Why Stalin won the political struggle. Reasons for Stalin's victory in the internal political struggle

After the concentration of sole power in his hands, Leon Trotsky would hardly have betrayed the communist ideals, but, quite likely, he would have put them into practice in a tougher and more uncompromising form than Stalin.

power struggle

When Lenin's health worsened in early 1923, a serious struggle for power began in the leadership of the CPSU (b). The situation was aggravated by the "Letter to the Congress", in which Lenin sharply criticized his closest associates - Stalin and Trotsky, calling the first "rude and disloyal", the second - "boastful and self-confident." It was Trotsky who found himself in a disadvantageous position in the upcoming battle: the “troika” consisting of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, armed with the term “Trotskyism”, was preparing to give a serious battle to their main political opponent.
To begin with, at the expense of the supporters of the "troika", the composition of the Central Committee was expanded, which allowed the main Bolshevik body to make decisions bypassing Trotsky's position. Later, Stalin, who headed the Orgburo and the secretariat of the Central Committee, began to appoint his proteges to key party posts, which ultimately neutralized the competitor.
Lev Davidovich could have been saved by the XIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which was held in May 1924 in Moscow, but having lost the debates preceding the congress, he remained in an absolute minority and soon completely lost control over the Central Committee. And yet, assuming that Trotsky defeated Stalin, what path could the USSR take? Let's think.

Chaos of a bright future

Trotsky, unlike the restrained and pragmatic Stalin, was an impulsive and categorical person. It is his political ideals that can best characterize the lines from the International: "We will destroy the whole world of violence to the ground, and then we will build ours, we will build a new world - who was nothing, he will become everything."
Speaking at a rally in Kazan in 1918, Trotsky said: “We highly value science, art, we want to make art, science, all schools, universities accessible to the people. But if our class enemies want to once again show us that all this exists only for them, we will say: death to the theater, science, art.
Such populist statements, and in the future, possibly inconsistent actions, would most likely complicate the building of socialism in the country with serious distortions, which could cause dissatisfaction with Trotsky's policies both in the ranks of party comrades-in-arms and among the broad masses of the population.
“We, comrades, love the sun that shines for us, but if the rich and the exploiters want to monopolize the sun, we will say: let the sun go out and darkness, eternal darkness reign,” Trotsky drew the frightening prospects for social construction to the people.

Father of terror

Although repressive methods Soviet policy many associate exclusively with the name of Stalin, the Bolshevik terror was the invention of Lenin and Trotsky. If the latter had inherited power in the USSR, then the scope of repression would have been no less, and perhaps even greater, than under Stalin.
In 1920, Trotsky wrote a book with the ominous title Terrorism and Communism, which was a response to the theses of the German Marxist Karl Kautsky. In it, Lev Bronstein not only justifies the Red Terror during the Civil War, but also calls not to abandon it after it ends. Even in the political struggle, Trotsky advises to be guided not by arguments, but by force and one's own interests: "The conquest of power by the proletariat does not complete the revolution, but only opens it."
Of course, the idealist Trotsky explained the coercive policy of the state by the interests of the working masses, without which the authorities cannot do anything. However, no one would give guarantees that, with the concentration of all power in the hands of Trotsky, he would not introduce an absolute dictatorship.
Trotsky's political methods were most clearly demonstrated by the suppression of Kronstadt rebellion, where more than 1,000 dead sailors testified to the true attitude towards democracy of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.
It is curious that Stalin repeatedly referred to the book "Terrorism and Communism" and more than once used excerpts from it to justify political repressions. Without sinning against the truth, it should be recognized that Trotsky may well share with Stalin the title of ideologist of the Great Terror.

United states of the world

Trotsky repeatedly stated that he was not going to limit himself to building socialism in a single state, which Stalin was inclined to do. His ideal is the fire of the world revolution. It is likely that, having come to power, he would have continued to support the Comintern, as well as any communist uprisings around the globe. So, if Stalin and Zinoviev reacted very coolly to the uprising of the Hamburg communists, then Trotsky was convinced that this was the beginning of a communist revolution in Germany.
Until the end of his life, Trotsky believed that a communist state "The United States of Europe and Asia" would be built in the eastern hemisphere of the earth, in which citizens liberated from bourgeois shackles would live and enjoy the fruits of universal equality and prosperity.
If the state led by Trotsky had waged a consistent campaign to communize the planet, then it is quite possible that the countries of the West would have taken up arms against the USSR through a broad anti-Soviet coalition. Without reliable allies, our country would most likely have to enter into a protracted military conflict with the leading powers of the world - the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan, and no one knows how this confrontation would end.
The Argentine writer Marcos Aginis writes in his book Young Leva: "If Trotsky's theses had prevailed over Stalin's, then everything would have gone differently in Europe." However, the Argentine overly idealizes his idol. The “beautiful and idealistic” character of the young Trotsky gives him the feeling that the revolutionary would never have become what Stalin later turned into.

Individual freedom

However, one can partly agree with Aginis. Trotsky did not suffer from leaderism; the cult of personality was unacceptable to him. Indicative in this regard are the words of Trotsky about the attitude of society towards Lenin, which made him not a revolutionary leader, but "the head of the church hierarchy", along the way cutting Lenin's quotes for "false sermons."
Absolutely not as Stalin perceived the position of individuals in the classless state built by the Bolsheviks. Even at the dawn of the Soviets, Trotsky was carried away by Freud and psychoanalytic experiments, the purpose of which was to create a "new man". So, at the initiative of Trotsky, the International Solidarity laboratory house was opened, where the younger generation was freed from all kinds of psychological complexes. An important element upbringing was an exception to this process of parents.
And now the obsolete institution of the family is being replaced by the commune, which was supposed to eliminate the line between personal and public, no matter whether it is material property or human feelings. It is not known what path Soviet society would have taken if all of Trotsky's social experiments had not been stopped.

Industrial spurt

The concept of over-industrialization of the country put forward by Trotsky was initially rejected by Stalin. The leader of the USSR was more attracted to the reform model proposed by Nikolai Bukharin, which envisaged the development of private entrepreneurship by attracting foreign loans. However, already in 1929, the Bukharinian approach was replaced by the Trotskyist one, though without the extremes inherent in the methods of war communism, on which Lev Davidovich intended to rely.
According to Trotsky's concept of accelerated industrialization, the rapid growth of the national economy was to be achieved by relying solely on internal resources, using for the development of heavy industry funds Agriculture and light industry. With such a one-sided approach, the costs of rapid industrial growth had to be "paid" by the peasantry. One can only imagine what kind of excesses and upheavals industrialization would have turned out for the country if the process was controlled by the author of the idea himself.

War cannot be avoided

The most tragic page Stalin era and all Soviet history became the Great Patriotic War. Could Trotsky have prevented this catastrophic event if he had assumed the post of head of state?
It is known that Trotsky treated Hitler with hostility, but the Fuhrer, on the contrary, showed all respect to the prominent revolutionary. Hitler's biographer Konrad Heyden recalled how the German leader praised Trotsky's memoirs, calling them "a brilliant book" and noting that he "learned a lot from their author."
The documents of the Reich even slipped the fact that the German government was making plans to create a collaborationist government of the USSR, headed by Trotsky. However, it was not Stalin's personality that prompted Germany to aggression against the USSR, but Hitler's indefatigable ambitions. It is not difficult to imagine that if Trotsky had been in Stalin's place, the staunch anti-Semite Hitler would have found additional arguments for attacking the Soviet state.

On January 21, 1924, Lenin died, in principle, he was already in recent times I was ill and couldn't do my job to the fullest. Everything great power acquired by other leaders; among the figures of the first magnitude: Trotsky - People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council and the Politburo; Zinoviev - Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Chairman of the Northern Commune (Petrograd), member of the Politburo; Kamenev - chairman of the STO (Council of Labor and Defense), head of the Moscow party organization, member of the Politburo; Stalin - People's Commissar of the Workers' Committee for Nationalities, General Secretary of the Central Committee, member of the Politburo. The figures of the "second row" who could influence the outcome of the struggle for power were: Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, Tomsky, Pyatakov, Molotov, Rykov, Kalinin and others.

The death of the leader of a country is always a blow, even in Russian Empire everything happened, as an example, one can cite the uprising of the “Decembrists” of 1825, but here there is no heir. Trotsky was ruined by conceit and pride, how could he think that he, the "leader of the revolution", behind whom they simply stood colossal forces"world behind the scenes", and his people occupied key positions throughout Russia, some Georgian peasant will beat?

Back in the spring of 1923, a "signal" was given - on the eve of the XII Party Congress, the newspaper Pravda (controlled by Bukharin) published an article by Radek "Leo Trotsky - the organizer of victory." This was an indication to the Bolsheviks who would be the new leader. Another signal: in 1923, when Petrograd had not yet been renamed Leningrad, Gatchina became Trotsky. On the eve of the congress, there was a throw-in of "black PR", the so-called first part of Lenin's will - the article "On the question of nationalities and" autonomization ", where Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Dzerzhinsky were poured with mud. But the congress did not become a triumph for Trotsky; Stalin was much closer to the military, workers, and peasants. The article with accusations of "Great Russian chauvinism" was taken as a thing of the past.

It was not possible to win at the congress, then they began to act by covert methods: Krupskaya "remembered" about another part of Lenin's "testament" ("Letter to the Congress"). In July-August, a conspiracy was drawn up: Bukharin, Zinoviev and others at a meeting near Kislovodsk decided to reorganize the party leadership, take away the management functions from the Secretariat of the Central Committee or introduce Trotsky and Zinoviev into it. An ultimatum letter was sent to Stalin, in which they mentioned Lenin's demand of January 4 to remove Stalin from the post of general secretary. Stalin was forced to maneuver, eventually agreeing to introduce Zinoviev, Bukharin and Trotsky to the Orgburo.

At this time, a severe political and economic crisis began in Germany, the mark fell a thousand times, the industry was paralyzed. Trotsky was on fire with the idea of a German revolution, and after the victory in Germany, Europe would be in the hands of the revolutionaries. Trotsky saw himself as a leader on a pan-European level. The “showdowns” of the Russian level were curtailed for a while - the Politburo voted “yes”. Huge funds and thousands of revolutionaries were sent to Germany, secret negotiations began with Warsaw on the passage of the Red Army troops to Germany, they (Poland) were promised to give East Prussia. Although at the same time it was decided to "revolutionize" Poland. At the same time, the Comintern was instructed to start a revolution in Bulgaria as well.

But the "world behind the scenes", or rather its European clans, did not need the European Revolution, so there were continuous overlays and mistakes. Yes, and in Russia, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev went over to the side of Stalin, who opposed this adventure, at the same time the Politburo decides that the preparations for the revolution in Germany have not been completed, revolutionary situation overestimated, in connection with which the uprising was canceled. Trotsky was furious, all his "Napoleonic" plans collapsed.

Then Trotsky launched an attack along the lines of "revolutionaries" - "bureaucrats", accusing Stalin and others of degenerating, betraying the cause of the revolution. Trotsky demands the expansion of party democracy. He was caught on this, announcing a general party discussion. Trotsky was reminded of his disputes with Lenin. As a result, at the 13th Party Conference (opened on January 16, 1924), his supporters were defeated, accused of "anti-Leninist deviationism" and "revisionism." Trotsky didn’t even come to her, he “fell ill”.

The possibility of a military coup was also neutralized, and it could have been organized, Trotsky’s positions in the army were strong: his deputy for the military people’s commissariat, Sklyansky, was transferred to the Supreme Council of National Economy by the decision of the Politburo, and Frunze, popular in the army and hostile to Trotsky, was appointed in his place. Trotskyist Antonov-Ovseenko was removed from the post of head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, disbanded Western Front Tukhachevsky.

And apparently one of the main reasons Trotsky's loss was the position of his foreign "masters", in connection with which he was carried away. But Stalin was not considered dangerous, he served Lenin, and now, they say, his environment will “correct” him ...

Sources:
Sakharov V.A. " political testament"Lenin: the reality of history and the myths of politics. M., 2003.
Shambarov V. Anti-Soviet. M., 2011.
Shubin A.V. Leaders and conspirators. M., 2004.
http://publ.lib.ru/ARCHIVES/K/KPSS/_KPSS.html#012
http://magister.msk.ru/library/trotsky/trotl026.htm

Why, after the death of Lenin (January 1924), did Stalin win in the struggle for leadership?

Applicants:

1. I. Stalin (Dzhugashvili)

2. Leon Trotsky (Leiba Bronstein)

3. L. Kamenev (Rosenfeld)

4. E. Zinoviev (Radomylsky-Apfelbaum)

5. N. I. Bukharin.

After the death of Lenin, there were at least four main ideological currents in the party - Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Stalinists, Bukharinites. At the heart of each of the groupings within the party lay a certain ideological platform. And each had powerful supporters in the party, higher bodies state authorities, in the regions, public organizations, etc.

The Trotskyists, who had the strongest positions in the army, were in favor of pushing the world revolution by any means, the accelerated introduction of socialist principles in the economy, including the curtailment of the NEP, industrialization and the fight against the kulaks. The Zinoviev-Kamenev faction, which dominated the capitals - especially Leningrad - and the Comintern and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, considered Trotsky's views too radical, disagreeing with him on the pace and means of achieving the same goals. The faction of Stalin, which controlled, first of all, the party apparatus (it was in the hands of Molotov) and the secret services (Dzerzhinsky), was already cooling off towards the ideas of the world revolution and did not consider until the end of the 1920s that the time had come to curtail the NEP. The Bukharinites, who had support in the government (it was headed by Rykov), trade unions (they were led by Tomsky), as well as in the party press and the university sphere, were supporters of the continuation of the NEP policy with its reliance on the potential of the private sector and the growing wealthy large peasantry. Today, many of the differences of those years seem microscopic or strange, then in the eyes of the leading Bolsheviks they were of great importance.

And this will turn out to be another reason for the growing influence of the Stalinists - their line was quite in tune with the mood of the party masses, tired of troubles.

Pitirim Sorokin, who was expelled from the country and later brought fame to Harvard, at the same time revealed general pattern: “People trained by an adamant teacher - hunger, cold, disease, want and death, face a dilemma: die, continuing the revolutionary brawl, or still find another way out. Bitter and tragic experience forces people to look at the world differently ... And now the demand for unlimited freedom is replaced by a thirst for order; the praise of the "liberators" from the old regime is replaced by the praise of the "liberators" from the revolution, in other words, the organizers of order. "Order!" and "Long live the creators of order!" - such is the general impulse of the second stage of the revolution.

In the mid-1920s, it was the Stalinist group that did NOT have keen desire, unlike the more left-wing factions, to continue the "revolutionary debauchery". This was the basis for the short-term “thaw” of the mid-1920s. Signs of the “thaw” were noticeable in the Constitution of the USSR of 1924, where there was no special chapter on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The aggravation of the struggle between the Stalinists and the Zinovievites in 1925 changed the situation on the Bolshevik chessboard. The main stumbling block was the theory of building socialism in one country. In April 1925, at a meeting of the Politburo, Kamenev, supported by Zinoviev, declared that "the technical and economic backwardness of the USSR is an insurmountable obstacle to building socialism." Help and loans from the West could come to the USSR only if the proletarian revolutions won there. On the eve of the XIV Party Conference, Zinoviev proposed to the Plenum of the Central Committee the theses "On the tasks of the Comintern and the RCP (b)", where he argued that the victory of socialism is possible only on a world scale, and at the Party conference itself almost openly went into battle against Stalin, warning of the danger of a "national limitedness”: “We are talking about such moods that can be reduced to the formula: what do we care about the international revolution, we can build ourselves a cell under the spruce.” The Commission of the Central Committee (Stalin) for drafting a resolution, also without naming Zinoviev and Kamenev, rejected as "Trotskyite" the opinion that building a complete socialist society is impossible in the USSR without the help of more developed countries. On the contrary, "the party of the proletariat must make every effort to build a socialist society in the confidence that this construction can be and will certainly be victorious if it succeeds in defending the country from all attempts at restoration." The offensive of the Zinovievites was undermined by the obvious decline of the revolutionary wave in the world and was easily repulsed.

The 14th Congress was one of the hottest in the entire history of the Party. At the forum, which went down in history as an industrialization congress, little was said about industrialization itself. Stalin's main strategic idea: "We must make every effort to make our country an economically independent country based on the domestic market, a country that will serve as a center of attraction for all other countries that are gradually falling away from capitalism and merging into the mainstream of socialist economy". At the same time, Stalin spoke of two deviations: one pulls in the direction of the world revolution and reprisals against the NEP, meaning the Trotskyists and Zinovievites; the other is the defense of the kulak, the rejection of industrialization and planning, meaning the Bukharinites. Stalin said: “You ask, which deviation is worse? You can't put the question like that. Both of them are worse, and the first and second deviations. But at the same time he emphasized that the party must concentrate its efforts on combating the deviation that exaggerates the kulak danger, since these ideas are much more popular in the party and behind them is the authority of prominent leaders, meaning Kamenev and Zinoviev.

Stalin's line was supported by the congress, which marked the beginning of the ousting of the Zinoviev group from power, which would be forced to draw closer to Trotsky, which would predetermine their joint decline. Then came the turn of the rightists - the Bukharinites.

“Russia would not have experienced many of the terrible misfortunes that befell her if she had been led by the right-wing communists (supporters of the market), and not by Stalin.” With these words of the Menshevik Nikolai Valentinov, who emigrated to Paris in 1928, many authors agree. But this is hardly the case. The market could not carry out forced modernization. Besides, did the Bukharinites have a chance to lead the country? There are different opinions. Such connoisseurs of the era as V.L. Danilov and E.N. Gimpelson are sure that the "Bukharin alternative" (rejection of accelerated industrialization, collectivization and the course towards a world revolution through the development of the market) was initially doomed to failure, since by the end of the 20s the balance of power in the leadership of the party, and hence the country, was completely in favor of the Stalinist majority.

The “Rights” (i.e., the Bukharinites) capitulated at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in June 1930.

The defeat of the “rightists” contributed to clearing the way to the “great turning point” - complete collectivization - was the final moment in the establishment of Stalin's sovereignty. However, it is hardly the case in Stalin alone. The tightening of state regimes was not only a Soviet phenomenon, but almost universal. The interwar period was marked by the growing narrowing of the scope of the spread of democracy in Europe. The Great Depression of 1929-1933 dealt a crushing blow to it, depriving people of their savings and discrediting the postulates of the free capitalist market. If in 1920 on the whole continent to the west Soviet Russia Since there were constitutional and elected representative bodies, by the beginning of the Second World War they were dissolved or deprived of real powers in 17 of the 27 European states, and in another five they ceased their powers when the war began. Fascists came to power in many countries. Only Britain and Finland, as well as Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland, which remained neutral, all this time supported the activity of democratic institutions.

The final completion of the process of subordinating the Politburo to Stalin can be dated to around 1930.

Based on the materials of the book by V. A. Nikonov "Russian Matrix". M. 2014.

Why, after the death of Lenin (January 1924), did Stalin win in the struggle for leadership?

Applicants:

1. I. Stalin (Dzhugashvili)

2. Leon Trotsky (Leiba Bronstein)

3. L. Kamenev (Rosenfeld)

4. E. Zinoviev (Radomylsky-Apfelbaum)

5. N. I. Bukharin.

After the death of Lenin, there were at least four main ideological currents in the party - Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Stalinists, Bukharinites. At the heart of each of the groupings within the party lay a certain ideological platform. And each had influential supporters in the party, the highest bodies of state power, in the regions, public organizations, etc.

And this will turn out to be another reason for the growing influence of the Stalinists - their line was quite in tune with the mood of the party masses, tired of troubles.

Pitirim Sorokin, who was expelled from the country, and later brought fame to Harvard, at the same time revealed a general pattern: “People trained by an inflexible teacher - hunger, cold, disease, want and death, face a dilemma: die, continuing the revolutionary brawl, or all to find another way out. Bitter and tragic experience forces people to look at the world differently ... And now the demand for unlimited freedom is replaced by a thirst for order; the praise of the "liberators" from the old regime is replaced by the praise of the "liberators" from the revolution, in other words, the organizers of order. "Order!" and "Long live the creators of order!" - such is the general impulse of the second stage of the revolution.

In the mid-1920s, it was precisely the Stalinist group that did NOT have a keen desire, in contrast to the more left-wing factions, to continue the "revolutionary debauchery." This was the basis for the short-term “thaw” of the mid-1920s. Signs of the “thaw” were noticeable in the Constitution of the USSR of 1924, where there was no special chapter on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The intensification of the struggle between the Stalinists and the Zinovievites in 1925 changed the situation on the Bolshevik chessboard. The main stumbling block was the theory of building socialism in one country. In April 1925, at a meeting of the Politburo, Kamenev, supported by Zinoviev, declared that "the technical and economic backwardness of the USSR is an insurmountable obstacle to building socialism." Help and loans from the West could come to the USSR only if the proletarian revolutions won there. On the eve of the XIV Party Conference, Zinoviev proposed to the Plenum of the Central Committee the theses "On the tasks of the Comintern and the RCP (b)", where he argued that the victory of socialism is possible only on a world scale, and at the Party conference itself almost openly went into battle against Stalin, warning of the danger of a "national limitedness”: “We are talking about such moods that can be reduced to the formula: what do we care about the international revolution, we can build ourselves a cell under the spruce.” The Commission of the Central Committee (Stalin) for the development of a resolution, also without naming Zinoviev and Kamenev, rejected as "Trotskyist" the opinion that building a complete socialist society is impossible in the USSR without the help of more developed countries. On the contrary, "the party of the proletariat must make every effort to build a socialist society in the confidence that this construction can be and will certainly be victorious if it succeeds in defending the country from all attempts at restoration." The offensive of the Zinovievites was undermined by the obvious decline of the revolutionary wave in the world and was easily repulsed.

“Russia would not have experienced many of the terrible misfortunes that befell her if she had been led by the right-wing communists (supporters of the market), and not by Stalin.” With these words of the Menshevik Nikolai Valentinov, who emigrated to Paris in 1928, many authors agree. But this is hardly the case. The market could not carry out forced modernization. Besides, did the Bukharinites have a chance to lead the country? There are different opinions on this subject. Such connoisseurs of the era as V.L. Danilov and E.N. Gimpelson are sure that the "Bukharin alternative" (rejection of accelerated industrialization, collectivization and the course towards a world revolution through the development of the market) was initially doomed to failure, since by the end of the 20s the balance of power in the leadership of the party, and hence the country, was completely in favor of the Stalinist majority.

The “Rights” (i.e., the Bukharinites) capitulated at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in June 1930.

The defeat of the “rightists” contributed to clearing the way to the “great turning point” - complete collectivization - was the final moment in the establishment of Stalin's sovereignty. However, it is hardly the case in Stalin alone. The tightening of state regimes was not only a Soviet phenomenon, but almost universal. The interwar period was marked by the growing narrowing of the scope of the spread of democracy in Europe. The Great Depression of 1929-1933 dealt a crushing blow to it, depriving people of their savings and discrediting the postulates of the free capitalist market. If in 1920 there were constitutional and elected representative bodies on the entire continent west of Soviet Russia, by the beginning of the Second World War they were dissolved or deprived of real powers in 17 of the 27 European states, and in five more they ceased their powers when the war began. Fascists came to power in many countries. Only Britain and Finland, as well as Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland, which remained neutral, all this time supported the activity of democratic institutions.

The final completion of the process of subordinating the Politburo to Stalin can be dated to around 1930.

Based on the materials of the book by V. A. Nikonov "Russian Matrix". M. 2014.

Prepared

Victor Shapovalov

Marx, Engels and Lenin never believed that victory proletarian revolution guarantees the inevitable victory of socialist society over the capitalist world.

“To create world history,” wrote K. Marx in a letter to L. Kugelmann, “it would, of course, be very convenient if the struggle were undertaken only under the condition of infallibly favorable chances. On the other hand, history would be very mystical if” accidents" did not play any role. These accidents enter, of course, into integral part in general course development, balanced by other accidents. "(PSS, vol. 33, p. 175)

The fact of the existence of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, their hostile clashes, as well as the contradiction between the development of productive forces and arbitrariness! military relations, in themselves do not predetermine the victory of one and the defeat of another social system.

The birth of a new socialist society can take place only through the class struggle (during which the proletariat accumulates the necessary experience, goes through the stage of organizing its forces, forms trade unions and a revolutionary party, etc.) and the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie - by revolutionary or parliamentary means. But this does not mean at all that the victory of the working class in one country or another necessarily ensures the spread of the socialist revolution to all capitalist countries ripe for the transition to socialism. The experience of both the Paris Commune and October revolution in Russia proves that there is no such predetermination. The completed proletarian revolution, isolated from other countries, not having received the support of the world proletariat, can then be defeated or reborn.

Taking power in October 1917, the Bolsheviks, in accordance with Lenin's strategy, believed that the world had entered an era of wars and socialist revolutions, that capitalism was in a state of decay and was no longer able to lead humanity out of a period of permanent crises. Therefore, they believed, the socialist revolution in backward Russia, although it would not have independent value, cannot be premature, for it will be a prologue, a torch that will ignite the world revolution.

In the intra-Party struggle that unfolded in the RCP(b) after Lenin's illness and death and culminated in a struggle for power, irreconcilable differences over "a questioning about the nature of the October Revolution" were of primary importance.

Trotsky and the group of members of the Central Committee adjoining him continued to take the traditional Marxist position, considering the October Revolution as the first stage of the world revolution. Stalin and most members of the Central Committee began to assign to the October Revolution an independent role, self-sufficient intra-national and intra-state significance. They argued that Lenin and the party considered the Russian revolution, first of all, as opening the way to the direct construction of socialism in Russia, that a new socialist society could be created in Russia regardless of the advent of the world revolution.

From two opposing positions flowed two different tactics formulated by Stalin and Trotsky.

It followed from Trotsky's position that the internal tasks of socialist construction in Russia should be subordinated to main task- world revolution. The spearhead of Trotsky's tactics was aimed at strengthening the role of the Comintern, at preparing and organizationally strengthening the Communist Parties of the capitalist (especially Western European) countries for the preparation

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ki them to the second, after the October Revolution, the storm of capitalism. Trotsky's tactics with regard to internal construction in the USSR did not differ in any way from the plan outlined by Lenin in his articles and letters of the KP to the Party Congress. In them, Vladimir Ilyich recommended using the time before the approach of the revolution in Western countries for the industrialization of the country and a powerful rise in agriculture through the gradual cooperation of peasant farms, for raising the cultural level of the working people and drawing the broad masses into the government of the country, which should have served the best remedy for a resolute struggle against bureaucracy.

At the heart of the tactics of Stalin and the majority headed by him Central Committee there was a certainty that the world revolution was a chimera, that capitalism had emerged from the crisis and finally stabilized. So foreign policy Stalin was aimed mainly at making it clear to the powerful capitalist countries surrounding the USSR that the USSR had moved away from the adventurist bet on world revolution. Stalin's internal policy was directed, first of all, at strengthening the state power of the country, at ever greater centralization of the management of economic, political and social activities, at an ever greater tightening of the methods of this management.

In the letter to L. Kugelmann quoted above, Marx, speaking of "accidents" that can eliminate or slow down the revolution, mentions among them "such a" case "as the character of the people standing ... at the head of the movement." The theoretical and tactical differences between the two factions of Bolshevism were immeasurably complicated and aggravated by the fact that such an immoral person as Stalin turned out to be at the head of the party.

Stalin did incalculable harm to the cause of communism. Not only by the fact that he made the Thermidorian coup in the USSR, destroyed the old Bolshevik guard and most of the ideological communists in the USSR (as well as the main cadres of the Comintern) and decomposed most of the rest. His main crime lies in the destruction of millions of innocent people - and in the destruction in the name of communism, the party, communist ideas. Thus, he discredited the communist ideology in the eyes of the peoples of the whole world (especially the advanced, developed countries), putting an equal sign between it and totalitarianism, calling the socialist society anti-democratic, inhumane, built on violence and exploitation of workers. The damage inflicted on the world labor movement by Stalin is incomparable to any other.

And in those times about which we are talking here, and now the point of view is widely spread, identifying Stalinism with Bolshevism and with Marxism, from which Bolshevism grew. This point of view, according to which Stalinism is a legitimate product of Bolshevism, is shared by the entire world reaction, and all the socialist parties that opposed Bolshevism, it was proclaimed by Stalin himself, and now both his modern followers and supporters of Solzhenitsyn's point of view are proclaiming it. It was consistently defended, in particular, by the Russian Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists.

We have always predicted this, they said. Beginning with the prohibition of other socialist parties, with the establishment of the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks in the Soviets, the October Revolution could not but lead to the dictatorship of the bureaucracy. Stalinism is the continuation and at the same time the bankruptcy of Bolshevism.

Trotsky strongly objected to the identification of Stalinism with Bolshevism. The fallacy of such reasoning, he said, begins with a tacit identification of the October Revolution and the Soviet Union. The historical process, consisting in the struggle of hostile forces, is thus, in his opinion, replaced by the evolution of Bolshevism in airless space.

Meanwhile, Bolshevism was only political trend, closely merged with the labor movement, but not identical even with it. And in addition to the working class in the USSR, there were then more than a hundred million peasants, diverse nationalities, as well as a legacy of oppression, poverty and ignorance. The state created by the Bolsheviks reflected not only the thought and will of Bolshevism, but everything that followed from the above: the cultural level of the country, the social composition of the population, the pressure of the barbaric past and no less barbaric world capitalism. Therefore, Trotsky believed, to depict the process of the degeneration of the Soviet state as the evolution of pure Bolshevism means to ignore social reality in the name of one logically identified element. When the Bolsheviks made concessions to the possessive tendencies of the peasants, they established strict rules to join the party, subjected this party to a purge of foreign elements, banned other parties, introduced the NEP, resorted to

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concessions or diplomatic agreements with the imperialist governments, they, the Bolsheviks, drew private conclusions from the basic fact that was clear to them from the very beginning. This fact can be formulated as follows: the conquest of power, no matter how important it is in itself, does not at all turn the party into a full-fledged master historical process.

Having seized the state, the party, it is true, obtains the opportunity to influence the development of society with a force previously inaccessible to it, but on the other hand, it itself is subjected to a tenfold influence from all its other elements. By a direct blow from hostile forces, it can be driven back from power; at a more protracted pace, having retained power, it can be reborn. The Bolsheviks have always reckoned with this theoretical possibility and spoke openly about it. Let us recall Lenin's forecast on the eve of the October Revolution and his own statements after its accomplishment. A special grouping of forces on a national and international scale created the prerequisites for the proletariat to be able to come to power in such a backward country like Russia. But the same grouping of forces testifies that without a more or less speedy victory of the proletariat in advanced countries the workers' state will not stand. Left to itself, the Soviet regime will fall or degenerate. More precisely, it will degenerate first, then it will fall. Not only soviet state may deviate from the socialist path, but the Bolshevik Party may, under unfavorable historical conditions, lose its Bolshevism.

From a clear understanding of such a danger, said L.D. Trotsky, the left opposition proceeded, which finally took shape in 1923.

Recording from day to day the symptoms of degeneration, it strove to oppose the impending Thermidor with the conscious will of the proletarian vanguard. However, this subjective factor was not enough. Those "giant masses" who, according to Lenin, decide the outcome of the struggle, are tired of internal hardships and of too long waiting for the world revolution. The masses were discouraged. The bureaucracy has taken over. It forced the proletarian vanguard to put up with it, trampled on Marxism, and prostituted the Bolshevik Party. Stalinism won. In the face of the opposition, real Bolshevism broke with the Soviet bureaucracy and its Comintern. This is the actual course of development.

True, in a formal sense, Stalinism emerged from Bolshevism. The Moscow bureaucracy even today continues to call itself the Bolshevik Party. True, she rarely uses this label now, but on occasion she uses it in order to better deceive the masses, passing off the shell for the core, the appearance for the essence.

The elimination of all other parties from the political arena was bound to lead to the fact that the conflicting interests and tendencies of different sections of the population, to one degree or another, began to find expression within the ruling party. As political center gravity moved from the proletarian vanguard to the bureaucracy, the party changed - both in social composition and in ideology. Thanks to the turbulent course of events, in the course of 15 years (from 1922 to 1937) it (the party) underwent a much more radical rebirth than the Social Democracy did in half a century.

The “purge” carried out by Stalin in 1936937 drew between Bolshevism and Stalinism not even a bloody line, but a whole river of blood. The extermination of the entire old generation of Bolsheviks, a significant part of the middle generation who participated in civil war, and that part of the youth who took the Bolshevik traditions most seriously, clearly showed not only the political, but almost physical incompatibility of Stalinism and Bolshevism.

Above, I outlined the views of L.D. Trotsky on the reasons for the degeneration of the party. But, as it seems to me now, there is a fair amount of fatalism in these views.

“Everyone who is at all familiar with history,” he writes in the article “Why Stalin defeated the opposition,” “knows that each The revolution produced in its wake a counter-revolution which... always took away from the people a significant, sometimes the lion's share of their political gains. The victim of the first reactionary wave was, according to general rule, that layer of revolutionaries who stood at the head of the masses in the first, offensive, "heroic" period of the revolution. This is already a common historical observation. must lead us to the idea that it is not just a matter of dexterity, cunning, the skill of two or more persons, but of reasons incomparably deeper order.

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Marxists, unlike superficial fatalists, by no means deny the role of the individual, his initiative and courage in the social struggle. But unlike idealists, Marxists know that consciousness in the last account subject to being."

There is a lot of truth in this. However, Trotsky did not give here a concrete analysis of the positions taken by individual prominent members of the Central Committee of the Party, did not consider the correlation of forces that had developed in the Central Committee before and after Lenin's death. In his analysis of the reasons for the defeat of the opposition and the victory of Stalin, he proceeds only from objective conditions that have developed in the world and in the USSR - and therefore his explanations smack of fatalism.

“The fact is absolutely undeniable and full of significance,” wrote L.D. Trotsky, “that the Soviet bureaucracy became the more powerful, the more severe blows fell on the world working class. The defeat of the revolutionary movements in Europe and Asia gradually undermined the faith of the workers in an international ally. In the interior of the country there was an acute need all the time.The most courageous and self-sacrificing representatives of the working class either managed to die in the civil war, or rose several steps higher and for the most part assimilated into the ranks of the bureaucracy, having lost their revolutionary spirit.

Tired of terrible tension revolutionary years, having lost perspective, poisoned by the bitterness of a series of disappointments, the broad masses fell into passivity. This kind of reaction was observed, as has already been said, after every revolution. The immeasurable historical advantage of the October Revolution as a proletarian revolution lies in the fact that it was not the class enemy in the person of the bourgeoisie and the nobility that took advantage of the fatigue and disappointment of the masses, but the upper stratum of the working class itself and the intermediate groups associated with it, which merged into the Soviet bureaucracy.

It is true that the Bolsheviks, Lenin and Trotsky himself foresaw the possibility of such a variant of history, when the proletarian revolutionary party, having taken power in an isolated and, moreover, backward country, with a delay in the world revolution and under the influence of tired and passive masses, forced will cede power to another class or be reborn.

But was there really such a situation in Russia after Lenin's illness and death?

If Trotsky at the 10th Party Congress, as Lenin insisted, had spoken out on behalf of Lenin and his own against Stalin on organizational and national issues, would he have succeeded in removing Stalin from the post of General Secretary?

Or, if all members of the Politburo did the same. Couldn't they fulfill Lenin's will and remove Stalin from the post of general secretary?

And if this had happened, a completely different situation could have developed in the party, a different atmosphere, which Lenin wanted to create and which he outlined in his letters to the congress. And this, in turn, could change both the international situation and the internal situation in the USSR in a revolutionary direction.

“Our party relies on two classes, and therefore its instability and its inevitable fall are possible if an agreement could not be reached between these two classes. In this case, it is useless to take one or another measure, in general, to talk about the stability of our Central Committee. No measures in this will not be able to avert a split, but I hope that this is too distant a future and too improbable an event to speak of...

I think that from this point of view, Central Committee members such as Stalin and Trotsky are the main ones on the issue of stability. Relations between them, in my opinion, constitute more than half of the danger of that split, which could have been avoided ... "(PSS, vol. 45, pp. 344-345)

Consequently, Vladimir Ilyich at that time saw the immediate danger that threatened the party not in the prolongation of the world revolution, not in the backwardness of the country, and not in the decline of the mood of the weary masses, but in the possibility of a personal struggle between the leaders of the party. Trotsky himself in the twenties and early thirties in the book "My Life" and in articles published

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In the Bulletins during these years, he repeatedly expressed the idea that if he had come out in a bloc with Lenin at the Tenth Congress, their victory would have been completely guaranteed. And it is true. After all, their joint statement in defense of the monopoly foreign trade quickly ended in their victory. Trotsky's speech in a bloc with Lenin on the question of organization would undoubtedly have ended in the same victory. This would mean the removal of Stalin from the post of general secretary, which would immediately deprive him of what he was strong in - connection with the apparatus.

In the article cited above, "Why Stalin Defeated the Opposition," Trotsky wrote:

"To the number major achievements The ability to distinguish between when it is possible to advance and when it is necessary to retreat must be attributed to the proletarian leadership. This ability was main force Lenin. The success or failure of the Left Opposition against the bureaucracy, of course, depended to one degree or another on the quality of the leadership of both fighting camps.

Here is this quality Trotsky did not have this ability at the decisive moment. Despite the fact that on the eve of Lenin's death, the two of them examined the situation in detail and agreed on tactics, Trotsky was unable to bring the line they had adopted to a victorious end. A negative role here was played, of course, by the behavior of the other members of the Politburo, who were carried away by their personal interests and therefore did not follow Lenin's advice - to remove Stalin from his post at the only favorable time when it was still possible.

This seemingly "private" question, this "accident" of history (who will be the general secretary?) had a tremendous impact on the entire subsequent history of the party and the country. Therefore, we consider it necessary to specifically investigate the question of what position each of the political leaders took in this short but decisive period of time.

Readers who wish to become more familiar with the political situation and the alignment of forces on the eve of the 12th Party Congress, with the nature of the disagreements then discussed in the party leadership (on the monopoly of foreign trade, on national and organizational problems and others), one should study the letters of Lenin during this period (to Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Mdivani, N. Okudzhava, K. Tsintsadze); his own letters addressed to the XII Congress; records of secretaries V.I. Lenin; his notes to L. Fotieva. All this is contained in vols. 45 and 54 Fifth complete collection works of V.I. Lenin. You should also read the IML editorial notes to these documents.

From these documents we learn, in particular, that on March 5, 1923, V.I. Lenin dictated to M.A. Volodicheva two letters: one - to Trotsky with a request to undertake the defense of his views on national question at the plenum of the Central Committee and at the XII Party Congress, and another - to Stalin about his rude antics in relation to N.K. Krupskaya. The next day, March 6, he inquired whether a reply had been received from Trotsky, reviewed yesterday's letter to Stalin for the second time, and instructed that it be sent.

On the same day, Lenin suffered a blow, after which he political life did not return.

This outcome favored Stalin's intentions. People close to Lenin got the impression that, under the pretext of following the advice of doctors, Stalin was trying to isolate Lenin from his comrades, from getting information to him. This system of prohibitions worried Lenin and harmed him more than any information. So, in the record of L.A. Fotieva on February 12, 1923 says:

“Vladimir Ilyich is worse. A severe headache ... According to Maria Ilyinichna, the doctors upset him to such an extent that his lips trembled ... ... the impression was that it was not the doctors who gave instructions to the Central Committee, but the Central Committee gave instructions to doctors", (underlined by me, PSS, vol. 45, p. 485)

It was at this time that Stalin took decisive measures to master the central apparatus, carefully studied each major party worker, his weaknesses and virtues, and all this from the point of view, the main thing for him: how this comrade relates to him, Stanin, and other members of the Politburo (especially - to Trotsky). For such a study, as described above, methods such as wiretapping were used. The formation of a "troika" directed against Trotsky belongs to the same time.

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On the eve of the Twelfth Congress, Stalin suddenly made a proposal: in the face of Vladimir Ilyich's illness, stop the strife and come to the congress united.

It sounded very noble. But what did this practically mean? This meant: due to deadly disease Lenin to stop fighting for Lenin's principled position on national and organizational issues, approve the theses of Stalin's reports on these issues, directly directed against Lenin's views expressed in his letters to the congress, leave Stalin in the post of general secretary and thereby place the fate of the party and country in his hands .

It is strange how Trotsky could fall for such a primitive bait! And, nevertheless, he agreed with Stalin's proposal not to submit disagreements to the congress and, together with other members of the Politburo, approved the theses of Stalin's reports on national and organizational issues.

This was Trotsky's biggest political mistake. And he did it, despite the fact that Lenin warned him: do not make any compromise with Stalin. This mistake played a fatal role in the life of the party and the country, it allowed Stalin to keep his post, gain time and consolidate his power in the party and state apparatus.

What was the root of the error? Why did Trotsky make concessions to Stalin?

It seems to me that during that period several unfavorable circumstances ("accidents") coincided with some individual traits Trotsky, which in his personal life are positive, but for a political figure, of course, they turn into shortcomings.

Trotsky underestimated the organizational side of the activities of the leading bodies of the party in comparison with the political, and even more so did not attach importance to behind-the-scenes intrigues, which, in his opinion, could not have a decisive influence on politics. Therefore, he did not attach as much importance to the post of general secretary, and to the one who occupies it, as Lenin did. Moreover, he underestimated the personality of Stalin, considering him a secondary figure, and assigned Zinoviev the main role in distorting the principled policy of the party. In the conditions of Lenin's fatal illness, he considered it impossible to reject Stalin's proposal for an "armistice", that the leadership of the party come out united for the congress - and put aside disputes of principle.

This delay became fatal. Accustomed to open political struggle, Trotsky was not sufficiently experienced in the intricacies of the behind-the-scenes game of political figures, he was dismissive of all kinds of organizational and political combinations, and even more so, he considered it below his dignity to delve into the intricacies of such combinations or participate in them. Stalin, on the other hand, played his entire game behind the scenes, in this area he was extremely cunning and dexterous, had a taste for intrigues and maneuvers, and attached decisive importance to the organizational consolidation of his power as general secretary.

Not seeing the main danger for the party in the continuation of Stalin's activities as General Secretary, Trotsky did not understand and did not feel that it was precisely at this and precisely at the moment when Lenin was already irretrievably lost to political life that it was impossible to yield and retreat. It was at this moment that Trotsky, both at the plenum of the Central Committee and at the congress, had to take upon himself open and active protection Lenin's views and change organizational structure and the composition of the central institutions of the party, and the removal of Stalin, and the national question. Moreover, he had in his hands such a document as Lenin's letter dated March 5, 1923, which allowed him to speak not only on his own behalf, but also on behalf of Lenin:

"Dear comrade Trotsky!

I would ask you to take it upon yourself to defend the Georgian cause at the Central Committee of the Party. This matter is now under persecution by Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Even quite the opposite. If you would agree to take over his protection, then I could be calm. If for some reason you disagree, then return the whole case to me. I will take this as a sign of your disagreement. With best comradely greetings, Lenin. March 5, 1923." (PSS, vol. 54, p. 329).

Trotsky did not have time to answer this letter: the next day, Lenin suffered an irreversible stroke. But he still has the letter!

Perhaps Trotsky did not share Lenin's views on the National Question? Judging by his subsequent performances, this is not the case. In 1926, listing at the VII Plenum of the ECCI

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Stalin's mistakes, he mentions his mistakes in the national question. In 1930, in Bulletin No. 14, outlining the history of Stalin's political mistakes, Trotsky writes: "On the national question, he took a position that Lenin accused of bureaucratic and chauvinistic tendencies ..."

So, Trotsky understood everything, but on the eve of the Twelfth Congress, and during the Congress, and after it, he was silent about Stalin's mistakes. Neither during the discussion of Stalin's theses at the pre-Congress plenum, nor at the congress itself, nor after it did Trotsky come out in support of Lenin's anti-Stalinist views and did not report Lenin's letter to him on the national question. He was not even present at the meeting of the congress that adopted a resolution on this issue. Some of the major party workers (Bukharin, Rakovsky, Skrypnik, Mdivani and others) tried to amend this resolution proposed by Stalin in the spirit of Lenin's views expressed in his letter "On Autonomization ...". But these attempts were not successful: the congress considered both the report and the resolution not as personal opinion Stalin, but as the opinion of the Central Committee. Trotsky's speech and his publication of Lenin's letter could have played a decisive role in turning the Congress around. But Trotsky did not speak.

After the Twelfth Party Congress, when Zinoviev felt that the power of Stalin, who held the apparatus in his hands, had grown unreasonably, he turned to Trotsky with a proposal to unite in order to fight for such a change in the structure of the central institutions of the party that would put the secretariat (and therefore Stalin) under control Politburo.

One can understand that L.D. Trotsky did not trust G.E. Zinoviev. It is impossible not to take into account the fact that Zinoviev, like Stalin, considered the organizational principles of Bolshevism exclusively pragmatically: as the most effective means of mastering the party machine - voting, elections, selection of "necessary" people. Both of them cared very little about raising the activity and initiative of the party members, although this alone could be the only guarantee against the degeneration of the leadership.

All this is true. But Trotsky did not understand that the post of general secretary and Stalin's personal qualities made him more dangerous than Zinoviev. Until the Fourteenth Party Congress, Trotsky associated the opportunist policy of the Central Committee with Zinoviev and Kamenev, and considered the role of Stalin to be secondary. Therefore, seeing another combination in Zinoviev's proposal, he rejected it.

Only when, after the 10th Party Congress, it becomes clear to Trotsky that time has been lost, and victory has gone to his opponents, does he, under pressure from his like-minded people, launch an attack. The discussion begins in 1923.

How did L.D. behave then? Trotsky?

He did not openly lead the Left Opposition, did not actively participate in the discussion, in the struggle of the party masses, among whom he enjoyed great prestige. Removing himself from direct participation in the discussion, he shifted this task onto the shoulders of his supporters - Preobrazhensky, Radek, Pyatakov, I.N. Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, Beloborodov and others.

At the heart of his line of conduct lay the fear of a split in the party. His closest associates believed that a split should not be feared, and did not approve of his behavior.

The discussion is over. On January 16, 1924, the Tenth Party Conference met, at which Stalin and Zinoviev accused the opposition of a petty-bourgeois deviation. The conference adopts a resolution "On the petty-bourgeois deviation" and also a decision to publish the previously unpublished paragraph 7 of the resolution of the Tenth Party Congress "On Unity" - a paragraph directly directed against any criticism of the Central Committee. And this despite the fact that less than a month ago, on December 5, 1923, the Central Committee adopted a resolution "On workers' democracy" agreed between the majority and the opposition.

In addition, the conference decides to purge the military and university cells, most of which voted for the left opposition.

How does Trotsky react to all these events? He is not present at the conference, he does not speak anywhere, he nowhere protests against the perfidious policy of the majority, that is, in essence, he betrays his like-minded people.

Three days after the end of the 13th Conference, Lenin dies. Four months later, in May 1924, the 13th Party Congress meets.

How did Trotsky behave at the congress that confirmed the resolution of the 13th Party Conference "On the petty-bourgeois deviation"?

Like a soldier, not like a party leader. He declared that "the party is always right" and called on his like-minded people to discipline and submit to the party. Notes of justification prevail in his speech, although he subsequently claimed that the degeneration of the party was predetermined.

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already at the 12th Congress.

When was Trotsky right?

Then, when did he assert that his victory would have been secured at the Twelfth Party Congress if he had spoken out against Stalin in his own name and Lenin's (and even only in his own name)?

Or when he began to assert that the defeat of the opposition was predetermined by the historical course of events?

In 1935, in the same article Why Stalin Defeated the Opposition, Trotsky wrote:

"Stalin, a minor figure in the proletarian revolution, revealed himself as the undisputed leader of the Thermidorian bureaucracy - nothing more ... Those wise men who retroactively accuse us of having lost power due to indecision ... they think that there are some These are the special technical "secrets" by means of which one can win or hold revolutionary power regardless of the action of the greatest objective factors: the victory or defeat of the revolution in the West and East, the rise or fall of the mass movement in the country, and so on.

Power is not a prize that goes to the more dexterous. Power is a relationship between people, in the last analysis, between classes. Proper leadership, as already mentioned, is an important lever of success. But this does not mean at all that the leadership can ensure victory under any conditions.

That's right, not at all. But under the specific conditions that prevailed in the country and in the party at the time of Lenin's illness, before the Twelfth Party Congress, it was possible to ensure Trotsky's victory for sure if he took the correct and decisive line that Lenin intended to take in preparing for the congress.

Apparently, Trotsky himself thought so when he wrote his book My Life, but by 1935 he changed his point of view. Here is what he writes about this in the mentioned article:

“The question of how the course of the struggle would have developed if Lenin had remained alive cannot, of course, be answered with mathematical accuracy. That Lenin was an implacable opponent of the greedy conservative bureaucracy and the policies of Stalin, who increasingly connected his fate with it, can be seen with indisputability from a whole series of letters, articles and proposals from Lenin over the last period of his life, in particular from his "Testament", in which he recommended that Stalin be removed from the post of General Secretary, and finally from his last letter in which he broke off "all personal and comradely relations" with Stalin. In the period between the two attacks, Lenin suggested that I create a faction with him to fight against the bureaucracy and its main headquarters, the Orgburo of the Central Committee, where Stalin led. For the 12th Party Congress, Lenin, in his own words, was preparing a "bomb" against Stalin. All this is told on the basis of precise and indisputable documents - in my autobiography and in separate work"Lenin's testament".

So, Trotsky himself declares that Lenin was preparing a "bomb" against Stalin at the 12th Party Congress, recommended that Stalin be removed from the post of General Secretary and proposed to Trotsky a bloc against Stalin.

Why didn't Trotsky implement this Leninist plan either at the next plenum of the Central Committee or at the 12th Party Congress?

Maybe he tried to do this, spoke on these points, but remained in the minority, was defeated for objective reasons?

No, as we know, there was nothing like that. Trotsky's behavior throughout this entire period, from the December Plenum of the Central Committee in 1922 to the Fourteenth Party Congress (1925) inclusive, was, as I have shown in concrete examples, passive, indecisive. And he suffered a defeat precisely for this reason, and even because he treated his opponent superficially, arrogantly.

We see that later on Trotsky not only ignores his mistakes, but also incorrectly evaluates Lenin. He argues that Lenin, if he had remained alive and entered the struggle with Stalin, most likely would have been defeated.

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“Lenin’s preparatory measures show,” writes Trotsky, “that he considered the forthcoming struggle to be very difficult—not, of course, because he was afraid of Stalin personally as an adversary (it’s ridiculous to talk about this), but because behind Stalin’s back he clearly discerned the plexus of blood interests of the powerful layer of the ruling bureaucracy (when did it have time to form and gain strength like that?).

It can be said with certainty that if Lenin had lived longer, the pressure of bureaucratic omnipotence would have been carried out - at least in the first years - more slowly. But already in 1926, Krupskaya said in a circle of left oppositionists: "If Ilyich had been alive, he probably would have been in prison by now." Lenin's fears and anxious foresights were then still fresh in her memory, and she had no illusions at all about Lenin's personal omnipotence, realizing, from his own words, the dependence of the best helmsman on fair or oncoming winds and currents.

Of course, if Lenin had behaved as passively and indecisively as Trotsky, if he had not achieved the removal of Stalin from the post of general secretary, the same thing could happen to him that happened to his comrades in the Politburo. But I think that Lenin, by the very nature of his character, could not act in this way.

The facts cited, I think, are sufficient to confirm the main idea of this chapter: Stalin's victory over the opposition was not predetermined by the nature of the era, as Trotsky later claimed. This victory - over Trotsky and other members of the Politburo - was planned, organized and carried out by Stalin.

This is not contradicted by Trotsky's assertion - very precise and correct - that the epoch was working towards the decline of the revolutionary movement, that weariness was increasingly affecting the mood of the working masses. The predestination of Stalin's victory does not at all follow from the fact of fatigue and passivity of the working masses. With a correct policy of the Party towards the peasantry and industrialization, with an improvement financial situation of the working class, in a resolute struggle against bureaucracy on the basis of broad intra-party democracy, the party could lead the country along the path of socialist construction without abandoning its main goal - the world revolution.

Lenin, in his letters to the congress and in his last, dying articles, outlined a plan, the implementation of which would enable the Russian proletariat to hold out until the approach of the world revolution. Stalin, having seized power, gave the policy of the party opposite direction which focuses not on world revolution, but on strengthening Russian state to consolidate the new bureaucracy. The reactionary tendencies of the era contributed to this direction and made it easier for Stalin to defeat his revolutionary opponents. His desire for personal power coincided with the reactionary tendencies of the era.

It is characteristic that Stalin avoided international problems, poorly versed in the issues of the international labor movement, did not study them and, due to his narrow-mindedness and provincialism, did not even have a taste for them. If he had to touch on these issues in his speeches, he either copied Lenin unsuccessfully, or used the analysis of his more educated allies. His suspicious, distrustful character was perfectly matched by the xenophobia planted in Russia for centuries, dislike and distrust of everything alien, foreign. Distrust of foreign communist parties, of foreign communists, also fit in well with this.

Trotsky put it this way: Stalin "was looking for a simpler, more national, more reliable policy." The reactionary course of abandoning the international goals of the revolution and building socialism in one country" was not predetermined. internal position in the country, it was the result of a turn in the policy of the party, outlined and prepared by Statny during the life of Lenin and carried out by him at the XII-XVII congresses of the party.

Let us summarize again the means by which he achieved this, and the circumstances that made his task easier.

Primarily - the enormous power of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. Using it, Stalin gradually, day after day, month after month, year after year, strengthened his indivisible influence in the party apparatus. The party masses gradually withdrew from participating in party life; from local and central authorities the party, at first slowly, then more quickly, cadres of the old ideological Bolsheviks were forced out; an obedient majority was formed by various organizational measures; expelled from leadership positions

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There were thinking and dissident communists.

Then - careful study of your opponents, cash and potential, capable of interfering with his sole power, and the skillful use of both their positive qualities (gullibility, devotion to the party) and personal weaknesses.

Stalin skillfully created situations for them to clash with each other, for a sharp aggravation of relations between them, and thus paved the way for their discredit and gradual removal from the political arena.

How inexperienced and gullible politicians turned out to be all opponents of Stalin!

First, L.D. showed his short-sightedness and indecision. Trotsky, who, out of fear of violating the unity of the party, withdrew from the struggle at the XII Party Congress, and then refused first an alliance with Zinoviev (in 1923 and 1925), and then an alliance with Bukharin (1928).

In all these cases, Trotsky remains a passive contemplator of Stalin's reprisals against his opponents - yesterday's allies in the struggle against Trotsky. Once in trouble, they were to become Trotsky's natural allies and indeed offered him this alliance. Trotsky's decisive intervention on the side of the minority could lead to success in the fight against Stalin. However, Trotsky was unable to rise above yesterday's disputes and strife, could not draw a line between Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin on the one hand, and Stalin on the other. And he tacitly allowed reprisals against them, which subsequently facilitated the final defeat of all opponents of Stalin - and, above all, the defeat and physical destruction of the left opposition.

Even less principled was the behavior of Zinoviev and Kamenev. If we carefully analyze all their speeches during the struggle against the Left Opposition, it becomes clear that these speeches were not caused by serious theoretical or practical disagreements. On the other hand, the struggle for power, for the "inheritance" of Lenin, which flared up especially on the threshold of imminent death recognized leader of the party. Trotsky was then the most authoritative member of the Politburo after Lenin - and that is why Zinoviev and Kamenev directed a blow against him, concluding an alliance with Stalin, who seemed to them harmless "practitioner". That is why Trotsky's historical "non-Bolshevism" began to be exaggerated and promoted in the party, which Lenin in his "Testament" did not consider it possible to blame him for. Precisely in order to isolate and eliminate Trotsky and those who supported him, Zinoviev and Kamenev, ignoring Lenin's advice, defended the retention of Stalin in the post of general secretary, which Zinoviev later repented of belatedly.

In 1926, Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev finally catch on and form a bloc. But it's' too late. Zinoviev and Kamenev then believed that in alliance with the opposition of 1923 they would be able to quickly seize the position, restore the Leninist line in the party and restore their personal prestige. They were wrong this time too. Time had already been lost; Stalin had already taken complete control of the apparatus, and through it the majority of the party.

The last fatal and shameful mistake was made by Zinoviev and Kamenev immediately after the Fifteenth Congress, capitulating on a question in which no self-respecting person has the right to capitulate. political figure: give up your views. Having achieved this from them, Stalin achieved his main goal: he publicly humiliated and discredited them before the party and the working class and established himself in the eyes of those old Bolsheviks who hesitated in their attitude towards the "new opposition". This capitulation, which Zinoviev and Kamenev foolishly regarded as a means of preventing a split in the party and a condition for their return to political activity, essentially was their political suicide that came long before Stalin killed them physically. All their further (especially Zinoviev's) behavior is the result of demoralization, the beginning of which was their rejection of their views.

As for the "Right Opposition", Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky were used three times by Stalin: first against Trotsky, then against Leningrad opposition and finally against the united opposition.

It should be noted here that, unlike the others, between Bukharin and Trotsky there really were fundamental, ideological, theoretical differences. It was Bukharin, and not Stalin at all, who was the author of the theory of building socialism in one, separately taken country, which

When someone reproached Zinoviev and Kamenev for abandoning their ally Trotsky after the 15th Congress, Kamenev replied "Trotsky was needed to form the government, but he is a ballast to return to the party."

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which Trotsky considered anti-revolutionary and nationalist. It was Bukharin who acted as her defender during the struggle with Zinoviev: Stalin was incapable of this even in his own way. theoretical level; on the other hand, he was perfectly adapted to pushing first Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky with their foreheads, then Bukharin against Zinoviev and Kamenev, and, in the end, in turn, to remove all his rivals with each other's hands.

After all, the “rightists” not only conducted theoretical discussions with the left oppositionists, they helped Stalin justify the need for police repressions against their party comrades, they covered up this black deed with their authority, the victims of which, in the end, became themselves. The reprisals against Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev and their supporters (arrests and exile) until 1928 took place not only in front of the right, but also with their direct participation.

Could it be that they really considered "Trotskyism" a petty-bourgeois deviation, and that Trotsky and the Trotskyists were anti-Leninists? I think it's possible. But what seems impossible is to continue to trust Stalin, to continue to consider him a Bolshevik, a Leninist, observing from day to day at close range his political kitchen, his treachery towards yesterday's allies, his unscrupulousness and cruelty.

However, right up to 1928, when it was the turn of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky to be squeezed out by Stalin and thrown out of the leadership, right up to that very time they went along with Stalin against their old party comrades. And they also realized that they made the biggest political miscalculation only when it was already too late.

But Trotsky, back in 1926, repeatedly offered Bukharin to join him "in general requirement restore a healthy intra-party regime."

In the party under Lenin, over the years of joint work, a backbone of middle-level leading cadres was formed and grew. These were workers' and proletarian intellectuals, for the most part devoted to the cause of the proletarian revolution, ideological, self-sacrificing, many very capable people. After the revolution, it was they who occupied the posts of people's commissars, secretaries of national communist parties, provincial committees (later krai and regional committees), major military and economic leaders. The intra-party regime created by Stalin disintegrated them. First, Stalin temporarily used these people in the struggle against the opposition under the guise of fighting for the unity of the party, and then destroyed them.

I am constantly tormented by the question: why did Stalin manage to carry out his plan so relatively easily? How and with what did he seduce some in order to incite them against others? Why did not one of the members of the Politburo, who worked with Stalin for many years, suspect the provocative nature of Stalin's activities?

Svetlana Alliluyeva in the book "Only One Year" wrote about her father:

"He treated people without any romanticization: people are strong, who are needed, equal, who interfere, and weak, who are not needed by anyone."

It seems to me that these words of Stalin's daughter contain the grain of an answer to the question that torments me.

Here I read how Stalin charmed his famous guests: H. Wells, L. Feuchtwanger, R. Rolland, B. Shaw, F. Roosevelt, W. Churchill and others who enjoyed great influence in their countries and throughout the world. They were all strong people, and he needed them. And he knew how, that means, to find the key to their hearts, knew how to make them believe in himself when he needed the stumps. He charmed some with his Georgian hospitality and cordiality, playing a sincere and wide man, he knew how to convince others of his devotion to the ideas of socialism, he impressed others as statesman.

Wasn't this the way he won over to his side, turning against each other in turn, members of the Politburo, playing an attentive friend, a sympathetic like-minded person, whose support against ideological opponents can be counted on? After all, when he entered the fight, it was strong people which he "really needed".

When Stalin was preparing an attack against Trotsky in 1922-923, in order to win over Zinoviev, he frightened him with Trotsky's "non-Bolshevism", who, after Lenin's death, could seize leadership in the party and, using the mistake of Zinoviev and Kamenev in October 1917, remove him from this leadership both of them. Mine own plan(which he subsequently carried out) Stalin at the same time passed off as Trotsky's plan, and he passed himself off as a modest

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a person who does not claim to be the first, but only cares about the outstanding leader Zinoviev.

When Stalin reinstated Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky against Zinoviev and Kamenev, he presented himself as the man who most of all stood up for the unity of the party and wished to keep all the members of the Politburo in the leadership. Hypocritically objecting to the demands of Zinoviev and Kamenev to expel Trotsky from the Central Committee and intensify the struggle against Bukharin, Stalin seemed to say to Bukharin:

You see, today they are demanding that Trotsky be cut off, tomorrow, when they are finished with Trotsky, they will demand your blood... Do not trust them, only trust me...

Of course, that was only a rough scheme, everything was subtler, more complicated, but that was precisely the basis of Stalin's tactics and strategy in his struggle for power: to set one against the other, and with a cue to discard his yesterday's allies when they were used. This is the tactics and strategy of all unprincipled politicians, all tyrants and dictators, all mafia leaders - political and criminal.

The biggest mistake of Lenin's former comrades-in-arms - and a mistake not only political, but also psychological - was that they all considered Stalin as one-party, as their ideological comrade, albeit standing on erroneous positions. And he never was. Its goal was not socialism, it was not a world revolution, it was not the liberation of working mankind from social and national oppression. He had one goal - power. Personal, unlimited power, power as such, regardless of its social content.

I don't know if he was ever a communist or joined revolutionary movement guided by the same basic passion. To quote his daughter's book again:

"... My father had the wounded pride of a poor man, capable of moving mountains in his path... firm conviction that any means are good to achieve the goal, promised more real results than political ideals ... The father remained inwardly the same as he left the doors of the seminary. Nothing has been added to his character, only the same qualities have been developed to the limit.

He dreamed of resurfacing from the bottom, and not just resurfacing to a more worthy human life but rise to the top, reach the highest power. He had no hope of achieving this under the old system; instinctively sensing the nearness of the fall of the monarchy, he realized that the revolutionary era provides unlimited opportunities for promotion. So he became a Bolshevik.

A curious detail that Trotsky notes more than once in his articles, books and memoirs: Stalin, who many times took a position opposite to Lenin’s, never entered into a fight with Lenin. He always, in the words of Trotsky, "bounced in time." Not because Lenin persuaded him, but because Stalin was really afraid of him. He was afraid that Lenin would not recognize him, would not guess his inner essence.

Unfortunately, it did not happen. Only shortly before his death did Lenin come close to unraveling this phenomenon. Approached, but did not recognize until the end.

And then death came.

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