Napoleon directed the main blow at. The balance of forces and means at the beginning of the war

The Patriotic War of 1812 began on June 12 - on this day, Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman River, unleashing wars between the two crowns of France and Russia. This war continued until December 14, 1812, ending with the complete and unconditional victory of the Russian and allied troops. This is a glorious page in Russian history, which we will consider, referring to the official textbooks of the history of Russia and France, as well as the books of bibliographers Napoleon, Alexander 1 and Kutuzov, who describe in great detail the events taking place at that moment.

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The beginning of the war

Causes of the War of 1812

The causes of the Patriotic War of 1812, like all other wars in the history of mankind, must be considered in two aspects - the reasons from France and the reasons from Russia.

Reasons from France

In just a few years, Napoleon radically changed his own view of Russia. If, having come to power, he wrote that Russia was his only ally, then by 1812 Russia had become a threat to France (consider the emperor). In many ways, this was provoked by Alexander 1 himself. So, this is why France attacked Russia in June 1812:

Breaking the Tilsit Accords: Relaxing the Continental Blockade. As you know, the main enemy of France at that time was England, against which the blockade was organized. Russia also participated in this, but in 1810 the government passed a law allowing trade with England through intermediaries. In fact, this made the entire blockade ineffective, which completely undermined the plans of France.
Refusals in dynastic marriage. Napoleon sought to marry imperial court Russia to become "God's anointed". However, in 1808 he was denied marriage to Princess Catherine. In 1810 he was denied marriage to Princess Anna. As a result, in 1811 french emperor married an Austrian princess.
The transfer of Russian troops to the border with Poland in 1811. In the first half of 1811, Alexander 1 ordered the transfer of 3 divisions to the Polish borders, fearing an uprising in Poland, which could be transferred to Russian lands. This step was regarded by Napoleon as aggression and preparation for a war for Polish territories, which by that time were already subordinate to France.

Soldiers! A new, second in a row, Polish war begins! The first ended in Tilsit. There Russia promised to be an eternal ally for France in the war with England, but she broke her promise. The Russian emperor does not want to give explanations for his actions until the French eagles cross the Rhine. Do they think that we have become different? Are we not the winners of Austerlitz? Russia put France before a choice - shame or war. The choice is obvious! Let's go ahead, cross the Neman! The second Polish howl will be glorious for French weapons. It will bring a messenger to the destructive influence of Russia on the affairs of Europe.

Thus began a war of conquest for France.

Reasons from Russia

On the part of Russia, there were also weighty reasons for participating in the war, which turned out to be a liberation state. Among the main reasons are the following:

Great losses of all segments of the population from the break in trade with England. The opinions of historians on this point differ, since it is believed that the blockade did not affect the state as a whole, but only its elite, which, as a result of the lack of the possibility of trade with England, was losing money.
The intention of France to recreate the Commonwealth. In 1807, Napoleon created the Duchy of Warsaw and sought to recreate ancient state in true dimensions. Perhaps this was only in the case of the seizure of Russia's western lands.
Violation of the Treaty of Tilsit by Napoleon. One of the main criteria for signing this agreement was that Prussia should be cleared of French troops, but this was never done, although Alexander 1 constantly reminded of this.

For a long time, France has been trying to encroach on the independence of Russia. Always we tried to be meek, thinking so to deflect her attempts at capture. With all our desire to keep the peace, we are forced to gather troops to defend the Motherland. There are no possibilities for a peaceful solution to the conflict with France, which means that only one thing remains - to defend the truth, to defend Russia from the invaders. I do not need to remind commanders and soldiers of courage, it is in our hearts. In our veins flows the blood of the victors, the blood of the Slavs. Soldiers! You are defending the country, defending the religion, defending the fatherland. I'm with you. God is with us.

The balance of forces and means at the beginning of the war

Napoleon's crossing of the Neman took place on June 12, with 450 thousand people at his disposal. Around the end of the month, another 200,000 people joined him. If we take into account that by that time there were no large losses on the part of both sides, then total strength French army at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in 1812 - 650 thousand soldiers. It is impossible to say that the French made up 100% of the army, since the combined army of almost all European countries (France, Austria, Poland, Switzerland, Italy, Prussia, Spain, Holland) fought on the side of France. However, it was the French who formed the basis of the army. These were proven soldiers who won many victories with their emperor.

Russia after mobilization had 590 thousand soldiers. Initially, the size of the army was 227 thousand people, and they were divided along three fronts:

Northern - First Army. Commander - Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Toli. The population is 120 thousand people. They were located in the north of Lithuania and covered St. Petersburg.
Central - Second Army. Commander - Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. Number - 49 thousand people. They were located in the south of Lithuania, covering Moscow.
Southern - Third Army. Commander - Alexander Petrovich Tormasov. The number is 58 thousand people. They were located in Volhynia, covering the attack on Kyiv.

Also in Russia, partisan detachments were actively operating, the number of which reached 400 thousand people.

The first stage of the war - the offensive of Napoleon's troops (June-September)

At 6 o'clock in the morning on June 12, 1812, the Patriotic War began for Russia with Napoleonic France. Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman and headed inland. The main direction of the strike was supposed to be in Moscow. The commander himself said that “if I capture Kyiv, I will lift the Russians by the legs, I will capture St. Petersburg, I will take it by the throat, if I take Moscow, I will strike the heart of Russia.”

The French army, commanded by brilliant commanders, was looking for a general battle, and the fact that Alexander 1 divided the army into 3 fronts was very helpful to the aggressors. However, on initial stage Barclay de Toli played a decisive role, who gave the order not to engage in battle with the enemy and retreat inland. This was necessary in order to combine forces, as well as to pull up reserves. Retreating, the Russians destroyed everything - they killed cattle, poisoned water, burned fields. AT literally of this word, the French moved forward through the ashes. Later, Napoleon complained that the Russian people were carrying out a vile war and were not behaving according to the rules.

North direction

32 thousand people, led by General MacDonald, Napoleon sent to St. Petersburg. The first city on this path was Riga. According to the French plan, MacDonald was to capture the city. Connect with General Oudinot (he had 28 thousand people at his disposal) and go further.

The defense of Riga was commanded by General Essen with 18,000 soldiers. He burned everything around the city, and the city itself was very well fortified. MacDonald by this time captured Dinaburg (the Russians left the city with the outbreak of war) and did not conduct further active operations. He understood the absurdity of the assault on Riga and was waiting for the arrival of artillery.

General Oudinot occupied Polotsk and from there tried to separate Wittenstein's corps from the army of Barclay de Toli. However, on July 18, Wittenstein delivered an unexpected blow to Oudinot, who was saved from defeat only by the corps of Saint-Cyr who came to the rescue. As a result, a balance came and no more active offensive operations were carried out in the northern direction.

South direction

General Ranier with an army of 22 thousand people was supposed to act in the young direction, blocking the army of General Tormasov, preventing it from connecting with the rest of the Russian army.

On July 27, Tormasov surrounded the city of Kobrin, where the main forces of Ranier gathered. The French suffered a terrible defeat - 5 thousand people were killed in the battle in 1 day, which forced the French to retreat. Napoleon realized that the southern direction in the Patriotic War of 1812 was in danger of failure. Therefore, he transferred the troops of General Schwarzenberg there, numbering 30 thousand people. As a result, on August 12, Tormasov was forced to retreat to Lutsk and take up defense there. In the future, active offensive operations on southbound the French did not. The main events took place in the Moscow direction.

The course of events of the offensive company

On June 26, the army of General Bagration advanced from Vitebsk, tasked by Alexander 1 to engage in battle with the main enemy forces in order to wear them out. Everyone was aware of the absurdity of this idea, but only by July 17 the emperor was finally dissuaded from this undertaking. The troops began to retreat to Smolensk.

July 6 became clear large numbers Napoleon's troops. To prevent the Patriotic War from dragging on for a long time, Alexander 1 signs a decree on the creation of a militia. Literally all the inhabitants of the country are recorded in it - in total, there were about 400 thousand volunteers.

On July 22, the armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly united near Smolensk. The command of the united army was taken over by Barclay de Tolly, who had 130 thousand soldiers at his disposal, while the front line of the French army consisted of 150 thousand soldiers.

On July 25, a military council was held in Smolensk, at which the issue of accepting the battle was discussed in order to go on the counteroffensive and defeat Napoleon with one blow. But Barclay spoke out against this idea, realizing that an open battle with the enemy, a brilliant strategist and tactician, could lead to a grand failure. As a result, the offensive idea was not implemented. It was decided to retreat further - to Moscow.

On July 26, the retreat of the troops began, which General Neverovsky was supposed to cover, occupying the village of Krasnoe, thereby closing the bypass of Smolensk for Napoleon.

On August 2, Murat with a cavalry corps tried to break through the defenses of Neverovsky, but to no avail. In total, more than 40 attacks were made with the help of cavalry, but it was not possible to achieve the desired.

August 5 is one of the important dates in the Patriotic War of 1812. Napoleon began the assault on Smolensk, capturing the suburbs by evening. However, at night he was driven out of the city, and the Russian army continued its massive retreat from the city. This caused a storm of discontent among the soldiers. They believed that if they managed to drive the French out of Smolensk, then it was necessary to destroy it there. They accused Barclay of cowardice, but the general implemented only 1 plan - to wear down the enemy and take the decisive battle when the balance of power was on the side of Russia. By this time, the French had the advantage.

On August 17, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov arrived in the army, who took command. This candidacy did not raise questions, since Kutuzov (a student of Suvorov) was highly respected and considered the best Russian commander after the death of Suvorov. Arriving in the army, the new commander-in-chief wrote that he had not yet decided what to do next: "The question has not yet been resolved - either lose the army or give up Moscow."

On August 26, the Battle of Borodino took place. Its outcome still raises many questions and disputes, but there were no losers then. Each commander solved his own problems: Napoleon opened his way to Moscow (the heart of Russia, as the emperor of France himself wrote), and Kutuzov was able to inflict heavy damage on the enemy, thereby introducing an initial turning point in the battle of 1812.

September 1 is a significant day, which is described in all history books. A military council was held in Fili, near Moscow. Kutuzov gathered his generals to decide what to do next. There were only two options: retreat and surrender Moscow, or organize a second general battle after Borodino. Most of the generals, on the wave of success, demanded a battle in order to defeat Napoleon as soon as possible. Opponents of such a development of events were Kutuzov himself and Barclay de Tolly. The military council in Fili ended with the phrase Kutuzov “As long as there is an army, there is hope. If we lose the army near Moscow, we will lose not only ancient capital but for the whole of Russia.

September 2 - following the results of the military council of the generals, which took place in Fili, it was decided that it was necessary to leave the ancient capital. The Russian army retreated, and Moscow itself, before the arrival of Napoleon, according to many sources, was subjected to terrible looting. However, even this is not the main thing. Retreating, the Russian army set fire to the city. Wooden Moscow burned down almost three-quarters. Most importantly, literally all food depots were destroyed. The reasons for the Moscow fire lie in the fact that the French did not get anything from what the enemies could use for food, movement, or in other aspects. As a result, the aggressor troops found themselves in a very precarious position.

The second stage of the war - the retreat of Napoleon (October - December)

Having occupied Moscow, Napoleon considered the mission accomplished. The commander's bibliographers later wrote that he was faithful - the loss of the historical center of Russia would break the victorious spirit, and the leaders of the country had to come to him with a request for peace. But this did not happen. Kutuzov deployed with an army 80 kilometers from Moscow near Tarutin and waited until the enemy army, deprived of normal supplies, weakened and itself introduced a radical change in the Patriotic War. Without waiting for an offer of peace from Russia, the French emperor himself took the initiative.

Napoleon's Desire for Peace

According to Napoleon's original plan, the capture of Moscow was to play a decisive role. Here it was possible to deploy a convenient bridgehead, including for a trip to St. Petersburg, the capital of Russia. However, the delay in moving around Russia and the heroism of the people, who literally fought for every piece of land, practically thwarted this plan. After all, a trip to the north of Russia in winter for the French army with irregular food supplies was actually equal to death. This became clear by the end of September, when it started to get colder. Subsequently, Napoleon wrote in his autobiography that his biggest mistake was a trip to Moscow and a month spent there.

Understanding the severity of his position, the French emperor and commander decided to end the Patriotic War of Russia by signing a peace treaty with her. Three such attempts have been made:

September 18th. Through General Tutolmin, a message was sent to Alexander 1, which said that Napoleon honored the Russian emperor and offered him peace. Russia is only required to give up the territory of Lithuania and return to the continental blockade again.
September 20th. Alexander 1 was delivered a second letter from Napoleon with an offer of peace. The conditions were the same as before. The Russian emperor did not answer these messages.
The 4th of October. The hopelessness of the situation led to the fact that Napoleon literally begged for peace. Here is what he writes to Alexander 1 (according to the prominent French historian F. Segur): “I need peace, I need it, no matter what, just save the honor.” This proposal was delivered to Kutuzov, but the emperor of France did not wait for an answer.

The retreat of the French army in autumn-winter 1812

For Napoleon, it became obvious that he would not be able to sign a peace treaty with Russia, and to stay for the winter in Moscow, which the Russians, retreating, burned down, was recklessness. Moreover, it was impossible to stay here, since the constant raids of the militias caused great damage to the army. So, for a month, while the French army was in Moscow, its number was reduced by 30 thousand people. As a result, the decision was made to retreat.

On October 7, preparations began for the retreat of the French army. One of the orders on this occasion was to blow up the Kremlin. Luckily, he didn't succeed. Russian historians attribute this to the fact that due to the high humidity, the wicks got wet and failed.

On October 19, the retreat of Napoleon's army from Moscow began. The purpose of this retreat was to get to Smolensk, since it was the only major nearby city that had significant food supplies. The road went through Kaluga, but this direction was blocked by Kutuzov. Now the advantage was on the side of the Russian army, so Napoleon decided to get around. However, Kutuzov foresaw this maneuver and met the enemy army at Maloyaroslavets.

On October 24, a battle took place near Maloyaroslavets. During the day this small town passed 8 times from one side to the other. In the final stage of the battle, Kutuzov managed to take up fortified positions, and Napoleon did not dare to storm them, since the numerical superiority was already on the side of the Russian army. As a result, the plans of the French were frustrated, and they had to retreat to Smolensk along the same road along which they went to Moscow. It was already scorched earth - without food and without water.

Napoleon's retreat was accompanied by heavy losses. Indeed, in addition to clashes with the army of Kutuzov, we also had to deal with partisan detachments that daily attacked the enemy, especially its trailing units. Napoleon's losses were terrible. On November 9, he managed to capture Smolensk, but this did not make a radical change in the course of the war. There was practically no food in the city, and it was not possible to organize a reliable defense. As a result, the army was subjected to almost continuous attacks by militias and local patriots. Therefore, Napoleon stayed in Smolensk for 4 days and decided to retreat further.

Crossing the Berezina River

The French were heading to the Berezina River (in modern Belarus) in order to force the river and go to the Neman. But on November 16, General Chichagov captured the city of Borisov, which is located on the Berezina. Napoleon's situation became catastrophic - for the first time, the possibility of being captured actively loomed for him, since he was surrounded.

On November 25, by order of Napoleon, the French army began to simulate a crossing south of Borisov. Chichagov bought into this maneuver and began the transfer of troops. At that moment, the French built two bridges across the Berezina and began crossing on November 26-27. Only on November 28 did Chichagov realize his mistake and tried to give battle to the French army, but it was too late - the crossing was completed, albeit with the loss of a huge number human lives. When crossing the Berezina, 21,000 Frenchmen died! The "Great Army" now consisted of only 9 thousand soldiers, most of which was already incapacitated.

It was during this crossing that unusually severe frosts set in, to which the French emperor referred, justifying the huge losses. In the 29th bulletin, which was published in one of the French newspapers, it was said that until November 10 the weather was normal, but after that there were very severe colds for which no one was ready.

Crossing the Neman (from Russia to France)

The crossing of the Berezina showed that Napoleon's Russian campaign was over - he lost the Patriotic War in Russia in 1812. Then the emperor decided that his further stay with the army did not make sense and on December 5 he left his troops and headed for Paris.

On December 16, in Kovno, the French army crossed the Neman and left the territory of Russia. Its number was only 1600 people. invincible army, which inspired fear throughout Europe, was almost completely destroyed by Kutuzov's army in less than 6 months.

Below is a graphical representation of Napoleon's retreat on a map.

Results of the Patriotic War of 1812

The Patriotic War between Russia and Napoleon great importance for all countries involved in the conflict. Largely due to these events, the undivided dominance of England in Europe became possible. Such a development was foreseen by Kutuzov, who, after the flight of the French army in December, sent a report to Alexander 1, where he explained to the ruler that the war must be ended immediately, and the pursuit of the enemy and the liberation of Europe would be beneficial for strengthening the power of England. But Alexander did not heed the advice of his commander and soon began a campaign abroad.

Reasons for Napoleon's defeat in the war

Determining the main reasons for the defeat of the Napoleonic army, it is necessary to focus on the most important ones that historians most often use:

The strategic mistake of the emperor of France, who sat in Moscow for 30 days and waited for the representatives of Alexander 1 with pleas for peace. As a result, it began to get colder and to run out of provisions, and the constant raids of partisan movements made a turning point in the war.
Unity of the Russian people. As usual, in the face of a great danger, the Slavs rally. So it was this time. For example, the historian Lieven writes that main reason France's defeat lies in the mass nature of the war. Everyone fought for the Russians - both women and children. And all this was ideologically justified, which made the morale of the army very strong. The emperor of France did not break him.
The unwillingness of the Russian generals to accept decisive battle. Most historians forget about this, but what would have happened to Bagration's army if he had accepted a general battle at the beginning of the war, as Alexander 1 really wanted? 60 thousand army of Bagration against 400 thousand army of aggressors. It would be an unconditional victory, and after it they would hardly have had time to recover. Therefore, the Russian people must express their gratitude to Barclay de Tolly, who, by his decision, gave the order to retreat and unite the armies.
Genius Kutuzov. The Russian general, who learned well from Suvorov, did not make a single tactical miscalculation. It is noteworthy that Kutuzov never managed to defeat his enemy, but he managed to win the Patriotic War tactically and strategically.
General Frost is used as an excuse. To be fair, it must be said that no significant influence The frost did not affect the final result, because at the time of the beginning of the abnormal frosts (mid-November), the outcome of the confrontation was decided - the great army was destroyed.

Russia under Alexander I.

Anti-Napoleonic coalition: Prussia, Austria, England, Russia (reasons): 1) save the map of Europe 2) Russia was a stronghold of autocracy, conservatism =>

Causes of the Patriotic War:

3) Napoleon's personal grievances.

June 12, 1812

Napoleon's goal

134 thousand French: 154 thousand Russians. The number of guns exceeded 1200 guns of various calibers. At 5:30 am the cavalry was sent to the village of Borodino. Main blow Napoleon sent Russian soldiers to the left flank, the goal: the battery of Nikolai Raevsky - was located above other Russian fortifications, from there it was possible to conduct mounted fire. Raevsky's battery was occupied by the French with huge losses. But the exhausted French could not continue the battle and rolled back to their previous positions. After 12 hours of continuous fighting, the course of the battle has not changed. Napoleon could not defeat the Russian army =>

The opinion of military historians:

September 1, 1812

November 14-16, 1812

Outcome

In 1815

The Russian Empire in the era of Nicholas I (1825 - 1855).

Internal policy and conditions of the reign of Nicholas I

Socio-economic development of Russia in the first half of the 19th century. The beginning of the industrial revolution.

Crimean War 1853 - 1856

Internal policy and conditions of the reign of Nicholas I.

Terms:

1) He ascended the throne after the suppression of the Decembrist uprising

2) On international arena puts together an unfavorable situation: 1848-1849. wave of European revolutions.

3) The era of Nicholas I - the beginning of the crisis of feudal-serf relations

4) In Russia, a new layer of people is being formed - raznochintsy: people from different classes who earned their living by mental work and competed with the nobility.

The policy of Nicholas I was protective, conservative (it was aimed at preserving the autocracy).

He was the third son of Paul I, his education was limited to traditional military training. I felt like the lord of millions, held myself proudly. A constitutional monarchy harmful for Russia. Under Nicholas I, Russia began to be called the gendarme of Europe.

In 1826, the 2nd and 3rd departments of His Majesty were created in Russia. Imperial Chancellery. Functions:

1) The second department was to deal with the establishment of order in the legislation. In 1830, under the leadership of Speransky, a complete set of laws of the Russian Empire (PSZRI) was compiled.

2) Third branch == police. Created to help separate building gendarmes ( secret police). Headed by: Benckendorff.

In 1826, the Cast Iron Charter was adopted. It was forbidden to criticize the Russian bureaucracy. Bureaucratization reaches unprecedented proportions. The works of ministries and departments were evaluated by summaries and tables, and not by real results.

The morals of the Russian nobility are being corrupted.

Decree on raising the rank, giving the right to hereditary nobility.

Decree on uniform inheritance for owners of large estates. Prevented the collapse of large land holdings.

1830 - the theory of official nationality, Count S. Uvarov. Postulates:

1. Orthodox faith. The Russian people are characterized by a special religiosity, the Russian people are chosen by God, because they correctly glorify Christ.

2. Autocracy. The autocratic form of government for Russia is the best, all other forms are harmful.

3. Nationality. The unity of the king and the people. The king cares for his people, so the people do not need another government. The need to adhere to their own primordially Russian traditions, rejecting everything foreign.

Education reforms:

1) Orders to admit children of peasants to accept only in primary schools.

2) Only children of nobles and officials could study in gymnasiums.

3) Eliminate the autonomy of universities.

The anthem of the Russian Empire "God Save the Tsar" was written.

Peasant question:

9 committees for peasant question, 1835 - Committee for the abolition of serfdom. The reform failed. Reform of the state peasants (Count Kiselyov). Purpose: to raise the standard of living of the state peasants. Introduced special institutions, which for the needy peasants allocate "cuttings" of land.

In 1848, secret peasant committees ceased to be created, because revolutions began in Europe.

Main Features Nikolaev era were: dominance of bureaucracy and corruption, protective domestic politics, the apogee of autocracy.

The era of great reforms of Alexander II Nikolaevich (liberator). 1855 - 1881.

Emperor's personality

Peasant reform

3) Other bourgeois reforms (zemstvo, city, judicial, financial, military, reforms in the field of education).

The personality of the emperor.

His mentor was V.A. Zhukovsky, who sought to educate a literate, worthy person from the Russian emperor. One of the educators of Alexander II was Merder, and the teacher of legislation was Speransky. Alexander was fluent in 5 languages, was strong in mathematics, physics, and jurisprudence. By the age of 19, he wrote to Nikolai “I feel in myself new strength tie myself to the work that God has ordained me to do.” Initially, he was an ardent serf-owner, but after the death of his father, he realizes the need for deep reforms.

In 1856, Alexander announces to the Decembrists, participants Polish uprising, suspended recruiting for 3 years, liquidated military settlements in 1857, abolished the most severe corporal punishment in the army.

Other reforms:

Zemstvo reform 1864. On January 1, the regulation on Zemstvo institutions came out - introduced bodies in Russia local government- lands. Functions and competence:

1) were engaged in medicine

2) The formation of the peasantry

4) Construction and repair of roads in countryside

5) Appointed from the population of monetary collections for the needs of the province or county

6) Provided food in case of famine

7) Built churches and schools

8) Engaged in charity

Zemstvos did not have the right of legislative initiative. They were created only in the European part of Russia. They did not affect Siberia, where there was no serfdom at all.

urban reform . It began in 1870, although it was planned to hold it together with the Zemstvo. City councils were created, which were engaged in local government of the city. The main role belonged to the urban bourgeoisie, because there was a property qualification. They were engaged in landscaping, medicine, education.

Judicial Reform of 1864. Before judicial reform : the proceedings were closed and secret, the trial was often held in absentia, in criminal cases the prosecution always had an advantage. The courts depended on the administration. Big influence landlords, police, etc. had After the reform: judicial statutes were introduced, according to which the court was declared without class, independence from administrative power, irremovability of judges or forensic investigators, equality of all classes before the law, the oral nature of the proceedings, competitiveness and publicity of the trial. Presumption of innocence. 12 jurors (representatives of the public). Appeared District Judge Judicial Chamber - united several judicial districts together. Appeals could be made to the Senate, which had the power to overrule the judgment. A magistrate's court was introduced - it sorts out minor offenses, civil cases, where the claim amounted to up to 500 rubles. The reform was not completed. The class volost court remained.

financial reform. In 1870, a state bank was created. In 1862, the Russian budget for the first time began to be published in print - a list of state revenues and expenditures. 1863 - the system of ransoms (assumes that an individual from the state buys the right to engage in trade or collect taxes) was replaced by an excise system (state tax included in the price of goods).

Education reform. Universities are getting autonomy again. The position of students has improved. The construction of universities continued. In 1864, a school charter was introduced, according to which 2 types of gymnasiums were introduced: classical, where the emphasis was on humanitarian and real, where emphasis was placed on technical knowledge. Both of them had equal status. The number of schools, gymnasiums and colleges increased sharply.

Military reform . Rifle, Balloons, telegraph. It became possible in short time form an army. The main goal: to make Russia the dominant power => it was necessary to build up the country's military potential to European standards. It was necessary to create a trained army. A network of institutions for the training of officers is being created. New railway troops. Canceled military settlements. In 1874, all-class military service was introduced instead of recruitment. Differences: all-class duty extended to all men from 20 years old, the service life was reduced - land 6 years, sea 7 years. After the end of the service, a person goes to the reserve. If a person had higher education, the service life is reduced. They were not called up due to marital status. Clerics, some peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Far North. AT 1877-1878 years another Russian-Turkish war (Slavic peoples long experienced the oppression of the Ottoman Empire, and Russia stood up for them). The war ended with the Peace of Sanstephan, which was successful for Russia. The main result was that the people of the Balkan Peninsula were granted freedom from the Ottoman yoke.

On March 1, 1881, the last attempt was made on Alexander II.. On the same day, the emperor was ready to voluntarily limit his power - he approved the constitutional project of Count Loris-Melikov.

Results: great reforms, like most, were carried out from above. In the middle of the 19th century, it could not be said that there was a revolutionary threat. Peasant and other reforms were the result of many years of discussions in various peasant committees. Despite their incompleteness, they had a huge impact on the country's economy in the direction of capitalism. Contributed to overcoming Russian backwardness from the West.

Socio-political life of the 2nd half of the 19th century : conservatism, liberalism, populism, Marxism . The differences between the last two: the populists considered the peasantry to be their main support, and the Marxists considered the proletariat. Unlike the Marxists, the Narodniks believed that Russia could pass to socialism bypassing the capitalist stage of development, i.e. from feudalism to socialism.

Red and white terror.

Russia under Alexander I.

Patriotic War of 1812.

Background: in France in 1789, the great French Revolution began, which ended 10 years later with the establishment of the dictatorship of Napoleon I Bonaparte.

Anti-Napoleonic coalition: Prussia, Austria, England, Russia (reasons): 1) save the map of Europe 2) Russia was a stronghold of autocracy, conservatism => fighting against revolutionary France.

1805 - Battle of Austerlitz. The allied Russian-Austrian army was defeated.

1807 - Peace of Tilsit: Russia creates the Duchy of Warsaw from its borders + Russia must join the continental blockade of England.

Causes of the Patriotic War:

1) Napoleon's claims to world domination.

2) Russia did not comply continental blockade against England

3) Napoleon's personal grievances.

June 12, 1812 The Napoleonic army of 448 thousand soldiers crossed the Neman River and entered the territory of the Russian Empire. They were opposed by 320 thousand. Russian soldiers, divided into three armies under the head: Barclay de Tolly, Pyotr Bagration, A. Tormasov.

Napoleon's goal: take several large Russian cities, hit Moscow, after which he assumed that Alexander I would sign a peace favorable to Napoleon.

Alexander I appointed to the post of commander-in-chief Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov: military officer, once received two severe wounds in the head.

Kutuzov decides to give Napoleon a general battle not far from Moscow in the village of Borodino. Before letting them go to Borodino, it was necessary to complete preparations for the battle, therefore, in the village. Shevardino, an additional redoubt was erected to delay the advanced corps of the French.

August 26 (September 7) 1812 - Battle of Borodino. 134 thousand French: 154 thousand Russians. The number of guns exceeded 1200 guns of various calibers. At 5:30 am the cavalry was sent to the village of Borodino. Napoleon sent the main blow to the left flank of the Russian soldiers, the goal: the battery of Nikolai Raevsky - was located above other Russian fortifications, from there it was possible to conduct mounted fire. Raevsky's battery was occupied by the French with huge losses. But the exhausted French could not continue the battle and rolled back to their previous positions. After 12 hours of continuous fighting, the course of the battle has not changed. Napoleon could not defeat the Russian army => the goal was not achieved. Kutuzov did not solve the task - to save Moscow.

The opinion of military historians:

Zhilin: when evaluating the Battle of Borodino, one must take into account 3 results that influenced the outcome of the war: 1) Napoleon could not defeat the Russians 2) The French suffered huge losses 3) The moral result - the united Napoleonic army did not meet such resistance.

The French lost 58,000, the Russians 44,000.

September 1, 1812 at the council in Fili, it was decided to leave Moscow and save the army. The devastated city becomes a trap for Napoleon's soldiers.

In October 1812, the Napoleonic troops moved back. Unprecedented frosts broke out this year + heavy damage was caused partisan movement. At the head: Vseslavin, Denis Davydov.

November 14-16, 1812 near the Berezina River. In the conditions of severe frost, the French tried to cross the river, where they met the resistance of the Russians. After that, Napoleon abandoned the remnants of his army and fled to Paris. In December, the remnants of the army left Russia.

Foreign trips begin.

The remnants of the troops of the Napoleonic army were destroyed in the battle of Leipzig in 1813 and Waterloo.

Outcome: for the first time, the entire population of Russia went to war with the invaders. These events are dedicated literary works, paintings. The defeat of Napoleon's troops in Russia was the beginning of the end of Napoleon's empire. During this war, Bonaparte's half-million army was destroyed. Impact on the Russian economy. The rise of Russia's foreign policy authority.

In 1815 Russia, Austria and Prussia have entered into a sacred alliance, which is created to maintain the old order in Europe, which participated in the suppression of the revolution in Europe.

The Patriotic War of 1812 was the greatest test for the Russian people and at the same time a turning point in the spiritual life of the entire vast country.

Enemy invasion of Russia, battle of Borodino, the fire of Moscow, intense - and finally victorious! - the struggle against the armies of Napoleon caused a mighty popular upsurge, and did not affect only the "upper floors" of society. “This people,” Herzen wrote about Russia, “is convinced that they are invincible at home; this thought lies in the depths of the consciousness of every peasant, it is his political religion. When he saw a foreigner on his land as an enemy, he threw down his plow and grabbed his gun. Dying on the battlefield “for the White Tsar and the Most Holy Theotokos,” as he said, he actually died for the inviolability of Russian territory.”

Beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812

Napoleon June 12, 1812 Napoleon's "Great Army" (649 thousand people), having crossed the Neman, invaded Russia. Its invasion can hardly be called unexpected. Two weeks before it, Paris notified the European treaties of the rupture diplomatic relations with Russia, and on June 22, the French ambassador in St. Petersburg presented the corresponding note to the manager of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

capture Russian territory and joining it to his possessions were not included in Napoleon's plans. He hoped to defeat the Russian army in a number of border battles and force Alexander I to conclude a peace treaty beneficial to France.

M. B. Barclay de Tolly

The Russian army numbered 590 thousand people, but a little more than 210 thousand could be put up against Napoleon. It was divided into three groups far apart from each other (under the command of Generals M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. I. Bagration and A. P. Tormasova).

Yielding to the French army in numbers, organization, management, the Russian army had no less combat experience. The Russian soldier was rightfully considered the best in Europe. Many generals in training and talents could compete with the famous Napoleonic marshals.

The "Great Army" had great virtues. But there was a serious flaw in it, which was clearly revealed during the war. Variegated in ethnic composition, it was deprived of cohesion, unity, moral superiority, which distinguished the Russian army.

The first stage of the Patriotic War of 1812 includes the retreat of the Russian army from the Neman to Borodino. This retreat was not a simple retreat of some troops under pressure from others. It largely determined the further course of events.

First, Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian armies in one or more pitched battles.

Secondly, by conducting constant rearguard battles with the French, the Russian troops gained experience, learned the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy, and showed miracles of heroism. Near Mogilev, near the village of Saltanovka, during a fight with parts of Marshal Davout, Lieutenant-General N. N. Raevsky, taking his two sons, 10 and 17 years old, by the arms, rushed to attack the enemy, dragging the soldiers with him. N. N. Raevsky himself was not inclined to exaggerate the significance of this episode, but admitted that he was ahead of the soldiers in that battle and that his sons were nearby.

Thirdly, the 1st and 2nd Russian armies managed, despite the desperate efforts of the French, to unite near Smolensk. Now they could more successfully resist Napoleon and prepare for a serious battle with him. The retreat showed the inconsistency of mediocrity, such as the author of the extremely unsuccessful war plan, General E. Ful. They were replaced by talented generals like A.P. Yermolov.

Fourthly, the "great army" lost its fighting qualities as it moved inland. The population fought the enemy. Suffering from hunger and thirst, Napoleon's soldiers looted and pillaged. French morale steadily declined.

Battle of Borodino.

In August 1812, a new commander-in-chief, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov, arrived in the Russian army. He replaced M. B. Barclay de Tolly in this post.

M. I. Kutuzov

In 1812, Mikhail Illarionovich was the oldest in age and time of service from the "full" generals. His family goes back to the 13th century. M. I. Kutuzov was a combat ally of P. A. Rumyantsev and A. V. Suvorov (out of his 67 years, he spent 50 in military campaigns). He successfully served under Catherine II and Paul I, was not only a respected general, but also a cautious courtier. With Alexander I, his relationship was not so successful, the emperor could not forgive him for the defeat at Austerlitz.

The masses of the nobility and soldiers saw in him "their own", in contrast to the foreigner and man of the dispossessed M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Back in June, the Moscow and St. Petersburg nobility chose M. I. Kutuzov as the head of the militia.

The question of the appointment of the commander-in-chief was decided by an emergency committee, which consisted of the most prominent dignitaries of Russia. Having considered a number of candidates, the committee settled on M. I. Kutuzov and voted for him almost unanimously.

On September 3, the commander-in-chief decided to give a general battle near the village of Borodino, 110 kilometers from Moscow. In the famous Battle of Borodino, sung by A. S. Pushkin, M. Yu. Lermontov, L. N. Tolstoy, 125,000 Russian and 134,000 French troops met. On September 7, the battle began with an attack by the French on the first flank of the Russian position and the capture of the village of Borodino by them.

P. I. Bagration

As it turned out, it was a distraction. Napoleon intended to break through the Russian positions in the center, bypass the left flank, push the Russian army back from the Old Smolensk road and free his way to Moscow. Napoleon directed the main blow to the opposite flank, to the Bagration flushes. The battle raged for more than 5 hours. During the eighth attack, General Bagration was mortally wounded. The command of the flank passed to General P.P. Konovnitsyn. Around noon, at the cost of huge losses, the French captured the fortifications. Russian troops retreated to the nearest hills. An attempt by the French cavalry to drive the Russians from their new position failed.

At the same time, two French attacks on Raevsky's battery were repulsed. While the third attack was being prepared, the Russian cavalry, led by Cossack ataman M. I. Platov and General F. I. Uvarov. Several hours passed before the French organized a rebuff. During this time, Kutuzov transferred reinforcements to the places of the main battles. The third, decisive attack on Raevsky's battery was made at about two o'clock in the afternoon. The fight lasted over an hour and a half. Under the pressure of superior forces, the Russians were forced to withdraw. Napoleon sent cavalry after them. But the Russian cavalry responded with a counterattack, and the French were stopped. Wedged into the defense of the Russian troops, they could not achieve a breakthrough. The day ended with the roar of artillery. With the onset of darkness, Napoleon ordered to leave a number of captured points, including the Raevsky battery.

The attacking side usually suffers larger losses. In battles, Napoleon lost 58.5 thousand soldiers and officers. However, in the course of the battle, the armies repeatedly changed roles - the Russians knocked out the French from the captured positions. Russian troops suffered heavy losses from enemy artillery. The Russian army had a slight advantage in the number of guns, but the French fired more concentrated fire. The actions of the Russian artillery were affected by the death of its commander, General A.I. Kutaisov, in the midst of the battle. Later, the brave Bagration died from a wound.

Five horses were killed that day under M. B. Barclay de Tolly, 9 or 12 of his adjutants were wounded.

Neither Napoleon (the defeat of the Russian army) nor M.I. Kutuzov (the salvation of Moscow) managed to achieve the main goals of the battle. The Russians lost 45,600 killed and wounded (including 29 generals), the French lost about 60,000 people (including 49 generals). Militarily, the Napoleonic troops were perhaps more trained; they were managed in a more professional manner. But morally and even political sense Borodino was a victory for Russia. This battle broke the spirit of the conquerors, their confidence in final victory, weakened the offensive activity of the French.

The turning point in the war was, however, ahead. The Napoleonic troops were still advancing, the Russians were retreating.

Moscow fire.

The beginning of the turning point was the abandonment of Moscow by M.I. Kutuzov - the most dramatic event of the war of 1812. The decision to give the ancient capital to the enemy was made on September 13 at the military council in Fili. Kutuzov convened a military council and raised the question of whether to give a new battle near the walls of the ancient capital or retreat without a fight. Some generals (Bennigsen, Dokhturov, Uvarov, Konovnitsyn, Yermolov) insisted on a battle. Barclay objected, pointing out that in the event of an unsuccessful outcome, the army would not be able to quickly retreat through the narrow streets of the big city and disaster would occur. Kutuzov was also not pleased with the position taken by the Russian army. “As long as the army still exists and is able to resist the enemy,” he said, “until then there will still be hope to end the war with honor, but with the destruction of the army, not only Moscow, but all of Russia would be lost.”

The question arose which way to retreat. Barclay suggested going to the Volga: "The Volga, flowing through the most fertile provinces, feeds Russia." If this proposal were accepted, they would have to retreat Vladimirskaya road. But Kutuzov did not agree: “Now we should not think about the regions that feed Russia, but about those that supply the army, and therefore we should take a direction to the midday (southern) provinces.” It was decided to go along the Ryazan road. Closing the council, Kutuzov said: "Whatever happens, I accept responsibility to the sovereign, the Fatherland and the army."

The main (and, I think, the only) reason for Napoleon's invasion of the territory of the Russian Empire was Alexander's failure to fulfill the terms of the Tilsit agreement on joint actions against Britain. That is, Britain, not Russia, is the main thorn that needs to be neutralized. Russia is just a tool. If we consider the intentions of Emperor Napoleon as a policy, then his goal was not the complete defeat of the Russian Empire and the Russian army, but pressure on Emperor Alexander I to force further coordinated actions according to Napoleon's scenario.

The conclusion of peace with Alexander the First, after the defeat of the Russian army, Napoleon had already passed, and it was the negative results of this experience that led to a new war. These negative results did not allow to deal with Napoleon's main competitor - the British Empire.

There is no doubt that from the point of view of French interests, a military invasion of Asia with the ultimate goal of conquering Hindustan would be strategic important step. This would lead to the complete collapse of Great Britain and change the geopolitical balance of power in the world. For the first time the idea of Indian campaign was expressed by Bonaparte in 1797, even before his expedition to Egypt.

The death of Paul I in 1801 crossed out Napoleon's plans for a while. However, he did not stop thinking about projects Eastern expeditions and prepare the ground for them. In 1805, the emigrant Verneg reported to the Russian government about the plan of the French emperor “with the help of a crowd of his agents, intrigues and the most strong means reach the English colonies in Great India. it the only way hit this power at the very source of its credit and wealth and hit it, so to speak, from the rear ”(Collection of RIO. T. 82. St. Petersburg, 1892.)

Even before the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon sent Romier and Jaubert missions to Asia with reconnaissance purposes, then sent an embassy of General J. M. Gardan to Iran. In May 1807, an agreement was signed between France and Persia in Finkenstein, one of the articles of which confirmed the consent of the Shah to ensure the French army unimpeded passage to India through its possessions. It is doubtful that Napoleon would waste time discussing this issue in the midst of a war with the anti-Napoleonic coalition.

Apparently, he did not doubt the victorious end of the campaign of 1807 and hoped to conclude an alliance, as a result of which French troops could enter Iran through Russian territory. (hereinafter, citing facts about the work of Russian and French intelligence, I will rely on materials Viktor Mikhailovich Bezotosny )

In the embassy of General Gardan in Persia, there were many officers who were legally engaged in topographic surveying of the area. The result of their activities was a detailed project of a campaign through Iran to India with a detailed indication of the roads and the calculation of the time of everyday crossings.
(Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. T. III. M., 1963. S. 761, edited by Antyukhin)

Even in Tilsit, Napoleon tried to seduce Alexander I with plans to divide the Ottoman Empire. Later, he repeatedly returned to the idea of a joint Franco-Russian campaign through Turkey to Iran. In a letter to the Russian sovereign dated February 2, 1808, the French emperor put forward the following program: “If an army of 50 thousand Russians, French, perhaps even a few Austrians, went through Constantinople to Asia and appeared on the Euphrates, then it forced would tremble England and would plunge her to the feet of the mainland ”(Collection of RIO. T. 88. St. Petersburg, 1893.)

In a conversation with L. Narbonne in April 1812, he predicted the development of events as follows: “... to get to England, you need to go to the rear of Asia from one side of Europe ... Imagine that Moscow is taken, Russia is broken, peace has been concluded with the king, or he fell victim to a palace conspiracy ... and tell me, is there any way to block the path of the great French army sent from Tiflis and the allied troops to the Ganges; Isn't the touch of the French sword enough to bring down the stage of mercantile grandeur throughout India?

On April 14, 1812, the head of French intelligence in the Duchy of Warsaw, Baron E. Bignon, presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs G. B. Mare a lengthy note on the main tasks of the upcoming gigantic expedition. Analyzing the extensive preparatory measures and the forces gathered, the author poses, in his opinion, reasonable questions: “What could be a worthy prize for such a huge effort? What goal is grand enough... to merit such a deployment of funds?” And, in his opinion, only "the weakening of Russia, the restriction of this power by the borders of the old Muscovy will not be a sufficient reward for the losses of excessive movement."

Thus, the purpose of the 1812 campaign was clearly defined - the preparation of an expedition to India. Russia, on the other hand, will “either voluntarily join the Napoleonic army, or, as a result of the laws of victory, will be drawn to the great movement that should change the face of the world.” Bignon even gave a detailed picture of future actions - a contingent "from a third or a quarter European army going to deliver a mortal blow to England, while the rest will be located on the banks of the Vistula, Dvina and Dnieper to guarantee the rear of those who will participate in the expedition. (Handelsman M. Instrukcje i depesze rezydentow francuskich w Warszawie. T.II. Warszawa, 1914.)

In 1811, an agent group consisting of Colonel A.S. Platter, Major Picornel and topographer Krestkovsky secretly entered Russia. Under the guise of retired Russian officers, equipped with the relevant documents, they made a long voyage - they visited Moscow and nine provinces. After that, Krestkovsky was sent back with the information received, and the other two continued their journey through the Volga region to Orenburg - again, to find out the possibilities of a campaign in India. This route was by no means random. Pursuing the same goals, it was through the Orenburg steppes in 1801 that Emperor Paul I ordered the 41st Don regiment under the command of the military ataman V.P. Orlov to go.

The poison of failures and accidents prevented the Napoleonic emissaries from reaching their intended goal, and they were forced to turn to the Don, where on August 5, 1812, Platter was arrested. Picornel managed to escape. (Collection historical materials extracted from the archives of His Imperial Majesty's own Chancellery. Issue. 2. St. Petersburg, 1889.)

Napoleonic plans were not a secret in Russia either. In March 1812, through General P.K. Sukhtelen, the heir to the Swedish throne and former French marshal J.B. Bernadotte conveyed to Alexander I that Napoleon expected to defeat the Russian troops and make peace within two months. Under the terms of which the combined Russian-French army will first go against the Turks, then enter Iran, and subsequently penetrate into India. Moreover, he plans to accomplish this in just three years (Collection of RIO, Vol. 6, St. Petersburg, 1871). Not surprisingly, many of the soldiers great army even before crossing the Neman, they believed that they were being led “into the depths of fabulous Asia” (Tirion, 1812. Memoirs of an officer of the French cuirassier regiment No. 2 about the campaign of 1812.)

The implementation of the Indian project primarily depended on success in Russia. “It was assumed that I had the intention to go to India through Persia, and I do not deny: the possibility of such an expedition occurred to me; but this expedition was a secondary circumstance, completely subordinate to the relationship in which we will remain with the St.

In the same spirit, the French emperor spoke to the Marquis A. Caulaincourt, Bonaparte's ambassador to Russia, who wrote in his Memoirs that during the war Napoleon "did not doubt that the Russian nobility would force Alexander to ask him for peace, because such a result lay in basis of his calculations” (Caulaincourt A. Memoirs. Napoleon’s Campaign in Russia. M., 1943.) What kind of calculations were these, where the support was precisely the nobles, and not the royal family?

France deliberately and persistently tried to destroy the colonial gains, and with them the economy of Britain. The raid into Egypt, the liquidation of all the British Mediterranean bases in the Mediterranean, the aid of the American colonists and the rush to India are consecutive moves in this game of chess. But for the latter, a reliable land route was required, and for him, a reliable ally in the rear.

How to ensure this reliability? Take Alexander hostage and carry him around like Cortes Montezuma? The English party among the Russian nobility will remain in the capital and will gladly exchange one Romanov for another, which they have done more than once over the past 100 years.

Yes, if only English. Since the time of Peter 1, the royal house has established with enviable constancy family ties with the German principalities, so there were also enough representatives of the still unformed Germany in power and they also did not have any tenderness for the French.

Occupy Russia entirely? The great army will dissolve in it like a grain of salt in the ocean. I needed to find a remote immediately. remote control vast territory, which will work at least for the duration of the solution of the British question.

And Napoleon stubbornly searched for this remote control.

We constantly and fairly note the merits of Russian intelligence in the person of Colonel Chernyshev, who recruited a whole crowd of Napoleon's top officials. But why don't we mention the French, which also felt at ease in Russia. Shortly before the war, French intelligence, for example, managed to steal the engraving boards of the "stolist" Russian map. Subsequently, the inscriptions on this map were translated into French, and this map was used by the French command during the war.

It has been described and repeated many times how different sources the Special Office received irrefutable information about the strategic plan of Napoleon: After military victory dictate peace to Alexander I, turning him into an obedient vassal. But at the time of the beginning of the 1812 campaign, all this was already there! The defeat of the army (near Friedland) and the dictated peace (Tilsit) already existed, but it categorically did not grow together with vassalage. New, stronger trump cards were needed.

The same Bezotosny, and not only him, not once or twice repeats information about great interest Napoleon to Russian history, both to the latest (in the investigation of the murder of Paul 1), and more distant, starting with Peter 1 and extending to the last peasant uprisings. Emperor was especially interested secret protocols interrogations of Pugachev. Why would?

So, once again on the goals and objectives of 1812:
The target is India. The task is the vassalage of Russia

And the confidence of Napoleon, who "had no doubt that the Russian nobility would force Alexander to ask him for peace ..." Where?

Version:

Napoleon was well aware of the illegality of the accession of Alexander 1st himself, his participation in palace coup and parricide and was extremely interested in obtaining Russian archival documents. And not only (and not so much) state. He was well aware of the fierce struggle in Russia for the Russian throne between various hostile clans.

Undoubtedly, in the caches of the nobility, especially in Moscow, unique archival documents who could, if necessary, confirm the illegality of the reign of not only Alexander, but also many other Russian sovereigns from the Romanov family.

This is probably why many Orthodox churches and monasteries in Moscow were desecrated, in the buildings of which, perhaps, the documents necessary to Napoleon were hidden. Traditionally, Russian tsars kept their most important documents in churches and monasteries. Alexander I, for example, kept his will about the heir to the throne in the Assumption Cathedral in Moscow, believing that this is the safest place.

Incidentally, working in secret archives and in the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, A.S. Pushkin understood how the supreme power was seized illegally in Russia. He wanted to write about this in his historical writings, but did not have time ... Maybe it is this excessive awareness of state affairs that is the real reason for the untimely death of the poet?

On the basis of which A.S. Pushkin in the 10th chapter of "Eugene Onegin" described Alexander I as follows:

"The ruler is weak and crafty,
Bald dandy, enemy of labor,
Inadvertently warmed by glory,
He reigned over us then?

Archival documents about other reigns, in particular Peter I, Catherine II and Emelyan Pugachev, were in the Moscow archive of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. These archives also interested Napoleon! Here, perhaps, is the answer to the question why Napoleon had to take Moscow by all means. He needed documents with which to prove the illegality of the power of the Romanovs in general and Alexander 1 in particular, and if he was lucky, then his involvement and imperial family Britain - to the murder of Paul 1st.

Undoubtedly, Alexander I also did not want archival documents compromising him to fall into the hands of the nobility opposed to the government.

But with the nobility itself, as they say, there were options. When, at the direction of Nicholas 1, the revision and systematization of the archives began, it turned out that “only in Lithuania and Belarus there were 40,000 “nobles”, of which only 16,000 owned land, and most of them received the nobility on forged documents. By the 1830s, the identification of falsifications had become widespread, and barely 4% of the submitted documents turned out to be genuine ...

At the same time, entire workshops for the manufacture of fake documents were revealed, where letters of nobility could be bought for a ruble apiece. Act books (they entered public and private legal acts drawn up), scattered around castles and institutions, were subjected to a real attack by forgers: non-existent documents were entered into empty spaces, entire notebooks of genuine acts were torn out of their bindings and new ones were inserted - fake ones. (Changes in the archival business of Russia and the process of collecting documents in the first half of the 19th century. VSGAO (IGPU).

I remind you that five historical archives functioned in Moscow: the Moscow Archive of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs (MA-KID). Archive of the survey office, Archive of the patrimonial department, Moscow State Archive of Old Cases (MGASD), Razryazno-Senatsky, as well as the Moscow Provincial Archive and archives of institutions that could give Napoleon invaluable compromising evidence to put pressure on many families at the court of the "chicks of Petrov's nest" or who think they are."

In a word, the possession of the necessary papers and the necessary witnesses (who will confirm anything under the pressure of the necessary papers) made it possible for their owner to tenderly hold the imperial family for a causal place. The presence on the throne of which could end at any moment after the publication of the history of their accession, and a noble society that risked at any moment to change their pillar rights for serfdom.

Well, now, if we take this version as a working one, it will become clear that Napoleon's desire to reach Moscow:

1. Moscow is a logical and very convenient transit point if you are going to go to the East later, and not return to Europe.

2. Moscow is a reconnoitered repository of an unmeasured amount of compromising evidence, which will give the most serious trump cards for successful negotiations on vassalage with ANY representative of the Russian elite.

3. Moscow is also rich trophies (according to the results of the revision of 1813, only state and church property was taken out of Moscow and then lost for 2 annual budgets of the entire empire)

The genuine interest of the French in the archives can be illustrated by the following report from the county archivist of the city of Bogorodsk (60 km to the East beyond Moscow):

“On September 22, at 11 o’clock in the evening, the city was unexpectedly occupied by enemy troops, who remained there until October 9. After the liberation of Bogorodsk, officials found a complete mess in the rooms of the district court: the shelves in the archives were torn off and the old solved cases were all untied and scattered, and the lock was knocked down and the lid was broken near the state chest, where the secret files were kept, and the secret files were scattered all over the place. chambers and in the yard. After the inspection, it turned out that 3 ordinary and 13 secret cases were stolen.

Of all three components of the dangers for the Russian imperial family, of course, the second one (compromising evidence in private and state archives) is a priority. It was necessary to do something energetically, but for this there was whole line restrictions:

If the withdrawal state archives rested only on the lack of time, material resources and reliable performers, then things were very bad with private storage facilities.

To announce the seizure of private archives under any pretext means not to find them at all, or to find only what they want to show you.

To say directly what documents you are looking for is suicide.

And even announcing that Moscow will be surrendered means not even having an idea how and where these archives will be hidden, where they will be evacuated, where and how they may later surface.

The difficult task of seizing, or at least preventing the hidden documents from falling into the wrong hands, could only be entrusted to an absolutely trusted courtier, politician and diplomat, that is, a person whose characteristics fully corresponded to Kutuzov.

The decision, which was the only possible one and was dictated by external circumstances and wild time pressure - not to allow evacuation, if possible - to withdraw, if impossible - to destroy.

From this point of view, Kutuzov’s numerous assurances that he “will lie down with his bones, but will not give up Moscow to the enemy”, complete silence during the retreat to the walls of the city, a resolute refusal to give battle under its walls and an order to retreat without fail through him, and not into in no case bypass, with the mandatory evacuation of living potential witnesses - the nobles and all the documents that can be found in their empty houses.

Then the meaning of the key phrase in Kutuzov's report is read in a completely different way: “The arsenal and almost all property, both public and private, were taken out and not a single nobleman remained in it.” Read - "All compromising materials found have been seized, witnesses have been neutralized". But this was not enough. "Almost" is not "everything"! In this case, "Plan B" was prepared, which went down in history as the famous Moscow fire.

Judge for yourself: there was no time to look for documents in the abandoned houses and institutions, and there was no time to sort the found ones. There was no way to take everything out, and it was dangerous - no one knew what was waiting for the "liquidation commission" around the nearest corner. Fire is the most reliable and easiest way to solve unsolvable problems with documentation - any experienced warehouse manager will tell you that.

“The idea of a fire in Moscow belonged to Alexander 1st himself,” testifies D.P. Runich , - for this measure could be conceived and prescribed ONLY by the emperor himself. It was ordered to be executed only in the last extreme, when the danger would threaten the entire empire. The execution of this measure could only be entrusted to Rostopchin and Kutuzov ... ”(RA 1885 No. 3 p. 605)

Compromising evidence on royal family in the hands of Napoleon - what could be more dangerous for the empire?

It is not for nothing that Alexander himself, the 1st fire in Moscow, in his rescript to M.I. Kutuzov called God's providence, saving for Russia and Europe. (M.I. Kutuzov. Collection of documents. M., 1954. T. 4. Part 2. P. 149-152.). In the same document, Alexander I reported: "Russia, through her harm, bought her peace and glory of being the savior of Europe." Last words suggest that compromising evidence was seized and (or) destroyed not only on the name of the Romanovs, but also on many of the reigning families of Europe.

1. Having calmed the nobility with militant rhetoric and, without giving rise to drastic actions, then, unexpectedly, just a day "before", Kutuzov announced the surrender of Moscow and the requisition of transport for the needs of the army. In addition, the advance of the army itself through the city made it much more difficult to export anything. And at the same time it became an excellent cover for searches of private houses, which, under the guise of looting, could be carried out by special teams from the department of the Minister of War.

2. After the dissemination of correct information about the atrocities of the French, where Smolensk, which died in the fire, was perhaps the main scarecrow, the voluntary forced evacuation of the nobles followed. As a result, Napoleon was deprived not only of private archives, but also of the opportunity to find out from anyone where to look for them and what interesting things can be found there, as well as to replace the lack of papers with the testimony of living witnesses.

3. The fire reliably concealed even what the “Kremlin agents” could not find and take out, and the responsibility for this fire was divided equally between the irrepressible Russian patriotism and the unbridled desire of the Great Army for primitive barbaric enrichment.

This is called "checkmate". Not only did Napoleon not solve any of his tasks, but also, as a real master of jiu-jitsu, using his own strength, Kutuzov solved the problem of curbing his own noble freemen, which is incredibly difficult for the autocracy, which:

1. They elegantly seized or destroyed part of the compromising evidence in private hands,

2. Significantly shattered economic independence, forcing, after the end of the war, to beat the forehead in front of the sovereign about at least some compensation for damage after the fires and robberies of 1812.

3. Responsibility for both was shifted onto the shoulders of an external aggressor who could no longer object.

It was the sharp weakening of the opposition nobility in 1812 that made it possible to suppress the next Guards rebellion in December 1825.

And Napoleon, instead of compromising the Russian nobility and royal family, received such a compromise of himself and his army, from which he could not wash himself until his death.

However, this was far from the end of the chess game. The meaning of such strange, at first glance, moves as the deliberate creation of a situation that increases losses and reduces the combat effectiveness of the Russian army, the repeated refusal to inflict a decisive defeat on Napoleon, and strange illogical maneuvering when pursuing the retreating enemy remains undisclosed.

Questions are also awaiting answers - why, despite the direct ban of Alexander the 1st, Loriston and Kutuzov met in Tarutino, what they talked about tete-a-tete and what they agreed on, why Napoleon left Moscow and went the most unfavorable route for himself, that he waited and what he left in the capital, and finally, where did the innumerable Moscow treasures go.

So - the main (and, I think, the only) reason for the invasion of the territory of the Russian Empire is Alexander's failure to fulfill the terms of the Tilsit agreement on joint actions against Britain. That is, Britain, not Russia, is the main thorn that needs to be neutralized. Russia is just a tool. If we consider the intentions of Emperor Napoleon as a policy, then his goal was not the complete defeat of the Russian Empire and the Russian army, but pressure on Emperor Alexander I to force further coordinated actions according to Napoleon's scenario.

There is no doubt that, from the point of view of French interests, a military invasion of Asia with the ultimate goal of conquering Hindustan would be a strategically important step. This would lead to the complete collapse of Great Britain and change the geopolitical balance of power in the world. The idea of an Indian campaign was first expressed by Bonaparte in 1797, even before his expedition to Egypt.

Bonaparte in front of the Sphinx. Baron Jean-Leon Gerome

Napoleon and his General base in Egypt. Jean-Leon Gerome

The death of Paul I in 1801 crossed out Napoleon's plans for a while. However, he did not stop thinking about the projects of the eastern expeditions and preparing the ground for them. In 1805, the emigrant Verneg reported to the Russian government about the plan of the French emperor “with the help of a crowd of his agents, intrigues and the strongest means to get to the English colonies in Great India. This is the only way to hit this power at the very source of its credit and wealth and hit it, so to speak, from the rear ”(Sbornik RIO. T. 82. St. Petersburg, 1892.)

Napoleon receives the Persian embassy on April 27, 1807. Engraving. Early XIX in.

Louis-Marie-Jacques-Almaric de Narbonne-Lara. diplomat and general. Adjutant of Napoleon

L.P.E. Bignon (1771-1841) - French diplomat, spy, historian

Thus, the purpose of the campaign of 1812 was clearly defined - the preparation of an expedition to India. Russia, on the other hand, will “either voluntarily join the Napoleonic army, or, as a result of the laws of victory, will be drawn to the great movement that should change the face of the world.” Bignon even drew a detailed picture of future actions - a contingent "from a third or a quarter of the European army going to strike a mortal blow to England" will be sent into the depths of Asia, while the rest will be located on the banks of the Vistula, Dvina and Dnieper to guarantee the rear of those who will participate in the expedition. ". (Handelsman M. Instrukcje i depesze rezydentow francuskich w Warszawie. T.II. Warszawa, 1914.)

The poison of failures and accidents prevented the Napoleonic emissaries from reaching their intended goal, and they were forced to turn to the Don, where on August 5, 1812, Platter was arrested. Picornel managed to escape. (Collection of historical materials extracted from the archives of His Imperial Majesty's own office. Issue 2. St. Petersburg, 1889.)

Napoleonic plans were not a secret in Russia either. In March 1812, through General P.K. Sukhtelen, the heir to the Swedish throne and former French marshal J.B. Bernadotte conveyed to Alexander I that Napoleon expected to defeat the Russian troops and make peace within two months. Under the terms of which the combined Russian-French army will first go against the Turks, then enter Iran, and subsequently penetrate into India. Moreover, he plans to accomplish this in just three years (Collection of RIO, Vol. 6, St. Petersburg, 1871). It is not surprising that many of the soldiers of the Great Army, even before crossing the Neman, believed that they were being led "into the depths of fabulous Asia" (Tirion, 1812. Memoirs of an officer of the French cuirassier regiment No. 2 about the campaign of 1812.)

Jean Baptiste Bernadotte

France deliberately and persistently tried to destroy the colonial gains, and with them the economy of Britain. The raid into Egypt, the elimination of all British Mediterranean bases in the Mediterranean, the aid of the American colonists, and the rush to India are consecutive moves in this game of chess. But for the latter, a reliable land route was required, and for him, a reliable ally in the rear.

Marshal Berthier began his military career in America...

Yes, if only English. Since the time of Peter the Great, the royal house established family ties with the German principalities with enviable constancy, so there were also enough representatives of the still undeveloped Germany in power and they also did not have any tenderness for the French.

Occupy Russia entirely? The great army will dissolve in it like a grain of salt in the ocean. It was urgent to find a remote control for a vast territory that would work at least for the duration of the solution of the British question.

And Napoleon stubbornly searched for this remote control.

It has been described and repeated many times how, from various sources, the Special Office received irrefutable information about Napoleon’s strategic plan: After a military victory, dictate peace to Alexander I, turning him into an obedient vassal. But at the time of the beginning of the 1812 campaign, all this was already there! The defeat of the army (near Friedland) and the dictated peace (Tilsit) already existed, but it categorically did not grow together with vassalage. New, stronger trump cards were needed.

The same Bezotosny, and not only him, more than once or twice repeats information about Napoleon’s great interest in Russian history, both in the latest (in the investigation of the murder of Paul 1), and more distant, starting with Peter 1 and extending to the last peasant uprisings. The emperor was especially interested in the secret protocols of Pugachev's interrogations. Why would?

So, once again on the goals and objectives of 1812:
The target is India. The task is the vassalage of Russia

And the confidence of Napoleon, who "had no doubt that the Russian nobility would force Alexander to ask him for peace ..." Where?

Version:

Napoleon was well aware of the illegality of the accession of Alexander the 1st himself, his participation in the palace coup and parricide, and was extremely interested in obtaining Russian archival documents. And not only (and not so much) state. He was well aware of the fierce struggle in Russia for the Russian throne between various hostile clans.

Undoubtedly, in the caches of the nobles, especially those in Moscow, unique archival documents were kept, which, if necessary, could confirm the illegality of the rule not only of Alexander, but also of many other Russian sovereigns from the Romanov family.

This is probably why many Orthodox churches and monasteries in Moscow were desecrated, in the buildings of which, perhaps, the documents necessary to Napoleon were hidden. Traditionally Russian tsars kept their most important documents in churches and monasteries. Alexander I, for example, kept his will about the heir to the throne in the Assumption Cathedral in Moscow, believing that this is the safest place.

By the way, while working in especially secret archives and in the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, A.S. Pushkin understood how the supreme power was seized illegally in Russia. He wanted to write about this in his historical writings, but did not have time ... Maybe it is this excessive awareness of state affairs that is the real reason for the untimely death of the poet?

On the basis of which A.S. Pushkin in the 10th chapter of "Eugene Onegin" described Alexander I as follows:

"The ruler is weak and crafty,
Bald dandy, enemy of labor,
Inadvertently warmed by glory,
He reigned over us then?

Archival documents about other reigns, in particular Peter I, Catherine II and Emelyan Pugachev, were in the Moscow archive of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. These archives also interested Napoleon! Here, perhaps, is the answer to the question why Napoleon had to take Moscow by all means. He needed documents with which to prove the illegality of the power of the Romanovs in general and Alexander 1 in particular, and if he was lucky, then the involvement of him and the imperial family of Britain in the murder of Paul 1st.

Undoubtedly, Alexander I also did not want archival documents compromising him to fall into the hands of the nobility opposed to the government.

At the same time, entire workshops for the manufacture of fake documents were revealed, where letters of nobility could be bought for a ruble apiece. The act books (they entered the public and private legal acts drawn up), scattered around the castles and institutions, were subjected to a real attack by forgers: non-existent documents were entered in the empty places, whole notebooks of genuine acts were torn out of the bindings and new ones were inserted - fake. (Changes in the archival business of Russia and the process of collecting documents in the first half of the 19th century. VSGAO (IGPU).

Well, now, if we take this version as a working one, it will become clear that Napoleon's desire to reach Moscow:

1. Moscow is a logical and very convenient transit point if you are going to go to the East later, and not return to Europe.

3. Moscow is also rich trophies (according to the results of the revision of 1813, only state and church property was taken out of Moscow and then lost for 2 annual budgets of the entire empire)

The genuine interest of the French in the archives can be illustrated by the following report from the county archivist of the city of Bogorodsk (60 km to the East beyond Moscow):

Of all three components of the dangers for the Russian imperial family, the second one (compromising evidence in private and state archives) is, of course, a priority. It was necessary to do something energetically, but there were a number of restrictions for this:

- If the seizure of state archives rested only on the lack of time, material resources and reliable executors, then the situation with private repositories was very bad.

- To announce the seizure of private archives under any pretext means not to find them at all, or to find only what they want to show you.

- To say directly what documents you are looking for is suicide.

“And even announcing that Moscow will be surrendered means not even having an idea how and where these archives will be hidden, where they will be evacuated, where and how they may later surface.

The decision, which was the only possible one and was dictated by external circumstances and wild time trouble - not to allow evacuation, if possible - to withdraw, if impossible - to destroy.

From this point of view, Kutuzov’s numerous assurances that he “will lie down with his bones, but will not give up Moscow to the enemy”, complete silence during the retreat to the walls of the city, a resolute refusal to give battle under its walls and an order to retreat without fail through him, and not into in no case bypass, with the obligatory evacuation of living potential witnesses - nobles and all documents that can be found in their empty houses.

Judge for yourself: there was no time to look for documents in the abandoned houses and institutions, and there was no time to sort the found ones. There was no way to take everything out, and it was dangerous - no one knew what was waiting for the "liquidation commission" around the nearest corner. Fire is the most reliable and easiest way to solve unsolvable documentation problems - any experienced warehouse manager will tell you that.

“The idea of a fire in Moscow belonged to Alexander I himself,” testifies D.P. Runich , - for this measure could be conceived and prescribed ONLY by the emperor himself. It was ordered to be executed only in the last extreme, when the danger would threaten the entire empire. The execution of this measure could only be entrusted to Rostopchin and Kutuzov ... ”(RA 1885 No. 3 p. 605)

Compromising evidence on the royal family in the hands of Napoleon - what could be more dangerous for the empire?

It is not for nothing that Alexander himself, the 1st fire in Moscow, in his rescript to M.I. Kutuzov called God's providence, saving for Russia and Europe. (M.I. Kutuzov. Collection of documents. M., 1954. T. 4. Part 2. P. 149-152.). In the same document, Alexander I reported: "Russia, through her harm, bought her peace and glory of being the savior of Europe." The last words suggest that compromising evidence was seized and (or) destroyed not only on the name of the Romanovs, but also on many of the reigning families of Europe.