Cavalry corps in the years of the Second World War commanders. Red Army Cavalry

The cavalry was effective participant fights with fascists

On April 26, 1945, soldiers of the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps launched an assault on the city of Brandenburg, 40 kilometers west of the German capital. Thus, it was the cavalrymen who, during the final offensive of the Great Patriotic War, closed the encirclement around Berlin

In total, 12 cavalry divisions, almost 100 thousand cavalrymen, participated in the Berlin operation. Contrary to popular myths, the cavalry turned out to be a full-fledged and effective participant in that war from its first to its last day.

Red cavalry and the Soviet Cossacks

Again, contrary to widespread speculation about the "cavalry lobby" of Budyonny, the Soviet leadership before the war, developing armored units, strenuously reduced the "red cavalry". The number of Soviet cavalry from 1937 to 1941 was halved.

But the war on the boundless impassability of Eastern Europe immediately forced to reconsider the pre-war views on the modest role of the cavalry. Already on July 15, 1941, Marshal Zhukov, summarizing the experience of the first three weeks of the war, wrote in a directive letter from the Headquarters of the Supreme Command: “Our army somewhat underestimates the importance of cavalry. With the current situation on the fronts, when the rear of the enemy stretched for several hundred kilometers in forested areas, the raids of the red cavalrymen can play a decisive role in disorganizing the control and supply of German troops ... "

In the summer of 1941, in a defensive battle near Smolensk, raids by five cavalry divisions into the German rear provided significant assistance to the Soviet troops. During the first Soviet counter-offensive near Yelnya, it was the raiding actions of the Soviet cavalry that delayed the approach of the German reserves and thereby ensured success.

In November-December 1941, during the offensive near Moscow, almost a quarter of Soviet divisions were cavalry. The two cavalry corps, which became guards in those days, played a strategic role in the Soviet counteroffensive. The cavalry, rapidly advancing through the snowy forests of the Moscow region, smashed the enemy's rear and reserves.

The combat experience of the Great Patriotic War forced a sharp increase in the number of cavalry - if on June 22, 1941 there were 13 cavalry divisions and 116 thousand cavalry soldiers in the Red Army, then by the spring of 1943 there were already 26 cavalry divisions, almost a quarter of a million cavalrymen fought in them.

Soviet cavalry units successfully participated in all the major offensives of 1942-44. Part of the cavalrymen were fighters from the Don and Kuban - the real Soviet Cossacks. Two guards cavalry corps during the Great Patriotic War were officially called "Cossack". In 1945, the 5th Guards Don Cossack Corps fought its way to Vienna, and the 4th Guards Kuban Cossack Corps liberated Prague.

horse war

Horses participated in the Great Patriotic War not only in the cavalry - by June 22, 1941, the number of horses in the Red Army was 526.4 thousand, but by September 1 there were 1.324 thousand of these four-legged ungulates in the army. For example, each infantry regiment was supposed to have 350 horses to transport artillery, equipment and field kitchens. Even in the infantry, 3039 horses were relied on by the state for each Soviet division.

Soviet cavalryman in the rear of the German troops. Photo: voenpravda.ru

But in the German "Wehrmacht" there were even more four-legged military personnel - according to the state, there were over 6,000 horses in their infantry division. Although at the time of the invasion of our country, there were more cars in the Nazi troops than in the entire USSR, but they also used over one million horses, 88% of which were in infantry divisions. In total, during the war years, the Germans exploited more than 3 million horses on the "eastern front".

So World War II became not only the first war of engines in the world, but also the last great war of cavalry and horsepower. The horse literally pulled out that war on itself, and on both sides of the front.

Unlike cars, horses, as a draft force, then had whole line advantages - they moved better off-road and conditional roads, did not depend on fuel supplies (and this is very a big problem in military conditions), they could manage pasture for a long time, and sometimes they themselves were still some kind of food ... In the spring of 1942, all the Soviet cavalry divisions that were surrounded partially ate their horses, but managed to escape from the enemy's grip.

The horse became an indispensable means of war for the partisans as well. Supervisor partisan movement in Ukraine, Sidor Artemyevich Kovpak wrote about this: “The partisan fighter on foot had a limited range and was therefore tied to the territory of the detachment’s base ... During the winter of 1942, partisan fighters mounted on a horse turned into a formidable force capable of delivering powerful blows to the enemy . A swift march of 80-100 kilometers winter night, and at dawn a raid on the enemy garrison, which had lived quietly and calmly before ... In the conditions of partisan struggle, no engine, no machine can replace a horse. First, the car requires fuel, and horse food can be found everywhere. Secondly, the most perfect silencer cannot muffle the sound of the engine, and on a horse, wrapping burlap around our hooves, we passed 50-100 meters from the enemy garrisons completely silently. Thirdly, roads are needed for a car, and we, in conditions of complete impassability in a snowstorm, cold and fog, when even planes did not fly, made marches of 50-60 km per night.

The highly experienced Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny turned out to be quite right when he said that the horse would still show itself in the war. Then, in the 1940s, on the off-roads of Eastern Europe, it played its uncontested role - the time of mass tracked amphibious all-terrain vehicles came much later. During the war years, the horse replaced the missing armored personnel carriers and SUVs for Soviet soldiers.

Therefore, it was the cavalry that turned out to be an indispensable tool in breakthroughs and raids behind enemy lines. Soviet cavalry successfully participated in all operations that ended in the encirclement of German troops. In offensives, the so-called "horse-mechanized groups" usually operated, combining the strike power of tanks and the mobility of cavalry. Contrary to myths, the horsemen did not ride naked against enemy tanks with sabers - rather, they were “riding infantry”, arrows on horseback, capable of covering up to 100 kilometers in a day even without roads.

However, the Great Patriotic War also knows several classic cavalry attacks and battles. So on the morning of August 2, 1942, the Cossacks of the 13th Kuban Cavalry Division, skillfully using the high steppe grass, unexpectedly and successfully attacked the German infantry near the village of Kushchevskaya in horseback formation.

During the war, the German command realized that they had underestimated the cavalry and already at the end of 1944, the 1st Wehrmacht cavalry corps was formed from German and Hungarian cavalry divisions. They also created two SS cavalry divisions. All of them were defeated by the Red Army in early 1945 during the battles for Budapest.

Near Budapest, the last classic cavalry battle in the history of wars took place - the Cossacks from the 5th Guards Don Corps attacked the enemy cavalry in the equestrian ranks, hacked to death about 150 cavalrymen from the SS with swords and captured more than a hundred saddled horses.

Plowing on cows

From 1942 to 1945, the Soviet army constantly had at least 2 million horses. In total, over 3 million of these animals were mobilized into the army during the war. They, like people, were wounded and killed in the war. They died from overwork, hunger and disease. Over 2 million horses were cured of wounds received in battle by army veterinary infirmaries.

Artillerymen are fording across the Sheshupe River. Photo: feldgrau.info

If the statistics of human losses are inconsistent, then the statistics of horse losses are all the more so. It is believed that during the years 1941-45 in the USSR in the army and in the occupied territory, up to 8 million horses were lost due to the war. Of these, 2 million were forcibly taken and stolen by the invaders. In Kharkov, Voroshilovgrad (now Lugansk. - RP.), Zaporozhye and other regions Ukrainian SSR after the horse invaders were expelled, less than 10% of the pre-war number remained.

Under these conditions, the main source of horses for the Soviet army was Russian village. Despite the successes of pre-war mechanization, the horse in those years still remained the basis of rural life, so the mass mobilization of the "horse stock" was a terrible burden on the peasantry.

Already in the first year of the war, the mechanization of agriculture dropped sharply. By 1942, from collective farms to active army 70% of tractors and 80% trucks, but even for the remaining cars there was not enough fuel. Most rural work again had to be carried out exclusively on “horsepower” - it can be said without exaggeration that during the war years it was not only impossible to lead without a horse fighting, but it would also be impossible to provide the army and the rear with bread. Meanwhile, there were not enough horses everywhere - the best were mobilized into the army, and the rest, due to overwork and poor feeding, fell ill and died.

Therefore, even in the rear areas of the USSR, the number of working horses in agriculture by the end of the war was calculated in a meager amount. So in the summer of 1944, Usman Kamaleevich Khisamutdinov, chairman of the Kirov collective farm of the Ilek district of the Chkalovsky (now Orenburg. - RP.) Region, who later became the Hero of Socialist Labor, informed the regional authorities that in the spring the collective farm used 204 bulls, 13 camels, 20 cows and 6 last remaining horses. Thus, out of 243 animals involved in field work, horses accounted for only 2.5%, yielding in numbers to cows ...

It is no coincidence that in the USSR in 1944 posters were even issued telling how to properly harness and plow on cows.

Mongolian Lend-Lease

Even in the first year of the war, due to the rapid advance of the enemy, the USSR lost almost half of its horse stock - by June 1941, there were 17.5 million horses in our country, and by the fall of 1942, only a few remained on the territory not captured by the enemy 9 million, including foals unable to work.

Horse on the ruins of Stalingrad. Photo: portal-kultura.ru

But what is even worse in war conditions - it is much more difficult to urgently increase the number of working horses than to increase the production of cars. After all, in order for a foal to become capable of at least some kind of work, it takes time that cannot be reduced in any way by any superior orders, financial investments or technologies.

And with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the USSR, in addition to its own agriculture, had the only additional source horses - Mongolia. Sometime in the 1920s, the Bolsheviks, in fact, themselves created this “socialist” republic from the remote outskirts of the former Qing Empire. In addition to the fact that the Mongolian People's Republic was a Soviet bridgehead against Japanese Manchuria, it also played a crucial role in maintaining the necessary mobility of the Soviet army during the Great Patriotic War.

Mongolia is a nomadic country and there were more horses, essentially wild, freely grazing in the steppes, than people. Supplies of horses from Mongolia began as early as 1941. And from March 1942, the Mongolian authorities began the planned "preparation" of horses for the USSR. During the four years of the war, more than 500 thousand “Mongol” horses were delivered to the Soviet Union (this is how this breed was called during the war years. -RP.).

It is not in vain that they say: "The road is a spoon for dinner." In 1941-45, the USSR could not get half a million horses anywhere for any money. In addition to Mongolia, horses in such a marketable quantity were only in Northern and South America- not to mention the price (purchasing such a quantity in a short time would inflate them very much. -RP.), Delivering live cargo across the seas to the warring USSR would be much more difficult than the rest of the Lend-Lease.

Horses were delivered from Mongolia on a planned basis, at a conditional price, mainly by offsetting for the Mongolian debts of the USSR. Thus, all political, military and economic investments paid off. Soviet Union to Mongolia. And the Mongols provided us with a horse "lend-lease" - extremely timely and uncontested, closing the hole in this type of military "equipment".

At the same time, semi-wild, unpretentious and hardy Mongolian horses were much better adapted to the extreme conditions of the "eastern front" than their selected European counterparts. No wonder General Issa Alexandrovich Pliev, who fought in horse-mechanized groups from 1941 to 1945, from Smolensk, through Stalingrad to Budapest and Manchuria, wrote later: “An unpretentious Mongolian horse next to a Soviet tank reached Berlin.”

In fact, in 1943-45, every fifth horse at the front was a "Mongolian". We are very fond of discussing how and how the American Lend-Lease influenced the victory and the course of hostilities. But at the same time, its Mongolian equestrian counterpart is forgotten.

Historic cavalry final

By the end of the Great Patriotic War, 8 cavalry corps fought in the Soviet army, 7 of them bore the rank of guards. Each corps, in addition to three cavalry divisions, had tank, anti-aircraft and artillery units.

The reduction of the Soviet cavalry began immediately after the victory on May 9 - horses were required to restore the agriculture destroyed by the war. Therefore, three cavalry divisions were disbanded in the summer of 1945, and in next year all cavalry corps were reorganized into mechanized or reduced three times to divisions. By the autumn of 1946, out of the 26 cavalry divisions available at the end of the war, only 5 remained.

Only in the era of nuclear and widespread motorization did the time of the cavalry finally end, the horse finally gave way to technology. During the first post-war decade, all remaining cavalry divisions were gradually reorganized into tank or mechanized divisions. The last two cavalry divisions of the Soviet army disappeared in the fall of 1954 - the 4th Guards Kuban Cossack Division was liquidated, and the 5th Guards Don Cossack Division was reorganized into a tank division.

The last cavalry unit in the history of the Russian army was the 11th separate cavalry regiment of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was mainly used for filming historical films. In our time, this single cavalry unit has become part of the Presidential Kremlin Regiment.

Topic: “The role of the Red Army cavalry in the Second World War 1941-1945.

Myths and Reality»

Completed:

student 4 "B" class

MOU secondary school №124

g.o. Samara

Melchenkov Mikhail

Supervisor:

primary school teacher

Antonova Olga Alekseevna

Samara.

Russia

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………........... ...........3

Part 1. The attitude of the Soviet command to the role of cavalry in modern war in prewar years.… ……………………………………………..…..........................……………..4

Part 2. Theory and practice of using the Red Army cavalry. ………………....................................6

Part 3. The main operations of the Red Army cavalry in 1941-1945………………………….......…..8

Conclusion …………………………………………………………………..……………………...16

List of used sources and literature...…………..…………………………………..18

Introduction

"With drafts on tanks..."

This study seems relevant, because in the early 90s of the twentieth century in Russia, the ideological curtains fell, and many considered it necessary to demonstrate their "professionalism" and "progressive views" on the issue of the complete humiliation of the role of the Red Army cavalry in the Second World War of 1941-1945.

It all started with an arrogant phrase in the memoirs of Heinz Guderian "Memoirs of a Soldier": "The Polish Pomeranian cavalry brigade, due to ignorance of the constructive data and methods of action of our tanks, attacked them with edged weapons and suffered monstrous losses." These words were understood literally and creatively developed in fiction: "The blades of the brave Warsaw zholners clanged loudly on Krupp's armor, the peaks of the Polish cavalry broke on the same armor. Under the caterpillars of tanks, all living things died ...". The cavalrymen began to present themselves as some kind of violently mad, rushing in a mounted formation at tanks with sabers and pikes. The battle of the mythical "jolners" with Guderian's tanks became a symbol of the victory of technology over obsolete weapons and tactics. Such attacks began to be attributed not only to the Poles, but also to the horsemen of the Red Army, and even to portray the cutting of tanks with checkers on the film. The obvious oddity of such an action is that a soldier and officer of the 1930s is not a Mongol who came from the depths of centuries, and not even a crusader, and being of sound mind and firm memory, will not try to chop metal objects with a saber. Although it was evident, it was not explained. Cavalrymen for a long time received the stigma of brave, but stupid savages, not familiar with the properties of modern technology.

This problem has not been fully explored and brought to the “broad masses”, as evidenced by a survey conducted by my father and me among classmates, friends, older and middle-aged people. Most of the respondents believe that the cavalry of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War was an outdated type of troops and went on attacks with checkers on the mechanized divisions of the Wehrmacht.

The purpose of our study is to prove that the Red Amiya cavalry was not an obsolete type of troops in the 30s and 40s of the twentieth century and contributed huge contribution in the victory of the Soviet people in the Second World War.

Research objectives: 1) was there a reassessment of the role of cavalry in modern warfare among the Soviet command in the prewar years?; 2) to study the theory and practice of using the Red Army cavalry; 3) to show that the cavalry corps were among the most combat-ready formations of the Red Army.

Part 1.

The attitude of the Soviet command to the role of cavalry in modern warfare

in the prewar years.
Many writers and publicists believe that in the pre-war years, there was a reassessment of the role of cavalry in modern warfare among the Soviet command. While the main capitalist states have significantly reduced the cavalry of their armies, they believe, in the USSR it has grown in numbers. At the same time, a quote from the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilova: "The cavalry in all the armies of the world is in crisis and in many armies it has almost disappeared. We stand on a different point of view. We are convinced that our valiant cavalry will again and again make us speak of itself as a powerful and invincible Red Cavalry" . Well-known domestic researcher of the initial period of the war V.A. Anfilov writes: "According to the saying "He who hurts, he talks about it", and gives such a comment on the speech of S.K. Timoshenko at the meeting commanders in December 1940: "Couldn't, of course, former boss divisions in the Cavalry Army of Budyonny did not pay tribute to the cavalry. “In modern warfare, cavalry occupies an important place among the main branches of the armed forces,” he declared, contrary to common sense, “although little was said about it here at our meeting (they did the right thing - Auth.). In our vast theaters, the cavalry will find wide application in decision critical tasks development of success and pursuit of the enemy, after the front is broken through. "The "profound" remark of V.A. Anfilov is especially pleasing - "they did the right thing."

But in the prewar years, the proportion of cavalry formations was constantly decreasing. A document that quite unambiguously characterizes the plans for the development of cavalry in the Red Army is the report People's Commissar defense in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, dated in the autumn of 1937, on the long-term plan for the development of the Red Army in 1938-1942.

Quote: "The composition of the cavalry in peacetime by 01/01/1938. Cavalry in peacetime (by 01/01/1938) consists of: 2 cavalry divisions, separate cavalry brigades, one separate and 8 reserve cavalry regiments and 7 boards of cavalry corps. The number of civilian cavalry time on 01/01/1938 - 95,690 people.

In 1938:

a) the number of cavalry divisions is proposed to be reduced by 7 (from 32 to 25), disbanding 7 cavalry divisions using their personnel to replenish the remaining divisions and to reinforce mechanized troops and artillery;

b) disband the two directorates of the cavalry corps;

c) disband two reserve cavalry regiments;

e) reduce the composition of the cavalry division from 6600 to 5900 people.

It can be seen with the naked eye that the document consists entirely of sentences like "reduce" and "disband". Perhaps, after 1938, which was rich in repressions in the army, these plans, which were reasonable from all sides, were consigned to oblivion? Nothing of the kind, the process of disbanding the cavalry corps and reducing the cavalry as a whole went on without stopping.

In the autumn of 1939, plans for the reduction of cavalry were put into practice. At the suggestion of the People's Commissar of Defense on July 4, 1940, the number of cavalry corps was reduced to three, the number of cavalry divisions to twenty, the brigade remained one and the reserve regiments - five. And this process continued until the spring of 1941. As a result, out of the 32 cavalry divisions and 7 corps directorates in the USSR by 1938, 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions remained by the beginning of the war.

Critics of the cavalry were consistent and, in addition to savagery and backwardness, accused the cavalrymen of destroying the advanced branches of the troops: "Not so long ago, Kulik gathered all the cavalrymen, and they jointly decided to disband the tank corps." But this statement is not true either. Cavalry formations were reorganized into mechanized ones. In particular, such a fate befell the 4th Cavalry Corps, whose command and 34th division became the basis for the 8th Mechanized Corps. The commander of the cavalry corps, Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Ryabyshev, led the mechanized corps and led it in June 1941 into battle against German tanks near Dubno.

The opinion of S.M. Budyonny, who is often presented as a seasoned stupid cavalryman, an enemy of the mechanization of the army. In fact, his position on the role of cavalry in the war was more than balanced: “The reasons for the rise or decline of cavalry should be sought in relation to the main properties of this type of troops to the main data of the situation of a certain historical period. In all cases when the war acquired a maneuverable nature and operational situation demanded the presence of mobile troops and decisive actions, the horse masses became one of the decisive elements of the armed force. This is manifested by a well-known pattern in the entire history of the cavalry; as soon as the possibility of maneuver warfare developed, the role of the cavalry immediately increased, and one or another operation was completed with its blows. Semyon Mikhailovich points to the field of application of cavalry - mobile warfare, the conditions for which may arise at any stage of the historical development of tactics and technology. For him, the cavalry is not a symbol taken from the Civil, but a means of warfare that meets modern conditions.

No exaltation of the cavalry is observed. The thesis that the Soviet command overestimated the role of the cavalry simply does not correspond to reality.

Part 2.

Theory and practice of using the Red Army cavalry
Theory

theory combat use cavalry in the USSR was engaged in quite soberly looking at things people. This is, for example, a former cavalryman tsarist army, who became the chief of the General Staff in the USSR, Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. It was he who wrote the theory that became the basis for the practice of combat use of cavalry in the USSR.

Boris Mikhailovich quite intelligibly outlined the role of the cavalry in the new conditions and measures to adapt it to these conditions: “Changes made under the influence of modern weapons in the activities and organization of the cavalry are reduced to:

In tactics. The modern power of fire has made cavalry combat extremely difficult, reducing it to exceptional and rare cases. The normal type of cavalry combat is combined combat. Equestrian and foot combat are equivalent modes of action for the cavalry of our day.

In strategy. The power, destructiveness and range of modern weapons made it difficult for the cavalry to work efficiently, but did not diminish its importance, and, on the contrary, they open up a true field of successful activity for the cavalry as an independent branch of the armed forces. However, successful operational work of the cavalry will be possible only when the cavalry in its tactical activity shows independence in solving problems in accordance with the modern situation of warfare, without shying away from decisive actions on foot.

Armed. The cavalry of our day must take into service with their horsemen rifles with a bayonet, similar to infantry, revolver, hand grenades and automatic rifles; to increase the number of machine guns, both in divisional and regimental teams, to strengthen artillery, both in number and in caliber, by introducing necessarily howitzers and anti-aircraft guns; reinforce themselves by adding armored vehicles with cannons and machine guns, light vehicles with the same means of fire, tanks and air squadron fire assistance.

If we turn from theoretical research to documents, the preferred course of action for the cavalry becomes quite unambiguous. The combat charter of the cavalry prescribed an offensive in cavalry formation only if "the situation is favorable (there are shelters, weakness or lack of enemy fire)". Naturally, new means of struggle were introduced into the rules for the use of cavalry. The field manual of 1939 indicated the need to use cavalry in conjunction with technical innovations: “The most appropriate use of cavalry formations together with tank formations, motorized infantry and aviation is ahead of the front (in the absence of contact with the enemy), on the approaching flank, in the development of a breakthrough, behind enemy lines, in raids and pursuit. Cavalry formations are able to consolidate their success and hold the terrain. However, at the first opportunity they must be released from this task in order to save them for maneuver. The actions of the cavalry formation must in all cases be reliably covered from the air " .

Practice

Perhaps all these phrases were forgotten in practice? Veteran cavalryman, Ivan Alexandrovich Yakushin, lieutenant, commander of an anti-tank platoon of the 24th Guards Cavalry Regiment of the 5th Guards Cavalry Division, recalled: "How the cavalry acted in Patriotic War? Horses were used as a means of transportation. There were, of course, battles on horseback - saber attacks, but this is rare. If the enemy is strong, sitting on a horse, it is impossible to cope with him, then a command is given to dismount, the horsemen take the horses and leave. And the horsemen work like infantry.”

The machine-gun carts preserved in the Soviet cavalry also found their place in the war. Ivan Alexandrovich recalls: "The carts were also used only as a means of transportation. And as soon as the battle began, the machine gun was removed from the cart, the grooms of the horses were taken away, the cart also left, but the machine gun remained."

N.L. Dupak (8th Guards Cavalry Rivne Order of the Red Banner Order of the Suvorov Morozov Division) recalls: “I went on the attack in the equestrian ranks only at the school, but not to chop, and I didn’t have to meet with the enemy’s cavalry. We fought dismounting.”

The scope of the attack in the cavalry was reminiscent of the conditions for using armored personnel carriers like the German "ganomage" - the enemy's fire system is upset, his morale is low. In all other cases, cavalry on horseback and armored personnel carriers did not appear on the battlefield. Both the Soviet cavalrymen with drafts unsheathed, and the Germans attacking on coffin-shaped "ganomags" are nothing more than a cinematic stamp. The armor of armored personnel carriers was intended to protect against fragments of long-range artillery in the starting positions, and not on the battlefield.

Part 3

The main operations of the Red Army cavalry in 1941-1945.
1941

After all the reductions, the Red Army cavalry met the war as part of 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions. All these formations were old formations of the Red Army with established military traditions. The cavalry corps turned out to be the most stable formations of the Red Army in 1941. Unlike the mechanized corps, they were able to survive in the endless retreats and encirclements of 1941. The cavalry corps of P.A. Belova and F.V. Kamkov became a "fire brigade" southwestern direction. Guderian wrote the following about these events: "On September 18, a critical situation developed in the Romny area. Fresh enemy forces - the 9th Cavalry Division and another division, together with tanks - advanced from the east to Romny in three columns. The 24th tank corps tasked with repelling the enemy's advance. The threatened situation of the city of Romny forced me on September 19 to transfer my command post back to Konotop. This time Guderian shows no undue contempt for the attacking cavalry. The Romans did not last battle 2nd Cavalry Corps. late autumn 1941 corps P.A. Belova played an important role in the Battle of Moscow, where he received the rank of Guards.

At the beginning of July 1941 near Stavropol, the formation of the 50th and 53rd cavalry divisions began. The main personnel of the divisions were conscripts and volunteers from the Kuban villages, Terek Cossacks Stavropol villages. Colonel Issa Aleksandrovich Pliev was appointed commander of the 50th division, brigade commander Kondrat Semyonovich Melnik was appointed commander of the 53rd division. Thus began the history of another legendary cavalry corps - the 2nd Guards L.M. Dovator.

Guards Major General L.M. Dovator with the cavalrymen of his corps.
Acting against superior enemy forces, Soviet cavalry sometimes achieved outstanding results. So, the 2nd (later the 1st Guards) Cavalry Corps P.I. Belova, stationed at the beginning of the war in Moldova, from the first days successfully fought against the German-Romanian troops and never retreated without an order. After the main forces of Army Group South broke through deep into Ukraine, the corps successfully avoided encirclement near Uman and Kyiv, and at the end of September defeated the German 25th motorized division near Shtepovka. Participating in the defense of Moscow, Belov's formation, together with the Dovator corps, attacked the flanks of the 4th German Army, forcing it to abandon the offensive. Then the guardsmen deployed near Kashira defeated the 3rd tank division of Guderian's army moving towards the city. During the counteroffensive, the corps broke through to the German rear, occupied Dorogobuzh together with the paratroopers, actively operated on enemy communications for four months, and on July 18, 1942 successfully broke through to its own.

Not only tried-and-true formations with long-standing combat traditions won guards ranks, but also newly formed corps and divisions. The reason for this, perhaps, should be sought in the level of physical fitness necessary for every cavalryman, which inevitably had an impact on the moral qualities of the fighter.

1942

In 1942 the Soviet cavalry has experienced the peak of its development. The number of cavalry formations jumped up sharply. During the winter campaign of 1942 freshly formed cavalry divisions were actively used in battles. A typical example is the fighting in the southern sector of the front. E. von Mackensen, who fought there, later recalled: “At the time of taking command of the group in Stalino in the afternoon of January 29, the enemy was already dangerously close to the Dnepropetrovsk-Stalino railway and thus to the vital (since it was the only) railway supply line of the 17th army and 1st tank army. Only in the course of a stubborn struggle with the throwing of sappers from pontoon battalions into battle did the Germans manage to hold on. His opponent was almost one cavalry. The reasons for this widespread use of cavalry are quite obvious. In the Red Army at that time there were simply no large mobile formations. In the tank forces, the largest unit was the tank brigade, which could be used operationally only as a means of supporting the infantry. The only means that allowed for deep envelopment and detours was the cavalry.

According to the same scenario, the introduction of cavalry into a deep breakthrough, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps P.A. Belova. Belov's group was given really large-scale tasks. The directive of the command of the Western Front of January 2, 1942 stated: "A very favorable situation has been created for encircling the enemy's 4th and 9th armies, and the main role should be played by the Belov strike group, operationally interacting through the front headquarters with our Rzhev group."

The breakthroughs, which first entered the cavalry corps, and then the 33rd army, were closed by the Germans through flank attacks. In fact, the encircled troops had to switch to semi-partisan actions. Cavalrymen in this capacity acted quite successfully. An important role in the overall development of events was played by the mobility of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, provided by horses. Thanks to this body, P.A. Belova managed to get out to her not the shortest way, breaking through the barrier of the Germans with his forehead, but in a roundabout way. On the contrary, the 33rd army of M.G. Efremov, not possessing the maneuverability of cavalrymen, in April 1942. was defeated when trying to break through to his own in the band of the 43rd army. Horses were vehicles and, as cynical as it sounds, self-moving food supplies. This provided greater stability cavalry in not always successful offensive operations in 1942. Operation Mars was no exception, later becoming the most big secret Soviet historians. This was an attempt to cut off the Rzhev salient with strikes from the Western and Kalinin Fronts in November-December 1942.

On September 11, 1942, under the directive of the Military Council of the Western Front, a cavalry-mechanized group was formed, which included the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps and the 6th Tank Corps. The group consisted of 21,011 soldiers and officers, 16,155 horses, 2,667 PPSh and PPD submachine guns, 95 machine guns, 33 DShK anti-aircraft machine guns, 384 anti-tank rifles, 226 50 mm mortars, 71 82 mm mortars, 64 mortar caliber 120 mm. The artillery of the Kryukov group consisted of forty-eight 45-mm anti-tank guns, forty-nine 76.2-mm guns of regimental and divisional artillery, and twelve 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. The armored fist of the group formed 120 tanks. In a word, Kryukov's cavalrymen were armed not only with sabers.

The operation began on 25 November. Due to the fact that the Germans opened the concentration Soviet troops for the offensive, a quick breakthrough of the defense did not work. Entered into battle on November 26, the 6th Panzer Corps lost up to 60% of its tanks during the breakthrough and also did not achieve a decisive result. In fact, the cavalry was forced not to enter the gap made by the infantry and tanks, but to break through the focal defenses of the Germans. A group of cavalrymen of the corps V.V. On the evening of November 28, Kryukova was able to slip through the gaps between the strongholds of the Germans on horseback and was surrounded. Soon the tanks of the 6th Panzer Corps were dug in at the positions they had reached due to running out of fuel. Attempts to break through to the blockaded cavalrymen and tankers from the outside were also unsuccessful. The Germans pulled up reserves and firmly "sealed" the breakthrough. Unlike the mechanized formations - the 6th tank corps of Paul Arman - the cavalry units that broke through into the depths of the German defense were not defeated. They went through the Rzhev salient, destroying the warehouses, soldiers and officers of the enemy, even 8 aircraft appeared on her account. Finally, after almost a month and a half from the moment they entered the breakthrough, the cavalrymen of the corps V.V. Kryukova went to their own in the sector of the 22nd Army of the Kalinin Front. Only cavalry could work in this style. The motorized and mechanized units in the isolated breach quickly ran out of fuel. The infantry was too inactive. Only horsemen could, even in an extremely unfavorable situation, like salamanders, go through the fire of an unsuccessful offensive.

Stalingrad - forgotten feat cavalry.

The Battle of Stalingrad became one of the decisive battles of World War II. And the cavalry corps played a role in the offensive phase of the Battle of Stalingrad, which is difficult to overestimate. In any encirclement operation, it is necessary not only to cut off the path to retreat and the supply lines of the encircled, but to secure the outer front of the ring. If we do not create a solid outer front of the encirclement, then with blows from the outside, the enemy can release the encircled, and all our work will go down the drain.

Near Stalingrad in November 1942, this role was assigned to three cavalry corps. The choice fell on the cavalry, since the Red Army at that time had few well-trained mechanized formations.

What were the formations that had to make their way deep into the snow-covered steppe, and then repel the attacks of German tanks? These are the 8th, 4th Cavalry and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps. The heaviest fighting fell to the lot of the 4th Cavalry Corps. By an evil irony of fate, he was the least equipped with people and equipment of all three involved in the operation. The corps arrived in the area of concentration after a long march (350-550 km). In parentheses, we note that the same march for a tank formation in the same period would have ended with a mass failure of tanks even before they were put into battle.

The cavalry corps was introduced into the gap on November 20, 1941. Romanian units were the enemy of the cavalry, and therefore the first target - Abganerovo - was captured on the morning of November 21 by an attack in the cavalry. However, the next task assigned to the 4th Cavalry Corps - to capture Kotelnikovo - required to overcome 95 km in a day, which is a non-trivial task even for a mechanized unit. On the morning of November 27, the 81st Cavalry Division reached Kotelnikov, but failed to capture the city on the move. Moreover, here the cavalrymen were in for an unpleasant surprise in the face of the fresh 6th Panzer Division, which had arrived by rail from France, which was a serious force. In November 1942, the division had 159 tanks, the vast majority of which were the latest models capable of withstanding the T-34. In fact, a full-blooded tank division lined up around a cavalry division reinforced by artillery, possessing both qualitative and quantitative superiority. On December 4, all 150 tanks of both tank battalions of the 6th Panzer Division with infantry attacked the location of the 81st Cavalry Division in the Pokhlebin area. By 1400, the 81st Cavalry Division was completely surrounded. The cavalry fought throughout the day, and with the onset of darkness they began to break through in small groups from the encirclement.

All this happened a few days before the events described in Bondarev's Hot Snow. Despite the tragic outcome of the battles for Kotelnikovo, Soviet cavalrymen played an important role in the initial stage of the defensive battle against attempts to unblock Paulus's army. The 81st Cavalry Division fought an isolated battle in the depths of the enemy's formation, separated from its neighbors, against a large German reserve. If it weren't there, nothing would have prevented Routh's 6th Panzer Division from wasting time and moving closer to Stalingrad with the arrival of the first echelons, unloading at stations north of Kotelnikov. The presence of the Soviet cavalry made it necessary to pause for the period of the arrival of the main forces of the division in Kotelnikovo and then spend time on a defensive and then offensive battle with it. Only on December 12, the German troops, with the main forces of their Kotelnikovskaya grouping, go on a counteroffensive in order to break through the encirclement from the southwest, squeezing the 6th Army of F. Paulus near Stalingrad.

It so happened that the feat of the 2nd Guards Army on the Myshkovka River was repeatedly sung in literature and on the movie screen. The actions of those who ensured the deployment of the 2nd Guards Army, unfortunately, remained unknown. To the greatest extent, this applied to the cavalry, in particular the 4th Cavalry Corps. Therefore the cavalry long years bore the stigma of an obsolete and not pretentious kind of troops. Without him, in fact, the encirclement of Paulus's army at Stalingrad could have failed.

1943

In the winter of 1943, the cavalry was again used as a means of forming the outer front of the encirclement. This time, events developed much less dramatically than at Stalingrad. In January 1943, the Voronezh Front carried out the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation. The main striking force of the front was the 3rd Panzer Army of P.S. Rybalko, but the horsemen in this operation were again entrusted with the important task of breaking through to maximum depth with the subsequent formation of the outer front of the encirclement. The use of cavalry for this purpose was quite understandable: it was less dependent on the supply of fuel and, accordingly, could work on a longer supply arm.

The breakthrough of the enemy defense was completed on January 15, 1943, and the 3rd Panzer Army entered the gap created, and from the south it was covered by the cavalry corps, which later went forward 100 km without encountering enemy resistance. Of course, there were no lava attacks with drafts drawn and a thunderous "Hurrah!" Having successfully completed the task of capturing the Valuyki railway junction, by the morning of January 19, the cavalry corps created the outer front of the encirclement.

Before us is the classic way of using cavalry in the operations of the Soviet troops in 1943-1945. Using cavalry units that were undemanding to the supply and quality of roads, the advancing Soviet troops could fruitfully use the period of absence of a solid front to capture important points and lines deep behind enemy lines.

Horsemen against "panthers" near Karachev

The offensive of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk began on July 12, 1943. By decision of the commander of the Western Front, V.D. Sokolovsky, from the 2nd Guards Cavalry, 16th Guards Rifle and 1st Tank Corps, an operational group was created under the leadership of the commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, General V.V. Kryukov. The task force was entrusted with the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses, then part of the forces of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps was to capture the city of Karachev (thus cutting railway communication along the Orel-Bryansk line) and secure it behind you until the infantry approaches.

However, the German command was well aware of the threat to the troops of the 2nd Panzer and 9th Field Armies, concentrated in the Oryol ledge. On the morning of July 25, the Germans suddenly launched a counteroffensive with large forces of infantry and tanks. The main striking force of the German offensive was the Great Germany motorized division transferred by rail from the Army Group South, the 51st Panzer Regiment, which received 96 brand new Panther tanks. In addition to them, the Wehrmacht's elite formation included 15 "tigers" and 84 "Pz.IV" tanks. With this large mass latest technology The cavalrymen were virtually one on one.

In the four-day battles in the impenetrable wooded and swampy terrain, neither side was able to achieve decisive success. But the cavalrymen still managed to demonstrate their maneuverability. On July 30, two regiments of the 4th Guards Cavalry Division made a bold raid on the rear of the enemy in order to undermine the Karachev-Bryansk railway and disrupt the railway communication behind German lines. Kryukov's group inflicted significant losses on the enemy: on the evening of August 2, the "Great Germany" included only 26 "Pz.IV" and 5 "tigers". The losses of the 51st Panther Regiment are estimated at 2/3 of the total number, of which up to 20% are irretrievable. The Germans used an elite mechanized formation against the "archaic" cavalrymen, which suffered significant losses inflicted by clearly not saber strikes on the armor.

Panther tanks "hacked with checkers"

1944

The cavalry, operating in close cooperation with tanks, became one of the active participants in the operations of the Red Army in 1944, when major offensives were carried out and liberated huge territory. characteristic feature The combat use of cavalry during this period was the creation of cavalry-mechanized groups, when cavalry and tank or mechanized corps were united under one command.

As a typical example of the combat use of horsemen, consider the 3rd Guards

cavalry corps commanded by N.S. Oslikovsky. In the summer of 1944, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was supposed to take part in the largest offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the entire war, called "Bagration". The 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps became the partner of the cavalry. Together they made up the cavalry-mechanized group of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The offensive began on June 23, 1944. By the end of the day, a gap appeared in the formation of the German troops, into which a cavalry-mechanized group was introduced. She rushed around the "fortress Vitebsk" deep into the formation of German troops. From 24 to 28 June, five days after entering the gap, making daily marches of 40-50 km and acting ahead of the infantry, the group advanced 150-200 km. The cavalrymen and tankers prevented the retreating German troops from restoring the front. Thus, she provided high pace offensive of the 11th Guards and 5th Armies of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

3rd Guards Cavalry Corps. Operation "Bagration"

The next step in the actions of the cavalry-mechanized group was the crossing of the Berezina River. With the approach of the pontoon park in the Leshchina area, a bridge was built, along which the entire cavalry corps had completely completed the crossing of the river by 17 o'clock on July 1. Berezina. Thus, a bridgehead was created on the river, which could be used by German troops to restore the front. The operation did not end there. After fighting for four days for the river. Berezina, a horse-mechanized group, having passed 100-150 km in difficult conditions of a wooded and swampy area, reached the Minsk-Vilnius railway and cut it. Thus, the Minsk group of Germans was deprived of the most important escape routes to Vilnius and Lida. Further, the cavalry-mechanized group developed the offensive and, again forming the outer front of the encirclement, this time the Minsk group of Germans.

Intelligence of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps. Operation "Bagration"

In the same spirit, two horse-mechanized groups were used in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation conducted in July 1944. The first consisted of the 25th tank corps of F.G. Anikushin and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps V.K. Baranov. Tellingly, the group was headed by the commander of the cavalry corps, it was called "KMG Baranova". The group formed the outer front of the encirclement of the Germans west of the city of Brody, and later captured the line along the San River. The second cavalry-mechanized group, which included the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps, operated to the north and went to the Vistula.

In the southern sector of the Soviet-German front in 1944, I.A. Pliev as part of the 4th Guards Cavalry and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps. In general, the style of using the Red Army cavalry in various operations in 1944 was similar: a deep "stabbing" blow.

1945 Last fight

The cavalry found its use even in such an area rich in fortifications as East Prussia. Here is what he writes about the use of the cavalry corps in East Prussian operation K.K. Rokossovsky: “Our cavalry corps of N.S. Oslikovsky, breaking ahead, flew into Allenstein (Olshtyn), where several echelons with tanks and artillery had just arrived. With a dashing attack (of course, not in cavalry formation!), Stunning the enemy with gun fire and machine guns, cavalry captured the echelons.

We see that Konstantin Konstantinovich, just in case, for those who have heard enough stories about checkers on Krupp armor, clarifies - "not in the cavalry", with exclamation mark. Indeed, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, already familiar to us, was introduced after breaking through the enemy defenses and moved to Allenstein on horseback, then entering the battle on foot. From the air, N.S. Oslikovsky was supported by the 230th assault air division, covered by the 229th fighter air division. In a word, the cavalry corps was a full-fledged mobile unit, the "obsolescence" of which consisted only in the use of horses instead of motor vehicles.

Conclusion

Stories about stupid, backward cavalrymen throwing themselves at tanks with sabers are in best case misleading people who are poorly versed in tactical and operational issues. As a rule, these misconceptions are the result of dishonesty of historians and memoirists. The cavalry was a completely adequate means of conducting maneuverable combat operations in 1939-1945. The Red Army demonstrated this most clearly. The cavalry of the Red Army in the prewar years has undergone a sharp reduction. It was believed that she could not seriously compete with tank and motorized formations on the battlefield. However, the experience of the war showed that with the reduction of the cavalry hastened. The creation of only motorized units and formations was, firstly, unbearable for domestic industry, and secondly, the nature of the terrain in the European part of the USSR in many cases did not favor the use of vehicles. All this led to the revival of large cavalry formations. Even at the end of the war, when the nature of hostilities had changed significantly compared to 1941-1942, 7 cavalry corps successfully operated in the Red Army, 6 of them bore the honorary title of guards. In fact, during its decline, the cavalry returned to the standard of 1938 - 7 departments of cavalry corps.

In 1941-- 1942 horsemen played a crucial role in the defensive and offensive operations of the Red Army. In fact, before the appearance in the Red Army of large independent mechanized formations and formations, cavalry was the only maneuverable means of the operational level. In 1943-1945, when the mechanisms of tank armies were finally fine-tuned, the cavalry became a subtle tool for solving especially important tasks in offensive operations. Tellingly, the number of cavalry corps was approximately equal to the number of tank armies. There were six tank armies in 1945, and seven cavalry corps. Most of both of them bore the rank of Guards by the end of the war. If the tank armies were the sword of the Red Army, then the cavalry was a sharp and long sword. A typical task of cavalrymen in 1943-1945. was the formation of an external front of encirclement, a breakthrough far into the depths of the enemy’s defenses at a time when old front crumbled, and a new one has not yet been created. On a good highway, the cavalry certainly lagged behind the motorized infantry. But on dirt roads and in wooded and swampy areas, it could advance at a pace quite comparable to motorized infantry. In addition, unlike motorized infantry, the cavalry did not require a constant delivery of many tons of fuel. This allowed the cavalry corps to advance deeper than most of the mechanized formations and ensure a high rate of advance for the armies and fronts as a whole. Cavalry breakthroughs to great depths made it possible to save the forces of infantrymen and tankmen.

Only a person who does not have the slightest idea about the tactics of the cavalry and has a vague idea of its operational use can assert that the cavalry is a backward branch of the army, only due to the thoughtlessness of the leadership remaining in the Red Army.

Cossacks before the Victory Parade. 1945

List of used sources and literature

Isaev A.V. Antisuvorov. Ten myths of World War II. M., 2004.
G. Guderian. "Memories of a Soldier" - M .: Military Publishing House, 1954.
[Electronic resource]

http://voinanet.ucoz.ru/Cavalry(date of access: 20.01.11).

[Electronic resource]

http://kz44.narod.ru/1928_rkka.htm/Combatcharter cavalry R.K.K.A. (date of access: 21.01.11).

[Electronic resource]

http://www.free-lance.ru/blogs/Rolecavalry in WWII(date of access: 01/19/11).

More recently, in the 90s, the myth was popular that Stalin, Voroshilov and Budyonny betrayed the paramount importance of cavalry, were fond of anachronism, so to speak, and, accordingly, completely ignored the development of armored and mechanized troops, which adversely affected the course of the Great Patriotic War.

“In the leadership of the Armed Forces, the installation of “horsemen” - Voroshilov, Budyonny, Kulik, Shchadenko, who dogmatically clung to the experience of the Civil War, prevailed. Voroshilov, from the rostrum of the XVII Party Congress, argued: “It is necessary ... once and for all to put an end to the wrecking “theories” about replacing a horse with a machine” ”(Eve and the beginning of the war: Documents and materials / Compiled by L.A. Kirshner. L., 1991. C .31).

L. Kishner, however, forgets to say that Voroshilov spoke about agriculture, and this was back in 1934. Quote: “... a considerable share of the blame lies with the workers of the Narkomzem system, who at one time favored the downright wrecking “theory” that the mechanization of agriculture, the introduction of tractors and combines will replace the horse, and in the near future will completely free from the need to use draft power in agriculture. Meanwhile, it is clear that the horse in our country now and in the future will be extremely necessary and needed, just as it was needed before, when we had few tractors. The horse not only does not oppose the tractor, does not compete with it, but, on the contrary, complements it in many ways, helps it.

In fact, the number of cavalry in the Red Army all the pre-war years has been steadily declining. In 1938, there were 32 cavalry divisions and 7 corps directorates; the Red Army entered the Great Patriotic War with only 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions

No. p / p	Division	Location
1	3 cav. division	Ukraine, Lviv region, Zholkev (Nesterov)
2	5 cav. division	Moldavian SSR, pariz
3	6 cav. division	Belarus, Belostok region, Lomzha
4	8 cav. division	Primorsky Territory, Ussuri region, Khankai district, village of Kamen-Rybolov
5	9 kav. division	Moldova, Comrat
6	14 kav. division	Ukraine, Kamenetz-Podolsk region, Slavuta
7	17 mining kav. division	Armenia, Leninakan
8	18 mining kav. division	Turkmenistan, Kushka
9	20 mining kav. division	Tajikistan, Stalinabad
10	21 mining kav. division	Uzbekistan, Fergana
11	24 cav. division	Azerbaijan, Kirovabad
12	32 cav. division	Crimean ASSR, Simferopol
13	36 cav. division	Belarus, Belostok region, Volkovysk

2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of General Dovator

The cavalry division of the Red Army was a rather formidable force
The mountain cavalry division was distinguished by a lighter composition. It included 3 cavalry regiments and an armored division (19 tanks and 148 men). personnel) instead of a full tank regiment.
Cavalry divisions, like all other divisions of the Red Army, were supposed to be brought to full strength in wartime after the start. Of the 13 cavalry divisions, 7 were stationed on the western borders of the USSR.

Structure	4th Cavalry Regiment tank regiment horse artillery. division anti-aircraft division sapper squadron communications squadron
Personnel, people	8 968
Tanks, pcs	64 BT-5
Armored vehicles, pcs	18
Machine guns, pcs	64
Anti-aircraft machine guns, pcs	18 quad 7.62 mm
Mortars, pcs	64 (50 mm and 82 mm)
Guns, pcs	12 - 37 mm AA 16 - 45 mm 24 - 76.2 mm 8 - 76.2 mm AA 8 - 122 mm howitzers
Cars, pcs	635
Tractors (tractors), pcs	21

The cavalry entered the battle in the very first hours of the Great Patriotic War. The 6th cavalry corps (6kd and 36kd), stationed on " Bialystok ledge”, the fate of the corps turned out to be very tragic, few managed to escape from the encirclement, part of the corps’s military personnel went over to partisan actions and formed the backbone of the partisan detachments of Belarus. heavy losses in battles in Ukraine, the 5th Cavalry Corps suffered (3kd and 14kd). The cavalry units showed steadfastness and courage in the battles of the first days of the war.

After the mechanized corps "burned out" in the border battles of the summer of 1941, the Red Army practically lost an important instrument of war - mechanized formations. The only replacement for the mechanized units, although inferior to them in mobility, was the cavalry. The tactics of cavalry battles are close to those of motorized riflemen, motorized riflemen use vehicles (cars, armored personnel carriers) and engage in battle dismounted, cavalrymen act similarly, the horse is used only to move to the battlefield, the battle itself is fought in the infantry chain. An attack on horseback was rare if "the situation is favorable (there are shelters, weakness or lack of enemy fire)" (Combat Regulations for the cavalry).

“Our army somewhat underestimates the importance of the cavalry. In the current situation on the fronts, when the rear of the enemy stretched for several hundred kilometers in forest areas and is completely unsecured from major sabotage actions on our part, raids by the Red cavalry on the enemy’s extended rear could play a decisive role in disorganizing the command and control and supply of German troops and , therefore, in the defeat of the German troops. .. The Headquarters believes that for such raids on the rear of the enemy, it would be enough to have several dozen light fighter-type cavalry divisions of three thousand people each, with a light convoy without overloading the rear. It would be necessary to start gradually, but without any damage to combat operations, the reorganization of the existing cavalry corps and cavalry divisions into light fighter-type cavalry divisions of three thousand people each, and where there are no cavalry units, the cavalry divisions of the mentioned lightweight type should be organized to carry out raids and strikes on the rear enemy."

By the end of 1941, there were already 82 cavalry divisions in the Red Army. light type 3447 personnel each. These divisions consisted of three cavalry regiments, an artillery battalion with three batteries: four 76 mm M-27 guns, four 76 mm M-39 guns and four 82 mm mortars, as well as a half-squadron of communications and a small logistics service . The light cavalry regiment of such a division consisted of four saber squadrons, one machine-gun squadron with 128 machine guns, an artillery battery with four 76-mm and two 45-mm cannons, an anti-tank platoon with seven anti-tank rifles, an engineer platoon, as well as a sanitary and supply group.

In February 1942, there were 87 cavalry divisions in the Red Army, this is the maximum, then the number of cavalry began to decline. On May 1, 1943, the Red Army had 26 cavalry divisions, numbering 238,968 men and 226,816 horses.

Since 1943, a new state of cavalry divisions has been introduced

According to the state number 06/317 of January 31, 1943, the cavalry division consisted of:

Division control (113 men and 97 horses)
3 cavalry regiments (1,138 men and 1,294 horses each)
4 saber squadrons (170 men and 180 horses each)
In each saber squadron - 4 saber platoons (27 people and 29 horses each)
machine gun platoon (4 machine guns, 26 men and 30 horses)
platoon of anti-tank rifles (6 anti-tank rifles, 21 men and 23 horses)
batteries of 76 mm guns (4 guns, 100 men and 132 horses)
batteries of 45 mm guns (4 guns, 85 men and 3 horses)
batteries of 82 mm mortars (12 mortars, 113 men and 131 horses)
communications platoon (38 men and 48 horses)
sapper platoon (23 people 26 horses)
chemical platoon (14 men and 26 horses)
service units (50 people)
Artillery and mortar regiment (700 men and 820 horses).
two batteries of 76-mm ZIS-3 guns 8 ZIS-3 guns, 134 people and 168 horses each battery)
three batteries of 120 mm mortars (18 120 mm mortars, 100 men and 130 horses each battery)
Tank regiment (352 people and 39 tanks, of which T-34 - 23 and T-70 - 16
Separate air defense division (250 people and 184 horses, 27 DShK machine guns, 6 small-caliber artillery guns, 37 - 25-mm mechanized)
Communication squadron (86 men and 83 horses)
Sapper squadron (85 men and 75 horses)
Separate chemical protection platoon (32 men and 34 horses)
Artillery park (143 people and 112 horses)
Food transport (56 people)
Medical squadron (50 people)
Fuel and lubricants supply platoon (11 people)
Veterinary infirmary (4 people and 9 horses)
Saddlery-saddle-shoe workshop (21 people)
Military Prosecutor's Office (2 persons)
Platoon of the special department (13 people).

People 5 352
Horses 5 298
Guns 76-mm regimental 12
Guns ZIS-3 8
Guns 45-mm 12
Mortar 82-mm 36
Mortars 120 mm 18
Heavy machine guns 48
Machine guns manual 113
DShK 37 machine guns
Submachine guns PPSh 1 049
Guns PTR 72
Rifles and carbines 3 497
Tanks T-34 23
Tanks T-70 16
Armored vehicles 3
Passenger cars 8
Trucks 156
Special vehicles 33

The Red Army cavalry took part in all the major battles of 1941-1945. The cavalry divisions played a crucial role in, it was they who created the outer front of the encirclement and repelled an attempt to break through German band armies "Don". In January 1943, the 7th Cavalry Corps, having covered 280 km in 6 days almost without rest, on January 15, 1943, captured the Valuiki station, created an outer ring of encirclement of the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan enemy group. The result of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation was the liberation of an area of 22.5 thousand square meters. km, capturing 86 thousand soldiers and officers of the enemy. The 2nd Hungarian Army, the Italian Alpine Corps, the 385th and 387th German Infantry Divisions, and the Vogelein Divisional Group were defeated. The cavalry was successfully used in 1944 in Belarus, in the conditions of a wooded and swampy area, during the operation "Bagration" as part of mechanized cavalry groups, acting in close cooperation with tanks. Forcing the river Berezin, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps created a bridgehead, did not allow the enemy to use the river as a line to restore the front. Then cutting the railway Minsk - Vilnius and cut it. Thus, the Minsk group of Germans was deprived of the most important escape routes to Vilnius and Lida ...

About how the cavalrymen fought is evidenced by the fact that 7 out of 8 cavalry corps by the end of World War II received the title - guards

The restoration and creation of new full-fledged mechanized units was hampered by a catastrophic shortage of vehicles in the Red Army. On June 15, 1941, the Red Army had 272,600 vehicles of all types, which accounted for 36% of the wartime staff. It was believed that all this huge shortfall in the event of the outbreak of hostilities would be replenished by the receipt of vehicles from the national economy, that is, by mobilization. However, as a result of the defeats of the summer and autumn of 1941, the Red Army irretrievably lost 159 thousand vehicles (58.3% of its original composition). These losses had to be replenished through mobilization (166.3 thousand vehicles were received from the national economy), but the shortage not only remained, but also increased due to the formation of new units and formations. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the production of cars dropped sharply, some of the factories were evacuated to the rear, and some switched to the production of other military products. In 1939, the industry produced 186.8 thousand cars, in 1940 - 124.4 thousand units. , in 1941, before the start of the war - 73.2 thousand cars. Data on the supply of vehicles to the Red Army are given in the table;

Delivery of domestic cars to the People's Commissariat of Defense during the war

year	1941 (from June 22 to January 1, 1942)	1942	1943	1944	1945 (from 1.01 to 9.05)	All the years of the war
Car production, thousand	46,1	32,3	47,9	57,4	21,3	205,0
NPO supply	37,3	25,0	40,6	36,7	10,8	150,4
% of output	80,9	77,4	84,7	64,0	50,7	73,3

The table shows that for all 4 years the industry was able to produce cars in a quantity comparable to the volume of production in one pre-war year. Since 1944, the supply of domestic cars to the People's Commissariat of Defense has been reduced due to an increase in the issuance of cars national economy mainly to restore the economy of the territories liberated from the enemy.

By 1943, the provision of Red Army vehicles began to improve due to Lend-Lease deliveries, which made it possible to create mechanized units, significantly increase the Red Army's mobility during its transition to major strategic offensive operations in the second half of the war, 1943-1945. In total, 477,785 American, Canadian and British cars were received during the war years.

Cavalrymen with sabers flying bare at German tanks are one of the favorite images of modern "historians" along with penal fighters, who are mowed down by bursts of a detachment. Oddly enough, this myth was largely facilitated by the famous battle near the village of Kushchevskaya, which took place on August 2, 1942. It was the largest classical attack in the equestrian formation of the Second World War and a brilliant tactical victory that stopped the advance of German troops into the Caucasus for several days.

The cavalrymen did not cut tanks, but played in the war huge role.
Although the number of cavalry in the Red Army was steadily declining all the pre-war years, it was too early to write off the cavalry, which was clearly demonstrated by the Great Patriotic War. Back in 1938, the Red Army had 32 cavalry divisions and 7 corps directorates, but it entered the war with only 13 cavalry divisions and 4 corps. At the same time, 4 of these divisions were mountain cavalry and were distinguished by a lighter composition. The beginning of the war, which was unsuccessful for the Soviet Union, also contributed to the revival of the cavalry.

Unlike road transport, horses as a means of transportation and draft power had a number of advantages - they moved better on conditional roads and off-roads, did not depend on fuel supplies (a serious problem in war conditions), could temporarily live on ordinary pasture, and often themselves became food, saving people from starvation. In the spring of 1942, many Soviet cavalry divisions that were surrounded partially ate their horses, but managed to escape from the clutches of the Nazis.

The cavalry was distinguished by high mobility, and at the initial stage of the war, these units could easily hide from the prevailing in the sky German aviation in large forest areas. As you know, you can't go far into the forest with cars and tanks. One of important aspects, which gave cavalrymen advantages over motorized units, it was possible to quickly overcome water obstacles ford or even swim where mechanized units could not do this.

During the war years, the cavalry was actually a serious force. No one jumped on tanks with a saber. And in general, according to the recollections of the fighters, there were few saber attacks, a common thing for the First World War or Civil War.

Horses were used as a means of transportation. There were, of course, battles on horseback - saber attacks, but this is rare. If the enemy is strong, it is impossible to cope with him on horseback, then a command is given to dismount, the horse-breeders take the horses and leave. And the horsemen work like infantry, - recalled after the war, Lieutenant Ivan Yashin, who served in the 5th Guards Cavalry Division.

In fact, the cavalry in those days served as the equivalent of modern motorized rifle troops, that is, for the rapid transfer of units and raids behind enemy lines. Their effectiveness was proved by Major General Lev Dovator, who made a trip to the rear of German units in the Smolensk region in the winter of 1941, for whose head the enemies even put a reward.

And then there was Stalingrad and the feat of the 4th cavalry corps, at the cost of terrible losses, which delayed the deployment German forces near Kotelnikov, rushing to help the encircled group of Paulus.

Yes, the feat of the 2nd Guards Division on the Myshkovka River found many reflections in the cinema (for example, in the famous film "Hot Snow"), and in literature. But the courage of the cavalrymen, who bought with their lives the precious watches that were necessary for the deployment of the division, for some reason was forgotten.

In Belarus, in 1944, it was the cavalry that pursued the German units defeated during Operation Bagration.

And Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky also recalled one of the battles of the cavalry: - Our cavalry corps, having pulled ahead, flew into Allenstein, where several echelons had just arrived ... With a dashing attack (of course, not in cavalry formation!), Stunning the enemy with gun fire and machine guns, cavalry captured the echelons.

And in the Far East, the Japanese Kwantung Army was smashed precisely by the mechanized cavalry corps of General Issa Pliev. To spite all the slanderers from history.

As soon as the possibility of a mobile war developed, the role of the cavalry immediately increased, and certain operations were completed with its blows, - said Marshal Semyon Budyonny.

KUSCHEVSKAYA ATTACK
The village of Kushchevskaya was a very convenient springboard for the development of the German offensive, it created a threat to the Soviet troops retreating in the Tuapse and Mozdok directions.

To restore positions on the Yeya River on August 1, the command North Caucasian Front decided to bring into battle a fresh 13th cavalry division, which was also part of the 17th Kuban Cossack Corps.

In the morning the Cossack regiments were ready to attack. It was decided not to carry out artillery preparation - the stake was placed on the surprise of a massive saber strike.

Marshal Andrey Antonovich Grechko mentioned in his memoirs that at dawn Kushchevskaya was bombed by Soviet aircraft - perhaps this also influenced the decision to act without artillery preparation.

Unfortunately, in all the memoirs, especially those of the direct participants in the battle, there are many discrepancies and contradictions. For example, the exact time of the attack is not known. Most sources claim that it began at dawn, but still more likely - closer to noon, since in the morning additional German infantry units managed to enter the village. This fact may also be related to numerous testimonies of wrecked German tanks. The German sources do not mention any tank units operating in the area. Therefore, it is most likely that the Cossacks mistook armored personnel carriers or several self-propelled assault guns for tanks, attached to reinforce the 4th Mountain Division. However, it is also impossible to completely exclude the participation of German tanks.

Half the distance to the enemy (about a kilometer) the Cossacks walked, seeping through the forest belts, stretching almost parallel to the line of attack. Then they switched to a trot, and from four hundred meters the riders, flashing their blades and shouting “Hurrah!” went into a gallop. They were met by belated gun and mortar fire, machine-gun and automatic bursts, but nothing could stop the Cossack lava. A few more minutes ... and a deadly hurricane hit the Nazis!

Surprise contributed to the success of the attack. It should also be taken into account that the presence of automatic weapons and machine guns in itself does not mean the ability to stop a massive cavalry attack. This requires, first of all, the correct location of machine-gun points (from the flanks and at a certain distance). Apparently, the Germans did not expect a strike during the day on horseback, this was a rather rare tactic.
The panic of the enemy was terrible, according to the most conservative and cautious estimates, in the first attack the Cossacks slaughtered more than one and a half thousand German soldiers and officers, and about three hundred were captured. Cossack lava scattered through the streets, chasing scattered groups and single Germans. This slowdown gave a respite and allowed the motorized infantry to organize a counterattack, which occupied positions on the heights stretching from Kushchevskaya to the Veseliy farm. Soon there were german planes. But the fascist troops failed to seize the initiative that day. Armored vehicles were met with direct fire by an artillery battalion, which by that time had managed to take up positions in front of the village itself. But the Germans did not wait for air support - in conditions of close contact with the enemy, this was impossible and the planes flew back.
Having cleared the streets, the Cossacks again went on the attack, they approached close to the armored vehicles and at a gallop threw grenades and Molotov cocktails at the vehicles.

Cossack squadrons swept through the gaps and burning houses, spreading terror and putting the infantry to flight. The battle broke up into separate skirmishes - new German units arrived from across the river and from the Bolshaya Lopatina farm, but they entered the battle inconsistently, in small groups. And only the numerical superiority and reinforcements coming from different sides allowed them to continue the fight.

AT Soviet sources and the memoirs of the participants in this battle, the elite mountain rifle division "Edelweiss" is almost universally mentioned. In fact, in Kushchevskaya there was a similar, and also mountain rifle, "Entsian". But individual units of "Edelweiss" could (and even had to) come to the aid of their units in the afternoon. In any case, the modern German author Wilhelm Tike, based on headquarters documents, claims that in addition to parts of the 4th mountain rifle division, as well as the 73rd and 125th infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht, on August 2, units of the 1st mountain rifle division were located in the Kushchevskaya area "Edelweiss".

This is just one example of how, due to the careful efforts of the Germans to exclude any mention of a Cossack victory and the many exaggerations in our sources, it is very difficult for modern historians to reconstruct a detailed picture of the battle.

In general, the losses of the Germans for the entire day of the battle in Kushchevskaya can be estimated in a fairly wide range: from three to five thousand people and about a hundred guns and mortars. As for tanks, if they existed at all, and other armored vehicles, this is a question that researchers have yet to answer.

And here soviet tanks were: about an hour and a half later, units of a separate Maikop tank brigade entered the battle, and received an order to clear the village of Kushchevskaya, interacting with units of the 13th cavalry division.
By the time the tanks appeared, the Germans had almost ousted the Cossacks from the village, most of whom dismounted - they had to cling to any shelters. The control of the division as a whole was lost, the squadron commanders acted independently, and the Germans had almost overcome the panic. Therefore, we can say that our tanks appeared on time, and they decided the outcome of the battle. They attacked the village several times within an hour and a half. At the same time, another counterattack was successfully repulsed: the Germans tried, using the same forest belts, to go behind the lines of the Soviet troops, but went straight to the Russian tanks.

By the end of the day, the village of Kushchevskaya was finally completely cleared of the enemy.

The losses of Soviet troops in the battles on August 2 near Kushchevskaya turned out to be significantly less than those of the Germans - about a thousand people, three T-34 tanks and four BT-7s.

And at the end of this story, we will quote from the diary of the murdered German officer, found the next day on August 3 near the village of Shkurinskaya - there the squadrons of the 12th Kuban division also went on the attack on horseback: “... some Cossacks stood in front of us. These are devils, not soldiers. And their horses are steel. You won't get out of here alive..."

AFTER THE WAR
After the Second World War, the question arose of reforming the army. At a meeting with Stalin, part of the Soviet generals proposed to immediately eliminate the cavalry. To which, Stalin wisely remarked "we have many probable theaters of military operations and the cavalry can be useful, for example, in areas with mountainous terrain." And so they did. Left a few cav. divisions where needed, in areas with impassability and in mountainous areas.

Only in the era of nuclear weapons and widespread motorization did the time of the cavalry finally end, the horse finally gave way to technology. During the first post-war decade, all remaining cavalry divisions were gradually reorganized into tank or mechanized divisions. The last two cavalry divisions of the Soviet army disappeared in the fall of 1954 - the 4th Guards Kuban Cossack Division was liquidated, and the 5th Guards Don Cossack Division was reorganized into a tank division.

The future showed that Stalin was right. During the Afghan war, in the USSR they tried to recreate two mountain cavalry divisions, with an eye to deploy regiments and even a division at their base. But alas. There were neither officers - cavalrymen, nor the required amount of equipment, nor horse composition suitable for cavalry.

During the Great Patriotic War, the Military Veterinary Directorate of the Red Army was headed by V. M. Lekarev.

Lieutenant General veterinary service Lekarev Vasily Mikhailovich (1902-1955) - one of the organizers of the Soviet military veterinary medicine, head of the Veterinary Administration Soviet army (1941-1955)

As of June 22, 1941, the list number of horses in the army totaled 0.5 million heads, which were served by 5.2 thousand people of the veterinary staff. As of January 1, 1945, these figures, respectively, amounted to 2.0 million heads and 14.3 thousand people.

Despite the high degree of motorization of the army, the horse staff served as a military weapon in the cavalry and as a reliable draft force in artillery and other branches of the armed forces and rear services. The combat effectiveness and mobility of troops, their timely combat and logistic support. The veterinary staff of military units and formations, both regular and called up from the reserve, performed their duties in difficult combat conditions with maximum effort, with the manifestation of initiative and ingenuity. More than 90% of treated horses have been returned to service from veterinary hospitals.

Even before the start of World War II, there was a reduction in the number of cavalry divisions in the Soviet Army from 32 in 1938 to 13 at the beginning of 1941.

In the Second World War, the cavalry, however, showed its effectiveness in clashes with enemy formations that did not have great firepower. The cavalry participated in most major operations. In the summer and autumn of 1941, cavalry formations fought heavy defensive battles, covering the withdrawal of combined arms formations, inflicted counterattacks and counterattacks on the flanks and rear of the enemy groupings that were breaking through, disorganized his control, transportation material resources and evacuation.

According to the urgent requirements of G.K. Zhukov, the Soviet command in the summer of 1941 began to form new cavalry divisions. By the end of 1941, 82 light cavalry divisions were additionally deployed, which began to be reduced to cavalry corps, subordinate to the front command. During offensive operations, cavalry corps were used to develop a breakthrough, encircle large enemy groupings, fight against its operational reserves, disrupt communications, seize bridgeheads on water barriers and important areas (lines) in the rear, and pursue. In defensive operations, they constituted the maneuvering reserve of the front and were used, as a rule, for delivering counterattacks.

In 1943, during the reorganization of the cavalry, a cavalry commander was appointed (S.M. Budyonny), a cavalry headquarters was formed (chief of staff, General V.T. Obukhov, then General P.S. Karpachev), light cavalry divisions were abolished, divisions were enlarged, and the them firepower, reinforced anti-tank weapons of the cavalry corps. Since 1943, the use of certain cavalry corps as part of cavalry-mechanized groups, which were used to develop success, which was envisaged even in the pre-war years, began to be widely practiced. The increased firepower of the troops during the Great Patriotic War forced the cavalry to often fight in dismounted combat formations. In the attack on the enemy, who hastily went over to the defensive, and during operations in his rear, an attack in the equestrian formation was also used.

The experience of using cavalry in the 2nd World War and the Great Patriotic War showed its great vulnerability with a high degree of saturation of the armies with artillery, mortars, automatic small arms, tanks and aircraft. The most effective under these conditions were the actions of tank and mechanized troops, which received significant development.

According to the modern historian Alexei Isaev, the use of cavalry was twofold. Firstly, it was used as "quasi-motorized infantry" as part of mobile formations. This use of cavalry was due to the lack of motorized infantry. Secondly, due to the weakness of the technical base of that time, motorized infantry could only operate on well-traversed terrain. In the absence of roads or muddy roads, the mobility of motorized infantry fell sharply. At the same time, the mobility of the cavalry depended much less on the state of the terrain. The ratio of mobility of motorized infantry and cavalry is different, and depends on specific physical and geographical conditions.

The cavalry also had one important advantage - lower supply requirements. In the absence of fuel, the motorized infantry will be forced to abandon their equipment, and the cavalry will continue to move. Accordingly, under certain conditions (hard terrain, short duration of the operation), the use of cavalry made it possible to increase the depth of the offensive operation.

The disadvantage of cavalry is the need to feed the horses all the time, while motor vehicles require fuel only during their operation. Feed intake is greatly increased in cold weather, and in severe frosts in the field, mass death of horses is possible. In general, we can say that the cavalry and motorized infantry complemented each other well.

See also 8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian Gayer"

Alexey Isaev. Ten myths of World War II, chapter about the Soviet cavalry :

With checkers on tanks
"According to Krupp's armor..."

It all started with an arrogant phrase in the memoirs of Heinz Guderian "Memoirs of a Soldier": "The Polish Pomeranian cavalry brigade, due to ignorance of the constructive data and methods of action of our tanks, attacked them with edged weapons and suffered monstrous losses." These words were understood literally and creatively developed in fiction: “The blades of the brave Warsaw zholners clanged loudly on the Krupp armor, the peaks of the Polish cavalry broke on the same armor. Under the caterpillars of tanks, all living things died ... ". The cavalrymen began to present themselves as some kind of violently crazy, rushing in mounted formation at tanks with sabers and pikes. The battle of the mythical "jolners" with Guderian's tanks became a symbol of the victory of technology over obsolete weapons and tactics. Such attacks began to be attributed not only to the Poles, but also to the horsemen of the Red Army, even to depict the cutting of tanks with checkers on the film. The obvious oddity of such an action: a soldier and an officer of the 1930s. - this is not a Mongol who came from the depths of centuries, and not even a crusader. Being of sound mind and solid memory, he will not try to chop metal objects with a saber. Although it was evident, it was not explained. Cavalrymen for a long time received the stigma of brave, but stupid savages, not familiar with the properties of modern technology.

The next step was the denunciation of the Red Army cavalry and cavalry in the leadership of the Soviet armed forces. The same Pikul, with childish fury, attacks the cavalrymen:

“All this was, unfortunately. "Motorization" - in words, but in deeds - a mare in a harness. Meanwhile, there were many adepts in riding, and Budyonny openly proclaimed:

- And what? A horse and a cart will still show themselves ...

Another apostle of horse tactics, Yefim Shchadenko, being deputy commissar, sang along with the Kremlin cavalry in the Pravda newspaper:
"Stalin as great strategist and the organizer of class battles correctly assessed the cavalry in his time, he collectivized it, made it mass, and together with K.E. Voroshilov, he raised a horse on the mountain to the enemies of the proletarian revolution ... ".

Given the popularity of the novelist Pikul in the 1970s and 1980s, it is not difficult to imagine the extent to which the views of the Soviet marine painter on cavalry were spread among the masses of his readers. The phrase "The horse and the cart will still show themselves ..." became winged. She characterized not only S.M. Budyonny personally, but also the entire Red Army of the pre-war period.

If the sailor Valentin Pikul was still forgiven for pouring slop on the cavalry in a work of art, then the repetition of similar phrases in scientific and even popular science works was absolutely amazing. Typical example:
“In the prewar years, there was a reassessment of the role of cavalry in modern warfare among the Soviet command. While the main capitalist states have significantly reduced the cavalry of their armies, in our country it has grown in numbers. Speaking with a report “XX years of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army and Navy”, People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov said: “The cavalry in all the armies of the world is in crisis and in many armies it has almost come to naught. We stand on a different point of view. We are convinced that our valiant cavalry will more than once make us speak of itself as a powerful and invincible Red Cavalry. The Red Cavalry is still a victorious and crushing military force and can and will decide big tasks on all fronts."

The utter ecstasy of the orgy of humiliation of the cavalry reached in the 90s. The ideological blinkers fell, and everyone who felt like it, found it necessary to demonstrate their "professionalism" and "progressive views." Previously, quite adequately assessing the role of the cavalry (apparently under the influence of pointers from the Central Committee), the well-known domestic researcher of the initial period of the war V.A. Anfilov switched to outright mockery. He writes: “According to the saying “Whoever hurts, he talks about it,” Inspector General of the Red Army Cavalry Colonel General O.I. Gorodovikov spoke about the role of the cavalry in the defense ... ". Further more. Scrolling through several pages of the same work, we are surprised to read about the speech of S.K. Timoshenko at a meeting of the commanding staff in December 1940, Viktor Alexandrovich made the following comment: “Of course, the former head of the division in the Budyonny Cavalry Army could not but pay tribute to the cavalry. “In modern warfare, cavalry occupies an important place among the main branches of the armed forces,” he declared, contrary to common sense, “although little was said about it here at our meeting (they did the right thing. - Auth.). In our vast theaters, the cavalry will find wide application in solving the most important tasks of developing success and pursuing the enemy, after the front has been broken through. Particularly pleasing is the "profound" remark - "they did the right thing." Critics of the cavalry were consistent and, in addition to savagery and backwardness, accused the cavalrymen of destroying the advanced branches of the troops: "Not so long ago, Kulik gathered all the cavalrymen, and they jointly decided to disband the tank corps." The immortal is remembered:

"-...and on the ruins of the chapel...

“What, I also destroyed the chapel?”
Was it a boy?

The thesis about the reassessment of the role of cavalry in the USSR simply does not correspond to reality. In the prewar years, the proportion of cavalry formations was constantly decreasing.

A document that quite unambiguously characterizes the plans for the development of the cavalry in the Red Army is the report of the People's Commissar of Defense to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, dated in the autumn of 1937, on the long-term plan for the development of the Red Army in 1938-1942. I quote:
“a) The composition of the cavalry in peacetime by 01/01/1938. Cavalry in peacetime (by 01/01/1938) consists of: 2 cavalry divisions (including 5 mountain and 3 territorial), separate cavalry brigades, one separate and 8 reserve cavalry regiments and 7 directorates of cavalry corps. The number of peacetime cavalry on 01/01/1938-95 690 people.

B) Organizational measures for the cavalry in 1938-1942.

In 1938:

A) it is proposed to reduce the number of cavalry divisions by 7 (from 32 to 25), disbanding 7 cavalry divisions using their personnel to replenish the remaining divisions and to strengthen mechanized troops and artillery;

B) disband the two directorates of the cavalry corps;

C) disband two reserve cavalry regiments;

D) in 3 cavalry [corps] to form one anti-aircraft artillery battalion (425 people each);

D) reduce the composition of the cavalry division from 6600 people to 5900 people;

E) leave the cavalry divisions of the OKDVA (2) in reinforced strength (6800 people). The number of mountain cavalry divisions to have is 2620 people.

The number of directorates of cavalry corps was reduced to 5, cavalry divisions - to 18 (of which 4 in the Far East), mountain cavalry divisions - to 5 and Cossack (territorial) cavalry divisions - to 2. As a result of the proposed transformations, "peacetime cavalry as a result reorganization is reduced by 57,130 people and will include 138,560 people” (ibid.).

It can be seen with the naked eye that the document consists entirely of sentences like “reduce” and “disband”. Perhaps, after 1938, which was rich in repressions in the army, these plans, which were reasonable from all sides, were consigned to oblivion? Nothing of the kind, the process of disbanding the cavalry corps and reducing the cavalry as a whole went on without stopping.

In the autumn of 1939, plans for the reduction of cavalry were put into practice. government approved proposal People's Commissariat defense of November 21, 1939 provided for the presence of five cavalry corps consisting of 24 cavalry divisions, 2 separate cavalry brigades and 6 reserve cavalry regiments. At the suggestion of the NPO on July 4, 1940, the number of cavalry corps was reduced to three, the number of cavalry divisions to twenty, the brigade remained one and the reserve regiments to five. And this process continued until the spring of 1941. As a result, out of the 32 cavalry divisions and 7 corps directorates in the USSR by 1938, 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions remained by the beginning of the war. Cavalry formations were reorganized into mechanized ones. In particular, such a fate befell the 4th Cavalry Corps, whose command and 34th division became the basis for the 8th Mechanized Corps. The commander of the cavalry corps, Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Ryabyshev, led the mechanized corps and led it in June 1941 into battle against German tanks near Dubno.
Theory

The theory of the combat use of cavalry in the USSR was dealt with by people who looked at things quite soberly. This, for example, is a former cavalryman of the tsarist army, who became the chief of the General Staff in the USSR, Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. It was he who wrote the theory that became the basis for the practice of combat use of cavalry in the USSR. It was the work "Cavalry (Cavalry Essays)" of 1923, which became the first large scientific research on the tactics of the cavalry, released after the Civil War. The work of B.M. Shaposhnikova caused a great discussion at meetings of cavalry commanders and in the press: does the cavalry retain its former significance in modern conditions or is it just "driving infantry".

Boris Mikhailovich quite intelligibly outlined the role of the cavalry in the new conditions and measures to adapt it to these conditions:

“Changes introduced under the influence of modern weapons in the activities and organization of the cavalry are reduced to:

In tactics. The modern power of fire has made cavalry combat extremely difficult, reducing it to exceptional and rare cases. The normal type of cavalry combat is a combined combat, and the cavalry should not wait for actions exclusively in the cavalry formation, but, starting a shooting battle, should conduct it with full tension, trying to solve problems for them if the situation is not favorable for the production of cavalry attacks. Equestrian and foot combat are equivalent modes of action for the cavalry of our day.

In the organisation. The fight against modern weapons on the battlefield, bringing that in the cavalry closer to infantry operations, requires a change in the organization of the cavalry closer to the infantry, outlining the numerical increase in cavalry formations and the subdivision of the latter for foot combat, similarly to that adopted in infantry units. Attaching infantry units to the cavalry, even if they move quickly, is a palliative - the cavalry must independently fight the enemy infantry, gaining success on its own, so as not to limit its operational mobility.

Armed. The modern power of firearms to combat it requires the presence of the same powerful firearms in the cavalry. Because of this, the "armored cavalry" of our day must take into service with their riders rifles with a bayonet, similar to infantry, a revolver, hand grenades and automatic guns; to increase the number of machine guns in both divisional and regimental teams, to strengthen the artillery, both in number and in caliber, by necessarily introducing a howitzer and anti-aircraft guns; to strengthen oneself with the addition of armored vehicles with cannons and machine guns, light vehicles with the same means of fire, tanks and air squadron fire assistance.

Note that the opinion expressed in hot pursuit after the Civil War (1923) was in no way affected by the euphoria from the use of cavalry in 1918-1920. The tasks and scope of the cavalry are quite clearly outlined and defined.

The opinion of S.M. Budyonny, who is often presented as a seasoned stupid cavalryman, an enemy of the mechanization of the army. In fact, his position on the role of cavalry in the war was more than balanced: “The reasons for the rise or decline of cavalry should be sought in relation to the main properties of this type of troops to the main data of the situation of a certain historical period. In all cases, when the war acquired a maneuverable character and the operational situation required the presence of mobile troops and decisive actions, the horse masses became one of the decisive elements of the armed force. This is manifested by a well-known pattern throughout the history of cavalry; as soon as the possibility of a mobile war developed, the role of the cavalry immediately increased and certain operations were completed with its blows. Semyon Mikhailovich points to the field of application of cavalry - mobile warfare, the conditions for which may arise at any stage of the historical development of tactics and technology. The cavalry for him is not a symbol taken from the Civil, but a means of warfare that meets modern conditions: “We are stubbornly fighting for the preservation of a powerful independent Red cavalry and for its further strengthening solely because sober, real score situation convinces us of the undoubted need to have such cavalry in the system of our Armed Forces.

No exaltation of the cavalry is observed. “The horse will still show itself” is the fruit of an analysis of the current state of the Armed Forces of the USSR and its probable opponents.
What do the documents say?

Naturally, new means of struggle were introduced into the rules for the use of cavalry. The field manual of 1939 indicated the need to use cavalry in conjunction with technical innovations: “The most appropriate use of cavalry formations together with tank formations, motorized infantry and aviation is ahead of the front (in the absence of contact with the enemy), on the approaching flank, in the development of a breakthrough, behind enemy lines, in raids and pursuit. Cavalry formations are able to consolidate their success and hold the terrain. However, at the first opportunity, they must be released from this task in order to save them for maneuver. The actions of the cavalry unit must in all cases be reliably covered from the air.
Practice

Perhaps all these phrases were forgotten in practice? Let's give the floor to veteran cavalrymen. Ivan Alexandrovich Yakushin, lieutenant, commander of an anti-tank platoon of the 24th Guards Cavalry Regiment of the 5th Guards Cavalry Division, recalled: “How did the cavalry operate during World War II? Horses were used as a means of transportation. There were, of course, battles on horseback - saber attacks, but this is rare. If the enemy is strong, sitting on a horse, it is impossible to cope with him, then a command is given to dismount, the horsemen take the horses and leave. And the horsemen work like infantry. Each groom took five horses with him and took them to safe place. So there were several grooms per squadron. Sometimes the squadron commander said: "Leave two horsemen for the whole squadron, and the rest in the chain, help." The machine-gun carts preserved in the Soviet cavalry also found their place in the war. Ivan Alexandrovich recalls: “Carts were also used only as a means of transportation. During cavalry attacks, they really turned around and, as in the Civil War, spun, but this was infrequent. [...] And as soon as the battle began, the machine gun was removed from the cart, the grooms of the horses were taken away, the cart also left, but the machine gun remained.

N.L. Dupak (8th Guards Cavalry Rovno Red Banner Order of the Suvorov Morozov Division) recalls: “I went on the attack in the equestrian ranks only at the school, but not to chop, and I didn’t have to meet with the enemy cavalry. There were such learned horses in the school that, even having heard a miserable “hurrah”, they were already rushing forward, and you just hold them back. They snore... No, they didn't. They fought dismounting. Grooms took the horses to shelters. True, they often paid dearly for this, since the Germans used to fire at them with mortars. There was only one groom for a squad of 11 horses.

Tactically, the cavalry was closest to the motorized infantry units and formations. Motorized infantry on the march moved in vehicles, and in battle - on foot. At the same time, no one tells us scary tales about trucks with infantrymen ramming tanks and knocking their bumpers on “Krupp steel”. The mechanism for the combat use of motorized infantry and cavalry in World War II was very similar. In the first case, the infantrymen disembarked from trucks before the battle, the drivers drove the vehicles to shelters. In the second case, the cavalry dismounted, and the horses were driven into shelters. The scope of the attack in the cavalry was reminiscent of the conditions for using armored personnel carriers like the German “ganomag” - the enemy’s fire system was upset, his morale was low. In all other cases, cavalry on horseback and armored personnel carriers did not appear on the battlefield. And the Soviet cavalrymen with drafts unsheathed, and the Germans attacking on coffin-shaped "ganomags" are nothing more than a cinematic stamp. The armor of armored personnel carriers was intended to protect against fragments of long-range artillery in the starting positions, and not on the battlefield.
Who knocked on the Krupp armor

When the theory and practice of the combat use of cavalry in the new conditions is built before us, a legitimate question arises: “What about the Poles? Who pounded the tanks with sabers? In fact, the Polish cavalry, in terms of the tactics of its use, was no different from the Soviet cavalry of those years. Moreover, in the Polish cavalry, the horse attack was not a regulated type of combat. According to the "General Instructions for Combat" of 1930, the cavalry was to march on horseback, and fight on foot. In practice, of course, there were exceptions. For example, if the enemy is taken by surprise or demoralized. It is not necessary to expect any follies from cavalry with such a charter.

The main hero of the episode mentioned by Guderian (which went down in history as the battle near Kroyants) was the Polish 18th Pomeranian Lancers Regiment. This regiment was formed on June 25, 1919 in Poznań under the name of the 4th Nadvislansky Lancers, and from February 1920 became the 18th Pomeranian. On August 22, 1939, the regiment received an order to mobilize, which ended less than a week before the war, on August 25. After mobilization, the regiment consisted of 35 officers, more than 800 sub-officers and privates, 850 horses, two 37-mm Bofors anti-tank guns (according to the state, there should have been twice as many), twelve 7.92-mm Maroshek anti-tank guns mod. 1935, twelve heavy machine guns and eighteen light machine guns. The novelties of the century of the “war of motors” were 2 motorcycles with sidecars and 2 radio stations. Soon the regiment was reinforced with a battery of the 11th Cavalry Artillery Battalion. The battery consisted of 180 gunners, 248 horses, four 75-mm cannons with 1440 rounds of ammunition and two heavy machine guns.

The regiment of Pomeranian Lancers met the morning of September 1, 1939 at the border and in the first half of the day fought a completely traditional defensive battle. In the afternoon, the cavalry received an order to launch a counterattack and, taking advantage of the enemy's transition to the defense as a result of this strike, retreat back. For the counterattack, a maneuver detachment was allocated (1st and 2nd squadrons and two platoons of the 3rd and 4th squadrons), it was supposed to go to the rear of the German infantry by 19.00, attack it, and then retreat to the line of fortifications in the area the town of Rytel, occupied by the Polish infantry.

However, the roundabout maneuver led to unexpected results for both sides. The head outpost of the detachment discovered a battalion of German infantry, which was on a halt 300-400 m from the edge of the forest. The Poles decided to attack this enemy in cavalry formation, using the effect of surprise. According to the old command "szable dlon!" (sabers out!) The uhlans quickly and smoothly unsheathed their blades, shining in the red rays of the setting sun. The commander of the 18th regiment, Colonel Mastalezh, participated in the attack. Obeying the signal of the trumpet, the uhlans swiftly rushed at the enemy. The calculation for the suddenness of the attack turned out to be correct: the Germans, who did not expect an attack, rushed in a panic across the field. The cavalry mercilessly cut down the fleeing foot soldiers with their sabers.

The triumph of the cavalry was interrupted by armored vehicles hitherto hidden in the forest. Driving out from behind the trees, these armored vehicles opened machine-gun fire. In addition to the armored car, one German gun also opened fire. Now the Poles were rushing across the field under deadly fire.

Having suffered heavy losses, the cavalry retreated behind the nearest wooded ridge, where hardly half of the riders participating in the attack had gathered. However, the casualties in the cavalry charge were far less than might be imagined from the description of the battle. Three officers (including the commander of the regiment, Colonel Mastalezh) and 23 lancers were killed, one officer and about 50 lancers were seriously wounded. Most of the losses on the 18th uhlan regiment on September 1, 1939, which amounted to 60% of the people, seven machine guns, two anti-tank guns, the regiment suffered in a combined arms defensive battle. Guderian's words do not have this case nothing to do with reality. The Polish cavalrymen did not attack the tanks, but were themselves attacked by armored vehicles in the process of cutting down a gaping battalion. In a similar situation, conventional infantry or dismounted cavalry would suffer quite comparable losses. Moreover, the situation with flank shelling from a gun could become piquant for a tank platoon that had left for the field. The story of cutting Krupp's armor turns out to be fiction from beginning to end.
1941 Red Army Phoenix Bird

After all the reductions, the Red Army cavalry met the war as part of 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions. Regular cavalry divisions in 1941 had four cavalry regiments, a horse artillery battalion (eight 76-mm guns and eight 122-mm howitzers), a tank regiment (64 BT tanks), an anti-aircraft division (eight 76-mm anti-aircraft guns and two batteries of anti-aircraft machine guns), a communications squadron, a sapper squadron, and other rear units and institutions. The cavalry regiment, in turn, consisted of four saber squadrons, a machine-gun squadron (16 heavy machine guns and four 82-mm mortars), regimental artillery (four 76-mm and four 45-mm guns), an anti-aircraft battery (three 37-mm guns and three quadruple "maxims"). The total staff strength of the cavalry division was 8968 people and 7625 horses, the cavalry regiment, respectively, 1428 people and 1506 horses. A two-divisional cavalry corps roughly corresponded to a motorized division, having somewhat less mobility and a lower weight of an artillery salvo.

In June 1941, the 5th Cavalry Corps was stationed in the Kiev Special Military District as part of the 3rd Bessarabian named after. G.I. Kotovsky and 14th them. Parkhomenko cavalry divisions, in the Odessa district was the 2nd cavalry corps as part of the 5th. M.F. Blinov and the 9th Crimean cavalry divisions. All these formations were old formations of the Red Army with stable military traditions.

The cavalry corps turned out to be the most stable formations of the Red Army in 1941. Unlike the mechanized corps, they were able to survive in the endless retreats and encirclements of 1941. The cavalry corps of P.A. Belova and F.V. Kamkov became the "fire brigade" of the South-West direction. The first later participated in an attempt to unblock the Kyiv "boiler". Guderian wrote the following about these events: “On September 18, a critical situation developed in the Romny region. Early in the morning on the eastern flank the noise of battle was heard, which in the course of the subsequent time became more and more intensified. Fresh enemy forces - the 9th Cavalry Division and another division, together with tanks - advanced from the east to Romny in three columns, approaching the city at a distance of 800 m. From the high tower of the prison, located on the outskirts of the city, I had the opportunity to clearly observe how the enemy was advancing, the 24th Panzer Corps was instructed to repel the enemy offensive. To accomplish this task, the corps had at its disposal two battalions of the 10th motorized division and several anti-aircraft batteries. Due to the superiority of enemy aircraft, our aerial reconnaissance was in critical condition. Lieutenant Colonel von Barsevish, who personally flew out on reconnaissance, with difficulty eluded the Russian fighters. This was followed by an enemy air raid on Romny. In the end, we still managed to keep the city of Romny and the advanced command post in our hands. [...] The threatened situation of the city of Romny forced me on September 19 to transfer my command post back to Konotop. General von Geyer made this decision easier for us with his radiogram, in which he wrote: "The transfer of the command post from Romna will not be interpreted by the troops as a manifestation of cowardice on the part of the command of the tank group." This time Guderian shows no undue contempt for the attacking cavalry. Romny did not become the last battle of the 2nd Cavalry Corps. In the late autumn of 1941, P.A. Belova played an important role in the Battle of Moscow, where he received the rank of Guards.

In early July 1941, the formation of the 50th and 53rd cavalry divisions began in the camps near the village of Urupskaya and near Stavropol. The main personnel of the divisions were conscripts and volunteers from the Kuban villages of Prochnookopskaya, Labinskaya, Kurgannaya, Sovetskaya, Voznesenskaya, Otradnaya, Terek Cossacks from the Stavropol villages of Trunovskoye, Izobilnoye, Ust-Dzhegutinskoye, Novo-Mikhailovskoye, Troitskoye. On July 13, 1941, loading into echelons began. Colonel Issa Alexandrovich Pliev was appointed commander of the 50th division, brigade commander Kondrat Semyonovich Melnik was appointed commander of the 53rd division. On July 18, 1941, the divisions unloaded at Staraya Toropa station, west of Rzhev. Thus began the history of another legendary cavalry corps - the 2nd Guards L.M. Dovator.

In 1942, the Soviet cavalry experienced the peak of its extensive development. At the beginning of 1942, the number of cavalry formations jumped up sharply. In table. Figure 2 clearly shows the increase in the number of cavalry corps (kk), cavalry divisions (kd) at the beginning of the year and gradual stabilization by the autumn of 1942. For comparison, the number of rifle formations (sd) is given.

Table 2. Dynamics of the number of cavalry formations of the Red Army in 1942
January February March April June July August September October November December KK 7 17 17 15 14 14 12 10 9 10 9 10 KD 82 87 87 68 68 60 53 46 32 32 31 31 31 31 391 425 433 426 425 424 417 421 425 414

In the winter campaign of 1942, the newly formed cavalry divisions were actively used in battles. A typical example is the fighting in the southern sector of the front. E. von Mackensen, who fought there, later recalled: “At the time of taking command of the group in Stalino in the afternoon of January 29, the enemy was already dangerously close to the Dnepropetrovsk-Stalino railway and thus to the vital (since it was the only) railway supply line of the 17th army and the 1st Panzer Army. Focusing on the circumstances, initially it could only be about how to keep the necessary communications and organize the first defense. Only in the course of a stubborn struggle with the throwing of sappers from pontoon battalions into battle did the Germans manage to hold on. Almost one cavalry was his opponent: "In the past eight weeks of fighting, the corps fought the Russians with 9 rifle, 10 cavalry divisions and 5 tank brigades." The German commander in this case is not mistaken, he really was opposed by more cavalry than rifle divisions. The divisions of the 1st (33rd, 56th and 68th), 2nd (62nd, 64th, 70th) and 5th (34th, 60th I, 79th) cavalry corps, also 30th separate cavalry division Southern Front. The reasons for such a widespread use of cavalry in the battle of Moscow are quite obvious. In the Red Army at that time there were simply no large mobile formations. In the tank forces, the largest unit was the tank brigade, which could be used operationally only as a means of supporting the infantry. The unification recommended at that time under one command of several tank brigades also did not work. The only means that allowed for deep envelopment and detours was the cavalry.

According to the same scenario, the introduction of cavalry into a deep breakthrough, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps P.A. Belova. The vicissitudes of the actions of the Western Front in the winter of 1942 are quite well covered in the memoir and historical literature and let me just point out a few important details. Belov's group was given really large-scale tasks. The directive of the command of the Western Front of January 2, 1942 stated: “A very favorable situation has been created for encircling the enemy’s 4th and 9th armies, and the main role should be played by the Belov strike group, quickly interacting through the front headquarters with our Rzhev group.” [TsAMO. F.208. Op.2513. D.205. L.6] However, despite the losses incurred during the Soviet counteroffensive in December 1941, the troops of Army Group Center retained controllability.

The breakthroughs, which first entered the cavalry corps, and then the 33rd army, were closed by the Germans through flank attacks. In fact, the encircled troops had to switch to semi-partisan actions. Cavalrymen in this capacity acted quite successfully. Belov's group received the order to go out to their units only on June 6 (!!!) 1942. Partisan detachments, of which P.A. Belov formed rifle formations, again split into separate detachments. An important role in the overall development of events was played by the mobility of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, provided by horses. Thanks to this body, P.A. Belova managed to get to her not the shortest route, breaking through the German barrier with her forehead, but in a roundabout way. On the contrary, the 33rd army of M.G. Efremov, not possessing the maneuverability of cavalrymen, was defeated in April 1942 while trying to break through to her own in the band of the 43rd Army. Horses were vehicles and, as cynical as it sounds, self-moving food supplies. This ensured greater stability of the cavalry in the not always successful offensive operations of 1942.

Portal for the student. Self-training

According to the state number 06/317 of January 31, 1943, the cavalry division consisted of:

Delivery of domestic cars to the People's Commissariat of Defense during the war

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