Date and place
June 23-30, 1941, the area of ​​​​the cities of Dubno (now the regional center of the Rivne region), Lutsk ( regional center Volyn region), Brody (regional center of Lviv region).
Characters
The Soviet Southwestern Front, deployed on the basis of the Kyiv Special Military District (KOVO), was commanded by Colonel General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos (1892-1941; participated in civil war under the command of N. Shchors, commanded a regiment, 1935 brigade commander, 1939 . commander, in March next year during the war with Finland, at the head of the 70th Infantry Division, successfully walked around on ice Gulf of Finland Vyborg fortified area, contributing to the capture of Vyborg, the same year, lieutenant general, commander of the Leningrad Military District, in the spring of 1941, colonel general, commander of KOVO); the chief of staff of the front was a competent staff officer, Major General Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev (1894-1953, from 1939 the chief of staff of the KOVO, in the fall of 1941 the commander of the 3rd shock army, in August 1942 - April 1943 the commander of the Kalinin Front, in 1943-1945 he commanded Far Eastern Front and the Far Eastern Military District). A significant negative role in planning the timing and directions of the counterattack was played by the representative of the Stavka Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov and the corps commissar Nikolai Nikolaevich Vashugin (1900-1941; from 1920 to 1941. He went from commissar of the regimental school to a member of the military council of the Kyiv Special Military District, in June 1941 Mr.. was a member of the military council Southwestern Front, after the failure of the Soviet counterattack, he shot himself).
The mechanized corps that delivered counterattacks were led by: 9th - in the future one of the best Soviet commanders Konstantin Konstantinovich (Ksaverievich) Rokossovsky (1896-1968), 15th - Major General Ignatiy Ivanovich Karpezo (1898-1987), 8th - Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Ryabyshev (1894-1985), 19th - Lieutenant General Nikolai Vladimirovich Feklenko (1901-1951), 22nd - Major General Semyon Mikhailovich Kondrusov (1897-1941). The powerful 4th mechanized corps, which held back the attacks of the German 17th Army west of Brod, was commanded by one of the best Soviet commanders the beginning of the war and in the future, the commander of the ROA, Major General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov (1901-1946), among the commanders of tank divisions, one of the best Soviet tank commanders in the future, Colonel Mikhail Efimovich Katukov (1900-1976), should be noted.
The German Army Group South was commanded by the experienced and conservative Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt (1875-1953; 1939 commanded Army Group South in the war with Poland, 1940 - Army Group A, which played a major role in the defeat of France, in during Operation Barbarossa from June to November 1941, the commander-in-chief of Army Group South, in November 1944 - March 1945, defeated the Allies near Arnhem, despite initial successes, lost the battle in the Ardennes), opposed Soviet tank commanders at the head of the 1st tank group Colonel General Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist (1881-1954; successfully operated against Poland, 1940 commanded the first ever tank army- tank group "Kleist", 1942. participated in the 2nd battle for Kharkov, from November 1942 he commanded Army Group A in the Caucasus, after 1945 he was accused of war crimes, died in a Soviet prison). The corps were commanded by: 3rd motorized - cavalry general Eberhard von Mackensen (1889-1969), 48th tank - one of the best German tank commanders of World War II, General of Tank Forces Werner Kempf (1886-1964).
Event Background
From the very beginning of the war, the course of hostilities in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front had a slightly different character than in the center and north. This was due to the noticeable advantage of the forces of the Soviet Southwestern Front over the Germans in artillery, large in tanks and noticeable in aviation. On June 22, the Soviet side was losing people, but the front received reinforcements during the hostilities. The strike force of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) on this front was 8 KOVO mechanized corps. Near Dubno - Lutsk - Brody, or in the Lvov direction, there were 6 of them, which were armed with 3.7 thousand tanks and 760 armored vehicles. The mechanized corps were not well equipped by car- had up to 9.8 thousand cars. FROM German side units of 5 tank divisions could be involved in the battle, they had 728 tanks, 84 assault guns. Significantly inferior in numbers, the Germans had a certain advantage in tanks in the directions of the main attack.
June 22 at 3.30 fighting began along the entire front line. In the afternoon, the German 11th Panzer Division successfully broke through the Soviet defenses at the junction of the 5th and 6th armies and began to advance towards Dubno and Ostrog, which created a serious threat to encircle the 5th army. The headquarters of the front under pressure from M. Vashugin and the representative of the Stavka G. Zhukov saw the only way out- powerful counterattacks.
Event progress
At dawn on June 24, the 24th tank regiment of the 20th tank division of Colonel M. Katukov from the 9th mechanized corps attacked units of the 13th German tank division on the move, capturing about 300 prisoners.
The 15th mechanized corps of Major General I. Karpezo advanced to Radzechow. During clashes with the German 11th Panzer Division, part of the tanks of the mechanized corps was immediately lost from the action of aviation and due to technical malfunctions. On the evening of June 24, the 19th mechanized corps of Major General Feklenko reached the Ikva River in the Melnichnaya area. The 43rd tank division of the mechanized corps rushed to the Rovno region, but suffered heavy air strikes. The Soviet 15th mechanized corps, exhausted by forced marches and partially drained of blood, failed to take Radzechow and stop the Germans. The same applies to the actions of the 22nd mechanized corps, Major General S. Kondrusov, who attacked the enemy west of Lutsk. 72% of the tanks and vehicles of the mechanized corps were lost on the march. The commander died in battle, the corps was actually bled. During the first three days of the war, the Germans advanced 100 km inland in some sectors of the front. Soviet defense. June 24 19th tank and 215th motorized rifle division The 22nd mechanized corps went on the offensive north of the Vladimir-Volynsky-Lutsk highway. The attack was unsuccessful, as the division's tanks ran into the German anti-tank defenses. The corps lost more than 50% of its tanks and began to retreat to the Rozhyshcha area. The 1st anti-tank artillery brigade of K. Moskalenko also retreated here, moreover, it successfully defended the highway.
From the direction of Lutsk and Dubno on the morning of June 25, the Soviet 9th and 19th mechanized corps attacked the left flank of the von Kleist tank group, which rejected parts of the 3rd German motorized corps southwest of Rovno. The 43rd Panzer Division of the 19th Mechanized Corps broke through the defensive positions of the barriers of the German 11th Panzer Division and at 6 pm broke into the outskirts of Dubno. But through the retreat of the neighbors, both flanks of the 43rd division were unprotected and she retreated. The German 11th Panzer Division, supported by the left flank of the 16th Panzer Division, at that time entered Ostrog, advancing deep into the rear of the Soviet troops.
From the south, from the Brod area, the 15th mechanized corps continued its difficult offensive towards Radzechow and Berestechko. On June 25, the 37th Panzer Division of the Mechanized Corps crossed the Radostavka River and moved forward. The 10th Panzer Division ran into German anti-tank defenses and was forced to withdraw. The formation of the corps was subjected to a massive German air raid, during which commander I. Karpezo was seriously wounded. German infantry units began to cover the corps' positions from the flanks.
The 8th mechanized corps, having carried out a 500 km march since the beginning of the war and leaving up to half of the tanks and artillery on the road from breakdowns and air strikes, on the evening of June 25 ended up in the Busk area, southwest of Brody. On the morning of June 26, the mechanized corps entered Brody with the task of advancing on Dubno. On the morning of June 26, the 12th Panzer Division of Major General T. Mishanin attacked and captured the city of Leshnev before 4 p.m. By the end of the day, the divisions of the 8th mechanized corps advanced in the direction of Berestechko by 8-15 km, pushing the units of the 57th infantry and 16th tank divisions of the enemy, withdrew and entrenched themselves behind the Plyashivka River. Realizing the threat to the right flank of their 48th motorized corps, the Germans transferred the 16th motorized division, the 670th anti-tank battalion and a battery of 88-mm guns to this area. By evening, the enemy was already trying to counterattack parts of the mechanized corps, which on the night of June 27 received an order to withdraw from the battle.
The 4th mechanized corps of Vlasov was used by units in fierce battles on various directions against the German army of Stülpnagel. On June 27, the commander of the 5th Army, M. Potapov, by order of the military council of the Southwestern Front, decided in the morning to launch an offensive by the 9th and 19th mechanized corps on the left flank German group between Lutsk and Rovno in converging, on Mlinov and the 36th Rifle Corps on Dubno. Parts of the 15th mechanized corps were to go to Berestechko and return to Dubno.
However, the Germans again turned out to be faster - during the night of June 26-27 they transported infantry units across the Ikva River and concentrated the 13th Panzer, 25th Motorized, 11th Infantry and parts of the 14th Panzer Division against the 9th Mechanized Corps. Having found fresh units in front of him, K. Rokossovsky did not begin the offensive. At the same time, the German 298th and 299th divisions launched an offensive near Lutsk, supported by the tanks of the 14th division. The 20th Panzer Division had to be transferred to this direction of the Red Army, and the situation stabilized until the beginning of July. The 19th mechanized corps of M. Feklenko also failed to go on the offensive, retreating to Rovno, and then to Goshcha under the blows of the 11th and 13th Panzerwaffe divisions. On the retreat and under the blows of aviation, part of the tanks, vehicles and guns of the mechanized corps were lost. The 36th Rifle Corps was weakened by the fighting and also could not go on the attack. FROM south direction at 2 p.m. on June 27, only the hastily organized combined detachments of the 24th Tank Regiment of Lieutenant Colonel P. Volkov and the 34th Tank Division under the command of Brigadier Commissar M. Popel were able to go on the offensive, which achieved the greatest success during the battle.
The blow in the direction of Dubno came as a surprise to the Germans - having crushed the defensive barriers, the group of M. Popel entered the outskirts of Dubno by evening, capturing the rear reserves of the 11th Panzer Division and several dozen intact tanks (which later had to be abandoned). During the night, the Germans transferred units of the 16th motorized, 75th and 111th infantry divisions to the breakthrough site and closed the breakthrough, interrupting the supply lines of the Popel group. Attempts by units of the 8th mechanized corps to break through the German defenses failed, the corps went on the defensive itself. On the left flank, having broken through the defenses of the 212th motorized division of the 15th mechanized corps, about 40 German tanks reached the headquarters of the 12th tank division. The division commander, Major General T. Mishanina, sent a reserve to meet them - 6 KV tanks and 4 T-34 tanks, which managed to stop the breakthrough by bringing german tanks and without suffering losses at the same time - the German tank guns could not penetrate their armor. The 8th mechanized corps managed to withdraw in an organized manner to the line of the Zolochevsky heights, breaking through the German barriers. By the morning of July 5, the divisions of the corps had completed their concentration in Proskurov. On June 29, the 15th mechanized corps was ordered to change units of the 37th rifle corps and withdraw to the Zolochevsky heights in the area White stone- Zolochev - Lyatsky. The detachment of M. Popel remained cut off in the deep rear of the enemy. Having taken up all-round defense in the Dubno region until July 2, after which, having destroyed the equipment, the remaining detachment successfully went to its own. More Soviet tank battle is over.
Consequences of the incident
The result of the counterattacks was a week delay in the offensive of the 1st Panzer Group and the disruption of the enemy's plans to quickly break through to Kyiv and encircle the armies of the Southwestern Front on the Lvov ledge. German command managed to repel a counterattack and defeat the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, without stopping its offensive. The Soviet side irrevocably lost up to 2.5 thousand tanks, the von Kleist group suffered an order of magnitude smaller, but still heavy losses - at the time these battles ended, there were up to 320 combat-ready tanks in its composition, however, the out-of-service vehicles were quickly repaired. There is information irretrievable losses von Kleist group on September 4, 1941 - 186 vehicles, most of which was lost near Dubno - Lutsk - Brody. human losses both sides in this battle are not exactly known. The Southwestern Front lost in all battles between June 22 - July 5, 165.5 thousand people killed and captured, up to 658 thousand wounded. The German Army Group South (without the Romanians and Hungarians who acted with it) during the same period lost 5.5 thousand killed and missing, 17.2 thousand wounded.
historical memory
In Soviet times, one of the largest tank battles in history was completely forgotten (for example, the IS-2 monument tank installed at the exit from Dubno has nothing to do with the battle). In the 1990s Interest in the event revived both in Ukraine and in Russia, primarily thanks to scientists, amateur historians, search groups, local historians, etc. world war. However, there are no significant events to honor the memory of the fallen in the battle.

When and where did the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually take place?

both as a science and as social tool, alas, is subject to too much political influence. And it often happens that for some reason - most often ideological - some events are praised, while others are forgotten or remain underestimated. Thus, the vast majority of our compatriots, both those who grew up in the days of the USSR and in post-Soviet Russia, sincerely consider the battle of Prokhorovka, an integral part of the Battle of Kursk, to be the largest tank battle in history. But in fairness it should be noted that the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually took place two years earlier and five hundred kilometers to the west. Within a week, two tank armadas met in a triangle between the cities of Dubno, Lutsk and Brody total strength about 4500 armored vehicles.

Counteroffensive on the second day of the war

The actual beginning of the battle of Dubno, which is also called the battle of Brody or the battle for Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, was June 23, 1941. It was on this day that the tank corps - at that time they were still called mechanized out of habit - corps of the Red Army, stationed in the Kiev military district, launched the first serious counterattacks on the advancing German troops. The representative of the Stavka insisted on counterattacking the Germans Supreme High Command Georgy Zhukov. First, the 4th, 15th and 22nd mechanized corps, which were in the first echelon, struck at the flanks of Army Group South. And after them, the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which advanced from the second echelon, joined the operation.

Strategically, the plan of the Soviet command was correct: to strike at the flanks of the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht, which was part of the Army Group "South" and rushed to Kyiv in order to surround and destroy it. In addition, the battles of the first day, when some Soviet divisions - such as the 87th division of Major General Philip Alyabushev - managed to stop the superior forces of the Germans, gave hope that this plan could be realized.

In addition, the Soviet troops in this area had a significant superiority in tanks. On the eve of the war, the Kyiv Special Military District was considered the most powerful of the Soviet districts, and in the event of an attack, it was assigned the role of the executor of the main retaliatory strike. Accordingly, the equipment came here first of all and in large quantities, and the training of the personnel was the highest. So, on the eve of the counterattack, the troops of the district, which had already become the Southwestern Front by this time, had no less than 3,695 tanks. And from the German side, only about 800 tanks and self-propelled guns went on the offensive - that is, more than four times less.

In practice, an unprepared, hasty decision to offensive operation resulted in the largest tank battle in which the Soviet troops were defeated.

Tanks fight tanks for the first time

When the tank units of the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps reached the front line and entered the battle from the march, this resulted in an oncoming tank battle - the first in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Although the concept of wars in the mid-twentieth century did not allow such battles. It was believed that tanks were a tool to break through the enemy's defenses or create chaos in his communications. “Tanks do not fight tanks” - this is how this principle was formulated, common to all armies of that time. Anti-tank artillery was supposed to fight with tanks - well, and carefully dug in infantry. And the battle near Dubno completely broke all the theoretical constructions of the military. Here, Soviet tank companies and battalions went literally head-on against German tanks. And they lost.

There were two reasons for this. Firstly, German troops much more active and intelligent than the Soviet ones, they used all types of communications, and the coordination of efforts various kinds and military branches in the Wehrmacht at that moment was generally, unfortunately, a head taller than in the Red Army. In the battle near Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, these factors led to the fact that Soviet tanks often acted without any support and at random. The infantry simply did not have time to support the tanks, to help them in the fight against anti-tank artillery: rifle units moved on their own two feet and simply did not catch up with the tanks that had gone ahead. And the tank units themselves at a level above the battalion acted without overall coordination, on their own. It often turned out that one mechanized corps was already rushing to the west, deep into German defense, and the other, who could support him, began to regroup or withdraw from occupied positions ...

Burning T-34 in a field near Dubno. Source: Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F016221-0015 / CC-BY-SA

The second reason for the mass destruction of Soviet tanks in the battle of Dubno, which must be mentioned separately, was their unpreparedness for a tank battle - a consequence of the same pre-war concepts "tanks do not fight tanks." Among the tanks of the Soviet mechanized corps that entered the battle of Dubno, light tanks for infantry escort and raid war, created in the early to mid-1930s, there was a majority.

More precisely - almost everything. As of June 22, there were 2803 tanks in five Soviet mechanized corps - 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd. Of these, medium tanks - 171 pieces (all - T-34), heavy tanks - 217 pieces (of which 33 KV-2 and 136 KV-1 and 48 T-35), and 2415 light tanks of the T-26, T- 27, T-37, T-38, BT-5 and BT-7, which can be considered the most modern. And the 4th mechanized corps, which fought just west of Brody, had 892 more tanks, but exactly half of them were modern - 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34.

Soviet light tanks, due to the specifics of the tasks assigned to them, had anti-bullet or anti-fragmentation armor. Light tanks are an excellent tool for deep raids behind enemy lines and actions on his communications, but light tanks are completely unsuitable for breaking through defenses. The German command took into account the strong and weak sides armored vehicles and used their tanks, which were inferior to ours both in quality and weapons, in defense, nullifying all the advantages of Soviet technology.

The German field artillery also had its say in this battle. And if for the T-34 and KV, as a rule, it was not dangerous, then light tanks had a hard time. And against the 88-mm anti-aircraft guns of the Wehrmacht, which were rolled out for direct fire, even the armor of the new “thirty-fours” was powerless. Only the heavy KV and T-35s resisted them with dignity. The light T-26s and BTs, as the reports said, were “partially destroyed as a result of hitting anti-aircraft shells,” and not just stopped. But the Germans in this direction in anti-tank defense used far from only anti-aircraft guns.

The defeat that brought victory closer

And yet, Soviet tankers, even on such "inappropriate" vehicles, went into battle - and often won it. Yes, without air cover, which is why on the march german aviation knocked out almost half of the columns. Yes, with weak armor, which was sometimes pierced even by heavy machine guns. Yes, without radio communication and at your own peril and risk. But they went.

They went and got their way. In the first two days of the counter-offensive, the scales fluctuated: first one side, then the other achieved success. On the fourth day, the Soviet tankers, despite all the complicating factors, managed to succeed, in some areas pushing the enemy back 25-35 kilometers. On the evening of June 26, Soviet tankers even took the city of Dubno with battle, from which the Germans were forced to retreat ... to the east!

Padded German tank PzKpfw II. Photo: waralbum.ru

And yet, the advantage of the Wehrmacht in the infantry units, without which in that war the tankers could fully operate except in the rear raids, soon began to affect. By the end of the fifth day of the battle, almost all the vanguard units of the Soviet mechanized corps were simply destroyed. Many units were surrounded and were forced to go on the defensive on all fronts. And every hour the tankers lacked serviceable vehicles, shells, spare parts and fuel more and more. It got to the point that they had to retreat, leaving the enemy almost undamaged tanks: there was no time and opportunity to put them on the move and take them with them.

Today one can meet the opinion that if the leadership of the front had not been given away, contrary to the order of Georgy Zhukov, the command to switch from offensive to defensive, the Red Army, they say, would have turned the Germans back near Dubno. Wouldn't turn back. Alas, that summer the German army fought much better, and its tank units had much more experience in active interaction with other branches of the military. But the battle near Dubno played its role in disrupting the Barbarossa plan fostered by Hitler. The Soviet tank counterattack forced the command of the Wehrmacht to commit reserves into battle, which were intended for an offensive in the direction of Moscow as part of Army Group Center. And the very direction to Kyiv after this battle was considered as a priority.

And this did not fit into the long-agreed German plans, broke them - and broke them so much that the pace of the offensive was catastrophically lost. And although there was a difficult autumn and winter of 1941 ahead, the largest tank battle had already said its word in the history of the Great Patriotic War. This is his, the battles near Dubno, the echo thundered in the fields near Kursk and Orel two years later - and echoed in the first volleys of victorious salutes ...

The tank battle near Dubno is considered a little-known and insignificant page in the history of the Great Patriotic War; it is given very little attention in history textbooks. However, historians and experts of the Patriotic War call it the most grandiose and important tank battle.

This tank battle unfolded almost on the second day of the Patriotic War in the area of ​​the Southwestern Front nearby settlements Dubno, Brody and Lutsk. On June 23, 1941, a dangerous breach was made in the Soviet front line. The danger of this break in the line of defense consisted not only in the possibility of the enemy breaking through to our rear, but also in opening a direct path for a quick throw of the German army to the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv.

In the conditions of chaos and confusion that reigned in our country in the first days of the war, the command of the Southwestern Front was able to realize the threat looming over Kyiv in time and realistically and tried to take appropriate measures to eliminate it.

In this sector of the front during this period of hostilities, the Soviet troops had a significant advantage in tanks. The Kyiv military district before the start of World War II was considered the strongest in terms of the number and equipment of mechanized vehicles. More than 3500 Soviet tanks took part in the battle near Dubno, only 800 combat vehicles (tanks and self-propelled guns) were put up from the German side

It would seem that our advantage in combat units of equipment should have ensured our victory, however, in practice, a grandiose tank battle two mechanized armies turned out to be a failure for Soviet side.

Tom had several objective reasons. The German troops were more mobile and organized, the enemy had more modern communications, which made it possible to accurately coordinate everything fighting and attacks. Soviet troops Unfortunately, they often acted chaotically and disorganized, without any coherence and coordination. The fragmentation of actions was especially felt in the inconsistency of the actions of aviation, infantry and tank groups. There were terrible, often senseless attacks under the slogan "You must not trample on the enemy Soviet land!", the battles began without waiting for the concentration tank corps, without creating full-fledged strike groups, without reconnaissance in the ranks of the enemy.

Also, historians and military experts argue that the second main reason for the defeat was the incorrect pre-war concept of Soviet military exercises, that tanks cannot fight their own kind. Our tankers simply did not have the necessary skills for such combat operations.

The battle near Dubno lasted a week. During these most difficult and bloody days there were both our victories and our defeats. However, many objective and subjective advantages of the Wehrmacht led to the defeat of the Soviet counterattack on the enemy. Most of the disparate units were surrounded, the tankers lacked whole vehicles, fuel and ammunition. Much of the abandoned equipment went to the enemy almost intact.

And yet, military historians are almost unanimous in their opinion that as a result of the hostilities near Dubno, the enemy’s plan for a quick breakthrough to Kyiv was completely thwarted and german blitzkrieg on the southwest direction. And it was also the first lesson for the German troops, who were able to see for themselves in their resilience Soviet soldiers ready to give their lives for their native land.

In the first weeks of the Great Patriotic War, when the German tank wedges of the Army Groups "Center" and "North" closed the pincers near Minsk and rushed to Smolensk and Pskov (aiming at Moscow and Leningrad), on our Southwestern Front, reflecting the blows German band armies "South", a grandiose tank battle unfolded. The largest in the history of the Second World War and the first tank battle of the Great Patriotic War took place on June 22 - July 10, 1941 and was a clear evidence of the high offensive activity of the Soviet troops, their desire to wrest the initiative from the hands of the enemy, which he seized as a result of an unexpected attack.

This battle is little covered in memoirs, and in military history works it is usually referred to as “battles near Brody” or simply “border battles”. However, it was by no means an ordinary event and not a private operation. The battle unfolded in several western regions of Ukraine, in a huge pentagon between the cities of Lutsk, Rivne, Ostrog, Kamenetz, Brody, with the center in Dubno. About 2,500 Soviet and German tanks met in oncoming battles. Its outcome was significant influence to disrupt the plans of the German command for the "lightning" crushing of the Red Army in the south. The breakthrough of the German troops on the move to Kyiv was thwarted. The encirclement and destruction of the troops of the Southwestern Front and the capture of the industrial regions of Ukraine did not take place on schedule.

In this paper, the battle is considered from the point of view of the initial decisions of the Soviet and German high commands, which determined the course and results of the first tank battle. We want, as far as possible, to show the general course of the battle, the clash of ideas and plans, operational-tactical decisions and initiatives of the Soviet and German commanders of formations and units that took part in the battle.

The plan of Germany's attack on the USSR and the plan of defense of the Soviet side were worked out and approved in final versions almost simultaneously, and this is no coincidence. The coincidence in time is explained by the ever-increasing tension in the world, caused by the successes of Germany at the beginning of the Second World War.

December 1940 - January 1941. in Moscow Soviet leadership held a meeting with military leaders and operational games, and a little earlier in Berlin, a similar meeting and games were held by the Nazi leadership of Germany. The aforementioned plans were the result of them.

In the German plan "Barbarossa" (Directive No. 21) is formulated common goal: "The main forces of the Russians, located in Western Russia, must be destroyed in operations, through deep rapid extension of tank wedges. The retreat of combat-ready enemy troops to the wide expanses of Russian territory must be prevented.

German strategists according to military doctrine"Blitzkrieg" made the main bet on the use of tank and mechanized formations. Army Group South, operating south of the Pripyat Marshes, was tasked with: “... through concentric strikes, having the main forces on the flanks, destroy the Russian troops stationed in Ukraine even before the latter reach the Dnieper. To this end main blow applied from the region of Lublin to general direction to Kyiv…”

According to F. Paulus, one of the authors of the plan, a participant in the meeting and the head of the games, two amendments were included in the final version of actions in Ukraine. Hitler demanded that the Russians be surrounded by coverage from the north, and Halder ordered tank wedges to prevent the Russians from retreating and creating defenses west of the Dnieper.

Based on these instructions, the headquarters of Army Group South (commander Field Marshal von Rundstedt) developed an offensive plan (Scheme 1).

Scheme 1. Plan German offensive north (Army Group Center) and south (Army Group South) of the Pripyat swamps.

His plan: with an enveloping blow from the Pripyat swamps to Kyiv, and then turning south along the Dnieper, to surround the main forces of the Southwestern Front, while cutting communications Southern Front, and with an auxiliary strike on Lvov (and further) to close the Soviet troops in a ring on right-bank Ukraine. The exit to Kyiv was planned in 3–4 days, the encirclement in 7–8 days.

The offensive zone for tank and motorized divisions in the direction of the main attack. German generals attracted areas of Rivne - Lutsk - Dubno, where forests along the river. Goryn interspersed with flat fields, and the plain stretched to the southwest, from Rivne and Dubno, and to the northwest, to Lutsk. From the south, this area, quite open and quite suitable for tank operations, was protected by forests, and in the north - by the Polesskaya (or Pripyat) swampy lowland with almost complete impassability. It is not surprising that the main German attack, originally planned for Lvov, was moved to this zone. The main roads from the border to Novograd-Volynsky, Rovno and further to Zhytomyr and Kyiv passed along it.

Army Group "South" deployed along the line Lublin - the mouth of the Danube (780 km). At the turn of Vlodava - Przemysl were the 6th and 17th field armies of Field Marshal Reichenau and General Stulpnagel, as well as the 1st Panzer Group (1st Tank Group) of General Kleist. The Hungarian corps advanced to the border with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Three more armies (11th German, 3rd and 4th Romanian) occupied a line along the Prut and Danube rivers (Scheme 2).

The 6th Reichenau Army and Kleist's 1st Tgr were tasked with attacking the Russians from Vlodava to Krystynopol and breaking through to the Dnieper through Vladimir-Volynsky, Sokal, Dubno in cooperation with the 17th Army. Therefore, Rundstedt concentrated shock tank and motorized divisions in the Ustilug - Sokal - Krystyonopol section, creating here, at the junction of the 5th and 6th Soviet armies, three and even fivefold superiority in forces and means. German 6th field army had 12 divisions, the Kleist tank group - 3 motorized corps (3rd, 14th and 48th), including 5 tank divisions (9th, 11th, 13th, 14th and 16th) and 4 motorized (16th, 25th, SS Viking and SS Life Standard Adolf Hitler). In total, there were 57 divisions in Army Group South, they were supported by the 4th air fleet General Döra (1300 aircraft).

On the night of June 18, Rundstedt began to advance divisions to the waiting and starting areas, which for infantry divisions were 7–20 km from the border, and for tank divisions, 20–30 km. The promotion ended on June 21st. The starting positions were located closer to the border and were occupied on the night of June 22. The Germans managed to reach them by 3 o'clock in the morning.

On the evening of June 21, the commanders of the prepared German formations received a conditional password: “The Legend of the Heroes. Wotan. Neckar 15 "- a signal for an attack, transmitted at 4 o'clock in the morning. On the night of June 21-22, the commander of the 48th motorized corps reported to Rundstedt:" Sokal is not darkened. The Russians equip their pillboxes in full light. They don't seem to be doing anything..."

On June 22, 1941, at 4:00 a.m., Rundstedt launched a simultaneous artillery and air attack and at 4:15 a.m. moved the infantry divisions. Around 9 o'clock, Kleist began to commit tank divisions to the battles. On June 22, Halder wrote in his diary: “The offensive of our troops was a complete surprise for the enemy ... units (Soviet. - Auth.) were taken by surprise in the barracks position, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin; the advanced units, suddenly attacked, asked the command what to do ... After the initial "tetanus" ... the enemy proceeded to hostilities ... ”(F. Halder. Military diary. Vol. 3, book 1).

Each soviet man since school bench by heart
learned the date July 12, 1943. On this day, as claimed
official Soviet historiography, in the Prokhorovka area took place
the greatest tank battle of World War II. At both sides
about one and a half thousand tanks took part in it. Ridge
fascist tank troops was broken. final
the myth about
that "summer is the time for the victories of the German army."
However, there was another "Greatest
tank battle "... Describing the combat
actions on the Southwestern Front in June 1941
year, Marshal Zhukov makes the Soviet
historians a serious remark: "Our
historical literature somehow in passing
concerns this great frontier
battles initial period wars with Nazi Germany.
It would be necessary to analyze in detail the operational expediency
the use here of a counterattack of mechanized corps on
the main grouping of the enemy that had broken through and the organization of the
counterattack. Indeed, as a result of precisely these actions of our troops on
Ukraine was thwarted at the very beginning of the enemy’s plan for a swift
breakthrough to Kyiv. The enemy suffered heavy losses and made sure
resilience of Soviet soldiers, ready to fight until last drop
blood" ("Memories and Reflections", p. 259). The problem is that
the leading and guiding line in the history of the war is clearly defined:
the greatest battle took place near Prokhorovka. Therefore, no
detailed analysis of that greatest battle that PK mentioned.
Zhukov, did not follow. And so everything is clear. Only after
fifty years, a true assessment was given to the events that took place
in June 1941 in the Dubno region.

So, on June 23, 1941, as a result of the wedging of the 1st tank
Kleist group at the junction between Vladimir-Volynsky and Strumilovsky
Fortified areas in the Soviet front line made a big gap.
The gap in the zone of the 5th and 6th armies could not only be used
enemy to reach them in the rear. Its main danger was
that it could become a convenient springboard for a swift
German attack on Kyiv. Command of the Southwestern Front,
well aware of the impending threat, took appropriate
urgent measures. These measures were clearly formulated in the directive
No. 3: the troops go on the counteroffensive with all their might and transfer
fighting on enemy territory. Especially since
the balance of forces promised quick and decisive success. Therefore, neither
representative of the Headquarters of the High Command, nor the commander of the front

did not doubt that they would defeat the presumptuous
aggressor a grand victory.
“The situation that had been created,” recalled G.K. Zhukov, “was detailed
discussed at the Military Council of the front. I suggested M.P. Kirponos
immediately issue a preliminary order to concentrate
mechanized corps for delivering a counterattack on the main
the grouping of the Army Group "South", which broke through in the Sokal area. To
counterattack to involve all the aviation of the front and part of the long-range
bomber aviation Main Command. command and
front headquarters, quickly preparing preliminary combat orders,
handed them over to the armies and corps "(Ibid., p. 252). Only the chief
front headquarters Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev, as they said then,
"succumbed to alarmist moods", offering instead of an offensive
put the main forces of the front on the defensive. But the majority on the Military
Council rejected his proposal. Indeed, what are Purkaev's
Was there reason to panic? 1st Panzer Group Kleist total
had 700 combat vehicles. And at the disposal of the command of the South
Western Front there were six mechanized corps, in
consisting of about 4,000 tanks. True, with such
overwhelming superiority, which was a huge plus,
there was also a minus - the dispersion of parts and subdivisions of mechanized corps on
very considerable distance from each other. Therefore, before
thrown into battle, they should have been assembled into strike groups.
According to the plan developed by the command of the Southwestern Front, 4-
th, 8th and 15th mechanized corps with attached rifle units should
were to strike at the right flank of the German tank-mechanized
grouping from the Brody area to Radekhov and Sokal, as well as to provide
help of the encircled 124th Infantry Division. 9th, 19th and 22nd
mechanized corps, 36th and 27th rifle corps and 1st anti-tank
the brigade attacked the German left flank from the Lutsk-Rivne region on
Vladimir-Volynsky, among other things, having the task of rescuing from
encirclement of the 87th Infantry Division. But the harsh reality
forced literally on the go to correct what seemed
carefully crafted plan. 4th Mechanized Corps, commanded by
Major General A.A. Vlasov, was on the left flank of the front, in
area of ​​Lvov, acting in the band of the 6th army. From its composition
the command intended to allocate the core - the 8th Panzer Division.
The rest of the corps had to continue fighting on the earlier
occupied areas.

15th Mechanized Corps Major General I.I. Carpezo was located in the area
Brody and part of his forces have already been drawn into the fighting. 22nd Mechanized
corps under the command of Major General S.M. Kondrusev was
concentrated in the region of Lutsk. But the other three had to

make marches of 200-300 kilometers to the front line in order to have
the opportunity to take part in the upcoming battle. 8th mechanized corps
Lieutenant General D.I. Ryabyshev began to advance from Drogobych,
which is 300 kilometers from the designated staging point. Order
The 9th mechanized corps had to go 150 kilometers under
command of Major General K.K. Rokossovsky. But worst of all
the 19th mechanized corps, commanded by Major General N.V.
Feklsko. His corps was 400 kilometers from the front line, in
Vinnitsa region.
Forced marches not provided for by any charter
norms, led to unnecessarily high out-of-combat losses of materiel
from breakdowns and accidents, stretching and falling behind units, and
means - to the initial loss of full-fledged control of mechanized corps
their commanders. Not to mention the higher headquarters. That's why
the attacking troops could not be assembled into a single, powerful grouping.
In agreement with the representative of the Headquarters of the High Command for
Southwestern Front, without waiting for the approach of a number of mechanized corps, in the morning
On June 24, the 15th mechanized corps went on the offensive
General I.I. Carpezo. Because in time to focus everything
parts subordinate to him did not work out, Carpezo performed
task assigned to the corps to capture Radekhov by the forces of the 10th
tank division, Major General S.Ya. Ogurtsova. The rest are only
pulled up to the battle area. In addition, Ogurtsov's division acted
not in in full force. Her heavy tank battalion, which had
armed with KV, hopelessly lagged behind on the march. The situation got worse
lack of accurate information about the enemy.
Former battalion commander Z.K. Slyusarenko wrote to
memories of how his battalion instead
Radekhov was sent to Brody: "We had to
walk about 60 kilometers. average speed
KV 20-25 kilometers per hour. sandy road,
hot day ... In such conditions, no less than
after one hour of engine operation
wash oil filters ... Order,
Of course we did, but at what cost!
More than half of the cars got stuck on the way due to technical
faults. The reconnaissance sent by me forward returned with
a message that the enemy in Brody and its environs is not
discovered. Before we had time, as they say, to take a breath, we received
new order - immediately return back to the previous area
defense, go in a forced march. Three were given for preparation.
hours" (" The last shoot", Military Publishing, 1974, p. 27).

Ogurtsov's tankers fought selflessly, but suffered
irreparable losses and were forced to withdraw from the battle. Rest
parts of the corps entered the battle as they arrived at
starting positions on 25, 26 and 27 June. Then to them for help from the area
Lvov approached the 8th tank division of the 4th mechanized corps. German
command, noticing the advance to its right flank of large
enemy forces, abandoned the tactics of oncoming battles and engaged in
organization of a solid anti-tank defense. Therefore, the attackers
Soviet tank units succeeded in penetrating the defensive
German orders are only a few kilometers away. Further
advance was thwarted by fierce resistance
concentrated on the defensive line of German troops. All attacks
parts of the 4th and 15th mechanized corps led only to huge losses in
manpower and technology.
The fighting of the 22nd mechanized corps took place in a similar way on
the left flank of the enemy tank wedge northwest of Lutsk. To
At the beginning of the attack, General Kondrusev failed to gather all his troops.
The 41st tank division of the corps was separated from the main forces in
Maciejów area - st. Koshary and did not take part in
offensive. As noted above, the Germans calculated the intentions
Soviet command and prepared on the way the attacking units
Corps Kondrusev proper anti-tank defense. How
only all available forces of the 22nd mechanized corps were drawn into a protracted battle,
The German 14th Panzer Division made a detour and
crushed the left flank of the enemy. Soviet troops, having suffered
significant losses, retreated across the river Styr.
While fierce battles were going on along the flanks of the 1st Panzer Group,
Kleist continued to develop a breakthrough in the operational depth in the center.
On June 25, German tanks broke into Dubno, passing in three days about
150 kilometers. The development of the German offensive forced the general
Colonel M.P. Kirponos smack fever and throw on the flanks
enemy, all fresh forces newly arrived in the battle area. Morning 26
June, the 9th mechanized corps from the Klevan-Olyka region launched a counterattack in
towards Dubno. He was opposed by the same 13th and 14th German
tank divisions, which had repulsed the offensive of the 22nd mechanized corps the day before.
Their mode of action has not changed. Standing on a tough defense, the Germans
were able to contain the attacks of the 9th mechanized corps. All subsequent days in the band
The 9th mechanized corps went on protracted, positional battles. moving forward
was insignificant. Only the 20th Panzer Division, Colonel M.E.
Katukov had a notable success. In his memoirs, he wrote: "The first
the victory at Klevan cost us dearly ... In this unequal battle we
lost all our "batushki" ("On the edge of the main blow", Voenizdat,
1976, p. 82). Fighting against the tankers of Katukov, the 13th tank

The enemy division also suffered heavy losses. But this separate
success could not change the situation as a whole.
The offensive of the 19th mechanized corps, Major General N.V.
Feklenko was supposed to support the 36th rifle corps of General
Major P.V. Sysoev. Since before arriving at the front of the corps
Feklenko had to make a march of almost 400
kilometers, with his concentration, the same story repeated itself.
On the morning of June 26, they managed to reach their original positions in the Rovno region.
only the 43rd Panzer Division, Colonel I.G. Qibina. approach of others
parts could be expected not earlier than in a day, or even two. But
There was no time, of course. However, the tankers of the 19th mechanized corps
had to spend several hours to put the materiel in order
and to rest after a hard march. Came up in the afternoon
part of the 40th tank division of Colonel M.V. Shirobokov.
The offensive began at about 1800 and had initial success.
Soviet tanks approached almost the outskirts of Dubno, crowding the 11th
enemy tank division.
However, the Germans destroyed the crossings over the Ikva River in time.
Therefore, a rapid breakthrough on the shoulders of the retreating enemy
broke. Since neither the 9th nor the 22nd mechanized corps succeed
could, the Soviet command was afraid of exposing the right flank
jumped far ahead of Feklenko's corps and gave the order to withdraw
to original positions. June 26 new blow collapsed on the right
the German flank, where the 4th and 15th had already been defeated
mechanized corps. From the Brody area, the 8th went on the offensive
mechanized body. Task for General D.I. Ryabyshev was
placed more sensibly. Since in the center a deep
German breakthrough, Ryabyshev’s corps was not aiming at Radekhov and
Sokal, where the Germans were ready to meet his blow with pleasure, and
to Berestechko, with access to the rear of the mobile
parts of the enemy.
But, like the Feklenko corps, the 8th mechanized corps was supposed to join
fighting on the move, after a grueling 300-kilometer march. General
Ryabyshev was not given time either to muster all his forces or to
organization of proper intelligence. Corps before entering the battle
suffered unexpectedly high outside combat losses from breakdowns and accidents.
Unlike their unlucky predecessors from the 4th and 15th
mechanized corps Ryabyshev's corps had an undoubted initial
success. In the first hours of the battle, which held the right
the flank of the 48th motorized corps of the 57th German infantry division was defeated.
Overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy, Ryabyshev's tanks to
At the end of the day we moved forward 20 kilometers. Actually
the combat mission assigned to the 8th mechanized corps was completed.

The Nazis were forced to throw their entire
their aircraft, which only saved them from defeat.
By the end of June 26, the Germans managed
stop moving forward
Ryabyshev Corps. Everywhere
unsuccessful attacks by mechanized corps forced
Finally, the military council of the front
listen to the arguments of M.A. Purkaeva.
Command of the Southwestern Front
inclined to stop
useless counterattacks, by the forces of the 27th,
31st and 36th rifle corps create a solid defense, and
take the mechkorlus to the rear and prepare for the next
counteroffensive. But since there are no instructions from Moscow to cancel
Directive No. 3 was not received, located at the headquarters of the front
the representative of the Headquarters continued to demand its implementation. G.K. himself
Zhukov motivated his demands in this way: "In connection with the release of advanced
enemy units in the Dubno area, General D. I. Ryabyshev received
an order to turn his 8th Corps there. 15th Mechanized Corps
aimed the main forces in the general direction at Berestechko and beyond
also in Dubno. The approaching 36th
rifle and 19th mechanized corps. fierce battle
in the Dubno region began on June 27".
So, the corps scattered on a wide front near Berestechko
Ryabyshev had to leave the battle in a matter of hours without rest and sleep,
gather and advance 50 kilometers north to the new initial
positions. Carpezo's corps was supposed to take its place, pretty much
shabby in previous battles near Radekhov. And to attack him
faced with a well-organized enemy defense. Although this
did not mean at all that the 8th mechanized corps was in for an easier task.
The German command had no doubt that the Russian attacks on
Dubno will continue, and took care of the organization
relevant meeting. In addition, repeat all your
counterattacks were to be the right-flank corps of Kondrusev,
Rokossovsky and Feklenko.
It is obvious that by the 9 a.m. appointed by the front headquarters on June 27
The 8th mechanized corps could not arrive in the designated area. But since
the order had to be carried out, it had to be based on the available
units - 34th Panzer Division, Colonel I.V. Vasiliev, one
tank and one motorcycle regiment to form a mobile
a group under the command of brigade commissar N.K. Popel and
throw her on the offensive. One way or another, but previously disentangled under
Dubno porridge was brewing again. Beginning on June 27, fierce fighting

continued on the 28th, 29th and 30th. The Germans had
additionally transfer the 55th to the battle area army corps.
The increased pressure on the flanks forced them to stop their
tank wedge, the tip of which reached Ostrog, which is 60 kilometers
east of Dubno. The Germans were saved only complete absence
interactions between attackers Soviet units. That's why,
restraining one of the mechanized corps with positional battles, they threw
their moving parts to another.
As a result, on June 29, part of the 8th mechanized corps, which was under
commanded by Ryabyshev, was surrounded. June 30 Germans
closed the ring around Popel's mobile group. Because three
days earlier, a representative of the Headquarters had left for Moscow, command
Southwestern Front decided to withdraw as soon as possible
the remaining mechanized corps from the battle. Thus, on July 1, this greatest
tank battle of World War II. Word G.K. Zhukov: "Our
troops failed to completely defeat the enemy and stop
his offensive, but the main thing was done: the enemy shock
group, rushing to the capital of Ukraine, was detained in the area
Brody is Dubno and is exhausted" (Ibid., p. 256). But in the memoirs of G.K.
Zhukov is not mentioned one very significant event. Next
the day after the end of the battle near Dubno, a member of the Military
Council Commissioner N.N. Vashugin. Why did he do this, if rushing to
the capital of Ukraine, an enemy strike force was detained and
exhausted?
This is how Marshal P.A. recalled this battle. Rotmistrov:
"The mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front entered this
battle after 200-400 kilometer marches under conditions of domination in
enemy aircraft in the air. Putting these corps into battle
was carried out without proper organization of the offensive, without reconnaissance
enemy and terrain. There was no aviation and due
artillery support. Therefore, the enemy had the opportunity
to repel the attacks of our troops one by one, maneuvering part of their forces,
and at the same time continue to attack uncovered
directions" ("Time and Tanks", Military Publishing House, 1972, p. 46). Genuine
the task of the Dubna battle was to defeat the German
shock groups. She went far beyond the ordinary.
counterattacks. Four thousand tanks are too much for a counterattack. But in
just right when trying to seize the initiative from the enemy and
turn the tide of hostilities in your favor.
There is no doubt that the chances of winning were absolutely real. Even
without more powerful aircraft. No additional rifle corps.
There were more than enough available forces. It was only required
dispose of them in a fire rush. Thankfully, nothing special.

threatening on the Southwestern Front in the first two days of the war did not
happened. So, there was some time left. Primarily
one fundamental point. After all, from the very beginning and command
front, and it was clear to the representatives of the Stavka that a one-time
the concentration of mechanized corps is impossible. Yes, the situation did not allow
wait. To wait meant to untie the hands of the enemy. But from this not
it followed that it was necessary to hastily throw into battle what we ourselves
was at hand at the moment. could have taken otherwise
solution.
G.K. Zhukov mentioned in his memoirs that the chief of staff of the front
M.A. Purkaev sharply objected to directives issued from Moscow.
But he could not help but know that Zhukov was not one of those people who could
object sharply. Purkaev's motives are clear: being an experienced and
a competent General Staff officer, he must have been biting his elbows out of annoyance
to the fact that he is deprived of the opportunity to win a certain victory.
The meaning of his proposals was quite simple. While the mechanized corps will
pull up to the starting positions, delay the movement of the German
tank wedge by organizing a strong anti-tank defense.
After all, it was for these purposes that even before the war, mobile
artillery brigades. Deploy them in the direction of travel
enemy tanks could be within a few hours. And at that
while the Germans were engaged in breaking through our defenses, collect all
mechanized corps in one fist.
Ideal Scenario was the preparation of several
defensive anti-tank lines. And the mechanized corps should
hold back. Let the Germans be in a situation where they need
over and over again to break through the defenses prepared on their way.
Five large rivers are a natural barrier to the enemy -
Turya, Stokhod, Styr, Goryn, Chance, not to mention the multitude
small ones. It remains only to wait for the enemy to stop on one of
milestones, no matter what - the second, third or fifth. The main thing -
make him waste his strength in positional battles, run out of steam,
exhaust reserves, which are not abundant. And when it becomes clear that
the Germans gave their all, to fall on them with combined power
six mechanized corps. And drive, drive, drive! hang on their shoulders. Not
give them a breath, somewhere to catch on, put in order
battered troops and organize defenses.
The consequences of such a development could be simply
catastrophic. Indeed, from the very first days, the troops of the army group
"Center" went far ahead, overtaking Runstedt's troops by several
hundreds of kilometers. Guderian was already beyond the Dnieper when Kleist
took Rovno. What if he didn't take it? If, according to the plan
Purkaev, stuck near Rovno or near Dubno? Moreover, if

to him, who lost at least 50
percent of their tanks, a whole armored armada would suddenly hit
from six Soviet mechanized corps? Where would they be in this case?
Kleist tankers and Reichenau infantrymen in early July? And not
one must call Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev a dreamer. Enough
remember that for each German soldier southwestern front could
put two of our own in the field, and for each artillery and
the enemy's mortar barrel accounted for two of ours.
Then the most interesting things would begin. Since the troops of the South
Western Front with this course of action had the opportunity to
unlike the enemy to keep their main forces in front of them
very attractive prospects opened up. In the north were
the rear communications of the Army Group "Center" open to strike. On the
south - the open flank of the German 17th Army. The strength was enough
delivering both primary and secondary strikes. It is clear that
the main blow should have been delivered to the rear of von Bock's armies. Besides
time, the strike groups of Army Group Center were so
far to fend off the blow of three or four Soviet mechanized corps
the Germans simply had nothing. What an extremely bad situation
could be German troops on the main strategic
direction! All supply lines were cut off in one fell swoop,
rear communications were cut. Fighters near Smolensk
the soldiers of Guderian and von Kluge would be left without shells and cartridges,
no sausages and schnapps, no fuel, no medical supplies, no
evacuation of the wounded. Moreover, Army Group Center was turning into
a nut clamped in a vise, which was squeezed on one side
raided the rear of the mechanized corps of the Soviet Southwestern Front, and
on the other, the troops of the Western and Reserve fronts. Very interesting
imagine how the Germans would have to get out
from such a position.
paramount task for the Germans it became putting things in order
in his rear, the restoration of supply lines. They go further
could no longer. But here's the question: would Goth's tank groups and
Guderian to go from Smolensk more than 300 kilometers to clean up
their rears? After all, simply by the nature of their actions, they could not carry
with a significant amount of fuel. Perhaps the Germans would have to
blow up part of the tanks before meeting with the enemy. Anyway, but
it all meant complete failure Eastern campaign back in the summer of 1941
of the year! And we wouldn't have to, choking on blood, for three
years expel the Germans from their land.