And the republican system was established. This was the impetus to start civil war between various socio-political and nationalist forces of the country.
In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party (PDPA) came to power in Afghanistan. The radicalism of the new Afghan leadership, the hasty breaking of the centuries-old traditions of the people and the foundations of Islam, increased the resistance of the population to the central government. The situation was complicated by foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The USSR and some other countries provided assistance to the Afghan government, while NATO countries, Muslim states and China provided assistance to the opposition forces.
By the end of 1979, the situation in the country had deteriorated sharply, and the threat of the overthrow of the ruling regime loomed. In this regard, the government Democratic Republic Afghanistan (DRA) repeatedly appealed to the USSR with a request to send military units to the country. The Soviet side at first rejected this form of intervention, but, in the context of the aggravation of the Afghan crisis, on December 12, 1979, the leadership of the USSR, fearing the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the Central Asian republics, decided to send troops to provide military assistance to the government of Afghanistan. The decision was made at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU in accordance with Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan "Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation", concluded on December 5, 1978, and formalized by a secret decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was considered by the political leadership of the USSR as a short-term measure aimed at ensuring the security of the southern borders of the Soviet Union.
The main task of the limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) was to create a "cordon sanitaire" near the borders of the USSR in the face of the impending threat of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism on the territory of the Soviet Muslim republics.
On December 16, 1979, an order was given to separate the field administration of the 40th Army from the administration of the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO) and its full mobilization. First Deputy Commander of the TurkVO troops, Lieutenant General Yuri Tukharinov, was appointed commander of the army. Formations and units of the 40th Army were fully mobilized 10-12 days before the entry.
The introduction and placement of OKSV in the DRA was carried out from December 25, 1979. By mid-January 1980, the entry of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. Three divisions (two motorized rifle and one airborne), an air assault brigade, two separate regiments and other units were introduced into the territory of Afghanistan.
Subsequently, the combat composition of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was constantly refined in order to strengthen it. The largest number OKSV (1985) amounted to 108.7 thousand people, including 73.6 thousand people in combat units. The composition of the OKSV mainly included: the command of the 40th Army, three motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, nine separate brigades and seven separate regiments, four front-line regiments and two army aviation regiments, as well as rear, medical, repair, construction and other units and subunits.
The general management of the OKSV was carried out by the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was headed by Marshal of the USSR Sergei Sokolov, since 1985 - General of the Army Valentin Varennikov. The direct control of the combat and daily activities of the OKSV was carried out by the commander of the 40th Army, who was subordinate to the command of the troops of the TurkVO.
Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded and defended national economic facilities, airfields, roads vital for the country, carried out convoys with cargo through the territory controlled by the armed opposition.
To reduce the military activity of the opposition, the OKSV conducted active military operations of various scales using the entire arsenal of conventional weapons, and launched air strikes on opposition bases. In accordance with the decision of the political leadership of the USSR Soviet troops in response to numerous shelling of their garrisons and transport columns by opposition detachments, they began to carry out jointly with Afghan units fighting to search for and eliminate the most aggressive enemy armed groups. Thus, the Soviet troops introduced into Afghanistan became involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the country's government against the opposition forces, which received the most assistance from Pakistan.
The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conditionally divided into four stages.
Stage 1: December 1979 - February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of the protection of deployment points and various objects.
Stage 2: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA.
Stage 3: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations mainly to supporting the actions of the Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special Forces units fought to prevent the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. Six Soviet regiments were withdrawn to their homeland.
Stage 4: January 1987 - February 1989. The participation of Soviet troops in the conduct of the policy by the Afghan leadership national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparation of Soviet troops for their return to their homeland and the implementation of their complete withdrawal.
Even after the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, the USSR continued to seek opportunities for a political solution to the intra-Afghan conflict. From August 1981, he tried to ensure the negotiation process of the DRA with Pakistan and Iran, from April 1986 - to promote a systemic policy of national reconciliation.
On April 14, 1988 in Geneva (Switzerland), representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA signed five fundamental documents on the settlement of the political situation around Afghanistan. These agreements regulated the process of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and declared international guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the republic, under which the USSR and the USA assumed obligations. Were installed deadlines the withdrawal of Soviet troops: half of the limited contingent was withdrawn by August 15, 1988, the rest of the units - after another six months.
On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of OKSV began, which ended on February 15, 1989. The withdrawal of troops was led by the last commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.
About 620,000 servicemen completed military service in Afghanistan, including 525,200 people in the OKSV.
The losses of the military personnel of the 40th Army were: killed and dead - 13,833 people, including 1979 officers and generals, wounded - 49,985 people. During the hostilities in Afghanistan, in addition, 572 military personnel were killed state security, 28 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, as well as 190 military advisers, including 145 officers. 172 officers stopped their service in the Armed Forces due to injuries. 6,669 "Afghans" became disabled, including 1,479 disabled people of the first group.
For military and other services, over 200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 86 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 28 of them posthumously.
(Additional
Soviet war in Afghanistan 1979-1989
Completed by: Bukov G.E.
Introduction
Afghan war 1979-1989 - An armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied forces of the USSR, who sought to maintain a pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.
Of course, this period is not the most positive in the history of the USSR, but I wanted to open a little curtain in this war, namely, the causes and main tasks for the USSR to eliminate the military conflict in Afghanistan.
1. Reason for hostilities
The main reason for the war was foreign intervention in the Afghan domestic political crisis, which was the result of a struggle for power between the government of Afghanistan and numerous armed formations of the Afghan Mujahideen (“dushmans”), who enjoy the political and financial support of the leading NATO states and Islamic world, on the other side.
The internal political crisis in Afghanistan was the "April Revolution" - the events in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, which resulted in the establishment of a Marxist pro-Soviet government in the country.
As a result of the April Revolution, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, the leader of which was in 1978. Nur Mohammad Taraki (was killed on the orders of Hafizullah Amin), and then Hafizullah Amin until December 1979, who proclaimed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would make it possible to overcome the backlog of Afghanistan ran into resistance from the Islamic opposition. In 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war broke out in Afghanistan.
Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. The unrest in the country and the strife between the supporters of Khalq and Parcham (the PDPA was divided into these two parts), taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and protecting the Central Asian republics), pushed the Soviet leadership to enter in December 1979 troops to Afghanistan under the pretext of providing international assistance. The entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Afghanistan began on the basis of a decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, without a formal decision on this by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan
In March 1979, during the mutiny in the city of Herat, the first request from the Afghan leadership for direct Soviet military intervention followed. But the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Afghanistan reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.
However, the Herat rebellion forced the strengthening of Soviet troops near the Soviet-Afghan border, and by order of the Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing in Afghanistan by the landing method of the 105th Guards Airborne Division. The number of Soviet advisers (including military ones) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979.
The impetus for the intervention of the USSR was US assistance to the Mujahideen. According to official version history, CIA assistance to the Mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until today, is different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on covert assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979.
In December 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Faizabad.
The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan, and the procedure for using weapons even for self-defense was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov issued an order to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would become garrisons and guard important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active operations against opposition groups, as well as against possible outside interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, on the hover pontoon bridge the 4th battalion of the 56th guards crossed the border river Amu Darya air assault brigade, who was given the task of capturing the high mountain pass Salang on the Termez - Kabul road in order to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops. On the same day, the transfer of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. Paratroopers of the 350th Guards Airborne Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.I. were the first to land on the Kabul airfield. Shpak.
The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar. Entering troops is not easy; During the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul, Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was killed. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.
Operation STORM-333
The general plan of the operation in Kabul, carried out on December 27, was developed by the dishonest efforts of representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the KGB of the USSR, headed by Major Y. Semenov. The plan of the operation, which received the code name "Baikal-79", provided for the capture of the most important objects in the Afghan capital: the Taj-Bek Palace, the buildings of the Central Committee of the PDPA, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Communications of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, General Staff, the headquarters of the air force and the headquarters of the Central army corps, military counterintelligence(KAM), a prison for political prisoners in Puli-Charkhi, a radio and television center, a post office and a telegraph office, an air force and air defense headquarters ... At the same time, it was planned to block the military units and formations of the DRA Armed Forces located in the Afghan capital by the forces of paratroopers of motorized rifle troops arriving in Kabul. In total, 17 objects were to be captured. Appropriate forces and means were assigned to each object, the order of interaction and control was determined.
In fact, by the beginning of the operation in Kabul there were special units of the KGB of the USSR ("Thunder" - a little more than 30 people, "Zenith" - 150 people, a company of border guards - 50 people), as well as quite significant forces from the USSR Ministry of Defense: air Airborne Division, 154th Detachment special purpose GRU General Staff ("Muslim" battalion), units of the 345th separate parachute regiment, military advisers (a total of more than 10 thousand people). All of them performed their tasks, worked for final result operations.
The most difficult and important object to capture was the Taj Beck Palace, where the residence of H. Amin was located and he himself was located. Of all the officers and soldiers who took part in the storming of the Taj Beck Palace, almost no one fully knew the plan of the operation and did not own the general situation, and each acted in his own narrow area, in fact, in the role of a simple fighter.
Therefore, for most of them, the events in Kabul focused only on their object, and for many fighters, the operation is still a mystery. For most of them, it was a "baptism of fire" - the first real battle in their lives. Hence the overlap of emotions in the memories, the "thickening" of colors. Finding themselves in an extreme situation, each of them showed what he was worth and what he had achieved. The vast majority honorably complied combat missionshowing heroism and courage. Many officers and soldiers were wounded, some died.
On the evening of December 25, General Drozdov, based on the results of reconnaissance of objects, held a meeting with the commanders of reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the KGB of the USSR, determined the place of each in mastering the Taj Beck. Everyone was ready, the situation was missing only the plan of the palace.
The officers of "Thunder" and "Zenith" M. Romanov, Y. Semenov, V. Fedoseev and E. Mazaev carried out reconnaissance of the area, reconnaissance of firing points located nearby. Not far from the palace, on a high-rise, there was a restaurant (casino), where the highest officers of the Afghan army usually gathered. Under the pretext that it is required to order places for our officers to celebrate the New Year, the commandos also visited there. From there, the Taj Beck was visible at a glance, all the approaches to it and the location of the storage posts were clearly visible. True, this initiative almost ended tragically for them.
By the beginning of Operation Storm-333, special forces from the KGB groups of the USSR thoroughly knew the object of the capture of Hadj-Bek: the most convenient ways approach; sentry mode services; total number protection and bodyguards of Amin; the location of machine-gun "nests", armored vehicles and tanks; the internal structure of the rooms of the labyrinths of the palace; placement of radiotelephone communication equipment.
Signals to start general operation"Baikal-79" was supposed to serve as a powerful explosion in the center of Kabul. The special group of the KGB of the USSR "Zenith" headed by B.A. Pleshkunov was supposed to blow up the so-called "well" - in fact, a neutral node for secret communications with the most important military and civilian facilities of the DRA.
Assault ladders, equipment, weapons and ammunition were being prepared. Under the leadership of the deputy battalion commander for the technical part, senior lieutenant Eduard Ibragimov, Glaznoye's military equipment was carefully checked and prepared - secrecy and secrecy.
The Taj Beck Palace was located on a high, steep hill overgrown with trees and shrubs, all approaches to it were mined. There was only one road, guarded around the clock. The palace itself was also an inaccessible building. Its thick walls are able to hold back an artillery strike. If we add to this that the area around was shot through from tanks and heavy machine guns, it becomes clear that it was very difficult to master it.
At about six o'clock in the evening, Kolesnik was called by Colonel-General Magomedov and said, "Due to unforeseen circumstances, the time of the assault has been postponed, it is necessary to start as soon as possible" and the operation began ahead of schedule. Literally fifteen or twenty minutes later, the capture group, led by Captain M. Sakhatov, drove off in the direction of the height where the tanks were buried. Among them were two officers of "Thunder" and "Zenith", as well as the head of intelligence of the battalion, Senior Lieutenant A. Jamolov. The tanks were guarded by sentries, and their crews were in the barracks, located at a distance of 150-200 meters from them.
When the car of M. Sakhatov's group drove up to the location of the third battalion, they suddenly heard shooting, which suddenly intensified. Colonel Kolesnik for soldiers and officers of the "Muslim" battalion and special groups of the KGB of the USSR immediately put the command "Fire!" and "Forward!" Red rockets flew into the air. It was 19:15 on the clock. The signal "Storm-333" was sent over the radio networks.
First, on the command of Senior Lieutenant Vasily Praut, two self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 "Shilki" opened fire on the palace, bringing down a sea of shells on it. Two other installations hit the location of the infantry battalion, supporting a company of paratroopers. Automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 began to fire at the location of the tank battalion, preventing the crews from approaching the vehicles.
Subdivisions of the "Muslim" battalion began to advance to the areas of destination. The 3rd company of senior lieutenant Vladimir Sharipov was supposed to advance to the Taj-bek palace, on its five infantry fighting vehicles, several subgroups of special forces officers from Grom were stationed together with soldiers Major Ya. Semenov with the Zenit group on four armored personnel carriers of the platoon The 1st company of Lieutenant Rustam Tursunkulov was supposed to advance to the western part of the hill. Then, on a pedestrian staircase, jump up to the end of the Taj Beck, and at the facade of the building, both groups were to connect and act together. But in last moment everything is mixed up. As soon as the first armored personnel carrier passed the turn and drove up to the stairs leading to the end of the Taj Beck, heavy machine guns fired from the building. The armored personnel carrier, where there was a subgroup of Boris Suvorov, was immediately knocked out, it caught fire. The personnel immediately began to parachute, some were injured. The commander of the subgroup himself was hit in the groin, just below the bulletproof vest. It was not possible to save him - he bled to death. Having jumped out of the armored personnel carriers, the "Zenit" and the soldiers of Tursunkulov's platoon were forced to lie down and shoot at the windows of the palace, with the help of assault ladders they began to climb up the mountain.
At this time, the subgroups of "Thunder" also began to advance towards the Taj Beck.
When the machine gunners of the group jumped out onto the platform in front of the Taj Beck, they came under heavy fire from heavy machine guns. It seemed like they were shooting from everywhere. Grom employees rushed to the palace building, and the soldiers of Sharipov's company lay down and began to cover them with machine gun and machine gun fire, as well as repel the attack of Afghan soldiers in the guardroom. The commander of the platoon, Lieutenant Abdullayev, supervised their actions. Something unimaginable happened. Hell picture. "Shilki" after all "beautifully" shoot. Everything was mixed up. But everyone acted in unison, there was not a single one who would try to evade or sit in a shelter, waiting out the assault. The number of assault groups was dwindling before our eyes. With incredible efforts, the special forces still managed to overcome the resistance of the Afghans and break through to the palace building. The fighters of the “Muslim” battalion rendered them great help in this. All groups and fighters mixed up, and everyone was already acting on their own. There was no single team. The only goal was to run faster to the walls of the palace, somehow hide behind them and complete the task. The commandos were in a foreign country, in a foreign uniform, without documents, without any identification marks, except for white bandages on their sleeves, there was nothing. The density of fire was such that the triplexes on all BMPs were broken, the bulwarks were pierced on each square centimeter, that is, they looked like a colander. The special forces were saved only by the fact that they were all in bulletproof vests, although almost all of them were wounded. The soldiers from the "Muslim" battalion were without bulletproof vests, as at the command of Koslesnik they handed over their bulletproof vests to the fighters of the assault groups. Of the thirty "Zenit" and twenty-two fighters from the "Thunder" in Taj Beck, no more than twenty-five people managed to break through, and many of them were injured. These forces were clearly not enough to guarantee the elimination of Amin. According to Alexander Ivashchenko, who was next to Colonel Boyarinov during the battle, when they broke into the palace and met the stubborn resistance of the guards, they realized that they could not complete the task with small forces. By the time the special forces entered the Shilki palace, they were supposed to cease fire, but contact with them was lost. Colonel V. Kolesnik sent a messenger, and “Shilki transferred the fire to other objects. The infantry fighting vehicles left the area in front of the palace, blocking the only road. Another company and a platoon of AGS-17 grenade launchers and ATGMs fired at the tank battalion, then the soldiers captured the tanks, disarming the tankers at the same time. The special group of the "Muslim" battalion took possession of the weapons of the anti-aircraft regiment, and captured its personnel. In the palace, officers and soldiers of Amin's personal guard, his bodyguards (about 100-150 people) resisted staunchly, not surrendering. They were killed by the fact that they were all armed mainly with MG-5 submachine guns, and they did not penetrate our body armor.
"Shilki" again shifted the fire, starting to hit the Taj-Bek, on the site in front of him. A fire broke out on the second floor of the palace, which had strong impact on the defending guards. As the special forces moved to the second floor, the shooting and explosions intensified. The soldiers from Amin's guard, who mistook the commandos for their own rebellious unit, heard Russian speech and surrendered to them. There were lights everywhere in the palace. All attempts by Nikolai Shvachko to turn it off ended in vain. The power supply was autonomous. Somewhere in the depths of the building, perhaps in the basement, electric generators were working, but there was no time to look for them. Some fighters fired at the light bulbs in order to somehow hide, because they were in full view of the defenders of the palace. By the end of the assault, only a few of the anti-aircraft devices remained intact, but they were on fire. The battle in the palace did not last long (43 minutes). Having received information about the death of Amin, the company commander, Senior Lieutenant V. Sharipov, also began to call Colonel V. Kolesnik on the radio station to report on the completion of the task, but there was no communication. He nevertheless managed to contact the battalion's chief of staff, Ashurov, and allegorically report that Amin had been killed. The chief of staff informed the battalion commander Major Khalbaev and Colonel Kolesnik about this. Major Khalbaev reported on the capture of the palace and the liquidation of Amin to Lieutenant General N.N. Guskov, and he - to the Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov. After Assadul Sarvari, who arrived at the palace (he did not participate in the assault), made sure and confirmed that Amin was really dead, the corpse of the head of state and the leader of the PDPA was wrapped in a carpet ... The main task was completed. Success in this operation was ensured not so much by strength as by surprise, audacity and swiftness of pressure. Immediately after the capture of the Taj-Bek, Drozdov reported to Ivanov on the completion of the task, and then handed over the radio station to Evald Kozlov and ordered the results of the battle to be reported to the leadership. When Kozlov, who had not yet retired from the battle, began to report to General Ivanov, he interrupted him with the question “What oak ? Ewald began to choose words to covertly say about the death of Amin, but Ivanov again asked: "Is he killed?" Kozlov replied: "Yes, he was killed." And the general immediately interrupted the connection. Yu.V. had to be urgently reported to Moscow. Andropov about the implementation main task, and a group of Captain M. Sakhatov arrived at the palace building in two tanks captured from the Afghans. He reported to Kolesnik about the accomplishment of the combat mission, said: when they drove past the third battalion of the security brigade, they saw that an alarm had been declared there. Afghan soldiers received ammunition. The battalion commander and two more officers were standing next to the road along which the special forces were passing. The decision came quickly. Having jumped out of the car, they captured the Afghan battalion commander and both officers, threw them into the car, and drove on. Some of the soldiers, who managed to get the cartridges, opened fire on them. Then the whole battalion rushed in pursuit - to free their commander. Then the commandos dismounted, began to shoot from machine guns and machine guns at the fleeing infantry. The fighters of Kurban Amangeldiyev’s company, which provided the actions of the Sakhatov group, also opened fire. tank brigade. But this did not happen. Soviet military advisers who worked in parts of the Afghan army, and units deployed to the capital airborne troops didn't let them do it. In addition, the special services paralyzed the control of the Afghan forces in advance. Some units of the Afghan Guard Brigade continued to resist. In particular, they had to fight with the remnants of the third battalion for another day, after which the Afghans went to the mountains. Probably, some of the compatriots also suffered from their own: in the dark, the personnel of the "Muslim" battalion and the special group of the KGB of the USSR recognized each other by white bandages on their sleeves, the password "Misha - Yasha" and by obscenities. But after all, everyone was dressed in Afghan uniforms, and they had to shoot and throw grenades from a decent distance. So try to keep track here in the dark, confusion - who has a bandage on his sleeve, and who does not ?! Moreover, when they began to withdraw the captured Afghans, they also had white armbands on their sleeves. After the battle, the losses were counted. In total, five people died in the special groups of the KGB of the USSR during the storming of the palace. Almost everyone was wounded, but those who could hold weapons in their hands continued to fight. In the "Muslim" battalion and the 9th airborne company, 14 people died, more than 50 were injured. Moreover, 23 people who were injured remained in the ranks. The seriously wounded soldiers of the battalion were taken to the BMP, first to the first-aid post, and then to various medical institutions deployed at that time in Kabul. In the evening, the seriously wounded were transported to the Soviet embassy, and in the morning of the next day they were sent by plane to Tashkent. On the same day, December 27, the airborne units of the 103rd division and units of the 345th regiment, as well as the forces allocated to help them from the border guards, the KGB groups of the USSR "Zenith" and "Thunder" went to the location military units and compounds, important administrative and special facilities in the capital and established their control over them. The capture of these key objects was organized, with minimal losses.
The course of the war
The Soviet command expected to entrust the suppression of the uprising to the Kabul troops, which, however, were greatly weakened by mass desertion and failed to cope with this task. A "limited contingent" controlled the situation in the main cities for a number of years, while the rebels felt relatively free in countryside. Changing tactics, the Soviet troops tried to crack down on the rebels with tanks, helicopters and planes, but the highly mobile Mujahideen groups easily avoided attacks. Bombardment settlements and the destruction of crops also failed, but by 1982, about 4 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran. The supply of weapons from other countries allowed the partisans to hold out until 1989, when the new Soviet leadership withdrew troops from Afghanistan.
The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conditionally divided into four stages: stage: December 1979 - February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects. stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active hostilities mainly to supporting the actions of the Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special Forces units fought to prevent the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place. Stage: January 1987 - February 1989 Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparation of Soviet troops for their return to their homeland and the implementation of their complete withdrawal.
afghanistan war soviet contingent
5. Conclusion Soviet wars from Afghanistan
Changes during foreign policy Soviet leadership during the period of "perestroika" contributed to the political settlement of the situation. The situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Western forecasts that the Kabul regime would fall immediately after the end of the Soviet military presence due to its complete unviability, and the coalition government of the Mujahideen groups would lead the country to peace after the "communist plague" was expelled, turned out to be untenable. On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the USSR, the USA, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the Geneva Accords on a phased peaceful solution of the Afghan problem. Soviet government pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. This event did not bring peace, as the various factions of the Mujahideen continued to fight for power among themselves.
According to updated official data, irretrievable losses personnel Soviet army in the Afghan war amounted to 14,427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. During the war, there were 49,984 wounded, 312 prisoners, and 18 internees. Injuries and contusions were received by St. 53 thousand people. A significant number of people who were admitted to hospitals on the territory of the USSR died from the consequences of severe wounds and injuries. These persons, who died in hospitals, were not among the officially announced casualties. Exact number Afghans who died in the war are unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.
Consequences of the war
After the withdrawal of the Soviet army from the territory of Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet regime of Najibullah (1986-1992) existed for another 3 years and, having lost the support of Russia, was overthrown in April 1992 by a coalition of Mujahideen field commanders. During the war years, the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda appeared in Afghanistan and groups of Islamic radicals became stronger.
Political implications:
In general, Soviet troops did not experience any particular difficulties in conducting military operations on the territory of Afghanistan - the main problem was that military victories were not supported by the political and economic actions of the ruling regime. Assessing the consequences of the Afghan war, it can be noted that the benefits of the intervention turned out to be negligible in comparison with the damage inflicted on the national interests of the USSR and Russia. The intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan provoked sharp condemnation from most of the international community (including the United States, China, member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, including Pakistan and Iran, and even some socialist countries), weakened the influence of the USSR on the Non-Aligned Movement, marked the end of the "era of detente The 1970s led to increased economic and technological pressure on the USSR from the West and even to some extent exacerbated the crisis in the USSR itself.
The war in Afghanistan led to numerous casualties, squandered huge material resources, destabilized the situation in Central Asia, contributed to the strengthening of Islam in politics, the intensification of Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism. In fact, this war was one of the factors behind the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. If we talk about a lesson, then the Afghan people really taught us a lesson of courage and valor in the struggle for their age-old traditions, culture, religion, and Motherland. And every valor should be glorified and admired even by the enemy. The main conclusion drawn from the Afghan war is that fundamentally political problems cannot be solved by military means.
Information sources
1. ru.wikipedia.org - article "Afghan war 1979-1989" in Wikipedia;
History.org.ua - article "The Afghan War 1979-1989" in the Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine (Ukrainian);
Mirslovarei.com - article "Afghan War" in the Historical Dictionary on the site "World of Dictionaries";
Rian.ru - "War in Afghanistan 1979-1989" (RIAN reference);
Rian.ru - "Statistics of losses Soviet army in Afghanistan does not include those who died from wounds in hospitals in the USSR” (RIAN report).
Alexander Lyakhovsky - The tragedy and valor of Afghanistan
Psi.ece.jhu.edu - secret documents the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU associated with the entry of Soviet troops and their stay in Afghanistan;
Ruswar.com - archive of military photography and video chronicles;
Fergananews.com - "The full truth about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan has not yet been revealed" (B. Yamshanov).
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Assessment of the situation. More and more reports came from Kabul with requests from H. Amin to bring Soviet troops into the DRA, as well as with assessments of the situation in Afghanistan. Moreover, representatives of various departments often gave conflicting information.
The strategic situation in the Near and Middle East in the late 1970s. was not in favor of the Soviet Union. The Camp David peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, the defeat of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the elections, the military coup in Iraq, the Islamic revolution in Iran significantly weakened the Soviet position in the region. In this regard, the possibility of losing Afghanistan, which had "taken the socialist path of development," was perceived extremely painfully by the Soviet leadership.
According to Soviet analysts of that time, the events in the DRA became part of the world revolutionary process, and the leadership of the USSR was recommended to prevent the export of counter-revolution and to assist the "healthy forces" of Afghanistan in protecting the revolutionary gains. This position was in tune with the mood of the Soviet leaders. It seemed too tempting to have on their own southern borders a reliable ally linked to the Soviet Union by a common ideology and interests. But H. Amin seemed to be a man capable of reorienting himself to the West at any moment. This development was the most feared. Changes in exchange rates in Egypt, Chile, Somalia were still fresh in my memory ... And then "information" surfaced about Amin's involvement in the CIA.
Gradually, the idea arose to eliminate H. Amin and replace him with a more loyal figure. At that time, the leader of the Parcham faction, B. Karmal, was already in Moscow. According to experts, he enjoyed the support of a certain part of the Afghan party members and the population. Therefore, he was asked to lead the struggle to overthrow the regime of H. Amin.
Andropov's letter. In early December, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yu.V. Andropov wrote to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. A letter to Brezhnev, in which he described the situation in Afghanistan as critical and proposed measures to ensure the protection of our interests in this region. Obviously, this letter gave a new impetus to the discussion and elaboration of the question of the need for Soviet troops to enter Afghanistan.
The leadership of the USSR came to the conclusion that without the Soviet troops it would be very difficult to create conditions for the removal of Amin from power. There was also no guarantee that afghan army will support B. Karmal and his new government. And even if he manages to seize power, will he be able to repel the attacks of the armed opposition?
Last meeting. On December 8, a meeting was held in Brezhnev's office, in which narrow circle members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU: Yu.V. Andropov, A.A. Gromyko, M.A. Suslov and D.F. Ustinov. They discussed the situation in Afghanistan and around it for a long time, weighed all the pros and cons of bringing Soviet troops there. Yu.V. Andropov and D.F. Ustinov cited the following arguments in defense of such a move: the efforts allegedly made by the US CIA (Paul Henzi, resident in Ankara) to create a “new Great Ottoman Empire» with the inclusion of the southern republics from the USSR; absence in the south reliable system air defense, that in the case of the deployment of American Pershing missiles in Afghanistan, many vital facilities, including the Baikonur Cosmodrome, were endangered; possibility of using Afghan uranium deposits Pakistan and Iraq to create nuclear weapons, the establishment of opposition power in the northern regions of Afghanistan and the annexation of this region to Pakistan. As a result, they decided to work out two options: to eliminate Kh. Amin by the KGB special services and transfer power in Afghanistan to B. Karmal; send a certain number of troops to Afghan territory for the same purposes.
The surprise of General Ogarkov. December 10, 1979 Minister of Defense of the USSR D.F. Ustinov summoned the Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov and informed him that the Politburo had made a preliminary decision to temporarily send Soviet troops into Afghanistan, and set the task of training 75-80 thousand people. N.V. Ogarkov was surprised by this decision, saying that 75 thousand people would not stabilize the situation and he was against the introduction of troops, as this was recklessness. But the minister besieged him: “Are you going to teach the Politburo? All you have to do is follow orders…”
On the same day, N.V. Ogarkov was urgently summoned to the office of L.I. Brezhnev, where the so-called "small Politburo" (Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov) gathered. The Chief of the General Staff again tried to convince those present that the Afghan problem must be solved by political means, and not rely on forceful methods. He referred to the traditions of the Afghans, who did not tolerate foreigners on their territory, and warned of the likelihood of our troops being drawn into hostilities, but everything turned out to be in vain.
Board of the Ministry of Defense. In the evening D.F. Ustinov gathered a collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense and said that in the near future, obviously, a decision would be made on the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and it was necessary to prepare an appropriate grouping. Directive G 312/12/00133 was sent to the troops. Starting from December 10, D.F. Ustinov began to give oral instructions to the Chief of the General Staff on the formation of a new combined arms army in the Turkestan military district, in particular, to prepare an airborne division for landing, a separate parachute regiment, increase the combat readiness of two divisions in the Turkestan military district, resupply to full staff pontoon-bridge regiment in the Kiev military district and send it to the Termez region. All activities were carried out in secret.
The Politburo inclined towards the use of troops even more confidently after receiving from Kabul a report from a representative of the KGB of the USSR with negative assessment situation in Afghanistan. The report said that the Afghan leadership's requests for help had real grounds. The threat of collapse hung over the country's Marxist regime. The sober assessments of the situation by Soviet military leaders were regarded by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU as a misunderstanding or underestimation of the political importance of the processes taking place in Afghanistan.
The last straw that tipped the scales in favor of sending troops to Afghanistan was the decision of the NATO foreign and defense ministers at a meeting in Brussels on December 12, which approved the scenario for deploying new American cruise and Pershing-2 medium-range missiles in Western Europe. These missiles could hit almost all European part territory of the USSR.
Final decision. It was on that day - December 12 - that it was accepted final decision bring Soviet troops into Afghanistan. In the Special Folder of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the protocol of this meeting of the Politburo, written by the secretary of the Central Committee K.U. Chernenko. It can be seen from the protocol that the initiators of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan were Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko. All members of the Politburo voted unanimously for the introduction of troops. However, noteworthy is the absence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin, who was categorically against the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. Either he himself chose not to appear at the meeting, or he was advised to do so, or the meeting was held without his knowledge. The latter still looks unlikely.
Cipher telegrams. The cipher telegrams that came later from Afghanistan, as it were, confirmed the correctness of the steps taken by the leadership of the USSR in relation to Afghanistan. According to a representative of the KGB of the USSR, Kh. Amin, during meetings with him on December 12 and 17, said that the Afghan leadership would welcome the presence of the Soviet Armed Forces in a number of strategically important points in the northern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The forms and methods of providing military assistance should be determined by the Soviet side.
The then leadership of the CPSU did not consider it necessary to make such important question like bringing troops into neighboring country, for discussion government agencies authorities - the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Neither a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, nor a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, nor any other document on the issue of bringing in troops was adopted. All instructions were given orally, motivated by the need to ensure and mislead H. Amin.
official reason. The officially proclaimed goal of the Soviet military presence in the DRA was formulated unequivocally - to assist in stabilizing the situation and repel possible aggression from outside. Soviet troops were supposed to stand in garrisons and not get involved in internal conflict and fighting. They were ordered to protect local population from gangs, as well as distribute food, fuel and basic necessities. It was believed that the very presence of Soviet troops would be a powerful stabilizing factor, significantly strengthen the PDPA regime, have a deterrent effect on the opposition movement and ensure stability military-political situation in Afghanistan. At the same time, it was emphasized that if the introduction of troops did happen, then it would be of a short-term nature.
At the same time, he hushed up the most important fact that the first task that our troops will have to solve will be the overthrow and elimination of Kh. Amin and his replacement by the Soviet protege B. Karmal. Consequently, the reference to the fact that the entry of Soviet troops into Afghan territory was carried out at the request of the legitimate government of the DRA is hardly justified.
In general, the decision of the Soviet leadership to send troops to the DRA was made without an appropriate analysis of the situation and a forecast of the development of the situation, an assessment of the causes, nature, scale and methods of resolving the conflict, and also without setting clear general political and strategic goals. As a result, Afghanistan for the Soviet Union became a "quagmire" like the one Vietnam was for the United States.
In 1979, the USSR sent its troops into Afghanistan. Many people ask the question - why did the leadership of the Soviet Union do this? The main reason is to stop the development of a civil war in neighboring Afghanistan and support the supporters of socialism. But did anyone push the USSR into an armed conflict?
Recall that in 1979, the leadership of the USSR, in order to stop the development of a civil war in neighboring Afghanistan, introduced limited contingent troops. This caused a strong reaction in the West: in particular, as a sign of protest, the United States and some other countries announced a boycott of the Moscow Olympics, which took place in 1980. The Soviet side in this war lost about 15,000 soldiers.
One of the US leaders of that time tells us the truth. He tells that the Americans lured the USSR to Afghanistan.
The CIA appeared in Afghanistan before the Russians
1998 archived interview with President Carter's adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski
about how the US provoked Soviet Union for intervention in Afghanistan. 
Nouvel Observater (French weekly magazine): Former CIA director Robert Gates writes in his memoirs that US intelligence agencies began helping the mujahideen in Afghanistan six months before Soviet troops entered. At the time, you were US President Carter's adviser on national security, you were in the know. Do you confirm the words of Gates?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version, the CIA began supporting the Mujahideen in 1980, that is, after the entry of the Soviet Army into Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But in reality (this was kept secret until today), everything was different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on providing covert assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979. And on the same day I wrote him a memorandum in which I explained that, in my opinion, this assistance would entail military intervention by the Soviets.
Despite this risk, you were a supporter of this covert operation. But maybe you wished the Soviets this war and were looking for ways to provoke it?
Brzezinski:
We didn't force the Russians to intervene, but we deliberately increased the likelihood that they would.
When the Soviets justified their actions by saying they intended to fight covert US interference in Afghanistan, no one believed them. However, there was truth in their words… Do you regret anything today?
Regret what? Ta covert operation was a brilliant idea. She let the Russians fall into the Afghan trap, and you want me to be sorry? When the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, in essence: “Now we have the opportunity to provide the USSR with its own Vietnam War". In fact, Moscow had to wage an unbearable war for almost ten years, a conflict that led to demoralization and eventually the collapse of the Soviet empire.
Do you regret that you promoted Islamic fundamentalism, armed and advised future terrorists?
What is more important for world history? Taliban or the fall of the Soviet empire? A few excited Islamists or liberation central Europe and the end of the cold war?
- "A few excited"? But it has been said many times: Islamic fundamentalism today poses a global threat...
Nonsense! It would be necessary, as they say, for the West to have a common policy towards Islamism. This is stupid: there is no global Islamism. Let's look at Islam rationally and without demagogy or emotion. It is a world religion with 1.5 billion adherents. But what do the fundamentalist pro-Western Saudi Arabia, moderate Morocco, militaristic Pakistan, Egypt or secular Central Asia? Nothing more than what unites Christian countries.
The United States supplied the Afghan Mujahideen with advanced weapons - MANPADS "Stinger"
US arms shipments to Afghanistan
Afghanistan, 1980s. Mujahideen with "Stinger" The command of the USSR promised the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to anyone who captures the Stinger MANPADS (Second Generation Portable Air Defense Systems) in good condition. During the years of the Afghan war, Soviet special forces managed to get 8 serviceable Stinger MANPADS, but none of them became a Hero.
The Pentagon and the CIA of the United States, arming the Afghan rebels with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, pursued a number of goals, one of which was the opportunity to test the new MANPADS in real combat conditions. By supplying modern MANPADS to the Afghan rebels, the Americans "tried on" them for the supply of Soviet weapons to Vietnam, where the United States lost hundreds of helicopters and planes shot down by Soviet missiles. But the Soviet Union provided legitimate assistance to the government of a sovereign country fighting an aggressor, and American politicians armed the anti-government armed formations of the Mujahideen (“international terrorists” - according to the current American classification). 
Despite the strictest secrecy, the first media reports about the supply of several hundred Stinger MANPADS to the Afghan opposition appeared in the summer of 1986. American anti-aircraft systems were delivered from the United States by sea to the Pakistani port of Karachi, and then transported by road armed forces Pakistan to the Mujahideen training camps. The supply of missiles and training of Afghan rebels in the vicinity of the Pakistani city of Rualpindi was carried out by the US CIA. After preparing the calculations at the training center, they, together with MANPADS, went to Afghanistan in pack caravans and vehicles.
About the author: Nikita Mendkovich is an expert at the Center for the Study modern Afghanistan(CICA).
The problems of armed confrontation in Afghanistan are still actively discussed in the scientific literature. In particular, losses in the armed confrontation involving Soviet troops from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989 are still a subject of discussion. The following text is an attempt to review estimates of existing data on the losses of the parties to the conflict.
To begin with, it can be stated that the statistics of the losses of Soviet troops fighting on the side of the Kabul government are somewhat better. The level of initial accounting for losses was quite high: this was facilitated by the order in the armed forces of the USSR, the norms for accounting for the movement and loss of personnel. Moreover, despite political change affecting post-Soviet space, the level of preservation of military archives is relatively good, which allowed specialists from the Ministry of Defense to assess losses with high accuracy last war.
In total, during the period, the troops stationed on the territory of Afghanistan passed military service 620 thousand military personnel, including 525.5 thousand soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army, 21 thousand civil servants, 95 thousand representatives of the KGB (including border troops), internal troops and the police.
Total number 15,051 people died during the period of more than nine years of military presence, of which 14,427 were members of the armed forces, who died both as a result of combat wounds and from accidents and diseases. The percentage of combat losses is 82.5%. Among the irrevocable combat and non-combat losses includes both those who died in hospitals and those who died from the effects of disease after leaving the armed forces. Therefore, apparently, these data on the dead are almost complete, and should be ignored for more high marks found in Western literature: the statistics presented here did not include only persons who died before being discharged from the army while being treated in hospitals outside the territory of the DRA.
In statistics irretrievable losses also not included are 417 people who went missing or were captured during the hostilities. As of 1999, 287 people had not been returned to their homeland.
Significant harm to the Soviet group was also caused by the so-called. sanitary losses, including persons who dropped out of the war for health reasons. They include both the wounded during the period of hostilities and those who fell ill for reasons not related to wounds and concussions. For the Afghan war, the level of losses associated with "non-combat" factors was extremely high: they accounted for 89% of sanitary losses.
Estimated American researchers 1990s, 56.6% of non-combat losses were due to infectious diseases, 15.1% to domestic injuries, 9.9% to dermatological diseases, 4.1% - lung diseases. According to Grau and Jorgensen, throughout the war, up to 1/4 of the personnel of the Soviet Army grouping was unfit for combat. As the authors write: “In October-December 1981, the entire 5th motorized rifle division became incapacitated when more than 3 thousand people fell ill with hepatitis at the same time.” Apparently high incidence associated with a lack of clean drinking water, supply interruptions new clothes, which created problems with washing uniforms, atypical for European Russia, where most of the fighters came from, infectious diseases. Due to the radical climate change, almost all newly arrived fighters through certain time symptoms of indigestion appeared. There were frequent cases of dysentery, hepatitis and typhoid fever.
In total, during the presence of the armed forces in the country, 466,000 servicemen sought medical help. Of these, due to illness, 11,284 people were dismissed from the armed forces, of which 10,751 people received a disability.
The highest irretrievable losses of the Soviet Army refer to the period from March 1980 to April 1985. It is to this time that the highest average monthly irretrievable losses also belong. The highest average monthly sanitary losses (and, apparently, the peak of morbidity) refer to May 1985 - December 1986.
The situation with the losses of the DRA armed forces, anti-government armed formations and civilians is more complicated. The losses of the armed forces subordinate to Kabul are known according to A.A. Lyakhovsky and amounted from 1979 to 1988: 26,595 people - irretrievable combat losses, 28,002 - missing, 285,541 - deserters. The abnormally high level of desertion is reflected in many memoirs and is explained by the chaotic mobilization policy of the DRA government and low level ideological work among the personnel. The peak of combat irretrievable losses occurred in 1981, when the Afghan armed forces lost 6,721 people killed. The peaks of losses from desertion (more than 30 thousand people a year) occurred in 1982 and 1988.
One side given level losses are much higher than Soviet side, which indicates a greater involvement in hostilities, but it is important to consider the difference in technical equipment and the quantity and quality of work of medical personnel, which led to large lethal losses.
As regards the losses of the Mujahideen and civilian population, the situation is even more complicated. Accurate statistics are almost non-existent. During the period from 1980 to 1990, the UN registered 640,000 deaths of the inhabitants of Afghanistan, of which 327,000 people were accounted for by the male population of the country. However, these data are obviously incomplete and can only be considered lower bound population losses.
First of all, the question of the number of opposition detachments is confused. The most common estimate in the literature is from 20 to 50 thousand people of a permanent composition, and 70-350 thousand people who participated in their activities on an irregular basis. Crile's assessment seems to be the most substantiated, citing the memoirs of CIA officers, who claimed that the United States financed detachments of approximately 150,000 fighters out of 400,000 operating in the country.
How many of them died? The author did not meet in the literature devoted to military history, any reliable estimates. Their appearance seems unlikely, if only because of the problems of identifying the affiliation of "irregular Mujahideen", documenting current losses individual detachments and centralized recording of these data, which was hardly carried out at all during the war.
Apparently, the losses of the opposition detachments can only be taken into account in total mass population, estimates of the losses of which vary greatly. So, as of 1987, in Afghanistan, according to USAID, 875 thousand people died, according to the Gallup study - 1.2 million people. The highest estimate of the total irretrievable losses of the population found in the literature is 1.5-2 million people, but the author considers them too high. The number of refugees is traditionally estimated at 5.7 million people in 1987 and 6.2 million in 1990 in Pakistan, Iran and some other states. However, it is important to note that a significant part of the persons registered as “refugees” were Afghan migrant workers who sought to legalize themselves abroad in this way and hoped to receive humanitarian assistance. Their numbers were large and pre-war period Thus, in the early 1970s, up to 1 million people left Afghanistan in search of work. Therefore, it is not easy to estimate the real percentage of those who were forced to leave Afghanistan during the war.
The given data on the number of parties and losses in the 1979-1989 conflict may be incomplete, however, in the author's opinion, they, according to at least, are argued in contrast to a number of clearly overestimated estimates that are used in political speculation around the history of this war.
Of course, any military losses, especially of the irresponsible participants in the conflict, and the population living in the territory where it unfolded, are terrible and cannot be justified from the point of view of simple ethics, and the war itself cannot be justified as the most terrible manifestation of human violence against man. However, as can be seen from the events of today, the level of development of society and international relations still does not exclude the use of this tool to resolve conflicts between states. And that means new losses and new human tragedies.
- Here and below the statistics Soviet losses Quoted from: Russia in the wars of the XX century. Losses of the armed forces. Under the general editorship of G. F. Krivosheev. Moscow: Olma-Press, 2001.
- Message from the professor of the Department of Thermal Injuries Military Medical Academy Petersburg by Vladimir Sidelnikov // RIA Novosti, February 15, 2007.
- L. W. Grau, W. A. Jorgensen Medical support in counter-guerrilla war: epidemiologic lesson learned in Soviet-Afghan war
- A. A. Lyakhovsky The tragedy and valor of Afghanistan
- United Nations Statistics Division
- J. B. Amstutz Afghanistan. The first five ears of soviet occupation. Washington D.C., 1986. P. 155-156.
- D. Crile Charlie Wilson's War. Translation from English by K. Saveliev. M., 2008. S. 205.
- D. C. Isby War in a Distant Country: Afghanistan, Invasion and Resistance. London, 1989.
- M. F. Slinkin Afghanistan: pages of history (80-90s of the XX century). Simferopol, 2003. S. 119-120.
