“I look with love at my I-16. Thank you, my dear "donkey"! You turned out to be much better than the Japanese I-97 fighter. Both in speed and strength. You saved me more than once, took on enemy bullets. Thanks also to your creator Nikolai Nikolayevich Polikarpov!”
Vorozheikin A.V., pilot of the 22nd IAP
On March 1, 1932, the “independent” state of Manchukuo appeared on the territory of Manchuria, created by the Japanese as one of the springboards for the future invasion of the Soviet Primorye and Eastern Siberia. After the unsuccessful conflict for the Kwantung Army on Lake Khasan, it was decided to deliver another blow from here.
The formal reason for the start of the conflict was the claims of Manchukuo to the Mongolian People's Republic. The leaders of the first country (in fact, the Japanese behind them) in the spring of 1939 began to demand a revision of the state border between states along the Khalkhin Gol River. The Japanese military began to build a railway line, directed to the border of the USSR. Due to the nature of the terrain, the road could only pass in the area close to the Mongolian border. Thus, in the event of a war with Soviet Union it could easily be blocked by artillery fire from the Mongolian side, which, of course, was unacceptable to the Kwantung Army. Moving the border close to the Khalkhin Gol River, that is, several tens of kilometers deep into Mongolian territory, would solve the problems of the Japanese.
Mongolia refused to meet the demands of Manchukuo. The Soviet Union, which signed a Protocol on Mutual Assistance with the MPR on March 12, 1936, declared that it would "defend the borders of Mongolia as if it were its own." Neither side was willing to compromise.
The first shots were fired on May 11, 1939. By May 14, the Japanese-Manchurian troops occupied the entire "disputed" territory up to Khalkhin Gol, Japanese government did not react in any way to the actions of the Kwantung Army and did not respond to the note sent by the Soviet Union. The war has begun.
Composition of forces
At the time of the start of the conflict in Mongolia, according to the Protocol, the Soviet 57th special corps was stationed, consisting of 30 thousand military personnel, 265 tanks, 280 armored vehicles and 107 combat aircraft. Fighter forces were represented by the 70th IAP, which had 14 I-15bis and 24 I-16s as of May 1939. All "donkeys", far from the first freshness, belonged to already obsolete type 5 and did not have armored backs. The level of combat readiness of the fighters was low: by May 20, only 13 I-16s and 9 I-15bis could take off. Personnel the regiment consisted of inexperienced pilots, who mainly owned only piloting techniques; they were not trained in group combat or shooting. Discipline seriously limped, due to poor living conditions, many fighter pilots wrote letters asking to be sent to the Union. The Japanese fighter force, numbering 20 vehicles Nakajima Ki.27(two squadrons), were equipped with experienced pilots, many Japanese had experience fighting in China. This alignment of forces was not slow to affect the results of the first battles.
air battles
The first loss of the Red Army Air Force was the R-5SH liaison, shot down by Japanese fighters on May 21. And the next day, the first air battle between fighters took place: 3 I-16s and 2 I-15bis met with five Ki-27s. One "donkey", which broke away from the group and rushed to the attack, was instantly shot down (the pilot I. T. Lysenko died), the rest did not enter into battle.
At this time, the Soviet Union began to pull up forces to the conflict area. On May 23, 1939, the 22nd IAP arrived in Mongolia, in which, in addition to thirty-five I-15bis (one of them went missing during the flight), there were 28 I-16 type 10, and the aircraft were in good technical condition. However, the level of training of the pilots of this regiment also left much to be desired, which did not allow, as it turned out later, to turn the tide in the air in their favor. In addition, the Japanese, in turn, transferred another 20 Ki-27s to Manchuria (two squadrons of the 11th Sentai).
On May 27, a very unsuccessful “debut” of the I-16 of the 22nd IAP took place. At Lake Buin-Nur, a battle took place between six "donkeys" and nine Ki.27. One Soviet pilot was killed, two were wounded; two I-16s shot down, three seriously damaged. The Japanese had no losses.
Khalkhin Gol, the beginning of hostilities of the 22nd IAP
“To be honest, the war on Khalkhin Gol started badly for us. In fact, we were not ready for it. The first fight took place on May 28 (More likely May 27 - ed.), our squadron lost outright - we still did not know how to attack, and material part turned out to be faulty…”
Even if the I-16s, close in their characteristics to the Japanese fighter, carried huge losses, then it can be reasonably assumed that there was no point at all for the pilots on the I-15bis to take to the air. In fact, it almost did. Our pilots, accustomed to the exceptional maneuverability of their biplanes, during the battles with the Japanese were surprised to find that they no longer had an advantage in this characteristic either (the maneuverability of the Ki.27 was no worse). So, on May 28, the I-15bis link of the 70th IAP was completely destroyed in battle, all the pilots died. On the same day, in a battle between nine biplanes from the 22nd IAP and the 18th Ki-27, six of our aircraft were lost in the air, another was shot on the ground after a forced landing, five pilots died, one was wounded. The Japanese once again left without loss.
When it became clear to the Soviet leadership that it would not be possible to seize air supremacy with the available forces, new aircraft and experienced pilots began to arrive in the battle area. On May 29, 1939, a group of forty-eight people arrived in Mongolia on three Douglas transports - the most experienced pilots and technicians, many of whom managed to visit Spain and China. The Japanese also strengthened their grouping, but were never able to achieve a numerical advantage.
“I look with love at my I-16. Thank you, my dear "donkey"! You turned out to be much better than the Japanese I-97 fighter. Both in speed and strength. You saved me more than once, took on enemy bullets. Thanks also to your creator Nikolai Nikolayevich Polikarpov!”
Vorozheikin A.V., pilot of the 22nd IAP
Brief history of events
On March 1, 1932, the “independent” state of Manchukuo appeared on the territory of Manchuria, created by the Japanese as one of the springboards for the future invasion of Soviet Primorye and Eastern Siberia. After the unsuccessful conflict for the Kwantung Army on Lake Khasan, it was decided to deliver another blow from here.
The formal reason for the start of the conflict was the claims of Manchukuo to the Mongolian People's Republic. The leaders of the first country (in fact, the Japanese behind them) in the spring of 1939 began to demand a revision of the state border between states along the Khalkhin Gol River. The Japanese military began to build a railway line, directed to the border of the USSR. Due to the nature of the terrain, the road could only pass in the area close to the Mongolian border. Thus, in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, it could easily be blocked by artillery fire from the Mongolian side, which, of course, was unacceptable for the Kwantung Army. Moving the border close to the Khalkhin Gol River, that is, several tens of kilometers deep into Mongolian territory, would solve the problems of the Japanese. Mongolia refused to satisfy the demands of Manchukuo. The Soviet Union, which signed a Protocol on Mutual Assistance with the MPR on March 12, 1936, declared that it would "defend the borders of Mongolia as if it were its own." Neither side was going to compromise. The first shots were fired on May 11, 1939. By May 14, the Japanese-Manchurian troops occupied the entire "disputed" territory up to Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese government did not react in any way to the actions of the Kwantung Army and did not respond to the note sent by the Soviet Union. The war has begun.
Composition of forces
At the time of the start of the conflict in Mongolia, according to the Protocol, the Soviet 57th special corps was stationed, consisting of 30 thousand military personnel, 265 tanks, 280 armored vehicles and 107 combat aircraft. Fighter forces were represented by the 70th IAP, which had 14 I-15bis and 24 I-16s as of May 1939. All "donkeys", far from the first freshness, belonged to the already outdated type 5 and did not have armored backs. The level of combat readiness of the fighters was low: by May 20, only 13 I-16s and 9 I-15bis could take off. The personnel of the regiment consisted of inexperienced pilots, who mainly owned only piloting techniques; they were not trained in group combat or shooting. Discipline seriously limped, due to poor living conditions, many fighter pilots wrote letters asking to be sent to the Union. The Japanese fighter force, numbering 20 vehicles Nakajima Ki.27(two squadrons), were equipped with experienced pilots, many Japanese had experience fighting in China. This alignment of forces was not slow to affect the results of the first battles.
air battles
The first loss of the Red Army Air Force was the R-5SH liaison, shot down by Japanese fighters on May 21. And the next day, the first air battle between fighters took place: 3 I-16s and 2 I-15bis met with five Ki-27s. One “donkey”, which broke away from the group and rushed to the attack, was instantly shot down (pilot I. T. Lysenko died), the rest did not enter the battle. At this time, the Soviet Union began to pull up forces to the conflict area. On May 23, 1939, the 22nd IAP arrived in Mongolia, in which, in addition to thirty-five I-15bis (one of them went missing during the flight), there were 28 I-16 type 10, and the aircraft were in good technical condition. However, the level of training of the pilots of this regiment also left much to be desired, which did not allow, as it turned out later, to turn the tide in the air in their favor. In addition, the Japanese, in turn, transferred another 20 Ki-27s to Manchuria (two squadrons on the 11th Sentai). On May 27, a very unsuccessful “debut” of the I-16s of the 22nd IAP took place. At Lake Buin-Nur, a battle took place between six "donkeys" and nine Ki.27. One Soviet pilot was killed, two were wounded; two I-16s shot down, three seriously damaged. The Japanese had no losses.
Even if the I-16s, close in their characteristics to the Japanese fighter, suffered huge losses, then it can be reasonably assumed that there was no point at all for the pilots on the I-15bis to take to the air. In fact, it almost did. Our pilots, accustomed to the exceptional maneuverability of their biplanes, during the battles with the Japanese were surprised to find that they no longer had an advantage in this characteristic either (the maneuverability of the Ki.27 was no worse). So, on May 28, the I-15bis link of the 70th IAP was completely destroyed in battle, all the pilots died. On the same day, in a battle between nine biplanes from the 22nd IAP and the 18th Ki-27, six of our aircraft were lost in the air, another was shot on the ground after a forced landing, five pilots died, one was wounded. The Japanese once again left without loss. When it became clear to the Soviet leadership that it would not be possible to seize air supremacy with the available forces, new aircraft and experienced pilots began to arrive in the battle area. On May 29, 1939, a group of forty-eight people arrived in Mongolia on three Douglas transports - the most experienced pilots and technicians, many of whom managed to visit Spain and China. The Japanese also strengthened their grouping, but were never able to achieve a numerical advantage.
Over time, Soviet pilots began to fight more confidently, and the ratio of losses began to straighten out in our direction. The "transitional moment" can be considered June 22, 1939, when the largest air battle between Japanese and Soviet fighters took place. On September 24, 18 combat-ready Ki-27s took off to intercept a group of Soviet fighters. From the Air Force of the Red Army, 105 aircraft took off (56 I-16 and 49 I-15bis). However, they attacked in two waves, some Soviet aircraft did not participate in the battle at all. The Japanese estimate their irretrievable losses at seven aircraft, the Red Army Air Force lost seventeen aircraft (14 I-15bis and 3 I-16), of which thirteen aircraft and eleven pilots were lost in the air. Four I-15bis were set on fire on the ground during landing, their pilots escaped. Despite the fact that the losses of the Red Army Air Force significantly exceeded the losses of the Japanese, the battlefield remained with the Soviet pilots: the Japanese were forced to retreat.
It is noticeable that the units that fought on Polikarpov's biplanes suffered significantly more than those armed with the I-16: the obsolescence of the I-15bis made itself felt. Already at the end of July, these aircraft were withdrawn from the first line units (some of them remained in the air defense of airfields), new I-153 biplanes with retractable landing gear and a more powerful M-62 engine arrived in their place. Of the other novelties of the Soviet aircraft industry, which were "noted" at Khalkhin Gol, we should mention the I-16P (I-16 type 17) - cannon variants of the widely used I-16 type 10, as well as variants of the "donkey" with M-62 engines. The first such machines were obtained by upgrading the I-16 type 10 in the field (the engines were taken from stocks for the I-153); subsequently, factory variants began to arrive, having the name I-16 type 18. ... Meanwhile, the Japanese troops, under the pressure of the Soviet-Mongolian forces, began to retreat. On August 20, a decisive offensive operation began to encircle and destroy the Kwantung Army grouping east of the Khalkhin Gol River. By this day, the number of the Soviet aviation group had reached its maximum. In the August battles Japanese aviation She tried in vain to seize the initiative, but she failed. Attacks on Soviet airfields also did not bring the desired results. The air units of the imperial aviation were losing equipment and pilots.
In this difficult situation the impossibility of a quick restoration of the Ki-27 fighter fleet was especially affected: the Nakajima plant could only produce one car a day. As a result, the Japanese had to use the 9th Sentai, armed with outdated biplanes, in battles. Kawasaki Ki.10. On September 2, 1939, these fighters first appeared in the sky of Khalkhin Gol and immediately began to suffer significant losses. Soon, the defeated Japanese requested a truce. On September 15, an agreement was signed between the USSR, the MPR and Japan on the cessation of hostilities from 13.00 on September 16. Before that, the aircraft of the Kwantung Army tried to strike large forces on Soviet airfields. Their idea failed: as a result, the attackers suffered greater losses than the attacked. The reflection of the Japanese raid on September 15, during which ten Japanese aircraft were shot down against six Soviet ones (one I-16 and five I-153), can be considered the last air battle in the sky over Khalkhin Gol.
The number of serviceable fighters is given in parentheses, if known.
| Period | I-15bis | I-153 | I-16 | I-16P |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.05-31.05 | 13 (1) | - | 5 (1) | - |
| 1.06-30.06 | 31 (2) | - | 17 (2) | - |
| 1.07-31.07 | 16 (1) | 2 (1) | 41 (2) | - |
| 1.08-31.08 | 5 (1) | 11 (4) | 37 (16) | 2 (0) |
| 1.09-16.09 | - | 9 (1) | 5 (1) | 2 (0) |
| Total | 65 (5) | 22 (6) | 105 (22) | 4 (0) |
Non-combat losses are given in brackets.
Enemy fighters
As mentioned above, the main Japanese fighter in conflict area became the army Ki-27 (aka “type 97”, the Soviet name is I-97) of the Nakajima company. At first, Soviet pilots mistook him for the Mitsubishi A5M, which made its debut in China. The error was eventually revealed: it happened after the arrival of war veterans in China on the theater. As A.V. Vorozheikin recalled, at the end of June, Commander Smushkevich, Colonel Lakeev, Major Kravchenko and some other pilots studied the wreckage of a Japanese fighter and found the absence of struts on the chassis, characteristic of a Mitsubishi product.
In terms of its structure, the Ki-27 is very similar to the A5M, while its engine power is lower. However, due to better aerodynamics and lighter weight it surpasses its “brother” from the Air Force of the Imperial Navy in terms of basic characteristics (except for range). The armament remained the same: two rifle-caliber machine guns. At Khalkhin Gol, both existing modifications of the "type 97" were used: Ki-27-Ko(other name options: Ki-27a, Ki-27-I) and Ki-27-Otsu(Ki-27b, Ki-27-II). latest version it was distinguished by a “lantern” with a circular view, a converted oil cooler, as well as the possibility of installing underwing fuel tanks and suspension of small-caliber bombs. The “Type-97” was superior in its characteristics to both the I-15bis and the I-153. With the I-16, the situation was somewhat more complicated. Horizontal
the maneuverability of the Ki-27 was better than that of any version of the donkey. In addition, the I-16 with M-25 engines was inferior to the Japanese fighter in terms of rate of climb and altitude, but they had better weapons and armor protection. "Donkeys" also had a more durable design and could develop greater speed in a dive. An important advantage of the Ki-27 was its high stability, which partly compensated for the small second weight of a volley when firing. Even after the arrival of the I-16 type 18 fighters, which surpassed the Ki-27 in speed and rate of climb, the Japanese fighters remained dangerous opponents. The shortcomings of the aircraft were compensated by the merits of their pilots: according to the recollections of Soviet veterans who managed to fight in Spain, the Japanese were superior to the Italians in experience, and the Germans in aggressiveness. From the interrogation of the captured Japanese pilot Miajimo:
“With the I-15 it is best to fight on horizontal and vertical turns, with the I-16 it’s the same. He believes that the I-16 fighter is more dangerous, explaining this by the speed and maneuverability of the I-16.
When attacking the I-16 in the forehead, the I-97 goes up with the subsequent ranversman. When I-16 attacks I-97 from above, I-97 goes into a turn.
The pilot states that Japanese pilots they don’t like front attacks, they are afraid of damaging the engine, they consider attacks on the I-16 from above from behind to be the best for them. As a rule, exiting the fight with a corkscrew does not apply.
Another Japanese fighter that fought at Khalkhin Gol was the Kawasaki Ki-10 biplane. AT in general terms it was an analogue of the Soviet I-15bis and by 1939 was irretrievably outdated. Here is a description of one of the first battles between I-16 and Ki-10:
Captured Ki-10-II, which was tested at the Air Force Research Institute
“On one of the first days of autumn, Senior Lieutenant Fedor Cheremukhin, Deputy Commander of the 22nd IAP, flew out on combat patrol. Soon he noticed that a group of Japanese aircraft appeared from behind the river. Cheremukhin, giving a sign to the followers, turned his I-16 towards the enemy. For him, this was far from the first battle, and he studied the appearance of the main Japanese fighter Ki-27 well. But this time, the Soviet pilots encountered completely different cars. Graceful sharp-nosed biplanes vividly reminded the Zamkomesku of the old Polikarpov I-3, on which he once began his career as a combat pilot. The ensuing "air carousel" immediately showed that the Japanese fighters were superior to the "donkeys" in turns, noticeably inferior to them in speed and rate of climb. Our pilots quickly figured out that it is better to start hitting biplanes from long distances, and, without getting involved in close combat, leave to repeat the attack on the vertical. Soon Cheremukhin managed to go into the tail of one of the Japanese and give an aiming burst. A jet of white steam escaped from the fuselage of the enemy plane. “The radiator is broken,” the senior lieutenant noted to himself and abruptly dropped the gas so as not to slip past the enemy. At random, the Japanese pilot either lost his head or was wounded, but he did not even try to maneuver to get away from the fire, but continued to “pull” in a straight line with a decrease, leaving a long steam plume behind him. Once again carefully aiming, Cheremukhin fired a long burst at the engine of the damaged car. Instead of steam from the “Japanese”, thick black smoke poured out, and he, increasing the angle of his dive, almost vertically crashed into the ground.
Interestingly, according to Japanese data, only one Ki-10 was lost during the conflict.
| Camouflage patterns | |
|---|---|
 |
Nakajima Ki-27-Ko Art. Sergeant Qasida, 2nd Chutai of the 59th Fighter Sentai |
 |
Nakajima Ki-27-Otsu commander of the 2nd chuchay 11th Fighter Sentai |
|
|
|
against the bombers
The Japanese bombers used in the conflict area gave the Soviet aviation leadership another reason to think: the speed of any of them (not counting the light reconnaissance aircraft and the Ki-36 bomber) exceeded that of the Red Army Air Force biplane fighters. Thus, the situation characteristic of the war in Spain was repeated: the I-16 became the main means of intercepting bombers. The aircraft was the main medium bomber in the theater Mitsubishi Ki.21(according to the Japanese classification, it was considered heavy). The Mitsubishi product had a very good speed of 432 km / h, which, however, did not exceed the I-16 type 10. Given the low level of security characteristic of Japanese aircraft of that time, the Ki-21, in theory, should have become an easy target for the donkeys, but only six aircraft were lost during the conflict. Another common Japanese strike aircraft at Khalkhin Gol was a single-engine Mitsubishi Ki.30 with fixed landing gear maximum speed of 430 km/h. It was he who suffered the greatest losses among Japanese bombers during the conflict. Another Japanese aircraft, a single-engine reconnaissance aircraft, should be noted. Mitsubishi Ki.15-Ko Karigane. Thanks to good aerodynamics (despite the non-retractable undercarriage) and lightweight design, this aircraft could reach a maximum speed of 481 km/h, which made it difficult to reach even for I-16s with M-62 engines. Nevertheless, seven aircraft of this type were still shot down. The next modification of the scout, Ki-15-Otsu, reached 510 km / h, but she did not arrive in time for the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
The use of unguided missiles
From August 20 to 31, a flight of fighter-missile carriers took part in the hostilities, which included five I-16s (link commander Captain N. Zvonarev, pilots I. Mikhailenko, S. Pimenov, V. Fedosov and T. Tkachenko), armed with installations RS-82. On August 20, 1939, at 4 p.m., pilots over the front line met with Japanese fighters and launched the RS from a distance of about a kilometer. As a result, 2 enemy planes were shot down. The success is due to the fact that the Japanese flew in close formation and with constant speed. In addition, the factor of surprise worked. The Japanese did not understand who was attacking them (they attributed their losses to the actions of the Soviet anti-aircraft gunners). In total, the missile-carrying link participated in 14 battles, shooting down 13 Japanese aircraft without loss. The Japanese military, having studied the wreckage of their equipment, came to the conclusion that large-caliber guns were installed on our fighters.| Camouflage patterns | |
|---|---|
 |
I-16 type 5 commander of the 2nd squadron of the 70th IAP st. Lieutenant M. P. Noga, autumn 1938. The blue star instead of the number on the vertical tail, obviously, was the emblem of the command vehicle. The artist is Sergey Vakhrushev. |
|
The author of the second drawing is Andrey Yurgenson. |
 |
I-16 type 10 of the 70th IAP. A green camouflage color applied in the field over the factory silver gray paint job. The artist is Sergey Vakhrushev. |
|
I-16 type 10 of one of the Soviet aviation formations. The color of the propeller spinner and the rudder tip are given presumably. The artist is Sergey Vakhrushev. |
 |
I-16 type 10 Witt Skobarihin. 22nd IAP, Tamtsag-Bulak airfield, summer 1939. |
 |
|
| I-16 type 10 | I-16 type 17 | I-16 type 18 | Kawasaki Ki.10-II | Nakajima Ki.27 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manufacturer country | USSR | USSR USSRJapan | Japan | ||
| 1938 | 1938 | 1939 | 1935 (1937**) | 1937 | |
| Wingspan, m | 9.00 | 9.00 | 9.0010.02/n. * | 11.31||
| 6.07 | 6.076.07 | 7.55 | 7.53|||
| Height, m | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.253.00 | 3.25 | |
| Wing area, m2 | 14.54 | 14.5414.54 | 23.00 18.56|||
| Engine | M-25VM-25V | M-62 Kawasaki Ha-9-IIb"Army type 97" | |||
| Power, hp | 750 | 750 | 800 | 850 | 710 |
| Aircraft weight, kg. | |||||
| - empty | 1327 | 14261434 | 1360 | 1110||
| - takeoff | 1716 1810 18301740 | 1790 | |||
| Speed, km/h | |||||
| - near the ground | 398 | 385 | 413 AD d.n. d. | ||
| 425 | 461400 | 470||||
| Rate of climb, m/min | 882688 | 1034 | n. d. | 920||
| Practical ceiling, m | 8470 | 8240 | 9300 | 11150 | 10000|
| Range, km | 525 | 417485 | 1100 627|||
| Turn time, s | 16-18 | 17-18 | 17 | n. d. | 8 |
| Armament | 4 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns | 2 20 mm ShVAK cannons, 2 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns | 4 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns | 2 7.7-mm synchronous machine guns "type 89" | |
| Pilot's name | Subdivision | Number of victories on I-16 (individual + group) | Notes|
|---|---|---|---|
| Rakhov V. G. | 22nd IAP | 8+6 | - |
| Vorozheikin A.V. | 22nd IAP | 6+13 | Flew on I-16P |
| Kravchenko G.P. | 22nd IAP | 5 | Commander of the 22nd IAP from July 1939 |
| Trubachenko V.P. | 22nd IAP | 5 | Squadron commander I-16P |
| Krasnoyurchenko I. I. | n. d. | 5 | Flew on I-16P |
| Smirnov B. A. | n. d. | 4 | - |
| Skobarihin V.F. | 22nd IAP | 2+6 | - |
| Zvonarev N.I. | 22nd IAP | 2+5 | He flew on I-16 with RO-82 |
| Antonenko A.K.* | n. d. | 0+6 | - |
| Glazykin N. G. | 22nd IAP | 1 | Commander of the 22nd IAP, died 06/22/1939 |
Sources of information Kondratiev V. Khalkhin-Gol: War in the air. - M .: "Technicians - Youth", 2002. Stepanov A. Air war at Khalkhin Gol. // "Corner of the sky" Astakhova E. Fighter "Kawasaki" Ki-10. // "Planes of the World" No. 03 (23), 2000. Kondratiev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol River. - M., 2008. Mikhail Maslov. Polikarpov I-15, I-16 and I-153 aces. Osprey Publishing, 2010.
In late July - early August, the situation on the border territory of the Mongolian People's Republic near the Khalkhin-Gol River, to a large extent, resembled the June one. Against the background of sporadic attacks on the ground and clashes in the sky, both sides were building up forces for new decisive operations.
In the photo: Red Army soldiers and captured Japanese soldiers
Original taken from mayorgb On the Soviet-Japanese military conflicts. Part 3. Fighting at Khalkhin Gol. II.
On August 4, 1939, by a special decree of the emperor, the Japanese-Manchu forces in the conflict area were united into the 6th military group under the command of Lieutenant General Ogisu Ryuhei. Its total number, taking into account all the collaborationist formations, reached 55 thousand people, however, on the Mongolian territory, that is, in the immediate battle zone, there were no more than 35 thousand. On August 24, the headquarters of General Ogisu planned a large-scale offensive in order to cover the right flank of the Soviet-Mongolian troops and defeat them.
However, the command of the Soviet 1st Army Group did not intend to wait for the Japanese strike. The forces of the Red Army in the combat area numbered about 57 thousand people, total strength two cavalry divisions of the MNRA reached 5 thousand. Soviet troops had artillery in 542 guns and mortars, armored vehicles of 498 tanks and 385 armored vehicles and aviation group number of 581 aircraft.
Warriors 6th cavalry division The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army is conducting surveillance.
The Soviet command developed a plan of operation, which consisted in encircling the main forces of the Japanese and Manchus with flank converging strikes, followed by the defeat of the encircled enemy without crossing the state border. To implement this plan, the troops of the 1st Army Group were divided into three groups: Northern, Central and Southern. The central group was tasked with tying down the Japanese-Manchurian grouping, depriving the Japanese command of the opportunity to regroup forces through maneuvering and castling; The northern and southern groups delivered converging flank attacks, and the main attack was considered to be the attack of the Southern group, which hit the enemy’s left wing. The Soviet command also left a reserve of the 9th motorized armored brigade, a tank battalion, 2 rifle and machine gun battalions and the 212th airborne brigade of Major Ivan Ivanovich Zatevakhin. Mongolian troops united under the general command of Marshal of the Mongolian People's Republic Khorlogiyin Choibalsan.
Khorlogiin Choibalsan and Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov.
While the ground Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese-Manchurian groups were preparing for large-scale offensives, the pilots of the Red Army Air Force and the armed forces Japanese Empire fought for air supremacy.
Red Army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a downed Japanese bomber.
On August 2, 23 I-16s, covered by 19 new I-153 Chaika biplane fighters, attacked one of the Japanese airfields; the result was the burning of 6 Japanese aircraft and damage to several more, and most importantly, the death of the commander of the 15th sentai, Colonel Abe Katsumi. The Red Star planes returned without loss.
On August 3, the commander of the squadron of the 56th fighter regiment Captain Viktor Pavlovich Kustov, who rammed a Japanese bomber at the cost of his life. For his feat, Captain Kustov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. On August 5, the commander of a SB bomber hit by anti-aircraft fire, battalion commissar Mikhail Anisimovich Yuyukin committed fire ram, directing the plane to the cluster Japanese troops, for which he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union; another Soviet aircraft, an I-16 fighter, was shot down in a dogfight.
Viktor Pavlovich KustovMikhail Anisimovich Yuyukin
The red pilots repaid the Japanese by defeating two aces of the Imperial Air Force on the same day: Kobayashi Taro, who had 10 victories in his asset, and Motojima Mineyoshi, whose score was 26 victories. And this event already clearly testified to the exhaustion of the Japanese aviators at Khalkhin Gol, who were forced to fight for more than two months against the numerically superior forces of the Red Army.
On August 12, 137 Soviet and about 60 Japanese fighters clashed in a large-scale battle; The Red Army Air Force lost 2 aircraft, there is no information about Japanese losses in cars, but it is known that another Japanese pilot died that day high class- Okuda Jiro with 14 wins to his credit. On August 13, a period of non-flying weather began. On August 19, the conditions again became acceptable for flights, which was immediately used by the pilots of the 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment, who burned down two Japanese aircraft at the airfields during the attack, but on the same day one of the SB bombers did not return from a sortie.
The preparations for the offensive required enormous efforts. For the operation, two-week stocks of provisions, fuel and lubricants and ammunition were accumulated; transportation of all this was carried out by more than 4 thousand trucks. At the same time, the troops carefully observed the measures to maintain secrecy - Zhukov was generally distinguished by hypertrophied attention to this side of the preparation of operations. All troop movements were carried out exclusively at night, the enemy's vigilance was dulled by continuous imitation with the help of car noise loudspeakers, artillery tractors and tanks.
Red Army mortars in position.
On August 20, a quarter of an hour before 6 a.m., 150 red star bombers rained down on Japanese positions a hail of bombs from a height of 2.5-3 kilometers. At the same time, 46 I-16s, acting in several groups, crushed Japanese anti-aircraft guns. At the same time, not a single Japanese fighter took off into the sky, which the Soviet pilots actively used: after attacking one of the airfields, they destroyed 6 and damaged 9 Japanese aircraft. At 6:15 am, the guns of the Soviet-Mongolian troops opened heavy fire on the enemy lines. After shelling, another 52 SB under the cover of 162 fighters bombarded Japanese troops in the valley of the Khailastyn-Gol River.
Then the Japanese pilots still answered. About 50 bombers, escorted by 80 fighters, took off to attack Soviet airfields, but the VNOS posts worked well, and 204 Soviet fighters met them in the vicinity of Tamtsak-Bulak. In the battle that took place, the Japanese were able to shoot down 6 Soviet fighters, and Japanese bombers even broke through to the airfield, but the Red Army pilots did not allow targeted bombing, and only one bomb was able to destroy the SB standing on the airfield. In total, for this day, the losses of the Red Army Air Force amounted to 7 fighters and 4 SBs, the Japanese - 6 fighters.
Soviet soldiers are ready to attack.
The ground forces of the Red Army and the MNRA went on the offensive at 9 am on August 20. Morning fog in a number of areas allowed the Red Army and Cyrics to covertly get close to the first line of enemy positions at a distance that allowed them to immediately rush to the attack. The strikes of Soviet artillery and aviation were so strong that in the first hour and a half the Japanese and Manchus did not fire a single retaliatory artillery shot. The Japanese were also unable to determine the direction of the main attack. It should be noted the successes of the 8th Cavalry Division of the MNRA, which operated in the Southern Group - its soldiers, pushing back the Bargut units encountered on their way, reached the very state border. Meanwhile, by the end of the day, the troops of the Northern Group began fighting for the Fui height, which the Japanese had turned into a powerful stronghold.
A group of Red Army soldiers in the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
In the next two days, Japanese resistance increased decisively. Commander of the machine gun company of the 57th Ural rifle division Vasily Ivanovich Davidenko recalled: “In general, we must honestly admit: the fanaticism and selflessness of the Japanese soldier were amazing. There was such a case in my company. The Red Army soldier Tatarnikov, having found a wounded Japanese in the trench, decided to take him prisoner. He put his bayonet to his chest and ordered to surrender. with both hands, drove him into his stomach. Tatarnikov then justified himself: they say, "who knew that this crazy person would do this" ". Zhukov himself described the Japanese soldiers as follows: "The Japanese soldier who fought with us at Khalkhin Gol is well prepared, especially for close combat. Disciplined, diligent and tenacious in combat, especially in defensive combat. Junior command staff prepared very well and fights with fanatical tenacity. As a rule, junior commanders do not surrender and do not stop before hara-kiri"; at the same time, the commander pointed out the following shortcomings in the Japanese Imperial Army: "The officers, especially the senior and higher ones, are poorly prepared, have little initiative and are inclined to act according to the template".
Already after the Great Patriotic War, Zhukov told Simonov about the frenzied stubbornness of Japanese soldiers, citing examples: “The Japanese fought exceptionally stubbornly, mostly infantry. I remember how I interrogated the Japanese who were sitting in the area of the Khailastyn-Gol River. They were taken prisoner there, in the reeds. I ask them: “How did you let mosquitoes eat you like that?” They answer: "We were ordered to sit on patrol and not move. We did not move." Indeed, they were ambushed, and then they were forgotten. The situation changed, and their battalion was pushed back, but they were still sitting for the second day and did not move until we captured them. They were eaten half to death by mosquitoes, but they continued to follow orders."
A notable event on August 22 was the victory of Soviet aviators over another Japanese ace, Motomura Koji, whose number of victories was 14. Red star aircraft firmly held the initiative in the air.
Red Army soldiers and an armored car.
The fierce resistance of the enemy forced Zhukov to commit reserves into battle - to help Northern group the 9th armored and 212th airborne brigades moved. The warriors of the latter, having entered the battle for the height of Fui, where the enemy was helped not only by outrageous fury, but also by the most powerful fortifications and the terrain itself, were able to take this stronghold with a decisive attack.
In their baptism of fire, held at the height of Fui, the paratroopers demonstrated excellent combat training. The 9th motorized armored brigade, supported by two companies of border guards and a rifle and machine-gun battalion of the 11th light tank brigade, reached the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo, by the end of August 23, cutting off the Japanese escape route to the east. At the same time, the Soviet-Mongolian troops of the Southern Group broke into the defensive lines of the Japanese in their offensive zone to the full depth. On August 24, the 8th Motorized Armored Brigade of the Southern Group linked up with units of the 9th Motorized Armored Brigade. Finally, the circle of encirclement finally closed. Of course, it would be premature to consider the battle over at this point, especially given the Japanese fanaticism.
The Red Army is on top.
And on August 25, in the air, the red pilots cut off the lives of two more aces of the Imperial Air Force: Suzuki Eisaku with 11 victories and Yajima Yoshihiku with 16 defeated opponents on account.
The command of the 6th military group tried to break through the steel ring created by the soldiers of the Red Army and the MNRA with strikes from the outside, but these attempts only led to unnecessary losses in the Japanese units. At the same time, battles of unprecedented intensity were going on inside the ring with the surrounded Japanese troops, the main centers of resistance of which were formed in the areas of the Peschanaya hill, Remizov and Zelenaya heights. AT last fights to finish off the Japanese, the Red Army and Cyrics had to face a special bitterness of the enemy, who did not show a shadow of self-pity. According to the memoirs of the reconnaissance platoon commander Nikolai Grigorievich Bogdanov, "Even making sure that they would not be able to escape from the encirclement, the samurai still did not lay down their arms and perished in hand-to-hand combat until last man. All the slopes were littered with their corpses". Finally, at the very end of August, the last center of enemy resistance on the Remizov hill was destroyed. After that, the Japanese made a number of attacks on the ground, but they all did not give any result.
Red Army soldiers inspect the Japanese gun.
But if the battles on the ground practically came to naught, then the Soviet pilots still had a lot of work to do in September. On August 27, a Soviet fighter pilot, Senior Lieutenant Viktor Georgievich Rakhov, who had shot down up to 14 enemy aircraft, was shot down and died of wounds two days later. The conflict at Khalkhin Gol was the first and last battle for a 25-year-old pilot who died without knowing that a decree had been signed in the Kremlin conferring on him the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But the Japanese Air Force did not bring anything good on August 27 either - the most productive Japanese ace at that time, Shinohara Hiromichi, died, who had as many as 58 victories on his account.
Viktor Georgievich Rakhov.
Hiromichi did not become the last Japanese ace whose life path broke off over the banks of Khalkhin Gol. In these last days war, Soviet pilots reached brilliant results. On September 1, a battle took place between 188 Soviet and approximately 120 Japanese fighters, culminating in the downing of 3 Soviet and 5 Japanese fighters; another Soviet plane made an emergency landing near Tamtsak-Bulak. In this battle, the Red Army Air Force pulled out two more aces from the enemy ranks: Kodama Takayori with 11 victories and Sudo Tokuya with 10.
On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the USSR and the MPR on the one hand and Japan on the other, prescribing the cessation of hostilities from 13.00 on September 16. And on the same day, the last, largest air battle of this military conflict took place. About 120 Japanese aircraft attacked the Tamtsak-Bulak air hub, where 207 aircraft with red stars rose towards them. In the battle, 6 Soviet and 9 Japanese fighters, as well as 1 Japanese bomber, were shot down, and among the 8 dead Japanese pilots there were two more aces: Shimada Kenji with 27 victories and Yoshiyama Bunji, whose asset totaled 20 victories. They became the latest addition to the cemetery of Mikado aces, arranged by Soviet soldiers on the border Mongolian land. In general, in the September battles, the aircraft of the Kwantung Group of Forces lost 24 aircraft, while the irretrievable losses of the Red Army Air Force amounted to 16 aircraft.
The winners are photographed on the wreckage of a Japanese aircraft.
The data of the statistical study "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century. The book of losses" indicate: during the conflict on the Khalkhin Gol armed forces The Soviet Union lost 6472 people who died on the battlefield and died at the stages of sanitary evacuation, 1152 died from wounds in hospitals, 8 died from diseases, 2028 went missing and 43 died in disasters or as a result of other incidents, a total of 9703 people; sanitary losses are estimated at 15,251 people wounded and 2,225 people sick (in relation to the latter, data are incomplete).
Given the scale of the battle and the almost inevitable error for statistics, including military casualty statistics, the number irretrievable losses should be rounded up to 10 thousand people, and the number of wounded up to 15.5 thousand. Since the number of those captured did not exceed 2-3 hundred people, almost all the soldiers attributed to the irretrievable losses at Khalkhin Gol can be considered dead. It should be noted that it is not known for sure whether the Japanese returned all the prisoners of war of the Red Army. Soviet side- there is even evidence that some of the prisoners Soviet soldiers used in the experiments of Detachment 731. Mongolian losses, taking into account the victims among the border guards, according to available data, do not exceed a thousand people, of which no more three hundred lost irretrievably. However, even if these data are incomplete, it is unlikely Mongolian losses exceed 1.5 thousand people, of which at most 0.5 thousand died and went missing. Soviet losses in the main types of military equipment reached the following values: 249 aircraft, of which 42 for non-combat reasons, 253 tanks and armored cars.
Red Army soldiers inspecting a wrecked Japanese tank.
In turn, relatively Japanese losses the following data are available: 8629 killed, 1201 missing, 9087 wounded and 2350 sick. Thus, the total Japanese deadweight loss according to these data is 9830 people. However, one should take into account the encirclement of a significant part of the Japanese troops in the final phase of the battles, which almost certainly had a negative impact on the completeness of the reporting. In addition, on the monument in honor of those killed during the "Nomonkhan Incident", opened by the Japanese in Hailar in 1942, 10,301 names of soldiers and officers of the Imperial Japanese Army who died at Khalkhin Gol were carved. Considering that during the battles, the Soviet-Mongolian troops captured 226 enemy troops, of which 155 were Japanese, all or almost all of whom served in the Japanese Imperial Army, the irretrievable losses of the Japanese troops in this case almost reach 10.5 thousand people.
Taking into account the error, it is necessary to round given number up to 11 thousand. As in the case of the Red Army, almost all of these people died. Thus, taking into account the 9 thousand wounded and excluding the sick, the total Japanese casualties in the conflict at Khalkhin Gol are about 20 thousand people. In aviation, the Japanese lost 162 aircraft, including 74 decommissioned. different reasons, including combat damage.
As for the Imperial Army of Manchukuo, according to some sources, its losses do not exceed 3 thousand people, but there is no exact certainty in this - it is not even possible to say for sure whether all these 3 thousand are qualified as losses, because many of those recorded as killed or missing in action could well have actually simply deserted.
So, the main participants in the battles at Khalkhin Gol: the USSR and Japan - suffered total losses minus the sick in 25.5 and 20 thousand, respectively. At the same time, a very high proportion of irretrievable losses among the Japanese should be noted, obviously caused by the encirclement, followed by the grinding of a significant part of the 6th military group. It was this environment that made it possible to practically equalize the final losses of the parties, while in general during the battles the Japanese suffered less damage, which is explained by the better training of Japanese soldiers who served a full 2-3-year military service, compared with the then fighters of the Red Army, most of whom military service took place in the form of short-term training camps. The very extensive combat experience they received in China also played into the hands of the Japanese.
Japanese weapons captured by the Red Army
One way or another, but the result of the battles at Khalkhin Gol turned out to be a complete failure for the leadership of the Japanese Imperial Army. By arranging the "Nomonhan Incident", the tenno generals were counting on a not-too-complicated, spectacular victory in a short local conflict without the threat of a full-scale war with the USSR. In fact, the Japanese troops suffered a local, but no less painful defeat. Attempts to attribute it to the technical superiority of the Red Army only aggravated the situation - in response to the generals of Yamato, accusations immediately poured in that they had abandoned people almost from with bare hands fight against armored Soviet armadas. Because of this, in the Japanese elite, the positions of those who called for trying their luck in south seas. And in the end, in 1941, it was the "southerners" who would win.
Former Japanese artillery
However, the turn of the island empire to the south, which was just beginning, had one more reason. On August 23, a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany was signed in Moscow. In Japan, which was Anti-Comintern Pact, many considered it a betrayal that the Germans concluded a certain agreement with the Russians at the very moment when the armored wedges of the Red Army were about to close the ring around the Japanese troops on the Mongolian border. On September 4, 1939, the Japanese government declared that it did not intend to interfere in any form in the conflict in Europe, and on April 13, 1941 People's Commissar Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke signed the Soviet-Japanese Treaty of Neutrality. The USSR received, albeit shaky, but still a guarantee of Japan's non-intervention in coming war between the Soviet Union and Germany.
A modification appeared with two ShKAS synchronous machine guns mounted in the upper part of the fuselage. Designated Type 10, this four-machine-gun I-16 became known in Spain as "Super Mosca" or simply "Super". The urgency of the order led to the fact that this type continued to be refined in the process of serial construction and in its final form with the forced M-25V engine, landing flaps and retractable skis, it passed state tests at the Air Force Research Institute only in February 1939.
Type 10 entered Spain for the first time in March 1938 in the amount of 31 copies. During the summer, another 90 of these four-machine guns arrived. These aircraft took part in air battles during the summer-autumn of 1938. During this period, 24 "smuggled" American high-altitude Wright "Cyclone" F-54 engines came to Spain. These engines were equipped with aircraft of squadron No. 4, consisting of 12 I-16 type 10, commanded by one of the most successful Spanish pilots, Antonio Arias. "Supers", equipped with an engine that developed maximum power at 7000 meters, received great opportunity recoup on German fighters Bf.109. It must be said that already the first combat clashes between the I-16 and Bf.109 in the spring of 1937 showed approximately equal capabilities of these machines. However, this continued only up to a 3-kilometer altitude, where the power of the I-16 engine began to fall, and the Bf.109 engine retained power until it climbed to a height of 5000 meters. This advantage allowed the Messerschmitt pilots to almost always take a more advantageous position.
This aircraft was a major modification of the I-16 after three years serial production and had the following main differences:
- the M-25V engine of increased power was supplied;
- the armament was supplemented by two upper synchronous machine guns "ShKAS", enclosed in protruding fairings;
-sliding lantern replaced by a fixed canopy with a stainless steel frame;
-optical sight OP-1 (a copy of the British Aldis sight) was replaced by the PAK-1 collimator sight (a copy of the French Claire sight).
The airframe of the aircraft has undergone significant changes. The lining of the wing console with duralumin has been increased to 44.5% from above and to 14.5% from below. The number of ribs on the upper surface of the wing is increased.
Removed aileron hover mechanism. Landing speed reduction is achieved by installing landing flaps. In this regard, the scope of the ailerons has decreased. Most of Type 10 aircraft were produced with air-operated landing flaps. Starting from the spring of 1939, aircraft No. 102175 was equipped with a mechanical release of landing flaps.
The strengthening of the airframe of the aircraft in accordance with the strength standards of 1937 affected the strengthening of the aircraft control. A new, stronger control knob has been installed.
The oil system was changed, an oil cooler with a diameter of 6 inches was installed. In this regard, in the lower part of the hood there was a supply pipe for dynamic pressure for cooling the radiator.
Modification: I-16 type 10
Wingspan, m: 9.00
Length, m: 6.07
Height, m: 3.25
Wing area, m2: 14.54
Weight, kg
- empty: 1327
- takeoff: 1716
Engine type: 1 x PD M-25
- power, hp: 1 x 750
Max speed, km/h
-at the ground: 398
-at height: 448
Practical range, km: 525
Climbing capacity, m/min: 882
Practical ceiling, m: 8470
Crew: 1
Armament: 4 x 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns.
Fighter I-16 type 10 from the 70th Fighter Aviation Regiment during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol. July 1939.
Fighter I-16 type 10 on a ski chassis.
Fighter I-16 type 10 of the naval aviation.
Squadron commander of the 7th Fighter Aviation Regiment Fyodor Ivanovich Shinkarenko (1913-1994, third from right) with his comrades near the I-16 type 10 fighter at the airfield. In the photo from left to right: Ensign B.S. Kulbatsky, lieutenant P.A. Pokryshev, captain M.M. Kidalinsky, senior lieutenant F.I. Shinkarenko and junior lieutenant M.V. Borisov.
Fighter I-16 type 10. Mongolia 1939
Fighter I-16 type 10 from the 1st squadron of the 70th IAP after an emergency landing in the Bain-Tumen region.
Soviet pilots play dominoes near the I-16 fighter at the Mongolian Tamsag-Bulak airfield. 1939
Group Soviet pilots in flight uniforms (leather raglans, helmets and goggles) against the background of an I-16 type 10 fighter aircraft standing in the steppe. From left to right: lieutenants I.V. Shpakovsky, M.V. Kadnikov, A.P. Pavlenko, captain I.F. Podgorny, lieutenants L.F. Lychev, P.I. Spirin. Airfield near the Khalkhin-Gol River.
Republican pilots at the I-16 type 10 "Supermoska".
Fighter I-16 type 10 of the Republican Spanish Air Force in the parking lot.
Fighter I-16 type 10 of the Republican Spanish Air Force in the parking lot.
Fighter I-16 type 10 of the Republican Spanish Air Force in the parking lot.
Starting the engine on the I-16 type 10 of the Republican Spanish Air Force in the parking lot.
Fighter I-16 type 10 of the Chinese Air Force.
I-16 pilot's instrument panel type 10.
I-16 type 10 Air Force of the Red Army. Picture.
During the conflict at Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in the world, unguided aircraft missiles RS-82 were used in a real combat situation.
From August 20 to August 31, 1939, a flight of fighter-missile carriers, which included five I-16s, took part in the hostilities (link commander Captain N. Zvonarev, pilots I. Mikhailenko, S. Pimenov, V. Fedosov and T. Tkachenko), armed with RS-82 installations. On August 20, 1939, at 4 p.m., pilots over the front line met with Japanese fighters and launched the RS from a distance of about a kilometer. As a result, 2 enemy planes were shot down. The success was due to the fact that the Japanese flew in close formation and at a constant speed. In addition, the factor of surprise worked. The Japanese did not understand who was attacking them (they attributed their losses to the actions of Soviet anti-aircraft gunners).
In total, the missile-carrying link participated in 14 battles, shooting down 13 Japanese aircraft without loss. The Japanese military, having studied the wreckage of their equipment, came to the conclusion that large-caliber guns were installed on our fighters.
At that time, this weapon was considered top secret, so there is no photo of the I-16 with missiles from Mongolia. What this modification looked like can be seen in the pictures already during the Second World War
Zvonarev Nikolay Ivanovich - test pilot, colonel (194?).
Born in 1911 in the city of Tsaritsyn (now Volgograd). In 1930 he graduated from the Penza flying club.
In the army since January 1931. In 1932 he graduated from the Odessa School of Military Pilots.
Since 1934 - test pilot of the 116th Aviation Squadron special purpose, which performed special tasks of the Research Institute of the Air Force of the Red Army. Squadron pilots tested new aircraft and aviation instruments in difficult flight conditions. Spent I-Z tests c APK (1934-35), I-14 with RS-82, I-5 with RS-82 (1936).
From November 20, 1937 - test pilot of the NIP AB Air Force. Squad Leader, Test Commander aviation regiment NII AV VVS.
Member of the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River. During the period from August 19 to September 16, 1939, he made 35 sorties, conducted 14 air battles, shot down 7 enemy aircraft (2 personally and 5 in the group). On August 20, 1939, five I-16 fighters, led by Captain Zvonarev, successfully used RS-82 rockets in combat conditions for the first time.
Member of the Soviet-Finnish war.
Member of the Great Patriotic War. In 1941 on Western front completed 18 sorties on the MiG-3.
At the end of September 1941, he demonstrated the Il-2 with the RS-82 to the British military mission. Tested LaGG-3 with Sh-37, LaGG-3 with 11P-37, Me-109, Me-110, Aircobra, A-20B.
From 19?? - reserve.
He worked as a foreman at the Lipetsk Metallurgical Plant.
He was awarded twice the Order of the Red Banner (1939, 08/13/1943), the Order of the Patriotic War II degree, twice the Order of the Red Star (05/25/1936), the Order of Sukhe Bator (1939), medals.
