bodies, to which the name of the rear services was assigned, require a unified, among other things, leadership already in peacetime. Only their totality gives rise to a quality that guarantees the reliability of logistic support. And disunity is like a blow, but not a fist, but a splayed five.

The desire to recreate the former structure, capable of solving the entire range of tasks for the logistic support of troops (forces) with acceptable quality, prompted the leadership of the Ministry of Defense in 1997 to decide to return the military medical service and the VOSO service to the Logistics of the Armed Forces.

Unfortunately, the experience of the past is rarely taken into account. In 1991, the situation of forty years ago was repeated: the head of Logistics in once more lost the status of Deputy Minister. The managerial distance between the Logistics of the Armed Forces and the Minister of Defense has increased, although most of the significant rear issues still required his solution. The efficiency of rear management as well as its quality have declined, but the flow of documents, on the contrary, has increased dramatically. It took three years to return the Chief of Logistics to direct subordination to the Minister of Defense and to the rank of his deputy - back to normal.

Today, the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, being an integral part of the defense potential of the state and a link between the country's economy and the troops directly consuming the manufactured products, is a well-coordinated, effectively operating mechanism. It consists of the headquarters of the Logistics, 9 main and central offices, 3 services, as well as governing bodies, troops and organizations of central subordination, rear structures of the branches and branches of the Armed Forces, military districts and fleets, associations, formations and military units.

Equipping with modern samples of material and technical means allows the rear structures in a timely manner and in in full to provide the troops with everything they need when they solve complex and responsible tasks related to maintaining the state's defense capability at the proper level.

In recent years, the rear has worked steadily. All measures stipulated by the Plan for the Construction and Development of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for 2001-2005 and other documents have been carried out.

Today, the Logistics of the Armed Forces in the interests of the troops solves a whole range of tasks, the main of which are: economic complex countries of stocks of materiel and rear equipment, storage and provision of troops (forces) with them; planning and organizing, together with the transport ministries and departments, the preparation, operation, technical cover, restoration of communications and vehicles; transportation of all types of material means; implementation of operational, supply and other types of military transportation, provision of basing of aviation and naval forces; technical support of troops (forces) for rear services; organization and implementation of medical and evacuation, sanitary and anti-epidemic (preventive) measures, medical protection personnel from weapons of mass destruction and adverse environmental factors, carrying out veterinary and sanitary measures and activities of the rear services for the NBC protection of troops (forces); monitoring the organization and condition of fire protection and local defense of troops (forces), assessing the environmental situation in the places of deployment of troops (forces), forecasting its development and monitoring the implementation of measures to protect personnel from environmentally harmful effects of natural and man-made nature; commercial and household, apartment-operational and financial support; protection and defense of communications and rear facilities in the rear zones, organization of camps (reception points) for prisoners of war (hostages), their registration and support; providing work on exhumation, identification, burial and reburial of servicemen.

The main efforts of the Logistics of the Armed Forces are aimed at:

  • ensuring combat and mobilization readiness, daily life of troops (forces), as well as activities military reform Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;
  • implementation of the measures of the Plan for the transition to an interdepartmental unified (interconnected) system of logistics support for the Armed Forces and other troops, military formations and organs;
  • implementation of measures to implement the concept of military construction of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;
  • optimization of the system of separation of food stocks, accumulation and organization of complete storage of clothing items, as well as the continuation of work on laying fuel into the Transnefteprodukt system;
  • logistic support of the OGV (s) in North Caucasus region, as well as formations and units of constant readiness and peacekeeping forces;
  • accumulation and delivery of materiel to garrisons Far North, including military units and organizations of federal executive bodies;
  • carrying out measures to ensure the safety of material assets.

In addition, there are such important tasks as basing aviation and naval forces; commercial and consumer services for military personnel, members of their families and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces. Considerable attention is also paid to the quality service for family vacations of military personnel on the existing material base of military tourism.

To solve these tasks, the Logistics of the Armed Forces in its composition includes special troops (automobile, road, pipeline), formations and parts of material support, medical formations, units and institutions, stationary bases and warehouses with appropriate supplies of materiel, transport commandant's offices, veterinary and sanitary, repair, agricultural, commercial and household and other institutions.

No matter what tasks throughout the history of the country the Armed Forces have faced, whether it is repelling enemy aggression in the harsh war years, in the post-war period - the creation of a nuclear missile shield, the fleet's entry into the oceans, strengthening state borders, the actions of units in the so-called "hot spots" and peacekeeping operations - the rear services, in close unity with the command, have always done and are doing everything in their power to ensure that the troops and forces of the fleet have everything they need to perform their tasks. After all, the overall result of hostilities and, ultimately, the life of the fighters depend on how ready the rear services are to clearly fulfill their functions.

Ensuring the daily activities of the troops, the structures of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must daily provide everything necessary not only for military personnel, but also for military equipment; provide life support for military garrisons and carry out a number of other activities in accordance with the tasks set.

RELATED ARTICLES