What did Napoleon want from Russia? At first he almost became an officer in the Russian army, then he wanted to intermarry with the Russian imperial family. The "Russian factor" became fatal for Napoleon. His campaign against Moscow was the beginning of the end of the Empire.
Military career
Perhaps Napoleon's very first plans for Russia were his desire to join the Russian army. In 1788 Russia recruited volunteers to take part in the war with Turkey. Governor-General Ivan Zaborovsky, commander of the expeditionary corps, came to Livorno to "keep an eye on military affairs" of Christian volunteers: militant Albanians, Greeks, Corsicans. By this time, Napoleon graduated with honors from the Paris military school with the rank of lieutenant. In addition, his family was in poverty - his father died, the family was left with virtually no means. Napoleon applied for readiness to serve in the Russian army.
However, just a month before Bonaparte's request for enrollment, a decree was issued in the Russian army - to take foreign officers into the Russian corps with a demotion by one rank. Napoleon was not satisfied with this option. Having received a written refusal, purposeful Napoleon managed to be accepted by the head of the Russian military commission. But this did not work, and, as they say, the offended Bonaparte ran out of Zaborovsky's office, promising that he would offer his candidacy to the King of Prussia: "The King of Prussia will give me the rank of captain!" True, as you know, he also did not become a Prussian captain, remaining to make a career in France.
Intermarry with the Russian Emperor
In 1809, already being emperor, Napoleon, to his regret, learned about the infertility of the Empress Josephine. Perhaps the disease developed during her imprisonment in Karm prison, when French revolution. Despite the sincere affection that bound Napoleon and this woman, the young dynasty needed a legitimate heir. Therefore, after long outpourings and tears, the couple parted according to mutual desire.
Josephine, like Napoleon, did not belong to blue blood To secure his position on the throne, Bonaparte needed a princess. Strange as it may seem, there was no question of choice - according to Napoleon, the future French empress should have been Russian Grand Duchess. Most likely, this was due to Napoleon's plans for a long-term alliance with Russia. He needed the latter in order, firstly, to keep the whole of Europe in subjection, and secondly, he counted on the helping hand of Russia in Egypt and in the subsequent transfer of the war to Bengal and India. He built these plans back in the days of Paul I.
In this regard, Napoleon badly needed a marriage with one of the sisters of Emperor Alexander - Catherine or Anna Pavlovna. At first, Napoleon tried to achieve the favor of Catherine, and most importantly the blessing of her mother, Maria Feodorovna. But, while the Grand Duchess herself said that she would rather marry the last Russian stoker than “this Corsican”, her mother began to hastily look for her daughter a suitable party, if only she would not go to the unpopular French “usurper” in Russia .
Almost the same thing happened to Anna. When in 1810 the French ambassador Caulaincourt turned to Alexander with a semi-official offer of Napoleon, the Russian emperor also vaguely answered him that he had no right to control the fate of his sisters, since by the will of his father Pavel Petrovich, this prerogative completely went to his mother Maria Feodorovna.
Russia as a foothold
Napoleon Bonaparte was not at all going to dwell on the subjugation of Russia. He dreamed of the empire of Alexander the Great, his further goals lay far in India. Thus, he was going to sting Great Britain with the peak of the Russian Cossacks in her most painful place. In other words, take over the rich English colonies. Such a conflict could lead to a complete collapse british empire. At one time, according to the historian Alexander Katzur, Paul I also thought about this project. Back in 1801, the French agent in Russia, Gitten, conveyed to Napoleon “... Russia from its Asian possessions ... could give a helping hand French army in Egypt and, acting in concert with France, transfer the war to Bengal." There was even a joint Russian-French project - a 35,000-strong army under the command of General Massena, to which Russian Cossacks joined in the Black Sea region, through the Caspian, Persia, Herat and Kandahar were to go to the provinces of India. And in fairyland the allies had to immediately "grab the British by the schulats."
The words of Napoleon, already during his exile to the island of St. Helena, are known, which he said to the Irish doctor Barry Edward O`Meara assigned to him: "If Paul had remained alive, you would have already lost India."
Moscow was not included in the plans
The decision to go to Moscow was for Napoleon not a military one, but a political one. According to A.P. Shuvalov, it was the reliance on politics that was the main mistake of Bonaparte. Shuvalov wrote: “He based his plans on political calculations. These calculations turned out to be false, and its building collapsed.
The ideal solution from the military point of view was to stay for the winter in Smolensk; Napoleon discussed these plans with the Austrian diplomat von Metternich. Bonaparte declared: “My enterprise belongs to those whose decision is given by patience. The triumph will be the lot of the more patient. I will open the campaign by crossing the Neman. I will finish it in Smolensk and Minsk. I will stop there."
The same plans were voiced by Bonaparte and according to the memoirs of General de Suger. He wrote down following words Napoleon, which he said to General Sebastiani in Vilna: “I will not cross the Dvina. To want to go further during this year is to go to your own death.”
It is obvious that the campaign against Moscow was a forced step for Napoleon. According to the historian V.M. Bezotosny, Napoleon "expected that the whole campaign would fit within the framework of the summer - the maximum of the beginning of the autumn of 1812." Moreover, the French emperor planned to spend the winter of 1812 in Paris, but political situation messed up all his cards. Historian A.K. Dzhivelegov wrote: “To stop for the winter in Smolensk meant to revive all possible discontent and unrest in France and Europe. Politics drove Napoleon further and forced him to violate his excellent original plan.
The tactics of the Russian army came as an unpleasant surprise to Napoleon. He was sure that the Russians would be forced to give a general battle to save their capital, and Alexander I would ask for peace to save her. These predictions were thwarted. Napoleon was ruined by both the retreat from his original plans and the retreat of the Russian army under the leadership of General Barclay de Tolly.
Before the castling of Tolly and Kutuzov, the French were awarded only two battles. At the beginning of the campaign, such behavior of the enemy was in the hands of the French emperor, he dreamed of reaching Smolensk with small losses and stopping there. The fate of Moscow was to be decided by a general battle, which Napoleon himself called the grand coup. It was needed by both Napoleon and France.
But everything turned out differently. Near Smolensk, the Russian armies managed to unite and they continued to draw Napoleon deep into the vast country. Grand coup was postponed. The French entered the empty cities, finished their last supplies and panicked. Later, sitting on the island of St. Helena, Napoleon recalled: “My regiments, amazed that after so many difficult and deadly transitions the fruits of their efforts are constantly moving away from them, began to look with concern at the distance separating them from France.”
So, I give the floor to Sergey Leksutov, Omsk, 2003.
Was Kutuzov going to defeat Napoleon? Any competent infantry lieutenant, if he thoughtfully reads the history of the war in the twelfth year in a textbook, immediately sees a lot of absurdities and inconsistencies in Kutuzov's behavior, and in general, in his conduct of the war. It will be objected to me that it is not given to an infantry lieutenant to comprehend the greatness of the plans of a great commander! Have mercy, gentlemen! Only from competent lieutenants grow great commanders! Those who are illiterate are retired in the ranks of majors. Kutuzov himself started as a lieutenant at Suvorov, and he fought with the former artillery lieutenant Bonaparte, who, it seems, only rose to the rank of colonel, and then appropriated the title of emperor to himself, and he seemed to have nothing to climb further up the career ladder. So, let's put aside false modesty, and look at the campaign of the twelfth year with the eyes of a competent infantry lieutenant.
DID NAPOLEON HOPE TO CONQUER RUSSIA?
Even Frederick the Great expressed the sound idea that it was impossible to defeat Russia in a war, especially on its territory. Napoleon could not but know the opinion of his great predecessor, and he himself was a sickly commander; could have thought of it myself. At the end of the nineteenth century, Bismarck only confirmed the conventional wisdom that it was impossible to conquer Russia. Although there has already been a shameful defeat in the Crimean war. Defeat, but not conquest! Crimea was not taken away from Russia. In addition, this defeat turned into a victory: in 1853, the old wooden fleet was flooded, and soon a navy of the latest steam ships appeared on the Black Sea.
A version slips in the history textbook. As if Napoleon was going to go to India through the territory of Russia, Central Asia and the Hindu Kush... But how to overcome this route of a half-million army, in which the main means of transportation and draft power are horses? For such a mass of horses, it would be simply impossible to find fodder and water on many stretches of the journey. How did the Napoleonic foragers hope to supply the army hundreds of kilometers away?
In addition, all available forces were not needed to capture India. The British did not hold large forces in India, and detachments of sepoys, at the first appearance of the French, would have rushed into their arms with joyful cries. The reliability of the sepoy detachments is evidenced at least by the fact that in the middle of the enlightened nineteenth century the British shot the rebellious sepoys by tying them to the muzzles of cannons, in order to greatly intimidate the survivors. Yes, and there is nothing to go far for: Napoleon was the idol of all Russian officers and young nobles without exception. What can we say about the Indians who slept and saw how to get rid of the damned English! An expeditionary corps of ten to twenty thousand people was enough.
WHAT DID THE KINGS TALK ABOUT IN TILZIT?
Protocols, as you know, were not kept. We talked alone. Perhaps the clue to the "Russian campaign" in Tilsit? Maybe there was a primitive collusion? And then, when Napoleon invaded Russia, Alexander got scared of something and vulgarly “changed his mind”? Or maybe he was afraid earlier, and Napoleon, by his invasion, hoped to move him to some kind of joint action, which was agreed upon in Tilsit? Not in vain, a couple of years before the invasion, when the French ambassador urged Alexander to join continental blockade England and threatened war, Alexander serenely said that he was not afraid of war, and would retreat even to Kamchatka. Napoleon could not help but know that it was impossible to defeat Russia, but he urgently needed it not defeated, but in the form of an ally. By the twelfth year, he realized that without Russia, England could not be defeated and put everything at stake. And lost. Most likely, Alexander's innate cunning played a role. It should not be discounted that he was a parricide. It says a lot about a person's character. Worthy of surprise is the fact of the assassination of Emperor Paul. Quite a few years have passed since the death of Catherine II, the division of warm places has ended, everything has settled down, and suddenly ... As usual in Russia, all the dogs were hung on the late emperor retroactively. And he was weak-minded, and an alcoholic, and a fan of Friedrich. First, aren't there too many imbecile emperors for long-suffering Russia? Peter the Third, it turns out, was also a feeble-minded, and an alcoholic, and an admirer of Friedrich ... And who, if not Friedrich, should be worshiped ?! To the greatest general of the eighteenth century, who created the best army in Europe! In my opinion, if you take a closer look, behind the backs of the guardsmen who were strangling the emperor with a scarf and hitting him on the head with a snuffbox, someone should loom, with english surname, and in the pockets of the guards, English gold must have rang. Indeed, objective reasons there was no coup, they were later invented, retroactively. There was only one reason: Paul was the first to gravitate toward an alliance with Napoleon. Not such a crazy idea. If you think about it, Russia got a lot of benefits from the alliance with Napoleon. But as soon as she began to gravitate towards England, all sorts of misfortunes immediately fell on her. (The last and most cruel misfortune was the entry into the war of 1914 on the side of England and for British interests, and the revolution that followed.) And England's Russia was vital! Few people think about this, but at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, Russian wood was a strategic raw material for England; the whole English fleet from the keel to the tops of the masts was built from Russian pine! By the end of the eighteenth century, England had lost almost all of its sources of timber. The colony on the American continent turned into the United States, and became the worst enemy of its mother country. And Canadian timber was not available for the same reason - Canada belonged entirely to France, the original enemy of England. The wood that grows in India is of little use for the construction of ship hulls. For this, conifers are needed. And conifers grow there in the inaccessible highlands of the Himalayas in very small quantities. So, not from a good life, it was in England that, for the first time in the world, ship hulls subsequently began to be made of steel. Thanks to this, England got rid of the need to buy timber in Russia for the construction of ships. That is why she dared to go to war with Russia in 1853. Now back to Napoleon.
FACTS AND NUMBERS
In the history textbook recommended for the history faculties of pedagogical institutes - "The History of the USSR from Ancient Times to 1861", (Publishing House "Prosveshchenie" 1983) - it is written in black and white that six hundred thousand Napoleonic soldiers and officers crossed the border of Russia. 130,000 - 135,000 reached Borodin. Losses amounted to about 150,000. After reading such a stunning message, I suspected that the gentlemen of historians were not good with arithmetic, and then I realized that historians did not really think about the meaning of the primary source that fell into their hands. So, adding up two numbers in a column, we get - 280,000 people. The question is, where did the rest of the 320,000 soldiers and officers go? Lost in the vastness of Russia?
It is well known that Napoleon did not leave large garrisons anywhere, simply, there was no need - all combat-ready Russian troops retreated to Moscow. There were garrisons in Jekabpils, Vilnius, Volokovysk, Minsk, Borisov, Mogilev, Orsha, Vitebsk and Smolensk, but not 320,000 people! If this were the case, then the retreating Napoleonic army, like a snowball, would wrap them around itself, and not 30,000 people, but all 300,000 would go to the Berezina! However, this did not happen. If all these disappeared, plus recorded losses, are the true losses of the Napoleonic army, then this means that the losses amounted to 80% personnel. For any army, this is a disaster, equivalent to a complete defeat. Yes, in general, and 60% loss is also tantamount to a disaster. Isn't it easier to assume that the number of Napoleon's army was 280,000 people? Or even less. Judging by the ratio of losses, it turns out two hundred and thirty thousand. The two active Russian armies had a total strength of 200,000 men. 120,000 people came to Borodin. (Some documents mention the figure - 157,000 people). Napoleon, of course, had to suffer heavy losses, because an advancing army always suffers heavy losses. Why was the size of the Napoleonic army more than doubled? And by whom? Perhaps even by Kutuzov himself. After all, it is believed that he was a diligent student of Suvorov. It is known that after the assault on Ishmael, one of the officers asked the commander how many dead Turks should be indicated in the report? To which Suvorov, with his usual humor, replied: “There is nothing to regret about the Basurmans, write more ...” So such a perfect, such a rounded number appeared to the world - 100,000. Although, perhaps this is taken from jokes about Suvorov - how could so many people be accommodated in Izmail ? And maybe later for a long time later after the war, someone, in order to stick out the genius of Kutuzov, exaggerated the size of the Napoleonic army? This mystery is among other mysteries associated with the personality of Kutuzov.
Further, in the same textbook we read that 50,000 Napoleonic soldiers died on the Borodino field. 130,000 minus 50,000 turns out to be 80,000. And suddenly we read further that 100,000 Frenchmen are already retreating from Moscow, and 40,000 wagons with looted goods are following them. Where did another 60,000 soldiers come from if Napoleon did not receive reinforcements from France, and the roads to Moscow were cut by Russian troops, assuming that the stragglers pulled up? Suppose that Russian prisoners were sitting on carts with looted goods, in this case it was still necessary to put at least one soldier with a gun on each wagon. Because the Russian driver, taking advantage of the confusion of the retreat, could at any right moment turn left, and after five or six miles you will be at the location of the Russian troops. Yes, it would not be bad for gentlemen historians to decide on these wizards, Napoleonic soldiers ... Either they disappear in hundreds of thousands, they appear out of nowhere in tens of thousands ...
Most likely, forty thousand wagons with loot, the same myth as the six hundred thousand soldiers who crossed the border of Russia. Napoleonic soldiers simply would not have had time to loot anything. The fact is that there is a lot of evidence that Moscow caught fire from all over even before the French entered it. That is why they rushed to catch the arsonists; after all, these villains burned their winter apartments!
WHY DID YOU FIGHT UNDER Borodino?
Before the arrival of Kutuzov in the army, the war went on without oddities, as usual - the three Russian armies, widely stretched along the border, gradually converged towards the direction of Napoleon's main attack.
By the way, where does the conclusion about mediocrity of Barclay de Tolly come from? The armies were scattered over a wide area not by his order, and with available forces he could only fight rearguard battles. As soon as enough strength was gathered for the battle, Barclay decided to give it to the Tsar's Zaimishch. What is Kutuzov doing? And he withdraws the army from the equipped positions of Tsarev Zaimishch and leads it to Borodino, arguing that there are not enough forces yet. During those few days that the army was marching towards Borodino, reinforcements still physically could not come up! After a grueling march, the army builds fortifications all night long before the battle. The full impression is that Kutuzov deliberately reduces the combat capability of his army!
Your will, gentlemen, but from the point of view of an infantry lieutenant, the Russian troops on the Borodino field are located in a very, very strange way! Firstly, what is Barclay's 40,000-strong corps doing, standing far behind the right flank, on the banks of the Kolocha River with steep banks? And does nothing! So he did not move anywhere for the entire duration of the battle. Also, the twenty-thousandth reserve, which was stationed near the village of Tatarinovo, did not move anywhere. Only episodically small detachments were sent either to Bagration's flushes or to Raevsky's battery. The main forces of the French were crushed only on the Raevsky battery! The inaction of Barclay's corps can be explained by only one thing: he covered Gorki, where Kutuzov's headquarters was, and had to cover the commander's possible flight. Nothing else can explain this strange and senseless standing of forty thousand Russian soldiers! A flank strike across the Kolocha River, not a single normal commander would inflict - for the cavalry this river was a good trap, and the infantry attack would be ineffective: the defenders would simply drop the attacking chains with bayonets from the high bank.
The result of the Battle of Borodino was that the Russians and the French were equal in terms of manpower. But! The Russians have fifty more guns, and this is a tangible advantage. But Kutuzov decides to surrender Moscow. In that case, how can one explain the massacre he committed on the Borodino field? After all, his leitmotif - to save the army at any cost - is replicated in all textbooks and in all works of art about the twelfth year campaign. If he really wanted to save the army, there was no need to ruin forty-four thousand soldiers and officers. It was necessary to immediately surrender Moscow, cut the roads, especially in the surrounding cities there were already thousands of people's militia detachments (in the history textbook the figure slips - 300,000 people), and calmly wait. In a month Napoleon would have asked for peace, in two he would have surrendered unconditionally.
TACTICS OR CRIME?
In the entire campaign, the only logical maneuver was Kutuzov's Tarutinsky maneuver. But how did he know that Napoleon would not go to St. Petersburg, which was only a week away on horseback? The capital is covered by only a few regiments palace guard, snickering and decomposed for a long time, having not smelled gunpowder for a hundred years!
So, Napoleon is sitting in Moscow, Kutuzov is in Tarutino. Only the Napoleonic soldiers are already starving, and reinforcements are constantly approaching Kutuzov, and by the end of September his army has 240,000 people. In that case, what are you waiting for? great commander?! With more than half a million soldiers available, even if half of them were peasants with axes, and landowners with hunting rifles, against eighty thousand Frenchmen, he could simply surround Moscow from all sides. In this situation, Napoleon would never have decided on a breakthrough.
The next oddity of the conduct of the war by Kutuzov: in the presence of numerous Cossack formations, for some reason Napoleonic couriers dart from Moscow and to Moscow without hindrance. Napoleon "secretly" comes out of Moscow and moves for six days to Maloyaroslavets, and Kutuzov does not even know about it! What's this? Poor intelligence? Ignorance, or criminal intent? This is followed by a tense battle for Maloyaroslavets. Kutuzov could not but understand the importance of Maloyaroslavets, and, nevertheless, sparingly sends small detachments to him, as a result of which the city changes hands seven times. What prevented Kutuzov, having a threefold numerical superiority, to immediately send a grouping to Maloyaroslavets sufficient to reliably block Napoleon's withdrawal route ?! What masks the heroism of Russian soldiers near Maloyaroslavets; mediocrity of the commander, or criminal intent?
Desperate to break through to the Kaluga road, Napoleon leaves the army, and, accompanied by several cavalrymen, rides freely through a hostile country to the border. Where is Denis Davydov? Where are three or four more partisan detachments formed from soldiers and officers of the regular army? Where are the Cossacks who will follow the devil and with bare hands catch? However, another version dominates in the textbooks: that Napoleon left his army only near Vilna. It is doubtful... Most likely, this is a nod to Napoleon.
Indeed, what should the emperor do in a defeated, retreating army? Generals can also lead the retreat. Further, dying of hunger, deprived of ammunition, abandoning cannons because of eating horses, the French army drags itself to the border, and Kutuzov literally holds his generals by the pants, who are rushing, if only out of mercy, to capture the dying French. What happened to the diligent student of Suvorov? The ingenious Teacher, with his inherent laconism, said: “The environment is a victory!”
Kutuzov himself sends reports to St. Petersburg about bloody rearguard battles. Have mercy, gentlemen! Eyewitnesses claim that the French were chasing Russian officers by the thousands, with the sole purpose of surrendering! Because it was better for the partisan peasants not to get caught - they would chop them into cabbage with axes without any talk! The history textbook also talks about bloody battles. This statement could have flown there only from Kutuzov's reports! So, there were already 60,000 French near Smolensk. Have you forgotten that there were 240,000 Russians? And all the reinforcements fit? What awaits the great commander, having a fourfold superiority? 40,000 Frenchmen came out to the Berezina, and, nevertheless, thirty thousand of them managed to cross. And Russia got two more years of war in Europe. Because already two months later Napoleon was at the head of a three hundred thousandth army. Your will, gentlemen, but if I were in the place of Emperor Alexander, I would appoint commission of inquiry, and put Kutuzov on trial by a military tribunal!
GENIUS KUTUZOV
However, Alexander did not appoint, and did not subject ... Why? For only one reason: such a clear unwillingness to defeat Napoleon was the will of the emperor himself! Alexander did not want to defeat Napoleon. And Kutuzov, as an experienced courtier, sensitively guessed the will of the emperor, and almost brilliantly fulfilled it; So much so that almost no one guessed about it. In gratitude, Alexander made him great and brilliant. But in fact, he was a good colonel under Suvorov, but he didn’t pull a field marshal with himself. Yes, and the generals did a great job with their heroism, they almost defeated Napoleon; all these Yermolovs, Raevskys, Dokhturovs, Bagrations, Miloradoviches ... It was not for nothing that they were then scattered to command provincial corps. Except Miloradovich. But Miloradovich was a simple dashing fighter, and in principle he could not shed light on the oddities of the campaign of the twelfth year. Perhaps Alexander saw his own benefit in having Europe endlessly at war with Napoleon, and Russia either joining the anti-Napoleonic coalition, or joining the continental blockade.
One thing is certain - Alexander disguised some dirty political game of his with victorious fanfare. And having exalted Kutuzov, turning him into a sort of sacred cow, finally obscured them. It is unlikely that we will ever know what kind of conspiracy it was, because of which Napoleon put everything on the line ... Although, an experienced historian who is good at working with documents, versed in the political realities of the first decade of the nineteenth century could have calculated. It is doubtful that anyone would undertake it; too much has been written about the war and the genius of Kutuzov. Although historians admit that Kutuzov was also a “brilliant” sycophant and sycophant, for some reason they do not doubt his genius as a commander. Although, it in itself is doubtful that the sycophant and sycophant was suddenly reborn and became a great commander. An indirect confirmation that Kutuzov is an exaggerated figure is at least the fact that neither his generals nor subsequent Russian officers, until 1917, said anything at all about Kutuzov! Neither good nor bad, and even more so, no one was stuffed into his disciples. Perhaps they knew something about Kutuzov that historians deny, like the devil from incense? (Not a bad expression; hell, and deny it ...) But the Russian officers were silent or observing their officer honor; did not want to get dirty, or for some other reason. But personally, it is not clear to me why a combat officer, participant Crimean War, Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy, who undoubtedly knew about the dirty background of Kutuzov’s “genius”, took the official point of view, and Kutuzov was brought out of him as a sort of folk hero? .. However, this can be explained psychologically: by the middle of the nineteenth century, a sort of global romantic the legend of the Great Victory, the highest patriotic impulse of the Russian people is also sung. Apparently, Tolstoy considered that he had no right to destroy such a grandiose and beautiful legend, but he considered himself and had no right not to write about the people in the war of the twelfth year. Now one can only guess about Tolstoy's motives ... If until 1917 the court chroniclers and biased historians were engaged in the exaltation of Kutuzov, and the military in general, kept proud silence, then after the seventeenth year, and especially during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Bolsheviks took up the matter. Seems like this one folk hero, written out by Leo Tolstoy, because the leaf image of Kutuzov is in no way similar to the real Kutuzov, as his contemporaries describe him.
BIG GAME, ALMOST KIPLING
Reflecting on the ridiculous gestures of the great Bonaparte, and the "brilliant" courtier Kutuzov, I came to the conclusion that from the point of view official history it is impossible to explain the sudden insanity of the first and the apparent sabotage of the second. But everything falls into place, if we assume that Alexander, back in Tilsit, promised not to impede the passage of the expeditionary corps to India through the territory of Russia. But then the pro-English clique at court put pressure on him, and in order not to get hit on the head with a snuffbox, or something even heavier, he surrendered. By sending a burnt out courtier and a faithful Angloman to the troops, Alexander reliably ensured the observance of English interests. And he himself, in order not to lose face and not remain in history as an English lackey, retired from command of the army, but he managed to express his will to Kutuzov, or show, or hint: in any case, Napoleon must leave Russia alive.
Then the massacre on the Borodino field and other oddities become clear. Firstly, despite the clear threat of invasion, no one bothered to pull the Russian armies to the direction of Napoleon's main attack; they stood like that until the very invasion, stretching along the entire western border of Russia. Bonaparte, most likely, planned to quickly march to Moscow, and immediately send an expeditionary corps along the Ryazan road towards Astrakhan, and with the main forces to tie down the possible pursuit of this corps by Russian troops. Perhaps he did not even expect any resistance from the Russian troops. Remember Alexander's phrase? “I am not afraid of war, and I will retreat even to Kamchatka ...”
Napoleon invaded Russia with not too much big forces, but not small, so that the war does not look like an operetta. It is clear why Kutuzov did not bring almost half of his army into battle on the Borodino field - he wanted to exclude the slightest possibility of the passage of the expeditionary force. Moscow was burned, most likely on the direct orders of Kutuzov. After all, having rested in Moscow, Napoleon could either send an expeditionary force to the southeast, or break through there with all the remnants of the army. Apparently Kutuzov before last moment and waited for a similar maneuver by Napoleon. Therefore, he settled in Tarutino, and not in Maloyaroslavets. Therefore, the movement of Napoleon's army to Maloyaroslavets was a complete surprise for Kutuzov.
Kutuzov's sitting in Tarutino is hardly explainable from the point of view of the generally accepted version, but if he expected Napoleon's breakthrough to the southeast, then this becomes quite logical. Kutuzov intended to let Napoleon's army pass him along the Ryazan road, and then destroy it with a blow from the rear. Well, if Napoleon sent an expeditionary force, and he himself tried to tie down the Russian army with the main forces, it would have turned out even better: with a flank attack, Kutuzov would have cut off the expeditionary force from the main forces, fettered them, and even a couple would have coped with the expeditionary force Cossack divisions: they would be cut down gradually on a long journey through the steppes.
It receives a logical explanation and the only decisive gesture of Kutuzov for the entire time of sitting in Tarutino is an order to defeat Murat's cavalry. And even then the generals persuaded Kutuzov for a long time and stubbornly, proving the need to defeat the cavalry. Why did it happen? Is it the cavalry? And not the whole army? And most of all fussed someone Benigsen. Very much his surname looks like an English one ... (By the way, he later smashed Murat's corps.) Yes, without cavalry, a raid on India became absolutely impossible!
By the way, on the Berezina, the Napoleonic army was nevertheless surrounded by two corps, and the third corps, which was late, was supposed to close the encirclement, which the French took advantage of. And the great commander Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov personally commanded the late corps!
Having come to these conclusions, I must admit that I began to respect Kutuzov! Well, what a trickster you have to be in order to make such a pirouette: he observed the interests of England, did not let the expeditionary corps go to India, and fulfilled the secret will of the emperor!
It is with regret that we have to state that the Patriotic War of the twelfth year was not at all domestic, and rivers of Russian blood were shed for the English interest. Because only England received all the benefits from the defeat of Napoleon, while Europe and Russia remained in their interest. Napoleon would not have invaded Russia at all if Alexander had kept a firm and clear position. But he twisted and turned, wriggled and maneuvered, played a dirty political game, and then created a giant exaggerated figure of the "great" commander and was shielded by it for centuries.
On June 24, 1812, the army of the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte invaded the borders without declaring war. Russian Empire. 640 thousand foreign soldiers suddenly crossed the Neman.
Bonaparte planned to complete the "Russian campaign" in three years: in 1812, having mastered the western provinces from Riga to Lutsk, in 1813 - Moscow, in 1814 - St. Petersburg. Before the invasion, when Russian diplomats still trying to save the situation and take the war away from their country, Napoleon conveyed young emperor Alexander 1 letter. It contained the following lines: “The day will come when Your Majesty admits that you lacked neither firmness, nor trust, nor sincerity ... Your Majesty themselves ruined your reign.” Since that time, 202 years have passed. But how does this message remind, almost word for word, those remarks and comments in relation to modern Russia, its leader Vladimir Putin, who are now flying to us from across the ocean, and from the European Union in connection with the situation in Ukraine! ..
Napoleon planned to complete his campaign in three years, but everything ended much faster.
Why did Napoleon go to Russia?
According to Academician Tarle, who wrote a monograph on Napoleon, there was a crop failure in France, and it was for bread that Bonaparte moved to Russia. But this, of course, is only one of the reasons. And - not the most important. Among the main ones are the lust for power of the former little corporal, his “Alexander the Great complex”, later renamed the “Napoleon complex”, the dream of nullifying the power of the neighbor England, for which the forces of one continental Europe he was clearly not enough.
Napoleon's army was considered the best, the best in the Old World. But here is what Countess Choiseul-Gouffier wrote about her in her memoirs: “The Lithuanians are amazed at the confusion in the diverse troops of the Great Army. Six hundred thousand people walked in two lines without provisions, without provisions for life, through a country impoverished by the continental system ... Churches were plundered, church utensils were stolen, cemeteries desecrated. The French army, stationed in Vilna, suffered a shortage of bread for three days, the soldiers were given food for horses, the horses died like flies, their corpses were dumped into the river "...
The European Napoleonic army was opposed by about 240 thousand Russian soldiers. At the same time, the Russian army was divided into three groups far apart from each other. They were commanded by Generals Barclay de Tolly, Bagration and Tormasov. With the advance of the French, the Russians retreated with exhausting battles for the enemy. Napoleon is behind them, stretching his communications and losing superiority in strength.
Why not Petersburg?
"Which road leads to Moscow?" - Napoleon asked shortly before the invasion of Balashov, adjutant of Alexander 1. “You can choose any road to Moscow. Karl X11, for example, chose Poltava,” Balashov replied. How to look into the water!
Why did Bonaparte go to Moscow, and not to the Russian capital - Petersburg? This remains a mystery to historians to this day. Petersburg was Imperial Courtyard, state institutions, palaces and estates of high dignitaries. In the event of the approach of enemy troops, fearing for the safety of property, they could influence the king so that he concluded peace with the French emperor on unfavorable terms for our country. And it was simply more convenient to go to St. Petersburg from Poland, from where the French military campaign began. The road from the West to the Russian capital was wide and solid, unlike in Moscow. In addition, on the way to the capital, it was necessary to overcome the then dense forests of Bryansk.
It seems that the commander of Bonaparte ambitions prevailed over reason. His words are known: “If I take Kyiv, I will take Russia by the legs. If I take possession of Petersburg, I will take her by the head. But if I enter Moscow, I will strike Russia in the very heart. By the way, many Western politicians are considered now. Everything in history repeats itself!
pitched battle
By August 24, 1812, the Napoleonic troops reached the Shevardinsky redoubt, where, before the general battle, they were detained by the soldiers of General Gorchakov. And two days later the great Battle of Borodino began. In it, as it is believed, no one won. But it was there that Napoleon suffered his main defeat - like the Nazis in Stalingrad 131 years later.
The French army numbered 136 thousand soldiers and officers near Borodino. Russian (according to various sources) - 112-120 thousand. Yes, for the time being, 8-9 thousand regular troops remained with us in reserve, including the guards Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky shelves. Then they, too, were thrown into battle.
The main blow of the Napoleonic troops fell on the corps of General Nikolai Raevsky. Of the 10 thousand soldiers of the corps, by the end of the 12-hour massacre, only about seven hundred people remained alive. The battery of the brave general changed hands several times during the battle. The French later called it none other than the "grave of the French cavalry."
Much has been written about the battle of Borodino in both countries. It remains to quote the words of himself: " battle of Borodino was the most beautiful and most formidable, the French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians deserved to be invincible.
"Finita la comedy!".
Napoleon managed to enter Moscow. But nothing good awaited him there. I managed only to remove sheets of pure gold from the temples of the "golden-domed" ones. Some of them went to cover the dome of the Les Invalides in Paris. The ashes of Bonaparte himself now rest in the temple of this House.
Already in burned and plundered Moscow, Napoleon three times offered to sign a peace treaty with Russia. He made his first attempts from a position of strength, demanding from Russian emperor the rejection of some territories, the confirmation of the blockade of England and the conclusion of a military alliance with France. The third, last, he did with the help of his ambassador, General Laurinston, sending him not to Alexander 1, but to Kutuzov, and accompanying his message with the words: “I need peace, I need it absolutely no matter what, save only honor.” Didn't wait for an answer.
The end of the Patriotic War is known: Kutuzov and his comrades drove the French out of Russia at an accelerated pace. Already in December of the same 1812, solemn prayer services were served in all churches in honor of the liberation of their native land from the devastating invasion of the "twelve peoples." Russia stood alone against the Army of Europe. And - won!
Why did Napoleon leave Moscow?
After the Battle of Tarutino, the French emperor takes final decision leave the old Russian capital, but he faces main question where to move in the future and how to bring your army to its destination in maximum safety.
"Woe to those who stand in my way!"
Even a few days before leaving Moscow, it was obvious to Napoleon that, firstly, the war would drag on and possibly last several more seasons; secondly, in the near future there is no possibility of capturing St. Petersburg, since the washed-out roads in the Tver province and Kutuzov’s army left in the rear prevent it; thirdly, the allies of the emperor will not be too zealous in their help, as soon as they know that the affairs of the Grand Army are really bad; fourthly, it is vital for the French army to find some new sources to replenish supplies of provisions, fodder and arsenal. All this was complicated by the fact that the return to their bases directly for the Great Army was impossible due to the complete ruin of the Smolensk road. When on October 19 (7) Napoleon left Moscow, he said: Let's go to Kaluga! And woe to those who stand in my way!”
The retreat of the French army from Moscow, November-December 1812. Hood. Johann Lorenz Rugendas. Army Museum. Paris.
Not a retreat, but a new attack?
Still remains open question about where, after all, Napoleon was heading with his army in mid-October, what was his real goal? All historians are inclined to believe that Napoleon really went to Kaluga and hoped that with or without a fight he would enter this city. However, as Domergue testifies, the army was told that the emperor “I intend to give a big battle and return in a few days, but not otherwise than by destroying the enemy” and that the movement that has begun is not a retreat, but a new attack.
Napoleon really set out in the direction of the Tarutinsky camp along the old Kaluga road with all his troops. Nevertheless, already at the end of the first day of his campaign, the French emperor orders to turn onto the new Kaluga road and move along it to Borovsk and Maloyaroslavets.
This maneuver of the emperor makes one think about the true plans of the Great Army after leaving Moscow. On the one hand, this movement clearly indicates that the information spread among the army about the upcoming general battle, which the emperor is set for, is incorrect; on the other hand, what true purpose Napoleon is precisely "Kali-chum" (as the emperor called Kaluga), but what are his future plans- was still a mystery.
Winter in the "Polish Lands"
Some contemporaries and historians Napoleonic Wars It is believed that, breaking through to Kaluga, the French emperor hoped not only to replenish his supplies there, but also to continue his movement southwest to the Little Russian regions of the Russian Empire, as well as to the Bryansk and Tula warehouses and factories, which would be quite likely if Napoleon would not understand that even in these untouched by war and extremely fertile lands he will not be able to quickly receive reinforcements due to opposition local population, and threats of attack by the armies of Chichagov and Ertel.
In this regard, most researchers of the question of Napoleon's plans reject the idea of a "Ukrainian campaign" and talk about the attempt of the Great Army to get as close as possible to its food warehouses and military arsenals, the closest of which were in Smolensk, where, in fact, after the occupation of Kaluga, it should the army was to move. This can be confirmed by such indirect facts as sending all the sick and wounded who are allowed to be moved to Mozhaisk, and a number of orders from the French headquarters to stop the transport of reinforcements beyond Smolensk, and, finally, Napoleon's letters themselves, which clearly indicate that the emperor I was going to spend the winter in the "Polish lands".
According to the idea of the French General Staff, the Grand Army was supposed to return to their bases before the onset of cold weather, but along already slightly frozen roads. Napoleon even ordered to look at all available Russian calendars for the previous 40 years in order to understand when winter begins in Russia. The result for the emperor was quite acceptable: according to staff researchers, it was not necessary to wait for serious cold weather before December. It was precisely in the expectation of warm weather that the French decided on that huge detour through Kaluga, which the Great Army would have to make to reach Smolensk. The cold that began soon showed the groundlessness of these conclusions.
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Chronicle of the day: The French arrived in with. Fominsky
French troops arrived in the village of Fominskoye, where the 4th Army and 3rd Reserve Corps of the Great Army were concentrated. Napoleon moved his main apartment to the village of Pleskovo Podolsky district where the colonel returned to him Bertemi. From the words of the colonel, Napoleon realized that Kutuzov did not know about the French movement towards Kaluga.
Main Forces main army still remained in Tarutino. Kutuzov did not really know that Napoleon had left Moscow. However, in the evening he received a message from flying squad I.S. Dorokhov that part of the troops of the 14th Infantry Division of General Zh.B. Brusier moved from the village of Fominskoye to the village of Kotovo. In order not to lose precious time, despite the descending twilight, Kutuzov sent the 6th Corps of D.S. to Fominsky. Dokhturova.
Person: Pierre Augustin Berthemy
Berthemy Pierre Augustin (1778-1855)
Cuirassier of the 8th Regiment, in 1799-1801 served in Army of the Rhine. He took part in the campaign of 1805, during which he distinguished himself at the Battle of Austerlitz, where he was wounded in the leg. In 1806 he was promoted to lieutenant. AT next year again distinguished himself on the battlefield, this time in the battle of Preussisch-Eylau, where he was again wounded. For his courage he was promoted to captain. From 1808 he served as squadron chief in Spain and Napoleon's orderly.
The Patriotic War of 1812 is not only the Battle of Borodino, Moscow burned down, not only a clash of armies and military leaders' plans. Two hundred years ago, under the battle banners of Bonaparte, a real state entered the territory of the Russian Empire, with its own currency, mail, office, and finally, its own ideology.
By the end of the campaign, this wandering Babylon, a cast of the whole civilized Europe, ceased to exist. However, not all of his "citizens" died on the battlefields, died of hunger and frost. A large part of them were captured, and these people - several tens of thousands of foreigners - were dispersed throughout the Russian provinces, where many spent the rest of their lives, becoming related to the local way of life and somehow changing it. The consequences for Russia of this spontaneous ethno-cultural intervention are realized and studied only to an insignificant extent. Of course, Napoleon was not going to leave his Grand Army in a harsh enemy country, thousands of leagues from Paris, and then he was preparing a campaign to the east.
Napoleon was not going to leave his Grand Army in a harsh enemy country, thousands of leagues from Paris, then he was preparing a campaign to the east
About how far the plans of the French emperor stretched and what prevented their implementation - the conversation of "Echo of the Planet" with the researcher of the Napoleonic era, ethnopsychologist, founder of the Eastern Bonapartist Committee Cyril Serebrenitsky.
- For what purpose did Bonaparte cross the Niemen by starting a war?
He wanted to achieve the restoration of the peace of Tilsit. This agreement consisted of two parts, official and secret. Secret articles can only be found on French. We are talking about a direct military alliance at the level of common armed forces. That is, about the infusion of Russian corps into the Great Army and the creation of a joint contingent aimed at the east. Napoleon was going to reorient it to India, and Alexander I was going to use it to divide the Ottoman Empire. Napoleon hatched a project that I would conditionally call "an alliance of four empires." Two of them are European: Russia and France, and two are eastern: India and Osmania or Iran. Such is the complex diplomatic intrigue. This quartet was seen by Bonaparte as a project for the future of the universe, the basis of geopolitics. Thus, it was about the complete elimination of Britain as a factor of political influence and the provision of Russia with the very niche that the United Kingdom occupied.
And Napoleon went to Russia to force Alexander I to return to the execution of the secret articles of the Tilsit Treaty. The Great Army cannot be treated only as a French, only hostile Russia. In accordance with the same treaty, Russia, with the help of France, captured Finland. Russian Corps Prince Sergei Golitsyn was part of the Great Army, in operational subordination. I am ready to prove that in 1813 Alexander I, a staunch Bonapartist, planned the creation of a Russian analogue of the Great Army. Then he passionately tried to drag the Napoleonic generals into his service. Except for Baron Henri Jomini, who was admitted to the headquarters and retinue of Alexander I, almost everyone refused. But the junior ranks were hundreds. The whole policy of the Russian Tsar in 1813-1814 was unsuccessful - it was an attempt to take the place of Napoleon. Therefore, he did his best to hamper the accession of the Bourbons to the throne of France.
The whole policy of the Russian Tsar in 1813-1814 was unsuccessful - this is an attempt to take the place of Napoleon
Many in Russia understood that breaking the alliance with France was politically advantageous for England. In 1812, Russia undoubtedly fought in the interests of London. Of course, her troops eventually entered Paris, made a decisive contribution to the overthrow of Napoleon. However, on Congress of Vienna 1814-1815, which determined the new balance of power in Europe and new state borders, Russia turned out to be the most offended party: royal Britain received much more significant acquisitions and status. By the way, Kutuzov belonged to the people who foresaw such a development of events.
Now more and more often they say about Kutuzov that during the Patriotic War he behaved strangely, that he deliberately missed the emperor of France under the Berezina. What do you think of it?
Well, this is the version of Robert Wilson, the English commissar at the headquarters of the Russian army. When the French were in Moscow, he wrote to Alexander I that the field marshal was a traitor, that he was on Napoleon's support. I deeply doubt that Kutuzov participated in some kind of conspiracy, that he artificially slowed down events. He was an excellent commander and, by the way, defeated the French in the battle of Maloyaroslavets, a difficult, bloody battle that turned the tide of the campaign. Why Russia is still celebrating success at Borodino, I don’t know. As for the Berezina, I think Napoleon played another successful chess game there. He assessed the current disposition incredibly soberly, saw it as if from a bird's eye view, calculated many factors. Unlike Admiral Chichagov, who did not know how. I note that Kutuzov’s troops, and not just the French, suffered unimaginable losses, were exhausted, not receiving food in time, which was brought to them from afar - from Kaluga, Tver, Nizhny Novgorod. The field marshal lagged behind, he tried to urge the army on, but it did not work. And Chichagov approached the Berezina with fresh energy.
Napoleon is a controversial figure, but at all times a cult. For some it is the ideal strong personality, others consider him a tyrant-destroyer, still others - a misunderstood, lonely, vulnerable genius, fourth - a lucky upstart without special talents. How do you feel about him?
I don't consider him my idol. In some ways it attracts me, in some ways it repels me. Brutal southern man. For example, I would not stand his manner of holding people by the ear. Marina Tsvetaeva said about Napoleon that he was the only poet in the history of mankind who broke free from the chain of allegory. All other poets, in her perception, lived in captivity of words, limited themselves to words. Bonaparte created with the help of realities - armies, countries, overthrowing and raising thrones. Tsvetaeva considered all his activities as a grandiose poem in the open air.
All his victories and mistakes are due to his mathematical, if you like, cybernetic mindset.
From what I know about Napoleon, he's more of a mathematician out of his chains. All his victories and mistakes are due to his mathematical, if you like, cybernetic warehouse mind. The Emperor of France had a fantastic geopolitical flair. His Russian tragedy is precisely the result of a collision between a mathematician and reality. He, as a mathematician, absolutely accurately calculated how many kilometers the army was able to walk, how many provisions the soldiers would need for a minimally comfortable stay in the Russian climate. However, he ignored the realms of physiology and psychology. I did not understand that a hungry and frozen person turns into a beast, that this is no longer an army, but a frightened crowd, unable to fight.
- What was the Grand Army in the understanding of the Emperor of France himself?
In the "Memorial of Saint Helena", the notes of the Comte de Las Case, secretary of the exiled emperor, there is interesting phrase, belonging to Napoleon: "The military are like freemasons, and I am their venerable master." He considered the Great Army as a para-Masonic mystical organization, having its own ideology, and its own mythology, its own mystical space. For him, it was what parties later became for politicians - an instrument for the ideological transformation of reality. Napoleon's concept fit into the maxim: "Peace on the continent will come only if there is one army on it." The one who has no one to fight. In the 20th century, this project was recreated in the form of the Entente. And even NATO is also, in fact, a continuation of this idea, albeit indirectly. The Soviet, and indeed the world, historical schools treated failed projects with disdain, and this is their gigantic conceptual mistake. A thwarted war, a failed expedition are also events.
By December 1812, about 100 thousand prisoners had accumulated in Russia - the French and people of other nationalities. How were they treated, how were they kept, where were they transported?
There were two transportation vectors. One - east, in the direction of the Volga region and Siberia, where they drove, of course, on foot, mainly the French and Germans. Final destination - Barnaul. To the south, towards Tambov and Odessa, Poles were sent, who were considered Russian subjects. The prisoners were not actually kept in any way, they tried to transfer them to the balance of local municipalities, terribly burdened with military extortions and did not have such an item in the budget. In March 1813, they realized it, carried out the first audit, and it turned out that from December to March, about 53 thousand "French" died - that was the name of the humiliated invaders, regardless of nationality. Shoeed, undressed people died on the way, unable to withstand this walking through the torments. There are forty thousand left.
Shoeed, undressed people died on the way, unable to withstand this torment
In addition to the prisoners, there were many enemy soldiers - exhausted, freezing, unable to move independently. They were picked out of compassion by the peasants. What is the fate of these soldiers?
Indeed, there were such "French". They remained in the estates in the villages, and they were attributed to the serfs. In a bloodless country, there was not enough male hands, and there are so many valuable employees here at once. Compared with the general peasant mass, foreigners fell into a privileged position. If one of them had a craft - a shoemaker, a tailor, a cook, a saddler, then he was incredibly valued, they literally shook over such a person, they blew off dust particles. In Russia, there were not enough good saddlers - masters in the manufacture of blinders, side eyecups for horses.
Craftsmen were granted privileges, they were exempted for 10 years from taxes "to equip a house and farm". As a rule, they married, the benefit of beautiful women, maidens and widows, was in abundance. In addition, by a circular of the Ministry of the Interior of July 4, 1813, soldiers and officers of the Great Army were allowed to take a written oath "for temporary or eternal citizenship of Russia." Within two months, such newly converted subjects had to decide on the type of their occupation, on which their belonging to the estate depended: nobles, philistines, peasants. They also accepted Orthodoxy. Many went to tutors. AT old times a French tutor cost the landowner up to a thousand rubles a year. And here, at the table and a roof over their heads, yesterday's combatants undertook to teach the offspring of small-scale nobles anything, and not just French speech, dancing and decent manners. The well-known surnames in Russia - Draverts, Lansere, Cui, Boye - are just the descendants of such tutors. Lermontov, by the way, was brought up by the retired Napoleonic guard Jean Cape.
There were also deserters - soldiers who fled from the Grand Army almost immediately after crossing the border in June 1812. These scattered in the forests of the Smolensk province, present-day Lithuania and Belarus. Back in 1816, gangs of Poles and ethnic Belarusians continued to operate there. The last in the Great Army, there were 22 thousand. They attacked farms, estates, robbed on the roads.
As far as we know, there were restrictions on the geography of the settlement of the Napoleonic soldiers who settled in Russia. What exactly?
- "French" did not have the right to settle in areas of strategic importance. It was forbidden to settle in Moscow, St. Petersburg and in all territories according to western border- in Poland, the Baltic States, Finland, Bessarabia. By decree of August 17, 1814, prisoners of war were granted freedom. Some returned home, mostly noble officers who received money from relatives. For example, the first batch of two thousand repatriates gathered in Riga and was sent on French ships to Le Havre. The lower ranks were not provided with "travel allowances" for travel, but to walk across Europe, embittered, devastated by the war and the same great army There were only a few who wanted to.
The lower ranks were not provided with “travel allowances”, but to walk across Europe, embittered, devastated by the war and the same Great Army, there were only a few who wanted to
To what extent did the foreigners who remained in Russia assimilate in a foreign environment? Did they change their surnames to Russian ones, or did they prefer to keep them intact?
They tried their best to blend in. total mass of the local population, not to betray their origin in any way, not to seem mi. And so most of the names changed. The Villiers became the Velirovs, the Bouchens became the Bouchenovs, the Saint-Bevs became the Sentebovs, the Matisas Matisovs. The son of one of the French, who settled in Altai, received the nickname Plenko - from "prisoner". This street name was fixed in the passport: the descendants are now called Plenkins. For example, Nikolai Plenkin - teacher-
philologist, author of books on teaching the Russian language. Or Mark Bourno, famous psychiatrist, founder own school, a corresponding member since the Soviet era. Stalin's grandson director Alexander Burdonsky has an ancestor from the Great Army, however, through the female line. From there they led their family Soviet commanders Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Konstantin Rokossovsky. The process of Russification of Napoleonic veterans can be traced well in the example of the so-called French Cossacks. This relic ethnic group lives in the Nagaybak region on Southern Urals. The settlement of the descendants of Napoleonic soldiers exists in Altai, in the village of Smolenskoye, forty kilometers from Biysk. I recently found a similar community in Kazakhstan, in the town of Aryk-Balyk, not far from Pavlodar. On the map Chelyabinsk region the names survived - Paris, Berlin, Kassel, Vershampenauz.
I will also mention such a phenomenon as the Bonapartist emigration to Russia after 1815, after the restoration of the Bourbons. Then proscriptive lists of persons who contributed to the return of Napoleon from Elba were compiled. The revolutionaries and Bonapartists were arrested, Ney and Murat were shot. And Napoleonic officers and generals moved to Russia in dozens, as in the most favored country. Take, for example, Colonel Gaspard Drouville, commander of the 30th Ingrian Dragoon Regiment, adventurer, traveler, participant Russian-Turkish war 1812, author of Travels in Persia.
- How many descendants of the soldiers of the Great Army live in Russia and the CIS countries today?
Unknown. In 1830, in connection with the unrest in Poland, the corps of gendarmes, on the orders of Nicholas I, carried out an audit of all foreigners who remained after the war on the territory of the empire. There were three thousand veterans of the Great Army. But this is a conditional figure, since only those who belonged to the privileged classes - the nobility, the merchant class and lived in major cities... Our Oriental Bonapartist Committee is engaged in just such a search. We are collaborating with Professor Thierry Schoffat, Director of the Center for Bonapartist Studies at the University of Nancy. I sent him a list: about 70 names of persons - descendants of the combatants of the Grand Army of French, German and Italian origin. They live in Kyiv, Minsk, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Moscow. It becomes more and more difficult to search every year: the archives are half-closed, access is being tightened. But we are trying to act by the very fact of existence, and this is like a signal to extraterrestrial intelligence.
If you like, I am Chingachgook in search of other Mohicans, and for me this is a personal matter. In 1996, I opened "Memoirs" by Anastasia Tsvetaeva, and the line caught my eye: "our grandmother Maria Lukinichna Bernatskaya." And my great-grandmother Elena Lukinichna Bernatskaya. As it turned out, Tsvetaeva and I common ancestor- Stanislav Ledukhovsky, Deputy Minister of Police of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.
If you think about it, the two hundred years that separate us from the Patriotic War of 1812 are not so long term. The last Napoleonic soldiers died in the 90s years XIX century...
The Napoleonic era formally lasted 20 years, but in reality did not end either in 1812, or in 1814, or in 1815, or in 1821
It's not even about time. Napoleonic era formally lasted 20 years, but in reality did not end either in 1812, or in 1814, or in 1815, or in 1821. Why did the myth about Bonaparte arise, why did the emperor of France not become an inverted page for humanity, like others historical figures like Cromwell? After all, there is no cult of Cromwell in Russia. Napoleonic is the gate through which the Middle Ages entered the present. For example, the 18th century is psychologically extremely far from us. This is a complete mystery. It is very difficult to read the memoirs of the people of that time, to try to peer into their faces. Napoleonic - a grandiose cataclysm that created modern language, culture, aesthetics, state borders. The Napoleonic era is a genealogy, a retrospective of today's events, which in one way or another go back to that time, have their own prototype in it.
I can call myself a Russian Bonapartist. This phenomenon - Russian Bonapartism - is generated by the death of Napoleon. This is not an ideology, but rather an aesthetics, at the origins of which are Pushkin and Lermontov. Her guides in the 20th century were Marina Tsvetaeva and Dmitry Merezhkovsky, the author of the book "Napoleon"
