In order to enlist the support of the Serbs in the fight against Tito and his Croatian-Bosnian corps, which had an almost 5-fold superiority in manpower over the Cossack division, Helmut von Pannwitz (with the knowledge of the "Center" and on the advice of Kononov) entered into a secret alliance with the Chetniks of the partisan Monarchist Serbian Orthodox army Drage Mikhailovich. The Chetniks waged war simultaneously against the communists and the Germans. It stipulated the possibility of creating a monarchical Serbian state on the Serbian lands, friendly to Russia!

The unsuccessful assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944 and the collapse of the anti-Hitler putsch attempt led to the death of the Black Chapel, with which von Pannwitz, a knight of the Order of the Prussian Johnites, was associated.

Helmut von Pannwitz never went to Himmler's "favorites". In his division, von Pannwitz hid from the Gestapo, SD and SS a group of several German officers - participants in a conspiracy against Hitler. Among them is the commander Terek Cossacks Captain Ernst Walther von Mossner. His father, General von Mossner, after July 20, 1944, was killed in Buchenwald on the orders of Himmler for participating in a conspiracy. Von Pannwitz ordered the Cossacks to shoot Gestapo, SS and SD officers if they appeared at the location of the Cossack division, tried to arrest von Mossner and other officers. The leadership of the Gestapo, the SS and SD were afraid to arrest von Pannwitz, fearing a rebellion of the Cossack division, personnel which was devoted to him personally. In the event of attempts to arrest him and disarm the Cossacks, they could easily put up fierce armed resistance and go over to the side of the Chetnik monarchists.

The decision on the further fate of the division and von Pannwitz was made only in November 1944. The Cossack division was transferred to the formal jurisdiction of the "SS" in order to somehow control the unpredictable aristocratic general with Slavic blood. This was done under the pretext of deploying the division to the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps (15th KKK). However, von Pannwitz refused the title of SS Gruppenfuhrer offered to him, categorically did not want to join the National Socialist Workers' Party. By the way, the alleged assignment of von Pannwitz with the title of “SS Gruppenfuehrer” is just a version presented as a fact by individual researchers. The archives have not yet found or published a single order along the line of the "SS" to confer this title on him. On the contrary, the Cossacks never wore the insignia of the SS troops, and von Pannwitz himself began defiantly to put on a Cossack hat and his old front-line overcoat.

Von Pannwitz officially restored the institution of the Orthodox military clergy in his corps; according to some testimonies, even he secretly converted to Orthodoxy.

Helmut von Pannwitz adopted the Soviet orphan boy Boris Nabokov. Von Pannwitz did this also because to emphasize his contempt for the delusional "racial theory" of the Nazis and not to join their party.

Part of the equipment and weapons that the 15th KKK received through the supply line from the Waffen SS, von Pannwitz ordered Drage Mihailovich to be handed over to the Chetnik army. Just at the time when the Anglo-Americans stopped supplying weapons to the Serbs-monarchists and helped exclusively their strategic agent Joseph Tito - a Croat and a hater of Orthodox Serbs.

In February 1945, Helmut von Pannwitz was unanimously elected by the All-Cossack Circle in Virovitsa as the "Supreme Field Ataman of all Cossack Troops." Having not even spent 1.5 months in the formal administration of the SS, he made another "savory spit" in the face of Himmler and the entire SS. Helmut von Pannwitz (on the advice of Kononov) actually (de facto) withdrew the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps from the jurisdiction of the "SS", moving to direct subordination Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR), headed personally by General Vlasov, an agent of the Kremlin's Strategic Intelligence, who continued to carry out his mission in the III Reich. From now on, von Pannwitz became the commander of the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps of the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (15th KKK Armed Forces KONR). Official historians in their publications write "15th Cossack Cavalry Corps of the SS." In fact, it is correct to write "15th Cossack Cavalry Corps of the Armed Forces of the KONR."

Unscrupulous researchers, seeking to once again denigrate von Pannwitz, like to refer to the protocol of his interrogation, falsified by the investigators of the SMERSH GUKR. In it, von Pannwitz (suddenly starting to speak the language of Stalin's agitprop) allegedly admits to carrying out punitive operations, mass executions of Serbs and the total rape of the entire female population by his Cossacks. In particular, the protocol says that “in December 1944, the Cossacks of the 5th cavalry regiment under the command of Colonel Kononov during an operation against partisans in the area of ​​the Drava River, not far from the mountains. Virovititsa, committed massacre of the population and rape of women…”.

The well-known historian Kirill Alexandrov found out that units of the Soviet 233rd division had been stationed in this area (including in the cities of Virovititsa, Pitomach and their environs) since December 8, 1944. And until December 8, 1944, there were units of the 10th Corps of the Titov NOAU, the basis of which were Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians.

The Cossacks of the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps occupied Virovititsa and Pitomach (with adjacent areas) only at the beginning of January 1945. This happened after a fierce battle between the 15th KKK and units of this same 233rd Soviet division, two regiments of which were almost completely destroyed, and the division itself suffered a crushing defeat. After this battle, the Cossacks in Virovitica unanimously elected von Pannwitz "Supreme Field Ataman of all Cossack Troops." In this city (on the initiative of Kononov and von Pannwitz), it was decided to transfer the entire 15th KKK to the subordination of the Armed Forces of the KONR General Vlasov. See the book by K. Alexandrov "Russian soldiers of the Wehrmacht".

Who raped who!? Nobody! The usual traditional propaganda to demonize the enemy. The Reds were broadcasting that the Whites were coming - the entire worker-peasant female gender was being raped without exception. White propaganda wrote - red commissars are coming, raping everyone without exception. Soviet newspapers in 1941-43. they broadcast - the Nazis are going to rape all Russian women without exception. Goebbels' propaganda since 1944 has been broadcasting the same thing - supposedly "Slavic barbarians" are coming, all German women are being raped without exception.

Now about what is not in the book of the historian K. Alexandrov. The 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps of the Armed Forces of the KONR, personally atamans Kononov and von Pannwitz, did their duty to the end in the fight against the West and its agent of strategic influence, the Croat Josef Tito. As planned by the Kremlin's Strategic Intelligence (largely thanks to successful actions Cossack Corps against NOAU) in 1943-44. Anglo-American troops were unable to penetrate Yugoslavia before the Soviet army. In December 1944, the Soviet army reached the borders of Yugoslavia.

Further (according to the stories of B.B.P., K.V.M., H.M. and L.E.M.) in the period from December 1944 to January 1945. the following tragic events took place in Virovititsa and Pitomach, which radically influenced the further actions and fates of von Pannwitz and Kononov. At the end of November 1944, Ataman Kononov sent a group of his proxies(agents) through the front to the location Soviet troops in order to meet with Soviet intelligence officers (who arrived from the "Center"), in order to agree with them on organizing the transition of the 15th KKK to the side of the USSR. Provided that all Cossacks are guaranteed complete forgiveness and that none of them will be sent to Soviet concentration camps in the future. The transition was scheduled for mid-December 1944.

Helmut von Moltke

Among the opposing elements of war, it is rarely possible to achieve the ideal; however, the result shows that mediocrity can achieve the goal. The joining of the Prussian armies at the proper moment was never considered at least by the Prussian general staff, especially by a brilliant idea or a deeply learned combination.

Helmut Karl Bernhard Moltke on his own strategy

According to legend, at one time Julius Caesar lamented in front of the statue of Alexander the Great. Why - Alexander at the age of 30 had already achieved amazing success, and the future dictator was still so far from his epochal achievements! None of them lived to be 60 years old. As, however, Napoleon Bonaparte and Gustav Adolph... At this age, commanders prefer to write memoirs, but the creator of a new style of military leadership, a new strategy that took into account the breakthrough that humanity made in the 19th century, the classic of the classics - Helmut von Moltke - at 60, he was still moving towards the pinnacle of his fame.

Unfortunately, it was his country that became the main culprit of those terrible disasters that befell Europe in the twentieth century. Perfectly debugged, tested in battles, the German military machine could not stop at what had been achieved in the era of Bismarck and his brilliant assistant, the chief of the general staff. Maybe the Germans believed too much in the invincibility of their army? And no wonder! With such a person as Moltke at its head, one can decide that all the events of any war can be foreseen, calculated, planned. You just need to arm yourself with a pen, a ruler and a protractor, surround yourself with the same thoughtful, pedantic, assiduous colleagues ... And then the army will reach the line at the indicated time, there it will be met by an enemy doomed to failure, the battle will begin and end exactly on time and with the desired result, and the commander-in-chief, putting the last tick, will report to the monarch: "The battle took place in strict accordance with the wishes of Your Majesty." Just as the unforgettable "great silencer" did.

Since the Thirty Years' War in the 17th century, Germany had remained fragmented into duchies, kingdoms, and principalities that were at war with each other more actively than with external enemies. This was used by the largest powers, each found support here in one or another possession, everyone was satisfied with the absence of too strong a neighbor on their borders - western or eastern. This was also used by the generals, in particular Napoleon, who put most of the German sovereigns in a humiliating position, beating them one by one. Naturally, the striped pattern in Germany interfered with normal economic growth, the German bourgeois were not competitors to the French or the British in terms of relations with the colonies.

Already in the 18th century, progressive figures in Germany spoke of the need to unite the German lands. Two states could act as a unifier: the Austrian Empire or Prussia, which had strengthened by this time. In this regard, there were two options for the path of such an unification: “Great German”, when the German lands, as well as Hungarian and part of the Slavic lands, were under the rule of the Habsburgs, and “Little German” - the unification of only German regions under the rule of the Hohenzollerns.

Napoleon clearly showed the Germans all the disadvantages of their dispersed position. The German principalities demonstrated all their economic, political, military weakness; thanks to the imperial redrawing of the European map, the conditionality of the formed historical borders of these principalities became obvious. In the victory over Napoleon on the battlefield near Leipzig and then at Waterloo, the Germans (Prussians, Saxons and others) already played a significant role, they could already talk about national pride, about the great opportunities that opened up before their country. On the other hand, the influence of the French who survived the revolution (which was also reflected in the Napoleonic code) also affected the development of the socio-economic system within Germany. Even when Bonaparte practically undividedly ruled the continent, the same Prussia went on serious reforms of a bourgeois nature. The Congress of Vienna in 1815, of course, did not create a German monolith, but the upheavals of the first quarter of the 19th century gave impetus to the development of unifying tendencies in Germany. Prussia, on the other hand, was steadily moving towards becoming the main conductor of these processes.

terrible disaster at the Battle of Jena in 1806, not only brought Prussia to its knees, but also contributed to the rapid growth of healthy nationalism, active search ways to strengthen the country in all respects. Was canceled serfdom, carried out other reforms of a bourgeois nature. This fully and almost primarily applied to military affairs. Here, even with the onset of periods of reaction in the next half century, the direction towards modernization was steadily preserved.

The main step was the introduction of compulsory military service during the Napoleonic wars. This turned the army into a national one. Representatives of the bourgeois class, who now had to serve, were more educated, which opened up great prospects for the military leaders in training and rearming the troops. The number of commanders increased, and the officers were persistently weaned from looking down on representatives of the lower class. The improvement in personnel made it possible to carry out the tactical fragmentation of large masses into relatively small detachments. Corporal punishment was abolished in the army. The service life has been seriously reduced. This made it possible to have a large number of trained troops in the country that could be mobilized during the war - at the end of the service, a person remained in the reserve for several years, and the “turnover” of personnel in the active army increased. Steps were also taken towards the so-called "arming the people". In Prussia, a special people's militia, the Landwehr, was created. Of course, he had limited capabilities, and the Landwehr warriors constantly became the object of ridicule from the military personnel, but such a militia made it possible to maintain the corresponding spirit of the broad masses of the population, to conduct military training for more people. The reform of 1860 seriously reduced the importance of these units, which caused justified fears among the authorities, but in subsequent wars the Prussian command could still use the landwehr to carry out rear and security service, without diverting parts of the regular army for this.

In boosting army morale important role official propaganda played; for several decades, teachers at school raised children in a military-patriotic spirit. By the 1960s, Prussia had, perhaps, the most devoted soldiers who were able not to run under enemy fire, to maintain discipline in the most extreme situations. This was facilitated by regular exercises. However, two trends constantly competed here - real-combat and parade ground. The military leaders, headed by the most august persons themselves, were too fond of the formal side of the matter, "beautiful". “A company that can go well with a ceremonial march,” said one of the Prussian kings, “will go well against the enemy.” On the parade ground, the battalions and regiments masterfully carried out rebuilding, the battle formations pleased the eye with the straightness of the lines. As a result, the real study of the new conditions in which the battle would have to be fought, namely, dense enemy fire, faded into the background. The close formation was completely useless when attacking under fire. This negatively affected the actions of the Prussian army, especially during the Franco-Prussian war. Right on the battlefield, I had to abandon ceremonial receptions, from shock tactics such as "break through".

The changes in weapons were best seen on the example of guns. The Prussian soldiers were armed with Dreyse needle guns loaded from the treasury. Since the technology of that time had not yet solved the problem of removing a metal sleeve from the barrel after firing, the latter was made of paper so that it would burn out when fired. The primer could not be mounted on a thin paper sleeve, and it had to be carried to the middle of the cartridge. To ignite this primer, the striker had to first pierce the paper sleeve and pass through the entire charge of gunpowder; therefore, he took the form of a long thin needle, which broke at the slightest malfunction in a gun or cartridge. For this, the Prussian soldiers had a certain supply of needles. At one time, the secret of this gun became known to the military of other countries, but they refused to transfer their armies to this weapon, since Dreyse guns required a higher technical culture soldier's army. Prussia could afford it, since universal conscription supplied the army with just such a mass. Dreyse's guns made it possible to fire three times more often, and most importantly, to load guns in a prone position, which ultimately led to much fewer losses. The Prussian artillery was also on top. Here the steel (rather than bronze) cannons of the emerging Krupp empire were put into action. His guns were also loaded from the treasury.

In 1857, his brother Wilhelm, distinguished by reactionary views and great ambitions, became regent of Prussia under the feebleminded Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Soon he became the Prussian king. Wilhelm I was quite far from the ideas of German unification, but he certainly craved territorial gains for his country. Wilhelm valued the Prussian crown more than a possible German one. But even for such “non-progressive” goals, he needed to strengthen the regular army. To this end, in 1860, the king, together with the energetic and powerful Minister of War Roon, carried out a military reform. Actually, the essence new reform was seen by the king in a completely reactionary spirit. One of the main goals was the creation of a well-trained standing army loyal to the king, devoid of bourgeois free-thinking, which especially worried the ruling feudal class after revolutionary events 1848. “I don’t need students or rich people in the army,” said Wilhelm I. In addition, the role of the landwehr was dealt a blow. However, objectively, the changes really strengthened the Prussian army.

Under the reform of 1860, the contingent annually drafted into the ranks of the army was increased by 66%. The term of active service was extended from 2 to 3 years. The total term of service in the army and reserve increased from 5 to 7 years. Spare parts were formed to ensure the replenishment of the standing army. The Landwehr was reduced - he lost his two younger ages (25-27 years old), who went into the reserve of the standing army. The Landwehr now contained men who had served their time in the standing army and its reserves. This people's militia was intended only for rear service. All these measures led to the fact that the composition of the Prussian army in peacetime was doubled, during the war the size of the army remained, in general, the same - 350 thousand people - but a completely permanent army without the admixture of landwehr. The army was rejuvenated and became monotonous.

The liberal bourgeoisie immediately began to fight against such innovations. The Landtag refused to give funds for new regiments. Wilhelm was already on the verge of abdicating when he called (in 1862) to save the position of one of the leaders of the militarists, Otto von Bismarck. Having become the head of the Prussian government, the "Iron Chancellor" took a hard line on the war. All Bismarck's activities indicated that the increase in the army was a necessary step in the light of the future struggle for the unification of Germany. Unlike his patron, this purposeful, very smart and tough politician saw as his goal not the exaltation of Prussia, but the revival of powerful Germany. "Iron and blood" he was going to realize this goal. To do this, it was necessary to suppress the opposition within the country (which he successfully did); to really strengthen the armed forces; to withdraw Austria from the German Confederation, to win over or subjugate other German states by force, to prevent opposition from the European powers - this was achieved by the chancellor both diplomatically (which was preferable for him) and militarily.

It would be good to say that it was then that Helmut von Moltke came to the fore, who created a new type of Prussian army, etc., etc. However, unfortunately, we are deprived of such an opportunity. The fact is that by the time Bismarck was appointed, Moltke had already been acting as head of the General Staff for five years. But his role in determining Prussian policy was negligible, even militarily. Roon and the king himself were the masters here. The headquarters has not yet acquired the enormous significance that distinguished it in the Austro-Prussian war, the Franco-Prussian war, and later. Moltke actually did not take any part even in the military reform of 1860. It seemed that this elderly modest man would remain the unknown owner of a sinecure in the bureaucratic apparatus of his country, but it turned out differently.

Helmut Karl Bernhard Moltke was born on October 26, 1800 in the town of Parchim in Mecklenburg. His father was an impoverished Prussian nobleman and soon entered the military service of the Danish king. It was here, in Denmark, which had long lost its former greatness, that his son was educated. In 1818 Helmut graduated from the Cadet Corps in Copenhagen. Military historians, admiring the diligence of Moltke, and on the other hand, emphasizing the unexpectedness of his rise later, often note that this corps gave very little knowledge. However, for service in the Danish army, which Helmut Moltke started in 1819, probably sufficient.

However, Moltke wanted more: for career reasons, he moved to a more promising position in the Prussian army. It happened in 1822. Soon the young officer entered the Berlin Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1826. Helmut Moltke really showed great ability and diligence in the sciences. By the time he graduated from the academy, he was already more or less fluent in several languages. When he later became chief of the general staff, he spoke not only German and Danish, but also Turkish, Russian, French, English, Italian. By the way, it was he who translated into German Lord Gibbon's classic work, The History of the Fall of the Roman Empire. Moltke was seriously interested in military history and geography, had a good command of the pen, and wrote not only military scientific works, which we will mention more than once, but also works of art- poems and novels.

In 1827, Moltke became the head of the divisional school, in 1828 he was assigned to the General Staff, and in 1833 he was transferred to it as a permanent employee. Moltke was assigned to the Topographic Bureau, one of the leading departments of the General Staff of that time. A few words should be said here about the organization of this military department before the hero of this essay came to lead it.

The General Staff received a great impetus for development at the beginning of the 19th century. Progressive-minded figures were concentrated here, who were not only the conductors of reformist ideas for the army, but also the ideologists of the struggle against the French yoke. After the victory over Napoleon, the chief of the general staff, Grolman, gave his department an open character: he saw the headquarters as a school through which a significant number of selected officers passed in peacetime. General staff officer was spared clerical work, from mobilization trifles and could devote himself entirely to the study of military art. The training of a general staff officer stretched for 9 years: 3 years of the academy and 6 years of enlistment, during which the so-called topographic qualification was served, various work was carried out at the Large General Staff - military geographical descriptions were compiled, separate tasks were developed, internships took place in winter and on field trips at the headquarters of the corps and service in the ranks. Only half of those accepted graduated from the academy, and only a third of those enlisted were transferred to the general staff. Service in it took place only 3-4 years, and then followed by expulsion and a new selection for higher positions. This was how the lack of caste among the employees of the General Staff was achieved.

Already in 1814, three main branches of the Great General Staff were formed, each of which specialized in the study of the French, Austrian or Russian front. Though these departments made plans possible wars, but they were not very reputable organizations, so no one was particularly in a hurry to put these campaign plans into practice, and did not consider it necessary. In the event of a specific threat, the plan to be implemented was developed by a person appointed by the commander of the army. Thus, before Moltke, the competence of the Great General Staff in drawing up a plan for operational deployment and developing the basic ideas of war was negligible and was predominantly in the nature of educational, preparatory and statistical work.

In 1819, Grolman, in addition to the three main departments, also formed the military history department. The large general staff thus received an instrument with which it could influence the development of military thought in the army. This department acquired leadership significance already under Moltke. Cartographic work was also organized to survey the entire territory of the state. In 1821 Grolman was forced to resign. Under the next chief - Müfling - the General Staff was separated from the War Ministry, then it was called the Great General Staff. But in fact, with the departure of Grolman, he lost his former significance.

But back to Moltke. In 1835, the Prussian captain made a great journey to the East. In Istanbul, he was introduced to Sultan Mahmud II and, at his request, remained in the Turkish army as an instructor. Moltke took part in the reorganization of this army, in fortification work, in organizing the defense of the straits. He was also in Turkish troops during campaigns against the Kurds, Egypt and Syria in 1839. (By the way, the Turkish army was defeated by the Egyptian Sultan Mehmed Ali.) During these campaigns, Moltke, with all the thoroughness of a real scientist and at the same time with German pedantry, which he was the very embodiment, explored the upper course of the Tigris, hitherto unknown to geographers. About Turkey, he wrote an interesting work “Letters on the state of Turkey and events in it”, which was quite a success - for a long time the name of Moltke was associated precisely with this work. Later, he published a work on the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829, in which the author proved himself to be a conscientious and thoughtful military theorist. Under a pseudonym, Moltke published a number of very serious political-historical articles. So, in 1843, he formulated the military significance of the railways that appeared relatively recently in Europe.

Upon returning to the Prussian service, Helmut Moltke continued mainly educational, theoretical and literary work. In 1848 he was appointed chief of the general staff section, then chief of staff of the corps, and later he was assigned to the sons of Wilhelm as their military mentor.

Moltke had an excellent command of technical drawing. So, he personally completed the first survey of the environs of Constantinople, and at the age of 45, when he accompanied Prince Henry in Rome and had a lot of free time, he surveyed 500 square miles of the environs of the Eternal City and put on this plan all the data of interest in archaeological and artistic relation. This map was published by the great Alexander Humboldt. In 1855, Helmut was appointed adjutant to Friedrich Wilhelm, the future Emperor Frederick III. With him he visited Paris, London, St. Petersburg, Moscow. In general, he traveled to almost all European capitals, in which he carefully got acquainted not only with the sights, but also with military organization countries.

By that time, the adjutant of the eldest son Wilhelm was already well-established in the Prussian leadership as an undoubtedly educated person, a great connoisseur of military history and geography, and at the same time a completely secular person. Everyone knew that Moltke was the first dancer at court, that he liked to hunt hares in Silesia ... He had a character trait that did not fit into the salon rules - Moltke was very reserved. In the future, when they recognize him from a completely different side, the nickname “great silent man” will appear. In the meantime, even the appointment of Helmut Moltke in the autumn of 1857 as chief of the general staff did not cause any resonance. Wilhelm, who recently became regent of Prussia, placed a well-mannered man loyal to the authorities, not without merit, in a not very important post; in this position, the elderly courtier (although he was at that time the youngest of the major generals of Prussia), perhaps, will quietly spend the rest of his days. The pinnacle of not the most brilliant, but worthy military career of a Prussian nobleman. Moreover, due to the complete lack of combat experience, Moltke could not even be appointed brigade commander.

It is generally accepted that the General Staff flourished under Moltke. So it is, in general, it is, but it did not happen right away. First, the new boss had to do painstaking work in order to prepare smart, educated, broad-minded, energetic assistants. Only with time did the General Staff begin to claim the leading role in directing most of the processes in the country related to the war. In this case, Helmut Moltke showed a sharp mind, unexpected for many, the ability to lead, the talent of the creator of the school. He, better than many colleagues, was able to catch the trends of the time, understand the changes that have taken place in the economy, technology of the new time, and bring military affairs in line with these changes. Being, in fact, in the position of an observer from the side throughout his long military career, being, it would seem, an armchair scientist, Moltke understood and systematized everything that dashing practical warriors missed. Russian General Dragomirov, who was at the Prussian headquarters during the Austro-Prussian war, wrote: “General Moltke belongs to those strong and rare people which the deep theoretical study of military affairs has almost replaced practice.

The entire general staff in 1857 consisted of 64 officers, 18 of which formed the Great General Staff. Ten years later, the headquarters had already grown to 119 officers, including 48 in the Great General Staff. In addition, 30 young test officers assigned to the general staff took part in the work of the latter. At the initiative of the new chief, classes on strategy and tactics became much more frequent - on maps and through field trips, during which students trained in studying and assessing the terrain, choosing a position, assessing the situation and issuing orders. During his first 13 years as Chief of the General Staff, Moltke made nine field trips and devoted much of his time to tactical tasks. Usually they were led by the heads of departments of the Great General Staff, but at the end of the year Moltke himself drew up the task and personally analyzed the decisions in his office, in the presence of the entire Great General Staff.

Moltke paid great attention, of course, to the work of his military history department. In 1862, the military history department published the History of the Italian Campaign of 1859. Already three years after the war, in the absence of accurate and complete information about this war, Moltke came out with a critically written work. The chief of the general staff sought to acquaint the Prussian army with new phenomena in modern warfare, to give correct coverage of the campaign of 1859 and to draw appropriate conclusions from it. Moltke's agents were also in the United States during the Civil War; the reports from there were carefully studied and analyzed by the Chief of the General Staff with his students and associates.

Military-historical narrative turned into a discussion of sensitive issues modern strategy and tactics, and this manner of historical criticism formed the basis of the subsequent historical works of the Prussian General Staff. Moltke's articles were distinguished by clarity and clarity of presentation, a vivid emphasis on the main ideas, and an iron logic of proofs. A few words should be said about military theory Moltke. It was quite difficult for the Chief of the General Staff to actively fight for new principles in this theory. In this area of ​​science, worship of Napoleonic art has long reigned supreme. It was almost impossible to push the gray-haired Prussian scientists at their desks off this path. Moltke believed that Napoleon's tactics were not a panacea. Moreover, in the new conditions in which the war in Europe has to be waged, it will lead to heavy losses. However, in order not to disturb the venerable elders, Moltke preferred to write books of a more practical nature: “On flank positions”, “On the depth of marching columns”.

Helmut Moltke was aware of the fact that not only the battle itself is a field for the activities of a military leader, he also sought to cover the preparatory and "intermediate" problems facing the army. “In most cases, history shows before our eyes only the circumstances of the war, hiding from us internal preconditions, - the commander wrote, - battles and brilliant deeds form bright spots, about which everyone reads willingly; difficulties in supply, difficulties in transitions, hardships in bivouacs, suffering in hospitals and the devastation of the country are the shadow side; it is difficult and unattractive to study the latter, but, nevertheless, it is extremely necessary. Of particular interest to the Chief of the Prussian General Staff was mobilization. The mobilization plan was revised under the leadership of the General Staff in such a way that the time for which the Prussian army grew in wartime became significantly less than that of potential opponents.

Questions of mobilization, transfer, coordination and supply of troops were directly linked to questions of the development and use of railways and the telegraph. Under the Great General Staff, a railway section was created. In 1859, Moltke managed to insist on the formation of a special railway commission from representatives of the German states. In plans for future wars, he paid great attention to the use of the few so far, but so important rail lines. Gradually, Moltke came to the conclusion that the railways made it possible to carry out the mobilization, transfer and supply of troops on completely new principles. Huge armies could quickly grow near the borders of hostile states. The chief of staff, when determining the place of assembly of the army, gave preference to railway stations over points that had other strategic advantages (threatening the enemy's flank, etc.). Thanks to new roads, instead of border fortresses, the entire territory left in the rear of their native country became a food base.

The concentration of troops at the ends of different railway lines was closely linked in Moltke's understanding and with the peculiarities of the further development of their offensive. An outstanding commander came to the conclusion that the concentrated movement of the entire army does not make any sense. Numerous (much more than a century ago) the column formed for a long time at the gathering place, then stretched in the campaign for many tens of kilometers. The advanced units approach the battlefield several days ahead of the tail of the column. The whole road is devastated, supply difficulties weaken the army. In the writings and speeches of the chief of the general staff, the term "vile extreme of concentration" appears. Moltke counters this principle with his famous motto: "Go apart, fight together." The ideal for the Prussian innovator is the concentric movement of different parts along different roads to the predetermined field of general battle. These armies should not close together, but come out, like halves of pincers, to the enemy army from two sides, strike at it from the flanks, surround and destroy it. Naturally, such an approach required a clear interaction between individual commanders, which was facilitated by the telegraph wires that followed the army and the very principles of command that Moltke adhered to. When the general was already the de facto head of the Prussian army, he preferred not to give exact orders, but directives that allowed the commanders to exercise a certain independence. In principle, during the battle, Moltke acted primarily as the head of the school, shifting the main concrete work to assistants and students. He could inform the commanders of the main instructions a day before the planned battle, and then remain at headquarters 20 kilometers from the battlefield throughout the fateful day. Not all commanders, of course, were at the height of the situation, there were many military leaders old school, but carefully worked out plans, the high level of strategic skill of Moltke and his staff, the described advantages that were available in the Prussian army, and finally, the weakness of the enemy made it possible to compensate for such shortcomings.

Moltke was also well aware of the demands on tactics that the new weapons made. He had to work hard to ensure that the old shock tactics were at least partially outlived in the army. He did not want to drive troops to attack enemy fire at any cost. Another thing is that the gun of the Prussians in the first two wars (Danish and Austrian) was so much superior to the gun of the enemy, and so many orthodox commanders commanded units that massive, shock attacks in close formation were still made. The task of shifting the emphasis in the attack to the guns and the possible formation in this case was all the more difficult because until 1888 the military regulations 1847, compiled under the personal direction of Wilhelm. The order "elbow to elbow" was almost " sacred cow» old Prussian generals. Moltke had to give only cautious advice: at the beginning of the battle, stay on the defensive, let the enemy run into our fire and suffer losses, and then energetically go on the offensive. Prince Friedrich Karl once accurately described this principle: "You must start battles like Wellington, and end like Blucher." In fact, during the battle, such recommendations were not very often implemented, since the Prussian army, according to the strategy developed by the same Moltke, was initially focused on the attack - otherwise why would it be necessary to cover the enemy with its tongs from the flanks.

They did not immediately learn how to properly use the excellent Prussian artillery - it was dragged along in the tail of the carts back in the 1866 campaign of the year; under the new conditions, when the troops directly from the campaign entered the battle without preliminary deployment, the Prussian batteries could be very useful precisely to the advanced units. In the same place, at the tail of the column, the cavalry was located for a long time, until the military leaders, and first of all the head of the general staff, realized that they could be used not only as a reserve.

For a very long time, Moltke failed to achieve great authority in the army. He was not in direct correspondence with the Minister of War. In 1859, he had to fight to beat out data on the capacity of the Prussian railways from the Ministry of War, which were necessary in the light of a possible mobilization that year. Without the participation of the chief of the general staff, the reform of 1860 was carried out, and Moltke was not called to compile the "Instruction for Great Maneuvers" the following year. Even during the war with Denmark in 1864, which is constantly recorded as an asset to this major military leader, he occupied a subordinate position, only towards the end of the campaign having won the sympathy and confidence of Wilhelm and Bismarck. What can we say, even if the chief of the Prussian general staff was forced to publish the conclusions from the war with Denmark in the press as a private person! Despite the fact that, according to his position, Moltke was supposed to be aware of the foreign policy of the state, many materials were handed over to him from the ministries selectively, late and at the wrong time, he learned many things from newspapers and unofficial sources.

Only in 1866 did Moltke fully prove his "professional suitability" and after that he was steadily moving towards establishing his hegemony in the affairs of the army. During Franco-Prussian War he was already not only the compiler of all plans, but also the actual commander of the army. He actively intervened in the solution of political issues, intrigued against Roon and even Bismarck, and at other times, together with the "Iron Chancellor", snatched the necessary decrees from the king. Wilhelm, Moltke and Bismarck constituted in the late 60s and 70s a kind of triumvirate that ruled the state.

The chief himself, in the sense of interfering in the internal politics of the state, was outdone by his talented subordinates, "demigods" - this is how the officers of the General Staff began to be called in the army. Verdy-du-Vernoy, who became the ideologist of the applied direction in the teaching of military art, at one time received the post of Minister of War. Caprivi succeeded Bismarck as chancellor. Waldersee was the de facto head of the General Staff since 1882 and a very influential politician, who, by the way, intrigued, like his two previous colleagues, against Bismarck. The fashion for the uniform of an officer of the general staff remained in force long years after the death of Helmut von Moltke.

The war against Denmark was for Prussia, as it were, a preparatory character before more serious achievements. It took place in 1864, and the allies of the Prussians were the country against which the spearhead of Bismarck's policy was directed - Austria.

In 1863 Christian IX ascended the Danish throne. German dynasty Glucksburg. The German on the Danish throne, of course, was not popular. In order to attract the sympathy of Danish patriots, on November 18, 1863, Christian IX introduced a very liberal constitution in Denmark, according to which Schleswig was declared an integral part of the Danish state. This was opposed by the German Confederation, skillfully directed by Bismarck. After Denmark refused to cancel the new constitution, the German Confederation decided to send its troops to Holstein, which was formally part of this union. Already at the end of November, the allied forces of Saxony and Hanover entered Holstein. Unsatisfied with the occupation of Holstein and Lauenburg, Austria and Prussia jointly, in an ultimatum form, again demanded the abolition of the Danish constitution. After the rejection of the Austro-Prussian ultimatum by Denmark on February 1, 1864, hostilities began. Austro-Prussian troops numbering about 60 thousand under the command of the Prussian Field Marshal Wrangel, who advanced in the revolutionary year 1848, ousted the main forces of the Danish troops from the fortified position at Dannevirke. Leading defensive battles, the Danes slowly retreated to the north. There were several battles at sea, curious for military historians, which, however, did not have a great influence on the development of events. On 12 May, at the suggestion of Denmark, a brief truce was concluded until 26 June. During this armistice, Prince Friedrich Karl became commander-in-chief instead of Wrangel, and Moltke was appointed his chief of staff. With the resumption of hostilities, the Austro-Prussian troops occupied the island of Als, and by July 14 they occupied all of Jutland up to Skagen. On July 16, 1864, a second truce was concluded, and on October 30, the parties signed the Peace of Vienna, according to which Denmark lost Schleswig and Holstein, occupied by Prussia and Austria, respectively. The territory of the duchy of Lauenburg remained with Denmark, but a year later the duchy was sold to Prussia for two and a half million thalers.

Denmark lost 20 percent of its population as a result of the war. The position and authority of Prussia sharply increased. But she did not solve her task of mastering Kiel. Therefore, the country immediately began to prepare for the next war, the war with Austria for leadership in the German Confederation.

For the Danes, the war resulted in a constant retreat, so Prussia could not fully experience the new tactics and strategy, as well as show the advantages of organizing its army. Moreover, many military experts were convinced of the superiority of the Austrians with their strike tactics. The cautious actions of the Prussians somehow did not fit with the complete unwillingness of the Danes to resist. Moltke, as has already been said, did not yet have full power over the army. Therefore, to the criticism of Bismarck, which he expressed about the insufficient preparedness of the troops and some confusion during the battles and campaigns, he calmly replied that the responsibility did not lie with him, but with Albrecht von Roon and Prince Friedrich Karl. “Arrange a campaign specifically for the General Staff,” the “great silent man” allegedly said to the “iron chancellor,” and you will see how we can fight.”

Such a war took place in 1866. Bismarck found it possible to oppose Austria already openly. The reason for the war was the division of the lands obtained in the war with Denmark. Austria could not annex the Holstein she had received to her territory, therefore she insisted on the formation of an independent state in Schleswig and Holstein. Prussia objected. At some point, Bismarck accused Austria of violating the terms of the Gastein Convention - Austria, they say, did not stop the anti-Prussian agitation in Holstein. When Austria raised the issue before the Federal Diet in response, Bismarck warned that the matter concerned only Prussia and Austria. The Diet, however, continued to discuss the problem, and Bismarck annulled the convention and submitted to the Federal Diet a proposal to reform the German Confederation and exclude Austria from it. He put forward an official unification program with a sharp restriction of the sovereignty of individual German states, with the creation of a single parliament, with the unification of all armed forces under the leadership of Prussia. Bismarck's proposal was rejected by the Diet.

The war was preceded by a long diplomatic preparation. Bismarck managed to secure the benevolent neutrality of Russia and even France. Italy itself began hostilities against Austria, chaining significant forces of the latter to the Venetian region. The Prussian government secretly supported the Hungarian revolutionaries, putting Emperor Franz Joseph in front of the threat of an uprising in the rear of his "patchwork" power. However, as we see, the chancellor had to quite frankly declare his plans for the unification of Germany with the leading role of Prussia, which drew a number of German states to the Austrian side.

I had to solve internal problems in Prussia. Not everyone there wanted this war and expected great success from it. Even Wilhelm I himself did not immediately agree to unleash hostilities. Bismarck made great efforts to create the appearance of a preventive, defensive war on the part of Prussia. With the help of the Prussian newspapers, it was Austria that he presented as the culprit of the fratricidal campaign of 66. It was all the easier for him to force the emperor to be the first to begin preparations for war, since in Prussia at that time the most modern rules mobilization. Austria, on the other hand, should have started collecting the army much earlier - after all, its regiments were specially formed away from the national territories that they represented. The mobilization that the Italians began forced the Austrians to act adequately. Bismarck, on the other hand, forced the enemy to proceed to even more large-scale preparation. The chancellor specifically brought to the attention of Austrian politicians the secret plans that Helmut Moltke was building. The chief of the general staff neglected political principles that were not entirely clear to him - not to act as an instigator of the war - but proceeded only from military expediency. Moltke believed that the Prussian army would achieve greater and faster success if it began to act without diplomatic warnings. It was fair, but what about the opinion of the European public? Bismarck was against it, but the draft mobilization "according to Moltke" was thrown to the Austrians, and the Marshal's Council of the Empire decided to strengthen the contingent of its troops in Bohemia. The Prussian press, controlled by the chancellor, immediately inflated these actions to the extent of large-scale preparations for war. When the Austrians tried to influence the newspapermen, Bismarck accused them of secret mobilization. On April 27, Austria announced a general mobilization; in May, Prussia also began its mobilization (the decrees on it by Moltke and Bismarck were literally wrested from the king with a fight). Naturally, the Prussian mobilization was much more successful than the Austrian one, there were more reserve formations under arms, the soldiers of the main army were well trained, but the Austrians could not fully boast of this.

On June 7, the Prussians proceeded to expel the Austrians from Holstein. On June 11, the Austrian ambassador was recalled from Berlin. Only on June 14, the council of the German Confederation decided to mobilize four corps from representatives of medium and small German states to help Austria, and the very next day the Prussians began military operations against the still not really formed German armies. Only the Saxon troops (the 23,000th corps) were alerted in advance and withdrew from Saxony, where the Prussians invaded, to Bohemia - towards the Austrian army.

Thus, the Prussian army had to operate in three military theaters. The main front against Prussia was formed by Austria and Saxony, which put up to 260 thousand troops in total. The second theater was represented by Hannover and Hesse, wedged into Northern Germany and causing a patchwork of Prussian possessions. Here, the opponents of Prussia put up only 25 thousand people. The third theater - South German - was only expected to act on the 95,000th army of the German allies of Austria, until the beginning of July they had not yet been mobilized.

The Prussian army consisted of 20 infantry divisions, 320 thousand people. The 1st Army (6 divisions) and the 2nd Army (8 divisions) were formed at the main theater. However, Moltke did not want to leave many troops to fight on other fronts and to protect the Rhine possessions from France. The last task was completely entrusted to the diplomatic art of Bismarck, and the chief of the general staff decided to fight the German states with only limited forces. So, he allocated three divisions to encircle and destroy the Hanoverian army, and then set about the South German troops. Moltke pulled the remaining three divisions from the Rhine and Westphalia to the main theater, making up the Elbe Army, subordinate to the commander of the 1st Army. In July, two reserve corps were to be formed from spare and landwehr units, which were to be used for the occupation of Bohemia in the rear of the main forces and operations in South Germany.

“A mistake made in the initial concentration of the army can hardly be corrected during the whole campaign,” this phrase of the famous Prussian Chief of Staff has become a classic. When concentrating troops at the beginning of the Austrian war, Helmut Moltke, contrary to all the ideas of the theorists of the Napoleonic school, took into account new factors - railways. Representatives of the old school believed that the most advantageous place for gathering the entire Prussian army was Upper Silesia, advanced into Austria, from which it was possible to reach Vienna in 10-12 passages. However, Moltke had to reckon with the fact that 5 railway lines led from the interior of Prussia to the Austro-Saxon border, including only one to Upper Silesia. It followed from this that the collection of troops in Upper Silesia would certainly be delayed, which would deprive Prussia of the advantages of a more systematic and well-organized mobilization. The Prussians wanted to complete the mobilization and deployment of armies in 25 days, and Moltke decided to land troops at the terminal stations of all railway lines. The deployment front, therefore, turned out to be unprecedentedly wide. However, we could already be convinced that under the new conditions - with improved communications, long-range guns, stretching columns, etc. - in holding the parts "elbow to elbow" and there was no particular need; moreover, we have already said that Moltke, on the contrary, was an ardent opponent of the "extreme concentration", the accumulation of large masses in one place. He saw such concentration as necessary only during the battle. So the Prussian army received the same order to "go apart, fight together." Moltke was not very afraid of being broken in pieces. To do this, the Austrians themselves first had to come at the right time to the right place - and when organizing control and movement in this army, such a danger was not very great.

The Austrians chose the Hungarian general Benedek as the commander-in-chief of the Bohemian, the main, theater of operations. This brave and intelligent commander desperately resisted this appointment. Until the summer of 1866, there had never been so many troops under his command, he did not even know the area, since he had previously led units in Lombardy. Under the leadership of a representative of the old school, Krismanich, a plan was developed according to which the Austrians were to gather all their forces at Olmutz and expect an attack from the enemy from Silesia. Later, Moltke correctly noted that if the Austrians had divided their forces into two parts and, using the railways, gathered them in at least two places - near Olmutz and Prague - it would be easier for them to maneuver and, accordingly, quickly move along the internal lines of operations. between the two Prussian armies, interfering with the implementation of their plan.

On June 22, the Prussians launched an invasion of Bohemia - from the northwest, from Lausitz - 140 thousand of the 1st and Elbe armies under the overall command of Prince Friedrich Karl. The 2nd Army crossed the border from Silesia 5 days later. She advanced through the mountains, in three columns, with a total of 125 thousand people under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia. The chief of staff here was General Blumenthal, one of Moltke's most gifted assistants. The general direction of both armies was given to Gichin, to which they had to pass 70 kilometers through Bohemian territory. Moltke expected that Prince Friedrich Karl would reach Gichin on June 25 and find himself in the rear of the Austrians if they tried to attack the 2nd Army and prevent it from leaving the border mountains. However, Prince Friedrich, in line with the Napoleonic tradition, cared more about concentration, he did not understand Moltke's strategy and clenched his army into a fist all the time. As a result, in order to overcome required distance, it took him 8 days; only on June 29, two of his head divisions approached Gichin and, after a successful battle, occupied it. This delay created a crisis on the 2nd Army front. Fortunately, the Austrians could not use it - the shortcomings in their strategy were much more serious.

The Austrian forces represented two groups: on the Yser River against Prince Friedrich Karl, there were 60 thousand under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony; Benedek's main forces - 180 thousand - were concentrated at Olmutz and on June 18 set out in the direction of Josefstadt (140 km). Benedek sought to deploy his forces on the right bank of the Elbe, between the 1st and 2nd Prussian armies, to block the mountain passes in front of the 2nd army with two corps, and with the rest of the forces, having attached the group of the Saxon crown prince at Gichin, to attack the army of Prince Friedrich Karl . The march from Olmutz to the upper Elbe was organized along three roads. The success of this operation depended on the speed of movement, but Benedek's columns were stretched; enormous hardships and hardships fell especially on the corps marching in the tail. The troops marched through rich Bohemia, as in a desert - even the wells along the way turned out to be scooped to the bottom. On June 25, the heads of the Austrian columns advanced to the height of Josefstadt, but the tail was still 4 marches behind.

On June 27, only 2 Austrian corps entered the battle against the front of the Prussian army. Near Trautenau, one of the columns of the 2nd Prussian army was attacked. The battle ended with the victory of the Austrians, but they lost three times as many people as the defeated (in particular, the advantage of the Dreyse gun affected). A concentrated blow did not take place in the following days. The Prussian 2nd Army managed to survive the crisis caused by the slowness of the advance of Friedrich Karl. A series of failures in the battles of individual corps forced Benedek on the 28th to concentrate his forces on the position of Josefstadt - Miletin. The 2nd Army, thus, found itself in front of the right wing of the Austrians, the 1st - on the continuation of the left. The group of the Saxon Crown Prince, attacked at Gichin on June 29, could not withdraw to Miletin, where it was supposed to form the left wing of the Austrian battle formation, but retreated in a direct direction to Königgrätz. Unable to continue the offensive due to the fact that the Prussian armies had already gotten so close that they could take him in pincers, here - to Koeniggrets - on the night of July 1, Benedek began to withdraw his main forces; he intended to retreat further. This is what the expectation of the rest of the parts coming to the head for a long time resulted in him. Even after Trautenau, Benedek wrote to the emperor that peace should be made with the Prussians immediately, but Franz Joseph categorically refused, and on July 2 he ordered the commander of the Austrian forces to stop in order to give a general battle.

The feldzeugmeister believed that the enemy would take advantage of the opportunity provided to him to connect his two groups in front of the Austrian front. And indeed, Moltke received from his subordinates an offer to unite the armies, but in the most decisive manner he ordered that the "tongs" be left open. Parts of the two princes stopped a few kilometers from each other. On the night of July 1, Moltke gave the order that the 2nd Army remained in place, and the 1st was instructed to advance in the direction of Königgrätz. If Feldzeugmeister Benedek came to this plateau, between the Yser and the upper Elbe, to stand between the Prussian armies and beat them apart, then Moltke led troops here from Saxony, Lausitz and Silesia in order to attack the concentrated enemy from different sides. The decisive battle, which took place on July 3, is historical literature two names: the battle of Koeniggretz or the battle of Sadovaya - by the name of the nearby settlements. In the same literature, this battle is unanimously recognized as one of the milestones throughout the history of Europe.

The Austrians positioned themselves to fight a defensive battle on two fronts between the Bystrica and Elbe rivers. Three corps (3rd, 10th and Saxon) stood on the left wing against the 1st Prussian Army on the crest of the heights facing Bystrica, from the village of Lipa to Nieder-Prim. The bridges over the Bystrica were deliberately left intact, since Benedek expected that the 1st Army would cross this river, come under fire from hundreds of guns deployed on the crest of the heights, be exhausted and be finished off by a counterattack. Another front, adjoining the first at a right angle (conditionally - the right flank of the Austrian army), stretched from Lipa to Lochenitz, where it rested on the Elbe and was turned north against the 2nd Prussian army. It was supposed to be occupied by the 4th and 2nd Corps, but by the morning of July 3, they were still somewhat ahead, to the north of the positions intended for them. Behind the center, Benedek concentrated his strong general reserve - two corps (1st and 4th) and 3 cavalry divisions. The 8th Corps stood in reserve behind the left flank.

On July 1, the Prussians lost contact with the retreating Austrians. Moltke assumed that the enemy had gone beyond the Elbe, and therefore took up a strong position between the fortresses of Josefstadt and Königgrätz. Let us recall that the chief of the general staff, who had already held the position of chief of staff of the army in the field, did not allow the army to join. By the evening of July 2, the headquarters of the 1st Army learned about the location between the Elbe and Bystrica of several Austrian corps. Friedrich Karl concluded that in the morning he was threatened by an Austrian attack, and decided to advance to repel it on the Bystrica River, gathering three corps in the immediate vicinity of the highway crossing near the village of Sadovaya and actively operating with his right wing (the Elbe army) on the village of Nehanits. He turned to the commander of the 2nd Army with a request to support the left wing of the 1st Army from the side of the Josefstadt fortress with at least one corps. Moltke strove for a deeper coverage of the Austrians by the left bank of the Elbe, but he decided not to cancel the movements that had already begun, so as not to confuse the actions of all units. Therefore, he added to the orders of Friedrich Karl the directive of the 2nd Army: "Move with all your might to support the 1st Army against the right flank of the expected enemy offensive and join the battle as soon as possible." This order, sent at midnight, was delivered to the headquarters of the 2nd Army 4 hours later.

At one o'clock in the morning, the 1st Prussian Army moved towards Bystrica. The Austrian offensive was not detected. Friedrich Karl moved 4 divisions across the river against the front of the Austrians, leaving 2 divisions in reserve near the village of Dub, where King Wilhelm and Moltke soon arrived. Here the chief of staff spent the entire battle, closely following the development of events together with the king.

Sadovaya and Hola Forest were defended by the Austrians as advanced points. Having forced the enemy to deploy significant forces, the Austrians withdrew, and the three Prussian divisions that crossed Bystrica here were under fire from 160 guns of the Austrian center. 5 hours 40 thousand Prussians stood, unable to take a single step forward; although the losses from artillery fire among them were only 4% of the composition, crowds of fugitives appeared, crossing back behind Bystrica; King Wilhelm personally stopped them and brought them back. The left-flank division of Friedrich Karl (7th division of General Franzezsky) attacked the same forward point of the Austrians - the forest of Svip (Maslovedsky). Around noon, by the combined efforts of 50 Austrian battalions and 120 guns of 19 French battalions, they were completely disordered; the Prussians were forced to retreat here, but the front from Chlum to the Elbe, contrary to the order of Benedek, was not occupied by the Austrians.

The 2nd Army, which was expected by 11 o'clock in the afternoon, did not show up. The three head divisions of the Elbe army, sent to the only crossing over the Bystrica near Nechanits, defended by the Austrians as an advanced point, hardly captured this village and immediately began to turn around on the left bank of the Bystrica, meaning not so much the coverage of the Austrians as the expansion of the front to the left - to establish direct communication with the 1st Army. Benedek, having learned that his corps were still fighting for the Maslovedsky forest and did not fulfill his order to occupy the front from Chlum to the Elbe, personally went to them, but the Austrians did not have time to complete the maneuver - the Prussians approached. The Austrians, attacked on the flank march, partly went beyond the Elbe, partly dispersed, and the Hungarian battalions willingly laid down their arms. Only 120 guns on the Chlum-Nedelist position hindered the Prussian advance.

Imperceptibly advancing in high loaves, the Prussian guard at about 14 o'clock quickly jumped out on the Austrian batteries on the heights of Chlum and captured them; half of Benedek's headquarters were killed before they could figure out what was going on. Continuing to advance forward detachments the guards penetrated into the depths of the Austrian location and by 15 o’clock captured the village of Rozberits.

By this time the situation was not in favor of the Austrians and on the left flank. The Crown Prince of Saxony at 13:30 went on the offensive against the Prussian units of the Elbe Army, which sought to cover his left flank. The Saxons were pushed back and lost Nieder-Prim and Problus. The crown prince began to slowly retreat to the crossings on the Elbe and left the coverage area. Doom threatened the center of Benedek, deeply engulfed on both sides. The fire of well-trained Austrian gunners and a number of counterattacks on the Prussian guard made it possible to avoid this danger.

At 1540 hours, Moltke saw that units of the 2nd Army had apparently already penetrated the rear of the Austrians. At this moment, the “great silent man” allegedly turned to the worried Wilhelm and said: “The outcome of the campaign is a foregone conclusion in accordance with the wishes of Your Majesty.” After that, he gave the order for a general transition to the attack. She met no resistance.

Benedek managed to ensure that the pincers of the 8th and 6th Prussian corps, located on the extreme flanks of the Prussian armies, could not close until the Austrian center slipped through the narrow gap between them. At the same time, the 1st Austrian Corps lost a third of its composition during the 20-minute attack. The direct pursuit, which the Prussians tried to organize, was stopped by the fire of 170 guns located 4 kilometers northwest of Königgrätz. By 23.00, all the Austrians managed to withdraw beyond the Elbe.

The losses of the Prussians in the Battle of Sadovaya amounted to 9 thousand killed and wounded, the Austrians - more than 22 thousand killed and wounded, 19 thousand captured. The Prussians also got 174 Austrian guns.

It is interesting that Moltke and other Prussian officers for a long time could not understand the extent of the victory won. As a result, the Prussian units advancing concentrically mixed up, Moltke did not know that in the 2nd Army there was another fresh corps with which to organize the pursuit. The enemy artillery fire raged until evening. The Elbe hid from the Prussian commander the size of the losses in the Austrian army. Dragomirov wrote that among the Prussians there were those who, in the evening after the battle, asked: “Who won as a result - us or them?” Only on the third day did it become clear what exactly had happened, and this made it possible for the Austrians to get away from complete defeat.

As we see, general scheme the battle was predetermined at the very beginning of the Prussian offensive in Bohemia, with the operational deployment of the army. “Circumstances will be incomparably more profitable if on the day of the battle the troops concentrate on the battlefield from different starting points, if the operation was carried out in such a way that it leads from different sides, the last short transition, simultaneously to the front and to the flanks of the enemy. In this case, the strategy will give the best that can be achieved at all, and the result will be great results. So wrote the Chief of the General Staff of Prussia, and so it happened: as a result, the edges of the deployed battle order of the Prussian army, at the right time, hit from the flanks and almost "slammed" the entire Austrian army. Moltke vehemently opposed the premature squeezing of the tongs, although Friedrich Carl was constantly looking for the "neighbor's elbow". But Benedek was never able to bring his reserves into battle, which were inside the semicircle outlined by the front parts of the Austrians. The tactics of the feldzeugmeister troops on the battlefield were also determined by the strategy chosen before the start of the war.

Only on July 7 did the further advance of the Prussians begin. Moltke sent the 2nd Army into a barrier against Benedek, who was setting up his army near Olmutz, and sent the rest of the forces directly to the Danube, to Vienna. The fate of the Austrian capital seemed to be sealed. The military party in Prussia demanded its mandatory capture and a triumphal parade on the main square. The usually modest chief of staff wanted this, as well as Wilhelm I, who had recently doubted his success. But the cunning Bismarck was against it. He was well aware that the humiliation of Austria could lead to undesirable consequences for Prussia. Firstly, in the defeated empire, Bismarck saw a future ally in European affairs, so the chancellor did not want to arouse strong revanchist sentiments and incite hatred of the Austrians. In addition, Napoleon III had already made proposals for mediation - the defeat of Vienna would have been a personal insult for him. And the rest of the European powers would hardly have positively perceived the inability of Prussia to moderate their ambitions. In the Prussian leadership, therefore, there was a fierce struggle between the moderate and militaristic parties, which was won by Bismarck. They say that he almost lay at the feet of the king with tears in his eyes and shouted: “Do not touch Vienna!” However, soon he proudly wrote in one letter: “I beat them all! Everyone!! Every single one!!!”, referring not to the Austrians, but to Wilhelm, Moltke and others. On August 23, peace was concluded in Prague, excluding Austria from the German Confederation. Prussia was satisfied with limited increments, Bismarck persuaded Wilhelm to abandon the annexation of Saxony and Bavaria. Austria ceded Venice to Italy, and Holstein to Prussia, paid a small indemnity. Hanover (which was ruled by the English king until 1837), Kurgessen, Nassau, Hesse-Homburg and Frankfurt am Main were annexed to Prussia, which now owned two-thirds of the territory and population of the German states (not counting Austria). 21 states north of the Main entered the new North German Confederation under the auspices of Prussia. Foreign policy and military matters were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Prussian king as head of the union. He was empowered to declare defensive war. Four others German states(Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt) were obliged to pay small indemnities and conclude military alliances with Prussia. The final unification of Germany was not far off.

With each passing day, such a successful war for Prussia, Helmut Moltke and his department gained more and more weight in the eyes of the Prussian military and the monarch. During the interwar period of 1866-1870, the "great silent man" began to manage most of the processes in the army. This purpose was also served by his own rapid exposition of the conclusions from the war of 1866. Immediately after the conclusion of the Peace of Prague, Moltke set a task for his subordinates: to collect archival documents left by the war and start developing them. It was not possible to completely objectively cover the course of the campaign; it was not for nothing that such influential people were at the head of the armies. So, Prince Friedrich Karl, of course, did not want to see in the official history of the war negative evaluation of his actions during the march to Gichin or a detailed account of how during the battle, not understanding Moltke's goals, nervous, forgetting about the scale - temporal and spatial - of the battle, he tried to throw thousands of people into an unnecessary attack on the Austrians. So for the compilation of the official history of the war of 1866, intended for publication, Moltke gave the directive: "The truth, only the truth, but not the whole truth." This story came out in 1867. But at the same time, the general staff, represented by, for example, Verdy du Vernoy and Count Wartensleben, conducted scientific research “for themselves” more carefully, without stopping before criticizing their own actions. On the basis of this study, in 1868 Moltke compiled and presented to the king "A Memoir on the Experience Arriving from a Consideration of the 1866 Campaign". A year later, the revised memoir was sent to all commanders, starting with the regimental commander and above in the form of "Instructions for the highest combatant commanders." It is believed that it was this instruction that made it possible during the Franco-Prussian war to avoid the mistakes that had been made before in the use of cavalry and artillery.

The General Staff seized the highest arbitration in matters of strategy and tactics. Within four years, the Prussian military system was extended to all the states of the North German Confederation and to the territories newly annexed to Prussia. The issues of armaments, the formation of reserves, the construction of fortresses, the increase in the staff of military units, the size of the conscription into the ranks of the army, the formation of new units, since they affected the size and combat effectiveness of the army in the field and influenced the speed of its concentration, became the responsibility of the general staff as components of the war plan . Responsibility for directives fell on the General Staff. The Minister of War in Prussia retained full power only in relation to their implementation.

Prussia came close to solving the most important task - the unification of Germany, but the last step could only be taken by breaking the obligatory resistance of France, which had traditional interests on the Rhine.

In 1869, Bismarck invited Bavaria and Württemberg, two of the most important independent states of South Germany, to join the North German Confederation and proclaim its president, the King of Prussia, as German Emperor. Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, as a result of the defeat they suffered jointly with Austria, already in the autumn of 1866 entered into a defensive alliance with Prussia. However, they were in no hurry to unite with her. Local leaders gave Bismarck a negative answer and entered into secret negotiations with French politicians about providing them with support in the event of a war with Prussia. In order to win over the South German lands to his side, the "Iron Chancellor" needed a war, but one in which France would be the first to show aggression. In an atmosphere of rising nationalist sentiment, it was easier to win over everyone to their side - the side of the "defenders of German independence."

Further developments became a classic of diplomatic intrigue. In order to displease France, Bismarck and Moltke convinced Wilhelm to nominate a prince from the Hohenzollern family as a pretender to the vacant Spanish throne, which had long been under the influence of the French. This was done, however, secretly, in the sense that Bismarck categorically denied his participation in this nomination. However, France could not turn a blind eye to this obvious challenge. In Ems, where the Prussian king was resting, Ambassador Benedetti arrived, who not only demanded, but asked him to give his government guarantees that the Prussians would never again nominate Hohenzollerns to the throne of the king of Spain. However, the very content of the request was a rather daring diplomatic step. William refused to give such guarantees, but when Benedetti asked for a new audience for a conversation on this topic, the king refused to accept him and conveyed through his adjutant that he had said his the last word. The adviser of Wilhelm I informed Bismarck of all this in a telegram. Her chancellor was delivered during lunch. Roon and Moltke dined with him. Bismarck read the dispatch to them. Roon and Moltke were so upset that they "neglected food and drink." Having finished reading, the chancellor asked Moltke about the state of the army and its readiness for war. The chief of staff replied that "the immediate start of the war is more profitable than delay." After that, Bismarck edited the telegram right there at the dinner table and read it to the generals. The words addressed personally to Bismarck were removed from the dispatch, and the fact that the king answered the French envoy "quite sharply" was also deleted, in order to strengthen the impression of Benedetti's irreverence. Hearing the new version of the Ems dispatch, Moltke exclaimed: “That sounds different; before it sounded like a signal to retreat, now it is a fanfare! The message was published in the German press. On July 16, France declared war on Prussia.

The state of the French armed forces was far from optimal. Unsuccessful military expedition to Mexico led to a sharp reduction in military spending. The country did not have a worthy mobilization plan; the French artillery was seriously lagging behind the Prussian. However, the Chaspeau guns were superior in range and reliability to the Prussian guns. During the war, this led to the fact that the Prussians, without waiting for the completion of the appropriate artillery preparation from their excellent batteries, sought to get closer to the enemy as quickly as possible, leveling the difference in the range of rifle fire. This, like the recurrences of shock tactics, caused great damage to the Prussian army.

The French war plan provided for the collection of 250-300 thousandth army on the border within two weeks. It was decided to put two armies on the border: the army of Bazaine in Lorraine, ahead of Metz, and the army of MacMahon in Alsace. Conrobert's third reserve army was to be formed at Chalons. It was assumed that the troops would quickly go on the offensive, cross the middle Rhine, which would lead to a breakaway southern Germany from the North German Confederation and provoke the performance of Austria-Hungary and assistance to Italy. Then it was necessary to advance on Berlin. However, the very first condition for the execution of this plan contained an error based on incomprehensible calculations. France could not assemble such an army on the border in two weeks.

The plan drawn up by Moltke looked much more reasonable. For the first time, he had to prepare a plan for a war with France back in 1859, when France was at war with Austria in Lombardy. Prussia was preparing mobilization, and the chief of the general staff was poring over the map, studying the possibilities of the still unreformed Prussian army, which he also did not lead. Then the plan looked very modest - Moltke proposed to be limited to operations in Alsace and Lorraine. Now, after the reform of 1860 and the filling of the Prussian army with permanent contingents instead of the Landwehr, after the victorious war with Austria, given the emergence of allied German armies, new conditions for mobilization and an established system of leadership from the General Staff, he moved on to the ideas of crushing.

Moltke drew up a war plan not only for one North German Confederation, all the armed forces of which were directly subordinated to the king of Prussia, but also for the allied states of southern Germany. It should be noted that the chief of the general staff (and during the war, the chief of the field staff of the entire army) decided not to allocate large forces in the event of a possible appearance of Austria on the side of France. Moltke intended to operate on internal lines between the two theaters of war. With an advanced system of mobilization, he could expect to have time to defeat the mobilized forces of France, and then have time to transfer troops to the east, since Austria also needed a long time to collect its army.

Moltke correctly identified the number of French troops and their points of concentration. In 1870, the operational deployment was already to be carried out entirely by railroads; France, on the other hand, had only two large railway junctions in the border zone with Germany - Metz and Strasbourg. There the groups of marshals Bazin and McMahon were concentrated. Moltke planned to take Paris and destroy the French army along the way. It was necessary to choose the general direction of the operation: either bypass the French with the right wing in order to cut them off from Paris and press them to the Swiss border, or bypass them with the left wing, trying to intercept the road to Paris and press the French to the Belgian border. Despite the fact that the first option looked more geographically promising, Moltke took into account the location of the railways, which made it much easier to accumulate a big fist on the border of Alsace than in the neighborhood of Holland and Belgium, and chose to bypass the French from the south and push them back to the Belgian border .

The very first days of the war showed how accurately everything was calculated in the Prussian General Staff, how carefully they prepared for the war there. The Germans quickly mobilized twice as large an army as the French, helped in this and carried out over the past four years specially with military purpose railroads towards the French border. Over half a million Germans were deployed on the front from Trier to Karlsruhe, Moltke demanded the speedy action of the armies from there: the 1st and 2nd armies - to Lorraine, and the 3rd - to Alsace. Thus, already in France, the armies had to move as quickly as possible to the traditional mode of action "along the Moltke" - an offensive in converging directions.

On August 4 at Wissamburg and on August 6 at Werth, the southern grouping of French troops under the command of Marshal MacMahon was defeated. At Forbach, on August 6, Prussian troops also defeated the northern grouping of Bazin. On this sector of the front, battles unfolded around the fortress of Metz. On August 14, the French were again defeated east coast the Moselle River, and two days later - on west bank. On the 18th, the most stubborn battles took place at Saint-Privat - Gravelot.

In the French Army of the Rhine there were about 150 thousand people, in the 1st and 2nd Prussian armies - 284 thousand. The French troops defended on a front of 11 kilometers, the Germans deployed for an offensive in a strip 14 kilometers wide, intending to crush the French defenses with frontal attacks of 200,000 masses ahead. At the cost of huge losses, they only managed to push back French troops with some points, but not to break through the defenses. The battle of Saint-Privat - Gravelot is an example of the development of a battle on the move. The French took up a defensive position, the Germans entered the battle right from the campaign. Moreover, the German artillery, being in the head of the marching columns, as a rule, was the first to open fire. But the artillery fire and the bold thrusts of the German infantry long time did not lead to success. The battle at Saint-Privat is interesting. The Prussian guards were advancing here on the open plain in close formations. The columns retained the "elbow feeling" and advanced under the shouts of "left-right", under the beat of drums and the play of buglers, stepping all the time in the same rhythm. Before the line, located at a distance of 600 meters from the main French position, the guards did not have the opportunity to use their guns, and the French, armed with Chaspeau guns, showered the attackers with a hail of bullets. At the cost of heavy losses, with the help of artillery, the guards troops approached the French at the range of the Dreyse gun. From this line, the greatly thinned company columns spontaneously deployed in a dense chain, combining movement in dashes with firing. In the evening, the village of Saint-Privat was occupied by the Prussian guard. In this battle, the French lost 13 thousand people, and the Germans - over 20 thousand people. This battle showed how soldiers on the battlefield spontaneously find a new tactic that alone allows them to save their lives in the face of dense enemy fire. The Prussian guardsmen began to crumble into a chain, move in dashes, contrary to all regulations and exercises and parades. On the other hand, it is impossible not to admit that, probably, only the trained Prussians could move in the right column for so long and purposefully, not paying attention to the comrades falling in the ranks.

The Army of the Rhine under Marshal Bazin, fearing that his left flank would be covered, withdrew under the cover of the forts of Metz. The Prussian high command failed to either defeat or push back the French army to the north. The blockade of the fortress was not included in original plan war, but Moltke quickly solved this problem. For the blockade of Metz, a Special Army of 200 thousand people was formed from the 1st and 2nd German armies. For the offensive against the French army in Chalons, commanded by Marshal MacMahon, the 3rd and new, Meuse, armies were intended - a total of about 224 thousand infantry and cavalry and 813 guns. The Chalonian army, at the request of the French government, moved to Metz to the rescue of Bazaine's Army of the Rhine, although MacMahon was sharply opposed to this, rather a political one (to calm the population - they say, we don’t leave our own in trouble) than a military decision. The mood of the French command ultimately led to disaster.

On August 23, the 120,000-strong army of Marshal MacMahon moved to Metz to the rescue of Bazaine. Naturally, McMahon's movement was not only not hidden, but exaggerated on the pages of the French press. Therefore, Moltke, having missed MacMahon at first, learned in time about the French maneuver and went after the Chalon army. McMahon tried to sabotage the orders of Paris, get off with small skirmishes with the enemy, but nothing could be done: the orders remained the same - to go to Bazaine. The army of Chalons moved headlong to the crossings on the Meuse at Mouzon and Stenay. At the Meuse, the Germans were already waiting for the French, and McMahon tried to deviate from the intended crossing point, moving troops north to the Mouzon-Remilly section.

Having reached Beaumont, the French stumbled here on the combined forces of the Meuse and the 3rd German armies. On August 30, the battle of Beaumont ended in failure for the French, however, the Prussians also suffered significant losses. MacMahon retreated behind the Meuse to the fortress of Sedan, where he was squeezed in a narrow space between the right bank of the Meuse and the Belgian border. A quick, vigorous retreat along the only Sedan-Mezieres road, with the movement of units around the gorge of Saint-Mange, launched on the night of September 1, could still save MacMahon's army. The demand of public opinion - to bail out Bazaine - could be satisfied with a report on the battle of Beaumont; one could point to the five-fold superiority of the Germans in this battle, which nullified the heroic efforts of the Chalon army to lend a helping hand to Bazaine. However, the battle of Beaumont was not used to break the political impasse: Napoleon III, who was with the army, was only concerned with hiding from France the defeat of another corps, and telegraphed this battle as a minor skirmish.

September 1, 1870 began famous battle at Sedan. The space in which it took place was limited by two streams - Givon and Fluen - and cut by ravines. The most important height on the battlefield was Mount Kalver, reinforced by the Garen Forest lying behind. The position of the French, who occupied the plateau and dominated the heights of the Zhivonsky ravine, gave only a ghostly chance for retreat. The retreat to Carignan was blocked by the Meuse army. The path to Mezieres was blocked by the 3rd German Army. It was still possible to go to Belgium, where MacMahon's army would most likely be disarmed by Belgian troops (Belgium remained neutral). The Germans expected that McMahon would definitely retreat to Mézières. Therefore, a plan was developed according to which the Meuse army was to tie the French in battle, crossing from the left bank of the Meuse at Remilly and attacking Basey. Meanwhile, the 3rd Army was to advance along the right bank, bypassing the left flank of the French with the forces of the 11th and 5th corps.

Early on the morning of September 1, in dense fog, the first brigade of the Bavarian corps of General Tanz crossed the pontoon bridges over the Meuse and launched an attack on Basey. Only one French division was stationed there. In Bazeya, the Germans met with the most serious rebuff: every house was stubbornly defended by the enemy. The Germans had to bring reinforcements into battle, and only by 10 o'clock in the morning there was a turning point in their favor. Simultaneously developed German attack on the right bank of the Meuse. Here the Prussians occupied La Moncelle and advanced to the valley of the Givon stream.

Already at 6 o'clock in the morning, Marshal MacMahon was wounded at Monsel. He handed over the command to General Ducrot. Threatened by encirclement, Ducrot ordered an immediate retreat to Mézières. Lartigue's division secured the crossing at Denier. Parts of the 12th Corps were to delay the Germans by advancing on Basey and La Moncelle in order to buy time for the retreat of other troops. The movement had already begun when the cancellation of this order was received. Presenting the secret order of the Minister of War, General Wimpfen, who had arrived the day before from Algiers and was appointed commander of the 5th Corps, demanded that the command be transferred to him. Ducrot obeyed without protest, and the retreating divisions of the second line were immediately ordered to return.

Wimpfen believed that the retreat to Mézières was certain death, therefore he changed the direction of the retreat, ordering to move to Carignan in the direction of Metz. To this end, he planned to first push the Bavarians at Bazeya with the forces of the 1st and 12th corps, and then fall on the right wing of the Germans and defeat him. The attack on Basey, however, was not successful, the French were forced to retreat to their previous positions.

Meanwhile, the ring was shrinking. Around noon, the Prussians took possession of the valley of the Givon stream. Having installed artillery on the left slope of the ravine, they opened fire on the French, who occupied east slope and Garen forest. From that moment on, the road to Carignan was finally cut off, but the retreat to Mézières was already blocked. Having crossed at Donchery through the Meuse at night, the 5th and 11th Prussian corps bypassed the left flank of the French army, while occupying the villages of Fluen, Saint-Mange and Flenier and reaching the vicinity of Sedan. Thus, by 12 o'clock the French army was already completely surrounded. The batteries of the 5th and 11th corps occupied the heights southeast of Saint-Mange, after which the French found themselves in the crossfire. The Garensky forest, in which their main forces were concentrated, was continuously fired upon. The French batteries could not compete with the German Krupp guns.

On the left flank, the position of Douai's French corps became more and more desperate. Having stretched out against the bypassing enemy in a thin line, having shot cartridges, he was not able to hold his position. By two o'clock in the afternoon, the French left Mount Kalver, and now the Garen forest was taken under fire by 60 guns of the guards corps.

The last desperate attempt to break through the ring was made by the French cavalry. From the Garen forest, seven cavalry regiments under the command of General Marguerite launched a desperate attack. Marguerite was seriously wounded at the very beginning, and General Galifet took his place. Under heavy artillery fire over rough terrain, the French cavalry attacked the infantry of the 11th Prussian corps: the cuirassiers suddenly appeared from Gollier and walked through the rear of the enemy, but in the Meuse valley they stumbled upon the Prussian hussars and galloped further north.

Helmut Moltke described the final stage of the battle as follows: “The attack of the French is repeated in various directions, a fierce scuffle continues for half an hour, but with less and less success. Confident infantry fire from short distances covers the entire field with wounded and dead horsemen. Many fall into quarries or fall off steep slopes, a few managed to swim across the Meuse, and hardly half of the brave men returned under the protection of the forest.

At about three o'clock in the afternoon, the French from all over the battlefield began to retreat to Sedan. Up to 500 guns from both banks of the Meuse crushed the retreating. The German assault on the Garensky forest began. Two hours later, the battle was completed, and even earlier, the fortress of Sedan capitulated. Napoleon III ordered a white flag to be raised above the town hall and sent a respectful note to Wilhelm I. The battle of Sedan was decisive in the course of the Franco-Prussian war. The loss of the French in it amounted to 3 thousand people killed, 14 thousand wounded, 21 thousand prisoners; another 63,000 surrendered at Sedan, and 3,000 were disarmed in Belgium. The Prussians lost 460 officers and 8,500 soldiers.

The defeat of MacMahon's army opened the way for the Prussians to Paris, and the capture of Emperor Napoleon III was the end of the monarchy in France. Already on September 4, France was proclaimed a republic. In the autumn of 1870, the republican government gathered significant forces to continue the war with Prussia, which came as an unpleasant surprise to Moltke. In December, he had several violent skirmishes with Secretary of War Roon, who refused to issue a follow-up call, leaving the chief of staff and the de facto head of the armed forces to fight against the now superior forces of the enemy. However, the German troops acted quite confidently against French recruits. They occupied a significant part of the country's territory, the army of Bazaine in Metz was forced to surrender as soon as the last cracker was eaten in the fortress. The Prussian army also participated in the suppression Paris Commune in 1871. In total, the Franco-Prussian War lasted 226 days. On May 10, 1871, in Frankfurt, the French signed a difficult peace for themselves, according to which they transferred Alsace, East Lorraine and 5 billion indemnities to Germany.

As early as November 1870, the South German states joined the Unified German Confederation, which had been transformed from the North. In December 1870, the Bavarian king offered to restore the German Empire and the German imperial dignity, destroyed in his time by Napoleon. This proposal was accepted, and the Reichstag turned to Wilhelm I with a request to accept the imperial crown. On January 18, 1871, the establishment of the German Empire was proclaimed in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles.

Moltke firmly won the glory of the first commander of his time. He received the rank of Field Marshal, Wilhelm I awarded him the title of count - now he was Helmut von Moltke. Even the Russian authorities considered it possible to award the Prussian commander with the Order of St. George, 2nd class "for the war with the French in 1870."

As the undisputed authority in the field military science, Moltke led the general staff until 1888, although, as already mentioned, for the last six years of this term, Waldersee was the actual head of the department. The emperor strongly objected to anyone taking the place of von Moltke before it became absolutely necessary. Under Moltke's direction, the official history of the Franco-Prussian War was written. In addition, the commander spent a lot of time developing plans for a future war. The fact is that France quickly recovered from the defeat, and already in 1874 Moltke said: “What we have acquired by force of arms, we will have to defend with arms in our hands for another half a century so that it is not taken from us.” He foresaw that Germany would definitely have to fight a war on two fronts - against France and Russia at the same time - and believed that the sooner this happened, the better. Together with Waldersee, the chief of the general staff developed a war strategy, according to which the German troops needed to keep the defense against France in the west, where there were a number of strong fortresses on the Rhine and the river itself created an obstacle for the enemy, and actively fight in the east against Russia. However, the Germans, according to Moltke, should have limited themselves here to the occupation of Poland, since "the boundless expanses of Russia are not of vital interest to Germany."

Since 1867, Helmut Moltke was a deputy first of the North German and then of the German Reichstag, and from 1872 - a member of the Prussian House of Lords. In the Reichstag, he belonged to the Conservative Party and always voted with the right. He spoke only on military matters. He perfectly mastered the subject of speech, knew how to illuminate each issue in an original way, and therefore he was listened to with interest in all the ranks of the Reichstag, including the extreme left. A supporter of strong power in war and in peace, Moltke was a monarchist, ardently devoted to the Prussian royalty, and defender of a strong and united German Empire. In military terms, the Field Marshal was a zealous supporter of the constant strengthening of the army and navy, his speeches about the natural inevitability of war were especially striking. The last such performance by Moltke dates back to 1890. “Eternal peace,” he said, “is a dream, and not even a beautiful one.” Moreover, the commander argued that war plays a civilizing role in history, that the best qualities of a person are manifested in it, that this shake-up is simply a necessary part of progress.

Moltke was distinguished by restraint and unshakable self-control both on the battlefield and in the Reichstag and personal life. He was a modest and chaste man, married when he was 42 years old, and lived with his wife in peace and harmony for 26 years. After the death of his wife in 1868, the general moved in with his nephew. Being a Protestant, the commander was always loyal to the Catholic Church, moreover, he said more than once that Martin Luther had made a big mistake in his time by starting hostility with Rome. Until his death, Moltke amazed everyone with his diligence. The entire empire solemnly celebrated the 90th anniversary of the outstanding commander. Even during his lifetime, several monuments were erected to him: in his homeland in Parchim in 1876, in Cologne - in 1881, in Leipzig - in 1888. Without any previous illness, Helmut von Moltke Sr. died on April 24, 1891. Legends still circulate about his death - as if two officers saw him on the streets of Berlin at the very hour when he got up from the card table, apologized and went to his room, where he lay down on his bed and died.

His nephew Helmuth von Moltke Jr. was Chief of the German General Staff during the First World War and proved to be much less capable than his famous uncle. The grand-nephew of the elder Moltke was executed during the Second World War for participating in a plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler.

The depth could vary from 8 to 24 ranks depending on the situation: the need to strike a certain force or, conversely, withstand the onslaught of the enemy, as well as the terrain.

When crossing the Oka, of course, there were no forests to build a bridge in these places, and the Macedonians used leather bags stuffed with straw and dry vines.

In order to understand the size of the wealth captured by Alexander, we note that by the time the Macedonian army crossed the Hellespont, the royal treasury of Macedonia consisted of only 60 (!) Talents.

(319-273 BC) - the king of Epirus, an outstanding commander who fought with Rome on the side of Tarentum.

In the next year 208 BC. e. Marcus Claudius Marcellus died. He was ambushed by the Numidians, leaving with a small convoy to inspect the area.

Former ally of Carthage, who once defeated Syphax. Now the Romans were drawing the peoples of Africa to their side, just as Hannibal once acted in Italy in relation to the Gauls, Ligurians and others.

Caesar was born allegedly as a result of the now traditional operation, called "caesarean section."

By the way, both of Caesar's paternal uncles were optimates and died fighting with the supporters of Marius and Cinna.

As it was not proved either then or later by historians, his participation in the so-called "first conspiracy of Catiline." Frankly speaking, there was no conspiracy, apparently.

The Gastein Convention was concluded between these states following the Danish war of 1864.

Such a late marriage can be explained by this aphorism attributed to Moltke: “Smart people are rarely good husbands ... they don’t marry!”

Getairs - these are the friends of the king, the most well-born representatives of the nobility, who sat on the council under the Macedonian ruler and formed the backbone of the leadership of the army. Naturally, many of them ended up in the ranks of the heavy cavalry, an elite branch of the military that required long training and a condition sufficient to fully arm themselves for war. There was also a part of foot hetairoi, also consisting of noble Macedonians. With a certain stretch, this term can be compared with the concept of "knight".

In this case, Oxenstierna probably violated the wishes of his late monarch. Gustav Adolf at one time was actively negotiating with the Brandenburgers that the prince Friedrich Wilhelm would marry his cousin in due time, uniting Sweden, Brandenburg, and Pomerania under his rule.

On December 25, 1800, Napoleon was assassinated on the Rue Saint-Nicaise. The Infernal Machine exploded seconds after the First Consul's carriage passed by. This was followed by mass arrests and the sending to hard labor of the Jacobins, who had nothing to do with this attempt.

In 1811, an economic crisis broke out in France, connected precisely with the marketing crisis. Napoleon gave huge subsidies to French manufactories, began to place large government orders. At court, it was ordered to appear in the most luxurious toilets, change clothes more often, and buy tons of delicacies.

Many experts believe that Moltke received the laurels of the winner under the Sedan not quite deservedly. In their opinion, even earlier, on September 1, he could have acted more actively against MacMahon, dividing the 3rd and Meuse armies to cover the enemy from two sides. However, the elderly chief of staff, who, according to sources, was on the verge of overwork on August 25-29, could not weaken the closeness of the mass of his troops, which he hated so much.

You need to start with documents. Here is an excerpt from the transcript of the meeting of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, held on January 15-16, 1947 in Moscow:

“The preliminary and judicial investigation established:

Von Pannwitz Helmut in 1941, being the commander of the head strike detachment of the 45th German infantry division, took part in the treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union in the Brest-Litovsk region. As cavalry inspector at the High Command ground forces, Pannwitz actively contributed to the massacres and violence against Soviet residents in the territory of the Soviet Union, temporarily occupied by the Germans, by Nazi soldiers.

Being in the army grouping of the German General Kleist in the North Caucasus, Pannwitz assisted the latter in using the so-called "volunteer" Cossack regiment against the Red Army, created by the Germans from the traitorous Cossacks of the Don and Kuban.

In April 1943, on the instructions of the High Command of the German Army, Pannwitz formed a Cossack "volunteer" division from the White Guards and Cossack prisoners of war, established contact with white guard general Krasnov.

The Pannwitz division, then reorganized into a corps, was in Yugoslavia from September 1943 until the day of the surrender of Germany, where it waged an armed struggle against the Yugoslav partisans and civilians. The Cossacks of the Pannwitz corps committed reprisals against the civilian population, shot innocent people, raped women, burned settlements. By personal order of Pannwitz, in the winter of 1944, 15 Yugoslav hostages were hanged on poles in the Sunja Zagreb region.

The Supreme Court sentenced von Pannwitz to death penalty through hanging. The verdict was final and not subject to cassation appeal.

And here is a certificate on the rehabilitation of Lieutenant General von Pannwitz Helmut, issued by the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office today, on April 23, 1996:

“Von Pannwitz Helmut Wilhelmovich, born in 1898, arrested on May 9, 1945, convicted on January 16, 1947 by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on the basis of Art. 1 of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 19, 1943 to death by hanging, in accordance with paragraph "a" of Art. 3 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On the rehabilitation of victims political repression» rehabilitated.

Assistant to the Chief Military Prosecutor V.M. Crook."

Let us immediately note that Colonel of Justice Viktor Mikhailovich Kruk, who signed this amazing document, soon after the fateful legal act resigned from the military justice bodies and left the Russian Federation.

But why did the German general, one of those who brought the war to Soviet land, and with it death, grief and suffering to millions of our compatriots, a military leader of a very high rank, who formed a division and a corps from traitors to the Motherland, suddenly forgiven all sins?

And this was done not by any public human rights organization of its own free will, but by the Main Military Prosecutor's Office itself.

But you are even more surprised when you get acquainted with the following revelation Cossack ataman(and part-time writer, as he introduces himself) Boris Almazov: “Helmut von Pannwitz - national hero Cossacks, he accomplished a feat ... of the highest morality (?! - A.V.), he came to a foreign people, understood its history and decided to go with this people.

This amazing passage is from a book published in 1997 called “The Marching Ataman Batko (?!) von Pannwitz”.

Who is he, this “von dad”, who turned out to be a “victim of political repressions” from the bay, and who was behind this amazing legal curbet? And what was his army, now given out by some of the Cossack public for "honest fighters against the communist totalitarian regime"?

Helmut (or Helmut, as they often write) Wilhelm (or Wilhelmovich, as he decided to be called after his appointment as commander of the Russian division) von Pannwitz was born in the village. Bocenowitz in Silesia in the family of a German Junker in 1898. His life path is absolutely typical for the Nazi warriors of the highest rank. At the age of 11, he was sent to the cadet corps in Waldstadt and, upon graduation, with the rank of cadet, he was seconded to the 1st Lancers Regiment of the Western Front. Since 1916, having risen to the rank of lieutenant, he fought with Russian troops in the Carpathians.

After the defeat of Germany in 1918, he was, like many other Kaiser officers, out of work, being dismissed. Since 1934, again in the Reichswehr (then - the Wehrmacht) with the rank of captain. In 1939, he took part in the attack on Poland, commanding the cavalry vanguard of an infantry division, in 1940 he fought in France ...

And now let's read the protocols of interrogations of von Pannwitz, conducted by investigators of the USSR Ministry of State Security in 1946-1947.

“- What crimes and criminal acts do you plead guilty to?

Moving from Brest-Litovsk to Kursk, the shock and other detachments of the 45th Infantry Division subordinate to me destroyed a number of villages and villages, destroyed Soviet cities, killed a large number of Soviet citizens and also robbed peaceful Soviet people ...

... I must admit that by participating in the inspection, and later in the formation of military units consisting of prisoners of war of the Red Army, and leading them in battles against the USSR and Yugoslavia, I committed an act that, according to international rules and customs of war, is considered a crime. I am ready to bear responsibility for this crime...

I plead responsible for the fact that, starting from the autumn of 1943, I led the battles of the division subordinate to me against the Yugoslav partisans, allowed the Cossacks to massacre civilians in the zone of action of the division ... I carried out the criminal orders of the Hitlerite high command and the circulars of the SS Obergruppenführer Bach-Zelewski, in which measures were outlined to combat the partisans and to massacre the civilian population ...

... - List the cases when, on your orders, the Cossacks committed acts of robbery, violence and other crimes against humanity in Yugoslavia.

Of the numerous crimes committed by the Cossacks subordinate to me in Yugoslavia, I recall the following facts.

In the winter of 1943-1944, in the Sunja-Zagreb region, on my order, 15 hostages from among the Yugoslav residents were hanged ...

At the end of 1943, in the area of ​​​​Frushka Gora, the Cossacks of the 1st Cavalry Regiment hanged 5 or 6 (I don’t remember exactly) peasants in the village.

Cossacks of the 3rd, 4th and 6th cavalry regiments committed mass rape of Yugoslav women in the same area.

In December 1943, similar executions and rapes took place in the area of ​​the city of Brod (Bosnia)

In May 1944, in Croatia, in the area south of the city of Zagreb, the Cossacks of the 1st regiment burned the village ...

... I also recall that in December 1944, the Cossacks of the 5th Cavalry Regiment under the command of Colonel Kononov, during an operation against partisans in the area of ​​the Drava River, near the town of Virovititsa, committed massacre of the population and rape of women ... ".

Probably enough.

If the army of the “father” von Pannwitz, who, together with his “valiant” ataman, surrendered to the British in May 1945, had not been transferred by the British command to the Soviet side, the government of Yugoslavia would probably have sought his extradition, to carry out well-deserved justice.

And undoubtedly, if not in Moscow, then in Belgrade, the punitive general would have received his death sentence.

And now let's turn to the documents on the rehabilitation of this gentleman. As follows from the conclusion submitted for approval by the assistant to the Chief Military Prosecutor, Colonel of Justice V.M. Kruk to the Deputy Chief Military Prosecutor, Lieutenant General of Justice V.A. Smirnov on April 22, 1996, in the temple of army legality, they began to review the case of the “marching ataman” because the granddaughter of von Pannwitz, Vanessa von Bassevitz, asked for the rehabilitation of her grandfather.

As can be seen from the certificate signed by the assistant to the Chief Military Prosecutor, the basis for the rehabilitation of von Pannwitz was clause “a” of Article 3 of the RF Law “On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions” of October 18, 1991. The text of the law reads:

“Subject to rehabilitation are persons who, for political reasons, were:

a) convicted of state and other crimes.

But what does “political motives” have to do with it, when we are talking about atrocities, violence, murders of innocent people. And Article 3 itself is arbitrarily taken out of the context of the law. For Article 4 of the same legal act states:

“The persons listed in Art. 3 of this Law, justifiably convicted by the courts, as well as punished by the decision of non-judicial bodies, in whose cases there is sufficient evidence on charges of committing the following crimes:

... b) committing violent acts against the civilian population and prisoners of war, as well as complicity with traitors to the Motherland and fascist invaders in committing such acts during the Great Patriotic War;

... d) war crimes and crimes against justice.”

It is unlikely that the guardian of law in colonel's uniform did not read Art. 4, referring to Art. 3, or considered it possible to selectively interpret a legal act, "without noticing" an inconvenient article. Obviously, Pannwitz's confession during interrogations at the MGB (the above excerpts from the protocols) just seemed to him "insufficient" evidence.

"Didn't notice" V.M. Kruk and frank confessions of von Pannwitz during interrogations. How else to explain such a statement by the colonel of justice in the rehabilitation opinion in the Pannwitz case:

“... it has been established that Lieutenant General von Pannwitz during the Great Patriotic War was a citizen of Germany, a member of the German army and carried out his military duties. There is no evidence that von Pannwitz or units subordinate to him committed atrocities and violence against the civilian Soviet population and captured Red Army soldiers.

Probably, I misunderstood something. Apparently, I was far from the level of legal consciousness that Colonel of Justice V.M. Crook…

But after reading these very eloquent documents, this was the thought that haunted me: are not the victims of political repression and are not subject to rehabilitation on the same basis those sentenced to hanging by the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946, say, the chief of staff of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, General -Field Marshal W. Keitel or the head of the Imperial Security Main Office, SS Obergruppenführer Dr. E. Kaltenbrunner? After all, “political motives” in their criminal cases are undoubtedly evident. They also fought Bolshevism to the best of their ability. Those sentenced to death by the international court in Nuremberg were again German citizens and "only" carried out their official duties or the orders of the Fuhrer. These people did not kill anyone, did not torture or rob anyone ...

Rhetorical question: did the Main military prosecutor's office headed by deputy Attorney General RF, Chief Military Prosecutor V.N. Panichev, before rehabilitating von Pannwitz, how far can this kind of "humanism" take legality?

Is this not a shameless mockery of the memory of the victims of Nazism, of the suffering and grief of millions of our fellow citizens and representatives of other conquered peoples, who bore the brunt of the fight against the "plague of the 20th century"?

Now about where, as they say, the wind blew in the spring of 1996. Recall that the rehabilitation of the Nazi general coincided with the visit of B.N. Yeltsin in Germany. Boris Nikolaevich at that memorable time imagined Russia to be an ally of the FRG and generously demonstrated his cordial disposition towards Chancellor H. Kohl. To confirm this friendship, of course, evidence was required, some kind of specific steps. So the officials from the GVP fussed: the rehabilitation of von Pannwitz became one of the "gestures of goodwill." True, it was designed entirely for the German audience, and neatly hidden from compatriots. This is not just my guess. The same explanation was given to me by a very well-informed member of the Foreign Intelligence Service. There is evidence that, following Pannwitz, they were going to rehabilitate Hans Rattenhuber, the head of Hitler's personal guard, who ended his days in a Soviet prison, but did not have time. People in the Kremlin began to change, and with them the prevailing mood.

In addition, in 2001, the author of these lines published in two publications - the weekly "Independent Military Review" and the monthly journalistic magazine "Selskaya Nov" - exposing materials about the rehabilitation of Helmut von Pannwitz. After the speeches in the press, the Main Military Prosecutor's Office reversed: the rehabilitation of the Nazi punitive general was urgently canceled. In the response received by the editors of the magazine "Selskaya Nov" signed by the head of the Department for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions of the State Military Police, Major General of Justice V.K. Kondratov said: “I inform you that the conclusion of April 22, 1996 on the rehabilitation of von Pannwitz Helmut was canceled as unfounded. On June 28 of this year (2001), a conclusion was made that von Pannwitz was justly convicted for the criminal acts committed, there are no grounds for protesting and he is not subject to rehabilitation.

At the same time, it is recognized that the certificate of rehabilitation of von Pannwitz Helmut legal force does not have, of which the interested persons, as well as the relevant government agencies Germany.

This decision allows us to conclude that corporate solidarity does not dominate GWP lawyers, they are open to public discussion of the problems of human rights activities and sincerely strive to correct the mistakes made.

In a conversation with the editor of the department of history and law of the magazine "Selskaya Nov" (your obedient servant was), Major General of Justice V.K. Kondratov told some details of this case. It turns out that in 1996, contrary to many years of established practice, the then leadership of the GVP instructed to study the issue of reviewing the von Pannwitz case and prepare an opinion on it not for the Office for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions, but personally for the assistant to the Chief Military Prosecutor, Colonel of Justice V.M. Crook. Of course, the secretly drawn up document was not subjected to legal expertise in the aforementioned Department and was approved, in fact, bypassing competent specialists.

If the von Pannwitz case had been considered by us, I think there would have been no mistake, - Valery Konstantinovich emphasized. - After all, our lawyers, when determining the degree of guilt of a person, take into account the totality of circumstances, and not individual formal grounds ...

According to Major General of Justice Kondratov, who has been involved in rehabilitation cases since 1987, Pannwitz's case is unprecedented in its kind.

For example, in the same 1996, when all the sins of General Pannwitz were "absolved", the Main Military Prosecutor's Office considered the cases of Major General G. Remlinger (military commandant of Pskov during the Nazi occupation) and Major General K. Burkhardt ( commandant of the rear of the 6th German army, stationed in 1941 - 1942 in Ukraine). Both were denied rehabilitation: their criminal cases contain similar testimonies about the atrocities they committed as in the materials of the interrogations of Helmut Pannwitz, with the only difference that executions and robberies of innocent people were committed on the territory of the USSR.

By the way, in 1997, the GVP considered the cases of Pannwitz's accomplices, sentenced to death by the same sentence passed on January 16, 1947, the leaders of the White Cossacks P.N. and S.N. Krasnov, A.G. Shkuro, Sultan-Gireya Klych, T.I. Domanova. According to Major General of Justice Kondratov, such organizations as the Don Military History Club, the Information Cossack Center of the Union of Cossacks of Russia, and the United Fund for Culture of the Kuban Cossacks insisted on their rehabilitation. However, on December 25, 1997, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, on the basis of the conclusion of the GVP, issued a final verdict: these persons were punished according to their merits and are not subject to acquittal.

For Helmut von Pannwitz, as we see, an exception was made. Did Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin know what a dubious curtsey was performed in the GVP for the sake of strengthening his personal friendship "with friend Helmut"? Dark water in the clouds ...

The article was published as part of a socially significant project implemented with state support funds allocated as a grant in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 11-rp dated January 17, 2014 and on the basis of a competition held by the All-Russian public organization Society "Knowledge" of Russia.

Recently, there has been a growing trend to justify, whitewash collaborators and traitors. There is a scientific basis for this justification. There is already a doctoral dissertation, where collaborationism is declared simply a social protest, the names of traitors are perpetuated through commemorative plaques, statues and even street names.

One of the famous figures of the collaborationist movement is Helmut von Pannwitz. "Father Pannwitz". Poems are dedicated to him, legends are told about him.

A German from Silesia, SS Gruppenführer von Pannwitz, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, which grew to the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps "SS".

What are the merits of the corps and the “German Cossack”, what glory did the Russian SS men under the command of a German SS man cover themselves with? What do “tears of sorrow and sadness” mean about their extradition by the British command to the Soviet side, and what can be the conversation about the so-called. "Tragedies of Lienz"?

A tragedy for the Nazis, their current fans and henchmen - yes. For everyone, it is the fulfillment by the allies of their obligations, followed by well-deserved retribution.
Let's consider in more detail.
***

1st Cossack Division was formed on August 4, 1943 under the command of Colonel Helmut von Pannwitz. He participated in the "Russian campaign" from the first day as the commander of a reconnaissance unit. (according to unconfirmed reports, a participant in the siege of the Brest Fortress).

They collected it from the retreating remnants of the Cossack formations as part of the Wehrmacht, emigrants, prisoners of war. Division commanders: Colonel Hans von Wolf, Lieutenant Colonel Wagner, Lieutenant Colonel von Nolken, Lieutenant Colonel von Wolf, Colonel von Bosse, Lieutenant Colonel von Jungshultz, Lieutenant Colonel Kononov, Lieutenant Colonel von Kalben. Similar to the Russian surname - one.

September 17, 1944, signed by the head of the Main Directorate of the Cossack troops, General P.N. Krasnova issued a special order number 15 "On the formation of the Cossack corps and the tasks of the Cossack camp". «

... The first Cossack division - said in the order - G Lieutenant General von Pannwitz elected Fuhrer gathering place for all Cossacks. All Cossacks must unite together and form one Cossack corps ... »
As of February 25, 1945, the Germans were already commanders in the 15th Cavalry Corps of General von Pannwitz:

Colonel Steinsdorf, Major Weil, Colonel von Baat, Colonel Wagner, Colonel Wagner, Colonel von Nolken, Lieutenant Colonel von Klein, Major von Eisenhard-Rothe, Colonel von Schultz,
Lieutenant Colonel Leman, Major Eltz, Lieutenant Colonel Prince Salm-Horstmar, Major Count Kottulinsky.
Many had nothing to do with the Cossacks, especially the officers - Krasnov explained this by the fact that among the Cossacks themselves there were no such trained in military knowledge and disciplined.

Maybe it was for this reason that they were not sent to fight at the front, against the regular units of the Red Army.

Who did you fight?
They fought in Yugoslavia against the partisans and the local population, which supported the partisans. The brothers of the Serbs, who, having heard Russian speech from the punishers, could not believe it.

“Under the command of von Pannwitz, who had already been promoted to general, the main part of the division was thrown against the partisans of Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia, in the region of Croatia, and five battalions - 6 thousand people. - To France.

The division turned the places of its operations into a continuous conflagration. Together with the 11th SS Panzer-Grenadier Division "Nordland" in the area northwest of the city of Sisak, they burned down the peasant farms and villages where the partisans were hiding and transferred these places under the control of the Ustashe. After that, the division was transferred to the Zagreb region, where it again committed a merciless robbery.

The German newspaper reported: “In a short time, the Cossacks became a thunderstorm of bandits” (calling the partisans like that. - A.K.). The local population, the Yugoslavs, hated the Cossacks, they were more afraid of the Germans. Significantly, in their eyes, the Cossacks appeared to be non-Russians, contemptuously called "Cherkasy". They said: “can the “Russian brothers” kill and rape”? In the end, the Cossacks opposed the entire population to themselves, lost their allies.
- - -
For these "feats" of Pannwitz's wards, their leader A. Hitler filled up with honey cookies and filled with jam:

“On May 1, 1944, he completely equalized the rights of the Cossacks of the 1st Cossack division with German soldiers, allowed the Cossacks to wear Wehrmacht insignia and at the same time retain the signs of the Cossack troops, wear stripes and hats, and outside the combat situation, the traditional Cossack uniform. The division was transferred completely to food and combat supply according to the standards of the German units, as well as monetary allowances according to their tariffs. Vacations were presented to officers and non-commissioned officers. In the absence of relatives in Germany, they were accommodated in special rest homes. The families of military personnel were entitled to cash benefits, and the disabled - pensions. The Cossacks were subject to the regulations in force in the Wehrmacht on military criminal law and disciplinary sanctions.
*
From the materials of the interrogation of von Panwitz after his capture in 1945

Question:What punitive measures did you take against the partisans?
Answer: Parts subordinate to me robbed the inhabitants of these areas, burned their homes, raped women and, at the slightest resistance, killed the population.

Question: Consequently, the killings and violence against civilians were carried out by you not only for helping the partisans, but also for resisting the robbery and violence that they committed?
Answer: Yes, it was.
* *

“... The fighters of the Cossack Corps fought in Yugoslavia with cruelty, second only to the thugs from the Ustashe, but they were a little worse than other belligerents. ... "

British historian Basil Davidson, during the occupation of Yugoslavia - a liaison officer between the British "management special operations"and Tito's partisans, believes that
“Pannwitz was a ruthless leader of a gang of bloody marauders. Is it too strong? Is there any language that looks too strong to describe their deeds?(von Pannwitz was the ruthless commander of a horde of murderous wreckers.Too strong? But what language could be too strong for what they did?)

Here is such an interesting touch to the life of the formation given in his book by the English historian and politician N.D. Tolstoy-Miloslavsky (namesake of L.N. Tolstoy):
Not too picky in matters of morality and discipline, Kononov was, one might say, the spiritual son of Shkuro. In his headquarters there was a personal executioner, a hefty guy with gold earrings, half Greek. At the first sign of Kononov, this fellow readily injected 9 grams of lead into anyone who had the misfortune not to please his commander.
Recall - Kononov is one of von Panwitz's subordinates: commander of the 5th Don Regiment.
***

Question: What instructions did you follow in the fight against the partisans?

Answer: A special circular drawn up by the SS-Obergruppenführer Bach-Zelevsky and approved by the General Staff. It was compiled on the basis of experience in the fight against partisans on the Eastern Front. The circular stated that guerrilla war contrary to international rules, and therefore it was proposed to use any means deemed appropriate by the head of the military unit on the spot. Since the partisans enjoy the support of the local population, it was proposed to consider every woman, every old man and even a child as an assistant to the partisans.
<…>The local population, if it is not recognized as an active assistant to the partisans, must be evicted and evacuated, and the village, as a center of partisan struggle - can be burned. It was proposed to identify and destroy partisan bases of weapons and food. The senior head of the punitive expedition was giventhe right to decide on the spot the fate of the captured partisans.
***

One of the division's most heinous crimes, a-priory Other, researcher of the suffering of children in Bosnian Krajina during the years wars are the murder by the Cossacks of the 2nd Caucasian brigade of thirteen Yugoslav Komsomol women and three pioneers in the mountains Kozary On January 11, 1944, during the anti-partisan operation "Incendiary Torch" (German. Brandflackel). Komsomol members and pioneers, residents of the village of Grbavtsi (Gradishka community), the eldest of whom was 21 and the youngest 12 years old, were returning from a partisan hospital in the village of Bukovitsa when they stumbled upon an ambush of Cossacks seven kilometers from the village of Gornji Podgradtsi. They were tortured, five-pointed stars were cut out on their bodies, and Stoya Zmiyanyats ( StojaZmijaњats), at which a flag was found, was torn apart by horses while still alive. In the end, after being raped, all thirteen girls and three pioneers were killed.
***
From the transcript of the interrogation of von Panwitz:

Question: What crimes and criminal acts do you plead guilty to?
Answer:... I recognize myself responsible for the fact that, starting from the autumn of 1943, I led the battles of the division subordinate to me against the Yugoslav partisans, allowed the Cossacks to massacre civilians in the zone of action of the division, carried out the criminal orders of the Nazi high command and SS circulars ...
Of the numerous crimes committed by the Cossacks subordinate to me in Yugoslavia, I recall the following facts.

In the winter of 1943-1944, in the Sunja-Zagreb region, on my order, 15 hostages from among the Yugoslav residents were hanged.
In the same area, in 1944, three local residents were shot, allegedly for espionage, although there were no facts of their espionage activities.
At the end of 1943, in the area of ​​​​Frushka Gora, the Cossacks of the 1st Cavalry Regiment hanged 5 or 6 (I don’t remember exactly) peasants in the village.
Cossacks of the 3rd, 4th and 6th cavalry regiments committed mass rape of Yugoslav women in the same area.
In December 1943, similar executions and rapes took place in the area of ​​the city of Brod (Bosnia).
In May 1944, in Croatia, in the area south of the city of Zagreb, the Cossacks of the 1st regiment burned one village.
In June 1944, the same regiment committed mass rape of the residents of the city of Metlika.
By order of the commander of the 4th cavalry regiment, lieutenant colonel of the German army Wolf, the village of Chazma, west of the city of Belovar, was burned.
In the same period, that is, in the summer of 1944, the Cossacks of the cavalry regiment burned several houses in the Pozhego-Daruvar region.
I also remember that in December 1944, the Cossacks of the 5th Cavalry Regiment under the command of Colonel Kononov during an operation against partisans in the area of ​​the Drava River, not far from the mountains. Virovititsa, committed the massacre of the population and the rape of women ... "

***
Von Pannwitz on January 16, 1947, by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on January 15-16, 1947, was hanged along with other generals of the Cossack Camp.

In 1998, in Moscow, on the territory of the Church of All Saints, they put (obviously, the Nazis) "Monument to the Leaders of the White Movement and Cossack chieftains"- there are mentioned, in particular, SS Gruppenfuehrer Helmut Wilhelm von Pannwitz, ataman Sultan-Klych-Girey, ataman Krasnov.
"To those who fell for the faith and the Fatherland" - that's what it says there.

— You can’t touch any monument - you can’t change history anymore, - said in 2005 Janis Bremzis, deputy public committee "Reconciliation of the peoples of Russia and Germany, who fought in two world and civil wars", after the speech of the initiative group for the demolition of the monument to the Nazis.
— We do not want a "war of monuments" that takes place in the same Baltic countries where both Soviet and national monuments are desecrated.(link)

So cleverly, masquerading as humanism, equating the SS men with Soviet soldiers, punishers with real soldiers. We will remember these words.

What is surprising is this: how can you even pronounce these names aloud - the names of traitors and murderers?

And yet July 17, 1996 SS General Pannwitz was rehabilitated as "victim of political repression" on the basis of the conclusion of April 22, 1996, Colonel of Justice V. Kruka.
Either from the fact that conscience prevailed, or from the fact that Yeltsin ceased to be president - but June 28, 2001 Crook's opinion was overturned as unfounded, and on June 28, 2001, an opinion was issued concluding:
“... von Panwitz was reasonably convicted for the committed criminal acts, there are no grounds for protesting and he is not subject to rehabilitation. At the same time, it was recognized that the certificate of the rehabilitation of von Panwitz Helmut has no legal force, of which the interested persons, as well as the relevant state institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany, were notified in writing.

But in Russia there are quite public people who call the SS punisher a “hero”, a “knight of honor”, ​​etc., who approve of the actions of the corps in Yugoslavia. At the same time, they seriously count on the support of the patriotic part of society. You have to be, to put it mildly, a very short-sighted politician and a person with very marginal views for Russia. With a very incomprehensible interpretation of the concept of "patriotism".

_________________________________

Krikunov P. “Cossacks. Between Hitler and Stalin

A. Kozlov "The Great Patriotic War and the Cossacks»

Parrish M. The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953 https://books.google.ru/books?id=NDgv5ognePgC&pg=PA125#v=onepage&q&f=false

Basil Davidson. bad habits http://www.lrb.co.uk/v13/n12/basil-davidson/bad-habits

N.D. Tolstoy "Victims of Yalta" http://lib.ru/HISTORY/FELSHTINSKY/tolstoj.txt
Wikipedia with a link to:

DragoKarasijevic. Č ETVRTAKRAJIŠ KANOUDIVIZIJA. — Beograd: Vojnoizdavač kiinovinskicentar, 1988.

DragojeLuki ć. RatidjecaKozare. III. Kozaro, usrcutenosim — Beograd — Prijedor — Jasenovac, 1990.

Danilo Karapetrov. Trinaestskojevki and three pioneers. - DoњаЈurkovitsa: Zavichaјna library, 2015.

Newspaper "Trud" dated 31.01.02 http://www. trud. ru / article /31-01-2002/36073_ delo _ generala - karatelja . html

Alexander Polanuer"Legends and myths of the 132nd separate battalion escort troops of the NKVD of the USSR » http://militaryspez. ru/index. php? topic=1307. msg 269140# msg 269140

Helmut von Pannwitz (1898-1947) - German officer, SS Gruppenfuehrer. From the German nobles, a veteran of the First World War. He fought on the Eastern Front from 1941.

Explaining what does he have to do with all this pack of traitors, I have to start "from Adam." The Hitlerite leadership traditionally paid a lot of attention to propaganda, and the war with the USSR was no exception. It was necessary to create a system of people who knew the language and the country, agitating the population to obey the Nazis, advising local punitive bodies. The splitting of the “political” budget took place in the conditions of rivalry between the two groups. The first is emigrants like Krasnov or Shkuro, they have experience in political struggle, a certain past, organizations focused on overthrowing the communists. The second is defectors like Vlasov, who know modern Soviet life and can speak “the same language” with the local population.

The first grouping was clustered in the 15th Corps, commanded by von Pannwitz, it included both the “Cossack reserve” Shkuro and the “highlanders” Klych-Girey. At the beginning of the war, all these personalities were used mainly as consultants and propagandists.

However, parts of collaborators are also formed little by little, the first "Cossack" units were created in September 1941. By the summer of 1943, a "Cossack division" was formed under the command of von Pannwitz, its ideological leader was Krasnov. In 1944, when serious problems began in Germany, it was decided to form the 15th SS Cavalry Corps, which included all the "Cossack" units.

All this menagerie was personally commanded by von Pannwitz, to whom the Cossack reserve awarded the honorary title of Cossack ataman "father". Even according to a pro-fascist historian Hofmann : « ... all command posts in the 1st and 2nd divisions of the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps were occupied by German officers. The only exceptions were a few additional staff officers, a few squadron and platoon commanders.". So there is no need to talk about any kind of “Russianness” of these parts of the SS.

Pannwitz became famous for the special cruelty of the reprisals back in 1941, during the fighting in Yugoslavia. For the same work, he was put at the head of a new connection. The created part was intended mainly for punitive operations in Yugoslavia and Russia, the calling card of the 15th cavalry was mass rapes in controlled areas. These numerous episodes arevon Pannwitz's own testimony , which are well enough known and I will not quote them again.

For the first time in a fight with Soviet units"Cossacks" entered in December 1944, but did not have much success.

In 1945 he was arrested at the request of the USSR and Yugoslavia, extradited for trial in Moscow, convicted of war crimes and hanged.