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When there was no more surprise author Isaev Alexey Valerievich

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Operation Mars

Codenamed "Mars", Operation is the least known to the general public of the "offensive of the gods" series. It became the last Soviet offensive against the Rzhev ledge, the fifth battle for Verdun on the Soviet-German front. The idea of ​​the Soviet command to conduct a major offensive on the central sector of the front was based on the following considerations. Firstly, the poverty of communications in the southwestern and southern theater of operations of the Soviet-German front prevented the use of all the available forces of the Red Army near Stalingrad and the Caucasus: they simply could not be provided with adequate supplies. Secondly, the uncertainty of the enemy’s plans and the proximity of the positions of the Army Group Center to Moscow made it necessary to keep significant forces on the central sector of the front in case the German offensive began on Moscow. Passive waiting was the worst choice in terms of strategy, so it was decided to attack. If the offensive was successful, the Rzhevsky ledge dangerously close to Moscow would be eliminated. Also, an offensive, even an unsuccessful one, could lead to the disruption of the enemy's plans, or at least shift the timing and outfit of forces for their implementation. Active actions also contributed to the accumulation of combat experience by commanders at all levels.

Plans and forces of the parties.

The beginning of work on the plan of the offensive operation, which later became known as "Mars", refers to the final period of the Pogorelo-Gorodischenskaya operation. As a result of this operation, the Rzhevsky ledge was formed in the form in which it existed throughout the autumn of 1942 and the beginning of the winter of 1943. The troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts were located on the eastern and western faces of the ledge, respectively. The dividing line between the fronts divided the ledge into two approximately equal parts. In September 1942, the troops of the Western Front made the last attempt to capture the city of Rzhev. Despite reaching the outskirts of the city and capturing several quarters, they failed to capture the city. The Soviet command regarded the stubborn defense of Rzhev as the desire of the Germans to keep a promising bridgehead on the northern bank of the Volga. Such a bridgehead could be useful to them for an attack on Moscow. The Rzhev ledge as a whole also seemed to be a giant springboard for an attack on Moscow. All this prompted us to work on plans to eliminate the springboard of Army Group Center extended to Kalinin and Moscow.

Since the German defense near Rzhev itself was sealed, the most logical next move was to look for another sector of the front for a breakthrough and further access to the rear of the Rzhev enemy grouping. The choice fell on the 20th Army. At the same time, it was decided not to disperse between different directions and concentrate forces on the right wing of the Western Front, south of Rzhev. To this end, on September 30, the command of the 33rd Army was ordered to transfer the 8th Guards Rifle Corps allocated for the Gzhatsk operation to the 20th Army. The strike point shifted south of Rzhev, into the zone of the 20th and 31st armies. On October 1, the commanders of the 20th and 31st armies were ordered to prepare to go on the offensive. The completion date was October 12th. In the 31st Army, the detachment of forces consisted of four rifle divisions, two tank brigades, seven RGK artillery regiments and six RS divisions. In the 20th Army, the strike force consisted of six rifle divisions, the 8th Guards Rifle Corps (26th Guards Rifle Division, 148th and 150th Rifle Brigades), nine RGK artillery regiments, and sixteen RS divisions. The echelon of development of success, which was subordinate to the headquarters of the Western Front, was to be a mobile group from the 6th Tank Corps, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps and the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade.

The paradox of planning the operation was that no one was going to cut off the entire ledge with the encirclement of the German troops in it with strikes at the base of the Rzhev salient. According to its plan, "Mars" is closest to the counter-offensive near Moscow in December 1941, when the German tank groups stretched out to the capital tried to break up into parts with a multitude of relatively small blows. Back in October 1942, the task of establishing communication with the troops of the Kalinin Front, advancing from the western front of the Rzhev salient, was assigned to only one (!) Cavalry division of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of V.V. Kryukov. The main forces of the cavalry corps, after breaking through the front by the troops of the 20th army, were to advance north, to the rear of the enemy's Rzhev grouping. The 6th Panzer Corps was supposed to strike at Sychevka in order to form an external encirclement front. In the final version, the task of covering the offensive flank with a strike in the Sychevka area was assigned to the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, with the support of three tank brigades. It was planned to break through the front for the introduction of a mobile group into it by the forces of the 20th Army and the left flank of the 31st Army adjacent to it. The right flank of the 31st Army, in the event of a successful advance of the group of V.V. Kryukov, was to strike through Rzhev towards the tankers and cavalrymen. This was a typical decision for Operation Mars, when the encirclement of a relatively small group of enemy troops was to be carried out by strikes from two adjacent armies, one of which received a tank or mechanized corps as a means of developing success.

In addition to a pair of the 20th and 31st armies, a strike force from the 5th and 33rd armies was created on the Western Front. The pause in October 1942 made it possible to accumulate strength and return to the offensive plan against Gzhatsk. In this pair, the "mobile" was the 5th army, it was attached to the 5th tank corps. In addition to him, seven rifle divisions and three tank brigades were allocated for the offensive in the 5th Army. The army was supposed to break through the front and go out with the 5th tank corps to Gzhatsk. The right neighbor of the 5th Army, the 33rd Army, was supposed to strike the main blow with five rifle divisions and two tank brigades, and the auxiliary one - with the 7th Guards Rifle Corps (17th Rifle Division, 36, 112, 125, 128th rifle brigades) and the 256th tank brigade. The target of both strike groups was Tumanovo, a village on the railway line from Gzhatsk to Vyazma. In the final version, the transition to the offensive of the 5th and 33rd armies was planned for December 1, that is, five days after the main forces of the 20th army went on the offensive.

The offensive in the Kalinin Front was also planned in the form of multiple crushing blows in several places. The difference from the plans of the Western Front was that all the shock groups of the Kalinin Front launched the offensive at the same time. There were five of them: the 39th army on the "top" of the Rzhev ledge, the 22nd army in the Luchesa valley, the 41st army south of Bely, and, finally, the adjacent flanks of the 3rd and 4th shock armies were supposed to surround Velikiye Luki . The 22nd Army (3rd Mechanized Corps), the 41st Army (1st Mechanized Corps) and the 4th shock army(2nd Mechanized Corps).

It should be noted that "Mars" and the Velikolukskaya operation were among the first battles in which independent tank formations of the Red Army participated. new organization- mechanized corps. The formation of mechanized corps began in September 1942. The first two such corps (1st and 2nd) were formed in accordance with the NPO directive of September 8, 1942. They had a staff strength of 175 tanks, consisting of three mechanized and one tank brigade. But the 3rd and 5th mechanized corps instead of one had two tank brigades (in the case of the 3rd mechanized corps of M.E. Katukov, this is the 1st guards and 49th tank brigades), the number of tanks, respectively, increased to 224 machines. The mechanized corps were stronger than the tank corps (which existed since April 1941 as part of two tank and one motorized rifle brigades) due to more infantry and tanks.

The "highlight" in the operation "Mars" by the troops of the Kalinin Front was the use of aviation. The 3rd Air Army, which supported the actions of the front, was included by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command five of the newest air corps (one bomber, two assault and two fighter), which arrived at the end of October 1942. These were the 1st BAK (129 Pe-2), 1st ShAK (211 Il-2s and 37 fighters), 2nd ShAK (163 Il-2s, arrived on November 16, 1942), 1st IAK (149 fighters), 2nd IAK (186 fighters). In addition, the 132nd Bomber Aviation Regiment, armed with the latest Tu-2 bombers, arrived in the 3rd Air Army. These were the first production Tu-2s with two M-82 engines (previously called 103VS). The Kalinin Front once again confirmed its reputation as a "preserve of aviation rarities." In total, by the beginning of the operation, the aviation of the Kalinin Front had 150 Pe-2 and Tu-2 bombers, 152 U-2 and R-5 night bombers, 457 Il-2 attack aircraft, 435 Yak-1, Yak-7 and La-5 fighters , 44 Pe-2 scouts, and a total of 1238 combat aircraft. A powerful aviation grouping was supposed to compensate for the dispersion of the directions of attacks of the Kalinin Front and the weak road network in the designated lanes of advance.

The offensive decisions were similar to those of the Western Front: two adjacent armies attacked in converging directions, with one of the armies being reinforced by a mobile unit. These pairs were, respectively, the 22nd and 39th armies and the 3rd and 4th shock armies. Initially, the 2nd mechanized corps was supposed to participate in the offensive of the 41st army south of Bely, but in the final version of the Mars plan it was sent to Velikiye Luki. The refusal to use the 41st Army of the 2nd Mechanized Corps in the offensive was caused by an underestimation of the German tank reserves. Back in October 1942, the 9th Panzer Division was named as the main enemy reserve. Of the arrival of reserves from the north it was said:

"The use of tanks of the 8th TD in the direction of our strike is unlikely."

No other operational and strategic reserves were discovered. By the way, the 8th Panzer Division nevertheless took part in the hostilities against the Kalinin Front, when German command tried to unblock the encircled garrison of Velikiye Luki. The struggle of the right wing of the Kalinin Front for Velikiye Luki, although it took place, according to many documents, as part of Mars, remained in history as an independent operation. There were some reasons for this: there was no operational connection between the battles near Velikie Luki and the offensive against the Rzhev salient. Therefore, we will consider the Velikoluksky operation separately.

According to its plan, the offensive of the Kalinin Front is almost symmetrical to the plan of the Western Front, that is, it was aimed not at cutting off the entire Rzhev salient, but at destroying part of the forces defending it. Moreover, the shock groups of the front troops were aimed primarily at inflicting defeat on the enemy troops to the north railway, passing along the line Velikiye Luki - Rzhev - Zubtsov. Attacks in converging directions by the 22nd and 39th armies were supposed to lead to the encirclement of the Oleninsky group of German troops. The offensive of the 41st Army was aimed at capturing the city of Bely and ensuring the actions of the 22nd and 39th armies from the south.

According to the official version of Russian historical science, "Mars" is a distraction operation carried out in order to tie down German reserves in the central sector of the front and prevent their transfer to Stalingrad. However, an analysis of the number of armies involved in the operation of the troops of Kalininsky and Western fronts, does not confirm this version. The total number of combat troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts was 552,714 and 769,436, respectively. If we sum up the number of troops of the armies along the perimeter of the Rzhev salient, then we will get the following data. 5th (71,249 men, 73 tanks), 20th (95,602 men, 301 tanks), 22nd (70,275 men, 272 tanks), 29th (54,073 men, 93 tanks), 30th I (50,199 men, 63 tanks), 31st (74,158 men, 90 tanks), 33rd (78,490 men, 196 tanks), 39th (92,135 men, 227 tanks) and 41st ( 116,743 people, 300 tanks) armies of the two fronts united more than seven hundred thousand soldiers and commanders and more than one thousand seven hundred tanks, namely 702,924 people and 1,718 tanks. Of the above armies, the 5th and 33rd armies did not conduct offensive operations at the end of November and December 1942, but, as mentioned above, they received offensive missions on Mars. On November 19, a week before the start of the offensive by the troops of the two fronts, they received directive No. 00315 from the headquarters of the Western Front to destroy the Gzhatsk enemy grouping. The planned offensive of these two armies did not take place only because of the failure of the first stage of the operation. Therefore, the exclusion from the order of forces on the "Mars" of the 5th and 33rd armies is unlawful. At the same time, I deliberately exclude from the calculations the troops of the right wing of the Kalinin Front, which participated in the encirclement of Velikiye Luki, so that the resulting estimate would be deliberately underestimated. The Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts that took part in Operation Uranus near Stalingrad numbered 331,948, 192,193, and 258,317, respectively. It can be seen with the naked eye that the total number of troops of the three fronts of "Uranus" is significantly inferior to the number of two fronts that conducted the "Mars". If we sum up the number of troops of the 1st guards army(142,869 people, 163 tanks), 21st Army (92,056 people, 199 tanks) and 5th Tank Army (90,600 people, 359 tanks) of the Southwestern Front, 24th (56,409 people, 48 tanks ), 65th (63,187 people, 49 tanks) and 66th (39,457 people, 5 tanks) armies of the Don Front, 62nd Army (41,667 people, 23 tanks), 64th Army (40,490 people , 40 tanks), the 51st Army (44,720 men, 207 tanks) and the 57th Army (56,026 men, 225 tanks) of the Stalingrad Front, we get 667,478 men and 1,318 tanks. That is, even the most rigorous calculations speak of smaller forces involved at Stalingrad, in comparison with the offensive undertaken against the Rzhev salient. Obviously, no more forces can be involved in a "diversion operation" than in the main offensive. Therefore, if we evaluate the plan of "Mars", then one can see rather a desire to seize the territory - to eliminate the bridgehead extended to Moscow and the release of the railway line going to Velikiye Luki.

At the same time, it should be noted that, despite the impressive outfit of forces, the plan for Operation Mars from the very beginning laid the prerequisites for its failure. Subsequently, A.I. Radzievsky, who participated in the operation as the chief of staff of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Front, headed the Academy of M.V. Frunze, wrote:

“The idea of ​​Operation Mars was to break up the defenses in the area of ​​the Rzhev salient with eight strikes from the Western and four strikes from the Kalinin Front and, having destroyed the forces defending it, to reach the Smolensk region. At the same time, the Kalinin Front, with the forces of the 3rd Shock Army, launched an offensive against Velikiye Luki and Novosokolniki. Due to the fact that in total 13 shock groups were created, most of them, with the exception of the Zubtsovskaya Western Front and the Oleninskaya Kalinin Front, turned out to be of a small composition - three or four divisions with a mechanized or tank corps. The multiplicity of blows, of which more than half were pinning down, led to the spraying of firepower. Although the density of artillery in some groupings reached 70-85 and even 100 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area, half of them were mortars that could only fire at the first position ”(Radzievsky A.I. Breakthrough. M .: Military Publishing House, 1979, pp. 49-50, highlighted by me).

The idea of ​​many crushing blows, on which the whole operation was built, is not new in itself. It belongs to the general of the tsarist army A.A. Brusilov, who used such a strategy against the Austrians in the summer of 1916 in an offensive that later received his name. The meaning of such a formation of troops is that strikes on auxiliary axes tie down the enemy's reserves, preventing him from transferring them against our troops in the direction of the main attack. In theory interesting idea worked to a limited extent against the Austrians in 1916, but was completely unsuitable against the German army in 1942. The difference was that the German reserves near Rzhev were motorized or received vehicles for transportation from one sector of the front to another. It was not an easy task to forge mobile formations, since during the battles they could consistently take part in repelling the offensive in different sectors. Under these conditions, a limited number of strong coordinated strikes with the echelon of success in the form of one or two mobile formations seems to be a more promising form of offensive. The Germans called the Brusilovsky breakthrough in 1916 "reconnaissance on a wide front without concentrating a strike." The same words can be said about Operation Mars. Not a single sector (with the exception of the Velikiye Luki region) was dealt a strong enough blow so that the Germans did not have time to fend off its development by transferring reserves.

In addition to the controversial form of the operation, the fact that the Germans became aware of the plans of the Soviet command played a negative role. First, the offensive was originally planned for mid-October, and troop movements were made by this date. However, due to bad condition roads during the rainy season, the start of the offensive was delayed. This led to the fact that the regrouping of troops and the concentration of tanks, infantry and artillery in the zones designated for the offensive of the armies were revealed by the air reconnaissance of the 9th Army. Secondly, undercover intelligence worked effectively. German agent Max reported on November 6, 1942:

“On November 4, a meeting of the military council was held in Moscow under the chairmanship of Stalin. 12 marshals and generals were present. The meeting adopted following solutions: a) in order to avoid heavy losses, a thorough study of all operations is necessary ... e) to carry out all planned offensive actions, if possible, before November 15, if weather conditions permit, namely: from Grozny [in the foothills of the Caucasus] ... in the Don region under Voronezh, near Rzhev, south of Lake Ilmen and Leningrad [presumably near the city of Toropets]. The front must be reinforced by reserve troops” (G I a n t z D. Op.cit. S. 37).

The combination of information about the upcoming offensive near Rzhev and intelligence data on the places of concentration of Soviet troops greatly facilitated the preparations for the defensive operation by the German command.

The enemy of the Soviet troops in "Mars" was the same as in the previous battles for Rzhev - the 9th Army under the command of Colonel-General Walter Model. The perimeter of the Rzhev ledge on November 15, 1942 was defended (Kriegstagebuch des OKW. 1.Januar 1942-31.December 1942. Zweiter Halbband. Band 2. S.1388): VI Army Corps (2nd air field, 7th air airborne and 197th infantry divisions), XXXXI tank corps (330th and 205th infantry divisions, regiment of the 328th infantry division), XXIII army corps (246th, 86th, 110th, 253rd and 206th infantry divisions , a regiment of the 87th Infantry Division and a regiment of the 10th Motorized Division), XXVII Army Corps (95, 72, 256, 129, 6th and 251st Infantry Divisions, two regiments of the 87th Infantry Division), XXXIX Tank Corps (337th, 102nd and 78th infantry, 5th tank division). In addition, subordinate to the headquarters of the 9th Army were: two motorized divisions (14th and " Greater Germany”), 1st and 9th Panzer Divisions, tank battalion of the 11th Panzer Division (37 tanks), 1st SS Cavalry Division. By the time Operation Mars began, only the 5th Panzer Division was in the first line of mobile formations in the German corps that were under attack. But she, too, was in the process of being replaced by the 78th Infantry Division. This allowed the Model to keep a strong enough mobile reserve in his hands to parry Soviet offensive.

The data provided to the Germans by agent "Max" was of a general nature, therefore, despite the expectation of a Soviet offensive, they did not know the exact directions of the strikes. In the order for the 9th Army No. 5562 dated November 16, 1942, assumptions were made about the direction of the strikes:

"The offensive will probably be carried out from two sides against the northern flank of the 9th Army - from the east to Sychevka and from the area southwest of Zubtsov, and also from the west to Bely."

Therefore, each corps was ordered, firstly, to be ready to repel an offensive in its sector, and secondly, to prepare forces for the transfer to neighboring sectors. The latter were reinforced grenadier regiments, which were ordered to be allocated to most infantry divisions. general principle there was an assignment for each corps of a tank or motorized division. Most of the forces were allocated to the XXXIX Panzer Corps. He had the 5th and 9th Panzer Divisions, as well as part of the 1st Panzer Division, to repel the offensive. The XXVII Corps, which was defending the Rzhev area, could use the 14th Motorized Division, and in a critical situation, parts of the 5th Panzer Division. Located on the "top" of the Rzhev salient, the XXIII Corps could dispose of two motorized divisions - the 14th and "Grossdeutschland". The tank corps sent to the defense of Belyi XXXXI could count on the help of a regiment of the 10th Motorized Division, units of the "Grossdeutschland", the 1st Panzer Division and the SS Cavalry Division. The 20th Panzer Division (transferred from the reserve of the GA "Center") was in the reserve of the VI Corps in the area of ​​Velizh and Staritsa. As we shall see later, this outfit of forces proved to be insufficient for most of the corps.

Almost all tank formations of the 9th Army took part in the summer battles in the Rzhev region and suffered significant losses. On November 18, 1942, the tank regiment of "Grossdeutschland" consisted of 7 Pz.II, 1 Pz.III with a 50-mm short-barreled gun, 7 Pz.IV with a 75-mm 24-caliber gun, 12 Pz.IV with a long-barreled gun and 3 command vehicles. Led during all the battles for Rzhev by Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, the 1st Panzer Division was in the fall of 1942 a real "zoo" of combat vehicles that were in service with the German army at that time. Before the beginning of the summer offensive, the division gave one of its battalions to the 16th motorized division and participated in the "Mars" in a single battalion. On November 18, 1942, it had combat-ready: 3 Pz.II, 7 Pz.38 (t), 16 Pz.III with a 50-mm short-barreled gun, 8 Pz.III with a 50-mm long-barreled gun, 6 Pz.III with 75-mm 24-caliber gun, 5 Pz.IVs with 75-mm 24-caliber guns, 6 Pz.IVs with a long-barreled gun and 4 command vehicles. Tanks Pz.38 (t)) were not originally in service with the division and were armored vehicles acquired on the Eastern Front. The 5th Panzer Division of Major General Eduard Metz, which was under attack by the 20th Army, was only slightly inferior in terms of the diversity of the tank fleet of the 1st Panzer Division. No one thinned out the tank regiment of this formation to reinforce the troops of the GA "South" and it operated in a two-battalion composition. On November 18, the 5th Panzer Division had 15 Pz.II, 23 Pz.III with a 50-mm short-barreled gun, 10 Pz.III with a 50-mm long-barreled gun, 7 Pz.III with a 75-mm 24-caliber gun , 10 Pz.IVs with a 75-mm 24-caliber gun, 6 Pz.IVs with a long-barreled gun, 7 command vehicles.

The main operational reserve of Model's army was Major General Walter Scheller's 9th Panzer Division, the only German mobile unit with three battalions in a tank regiment that participated in the "fifth battle for Rzhev". On the same date as in the above two formations, 26 Pz.II, 30 Pz.III with a 50-mm short-barreled gun, 32 Pz.III with a 50-mm long-barreled gun, 7 Pz.IV with 75- mm 24-caliber gun, 5 Pz.IV with a long-barreled gun, 2 command vehicles. In a word, those who have taken the most Active participation in the battles near Rzhev, German tank formations were not at that time the best in the Wehrmacht. Their main advantage was mobility. In fact, tank formations became a means of quickly moving infantry and artillery to threatened sectors of the front. In addition to tank formations, the 9th Army included assault gun battalions. These are the 189th, 667th (subordinate to the XXXIX Tank Corps) battalions of StuGIII self-propelled guns. It should be noted that by the autumn of 1942, the Wehrmacht was receiving in increasing quantities anti-tank weapons capable of fighting the T-34 and KV. The proportion of tanks and self-propelled guns armed with long-barreled guns increased. The already rather shaky advantage of the KB and T-34 in booking was almost completely lost.

The first phase of the offensive of the 20th army.

Since all the advancing armies during the entire operation "Mars" fought without operational communication with each other, it makes sense to sequentially describe the development of events in each sector, moving counterclockwise, starting from the most complex in form and most impressive in terms of the forces involved in the offensive in the strip 20th Army.

The front line dividing the Soviet and German troops on the eastern face of the Rzhev salient was formed as a result of the offensive of the Western Front in August 1942. Thus, the Germans had several months to prepare the defense. On the front of the breakthrough section planned by the command, the Germans equipped two defensive lines. The first one ran from the Osuga riverbed to Vazuza and further along the banks of the Vazuza River, and the second was located 4-5 km from the front line and relied on a chain of settlements (from north to south): Bolshoye Kropotovo, Maloye Kropotovo, Podosinovka and Zherebtsovo. By that time, the Germans had almost completely abandoned the “pearl necklace” of defense with strong points, connecting them with a continuous trench, every 100-150 m of which the so-called “bastions” were built, capable of firing along the trench.

The grouping of the 20th Army consisted of the 326th, 251st, 42nd Guards, 247th, 331st, 20th Guards and 415th Rifle Divisions, the 8th Guards Rifle Corps (26th Guards Rifle Division, 150th and 148th th rifle brigades), 93rd, 80th, 255th, 240th, 11th, 25th, 31st and 18th tank brigades. The army's mobile reserve was the 1st Guards Moscow Motor Rifle Division. A feature of the strike force of the rifle formations of the 20th Army was their division into two groups. The first (326th, 42nd Guards and 251st Rifle Divisions) were located on the western bank of the Vazuza, and during the offensive they did not need to cross the river. On the contrary, the 247th and 331st rifle divisions were supposed to force Vazuza on the first day of the offensive. The width of the river was 40-70 meters with a depth of 0.8 to 1.5 meters. By the beginning of the offensive, ice had frozen, which, however, did not reach a thickness that would allow tanks to move on it. On the second day of the operation, the 326th, 42nd Guards, 251st and 247th Rifle Divisions were to capture the Rzhev-Sychevka railway. After reaching the railway line, the first three turned to the north-west, and the last - to the south-west. Such a maneuver was supposed to provide a kind of "gate" for entering a cavalry-mechanized group into the breakthrough.

For the offensive in the zone of the 20th Army, two mobile groups were formed by the beginning of the operation. The first, horse-mechanized, under the command of Major General V.V. Kryukov, consisted of the 6th Tank Corps, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps and the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. The mobile group of Kryukov was intended to solve the main task of the offensive: after the breakthrough German defense it was supposed to move to the northeast in order to encircle the enemy's Rzhev grouping. By the beginning of the battle, the 6th Tank Corps had 165 tanks, combined into the 22nd (10 KB, 23 T-34, 12 T-70, 6 T-60), 100th (8 KB, 18 T-34, 3 T-70, 25 T-60) and 200th (41 T-34, 15 T-70, 4 T-60) tank brigades. The motorized infantry of the corps was the 6th motorized rifle brigade numbering 2186 people. Artillery was limited to the 11th Separate Katyusha Guards Mortar Battalion. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps included the 3rd, 4th Guards Cavalry, 20th cavalry division, 5th separate cavalry artillery battalion, 2nd separate anti-tank fighter battalion, 151st mortar regiment. In addition, the 1st motorized rifle brigade was attached to the mobile group. In total, the horse-mechanized group of General Kryukov included 21,011 people, 16,155 horses, 13,906 rifles and carbines, 2,667 submachine guns (PPSh and PPD), 95 heavy machine guns, 33 anti-aircraft machine guns (12.7-mm DShK), 384 anti-tank rifles, 226 company mortars (50 mm), 71 battalion mortars (82 mm), 64 regimental mortars (120 mm), 48 anti-tank guns of 45 mm caliber, 49 regimental and divisional 76 mm guns, 12 automatic anti-aircraft guns of caliber 37 mm (Collection of materials on the study of the experience of war. Issue No. 9. M .: Military Publishing House, 1944. P. 139). It is clearly seen that the artillery of the mobile group is limited to 76-mm cannons and 120-mm mortars, there is not a single howitzer of at least 122-mm caliber, not to mention artillery of 152-mm caliber and above. Subsequently, this played a fatal role in the actions of tankers and horsemen in the depths of the enemy's defenses.

The second mobile group, under the command of Colonel N.A. Kropotin, included the 18th, 25th and 31st tank brigades. It was supposed to develop the success of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps to the southeast, in the direction of Sychevka, providing the left flank of the offensive of the Kryukov group. In fact, such a formation compensated for the absence of a second tank and mechanized corps in the shock group of the 20th Army. The three brigades of Kropotin's mobile group were only conditionally capable of independent action. In addition, the 25th tank brigade was introduced into the Kropotin mobile group at the last moment, replacing the 80th tank brigade. The latter was transferred as a means of direct infantry support to the 251st Rifle Division.

In addition to the mobile groups intended to develop the success, the tank brigades of direct infantry support received rifle divisions assigned to break through the front. So the 326th Rifle Division received the 93rd Tank Brigade, the 251st Rifle Division - the 80th Tank Brigade, the 42nd Guards Rifle Division - the 255th Tank Brigade, the 247th Rifle Division - the 240th and 11th th tank brigades.

Finally, after almost two months of preparation, at 7.30 on November 25, 1942, artillery rumbled, through the uniform volleys of which volleys of Katyushas periodically broke through. More than 20 artillery regiments of the RGK of heavy and medium caliber took part in the artillery preparation. However, even before dawn, the weather intervened in the plans of Zhukov and Konev: a sharp south-west wind blew, bringing with it heavy gray clouds. Large flakes of wet snow fell on the field of the upcoming battle. Visibility dropped to twenty paces. Artillery observers could no longer see anything, and the fire was fired without adjustment. The guns fired at the squares. Aviation was also inactive due to non-flying weather.

At 9.30, the troops of the 20th Army went on the offensive. As expected, the enemy's fire system was not suppressed, and during the day only individual units managed to penetrate the defensive formations of the German troops. The 20th Army was most unlucky: in its offensive zone, the 5th Panzer Division was replaced by the 78th Infantry Division, and units of both divisions were simultaneously in the trenches. The 326th, 251st, and 42nd Guards Rifle Divisions, advancing without forcing the Vazuza River, were stopped by the fire of unsuppressed bunkers and had no success in advancing. The best result, oddly enough, was achieved by the 247th Infantry Division of Major General G.D. Mukhin. She successfully crossed the Wazuza and formed a small foothold on its western bank. In general, the result of the first day of the battle was rather modest. However, the commander of the 20th Army, Major General N.I. Kiryukhin, decided to advance the 8th Guards Rifle Corps to the patch captured by units of the 247th division, trying to develop the only success at that time. In turn, the command of the front (to which the cavalry-mechanized group was directly subordinate) decided to introduce the 247th Rifle Division and the 6th Tank Corps of P.M.Arman, and the 2nd Guards cavalry corps V.V. Kryukov. By that time, the 6th Panzer Corps had already crossed to the western bank of the Vazuza and by 1800 on November 25 was already ready to enter the breakthrough along original plan operations. However, the failure to fulfill the tasks of the right flank of the 20th Army led to the fact that the corps was divided in two by Vazuza. Now part of the hull was to be ferried back to the eastern bank of the river and again forced upstream. In fact, the entire original plan of the operation was broken. According to a previously developed plan, the mobile group was to concentrate on a bridgehead 4-5 km deep after the 20th Army's rifle formations reached the second line of defense. Instead, on the first day of the operation, large masses of cavalry and tanks, together with the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, squeezed into a small bridgehead no more than 3 km wide and at best 1.5 km deep. Accordingly, instead of the planned four crossings across the river. Vazuza at the disposal of the cavalry and tank corps were only two crossings, located in the offensive zone of the 247th rifle division. One crossing was at the village of Zevalovka, the second, to the south of it, at the village of Prudy.

On the morning of November 26, the weather improved and the artillery preparation was repeated. The formations of the 20th Army advancing on the right flank did not advance; the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, transferred to the bridgehead captured by the 247th Rifle Division, advanced only 1-2 km. By 13:00 on November 26, the 6th Panzer Corps had completely crossed over to the western bank of the Vazuza, to the same bridgehead captured on the first day. At 1500, the 6th Panzer Corps went on the offensive. Following the tank corps on the evening of November 26, the 18th and 25th tank brigades of N.A. Kropotin's mobile group crossed to the bridgehead. On the evening of November 26, only the 18th Tank Brigade managed to enter the battle, which, together with the 148th Rifle Brigade, attempted to expand the bridgehead to the south. The introduction of a large mass of tanks into battle could not but lead to a qualitative change in the situation. P.Arman's corps broke through the front of the 5th Panzer Division, advanced 2 km and reached the second line of defense. However, the enemy artillery fire system was not suppressed, and the 6th Panzer Corps lost 50-60% of its tanks in a desperate push into the depths of the German defenses. By the end of the day on November 26, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps pulled up to the crossings. The 20th Cavalry Division was the first to reach the crossing at Zevalovka. The crossing was occupied by the rear of the 6th Panzer Corps and the 247th Rifle Division. The head of the operational department of the 20th Army refused to allow the cavalry to cross before the rear was crossed. The cavalry division was forced to head for the crossing at the Ponds and in the second half of the night of November 27 crossed to the western bank of the Vazuza. The 3rd Guards Cavalry Division, which approached the crossing at Prudy at night, was forced to wait until dawn on November 27th.

On the third day of the offensive, November 27, the command of the 20th Army decided to expand the bridgehead captured on the first day. To this end, the pumping of the bridgehead by troops continued. The 251st Rifle Division with the 80th Tank Brigade, which did not succeed in breaking through the defenses in the area allocated to them according to the plan, surrendered their lane to neighboring formations and crossed over the Vazuza. The 1st Guards Moscow Motor Rifle Division and the 31st Tank Brigade allocated to it from the Kropotin group also crossed to the bridgehead by 15.00. They began to expand the bridgehead to the east, in the direction of Maly Kropotov. From the early morning of November 27, the 8th Guards Rifle Corps tried to expand the bridgehead to the south and southeast, attacking Zherebtsovo with the 26th Guards Rifle Division and the 25th Tank Brigade. However, the still unsuppressed enemy fire system prevented the advance of large masses of tanks concentrated on the bridgehead and in the corridor pierced by the tank corps. The infantry was cut off by fire from the tanks, and the tanks, left alone, could not effectively fight. November 27 was also marked by the entry into battle of the cavalry that crossed to the bridgehead. The 20th cavalry division launched an offensive at 0800, the 3rd guards cavalry division attacked the points on the second German defense line, Podosinovka and Zherebtsovo. The 4th Guards Cavalry Division crossed to the western bank of the Vazuza, but did not fight, being, however, subjected to German air and artillery strikes.

On the night of November 28, an attempt was made to push the mobile front group to the west. The 20th cavalry division in mounted formation with its two regiments broke through the hollow between Bolshoy and Maly Kropotovo in the first half of the night. The last, the 22nd Cavalry Regiment, lagged behind and approached the hollow to the moment when it was already illuminated by the Germans, who had recovered from surprise, and could not break through under the fire. The 3rd Guards Cavalry Division, which tried to follow the example of the 20th Division, suffered heavy losses in the breakthrough through the hollow, only one 12th Guards Cavalry Regiment broke through, and the 10th Cavalry Regiment was almost completely scattered and destroyed. By the morning of November 28, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps was torn into two parts. The forward echelon, represented by two regiments of the 20th and one regiment of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Divisions, broke through the railroad. The rest of the corps and the 4th Guards Cavalry Division remained on the bridgehead. In the same vein, the 6th Panzer Corps broke through the railroad. The 22nd and 200th tank brigades (the 100th tank brigade, which suffered heavy losses, remained in place), broke through starting at 2.00 am on November 28, along with the 1st and 6th motorized rifle brigades and the 6th guards anti-tank regiment . They moved parallel to the direction of movement of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, south of Maly Kropotov. By morning, parts of the corps managed to break through the railroad and connect with the units of the 20th and 3rd Guards Cavalry Divisions that had broken through. However, only 20 tanks remained in service by that time (12 tanks in the 22nd and 8 tanks in the 200th tank brigades). Such weak forces, of course, did not pose a danger to the Rzhev grouping of the enemy, but the entry of tanks and cavalry into the depths of the defense had a certain effect. Soviet tanks reached the positions of the German artillery, destroyed the artillery headquarters and two artillery regiment(one in position, the other on the march). A number of warehouses were also captured and destroyed and the Rzhev-Sychevka railway was blown up. But all this could no longer improve the situation: the German command was intensively pulling together reserves to the place of the breakthrough. On the morning of November 28, the Becker Battle Group was formed from the 18th Regiment of the 6th Infantry Division and the 3rd Battalion of the Artillery Regiment of the 129th Infantry Division. It was transferred from the Rzhev region to Osuga in order to defeat parts of the corps of V.V. Kryukov that had broken through to the railway.

On the afternoon of November 28, the 20th Army continued to expand its bridgehead on the western bank of the Vazuza. The greatest success was brought by the decision of Major General N.I. Kiryukhin with the castling of a rifle division and a tank brigade from the right flank of the army. The 80th tank brigade (10 tanks), together with the 251st rifle division, went to the rear of the enemy grouping, which held three rifle divisions of the 20th army for three days. This made it possible to complete the overcoming of the first line of defense along the entire front of the army.

The situation on the fourth day of the offensive was strange. On the one hand, the echelon of development of success broke through the second line of defense of the Germans. On the other hand, there was practically no connection between him and the main forces of the front - the Germans blocked the supply lines of the mobile group of V.V. Kryukov with fire from the unoccupied strongholds of the second line of defense. The situation is best characterized by an attempt made on the night of November 29, through the gaps between the German strongholds, to push vehicles with fuel and food for P. Arman's corps into the gap. 33 vehicles were assembled in a convoy under the cover of a motorcycle regiment of the 1st motorized rifle brigade and 10 tanks of the 200th tank brigade. The motorcycle regiment was also followed by the task force of the headquarters of the 6th tank corps. When the column moved west on the night of November 29, it was stopped by fire from Maly Kropotov and Podosinovka (villages on both sides of the intended route of movement). Only 3 tanks broke through the railway to the west. Fuel and food could not be delivered.

On the afternoon of November 29, the Soviet command continued to transport fresh forces to the gradually expanding bridgehead. The 20th Guards Rifle Division and the 32nd Tank Brigade (5 KB, 4 T-34s, 1 T-70 and 1 T-60) from the 31st Army were transferred to the operational subordination of the 20th Army. On the same day, an attempt was made to bring the 4th Guards Cavalry Division into the gap. The variant with a daring breakthrough in cavalry formation, similar to the 20th Cavalry Division, was discarded: the heavy losses of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Division indicated that such a number could not be done a second time. V.V. Kryukov decided first to take possession of the enemy’s stronghold in Maly Kropotovo, which was sticking out like a bone in his throat. However, the defenders also received reinforcements. The 430th regiment of the 129th infantry division arrived at the disposal of the commander of the XXXIX tank corps, von Arnim, which formed the battle group Veshe, defending Maloye Kropotovo. The attacks of the 20th Guards Rifle Division on the village were unsuccessful. Positions in the strongholds of the second line of defense also began to be occupied by units of the 9th Panzer Division, in particular, the 31st Panzer Regiment occupied Bolshoye Kropotovo. On the morning of November 29, the cavalrymen, together with the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, tried to capture the village, but did not achieve any results during the day. In the history of the 1st Guards motorized rifle division these fights are described as follows:

“... the attacks were unsuccessful. Neither artillery fire from closed positions, nor direct fire from regimental guns could suppress the numerous bunkers and tanks dug into the ground. Having suffered significant damage in the infantry and lost eight tanks, the guards regiments dug into the snow ”(Kuznetsov P.G. Proletarskaya Moscow-Minskaya. M .: Military Publishing House, 1975. P. 206).

The worst happened: due to the slow development of the offensive, the German command was able to occupy the second line of defense with formations transferred from the reserve. If we proceed from the theoretical sufficiency of putting one defending infantry regiment against one Soviet rifle division in the offensive, then the German defense has achieved the necessary stability. By November 29, the Soviet offensive was held back by the 13th and 14th motorized infantry regiments of the 5th Panzer Division, three regiments of the 78th Infantry Division, a regiment of the 102nd Infantry Division, and infantry regiments from the 129th and 6th and infantry divisions. The 326th, 251st, 247th rifle, 42nd, 20th and 26th guards rifle, 1st guards motorized rifle divisions, two rifle and two motorized rifle brigades advanced on them.

Meanwhile, the Soviet command decided to slightly modify tactics. Due to the failure of the enterprise with the delivery of fuel and ammunition to the advanced units of the 6th tank corps, it was decided to turn the corps 180 degrees and attack Maloye Kropotovo from the west. At 0800, the 6th Tank Corps, consisting of 23 T-34 tanks with the remnants of two motorized rifle brigades, attacked Maloye Kropotovo from the west and captured it by 0900, losing 18 tanks and more than 50% personnel. The offensive impulse of the 6th Panzer Corps dried up. The remaining few tanks attacked on the last liters of fuel and in the captured village were immediately dug into the ground with empty tanks as fixed firing points. Within 30-40 minutes, a rifle regiment of the 20th Guards Rifle Division entered Maloye Kropotovo from the east. Communication between the mobile front group and units of the 20th Army was restored.

However, the situation changed literally within a few hours. By the beginning of the day on November 30, the advanced reserves in the face of the battalion of the 18th regiment of the 6th infantry division, from the Becker group described above, entered the battle. In addition, a group of Captain Koehler from the 5th Panzer Division advanced from Bolshoi Kropotov with a training company, a tank company and four assault guns. At 1000 on November 30, these two battle groups counterattacked units of the 6th Panzer Corps that had captured Maloye Kropotovo. Parts of the 20th Guards Rifle Division and the 6th Tank Corps were driven out of the village. During the battle, the last 5 tanks of P.Arman's corps that attacked the village a few hours ago were destroyed. In this battle, the commander of the 200th tank brigade, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel V.P. Vinokurov, died.

The 32nd Tank Brigade, the 1st Guards Motor Rifle Division and the regiment of the 4th Guards Cavalry Division, assigned to hold Maly Kropotov jointly with the 20th Guards Division, did not have time for the decisive battle by just a few hours. Instead of marching and securing in the village, parts of the tank brigade came under fire and lost two T-34s and one T-60 burnt out and 4 T-34s knocked out. An attempt by the 20th Guards Rifle Division and the 32nd Tank Brigade the next day to recapture Maloye Kropotovo did not bring success. The brigade's tank losses on December 1 amounted to 4 KB, 3 T-34s, 1 T-70, a second attack brought the loss of another 2 KB and 2 T-34s.

On November 30, the cavalrymen of the 20th Cavalry Division also made an attempt to connect with the main forces of the 20th Army. They tried to attack the German strongholds in the second line of defense from the west, but were unsuccessful. The 103rd and 124th cavalry regiments of the 20th Cavalry Division, the 12th Guards Regiment of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Division, and separate units of two other regiments of the same division, which remained in the depths of the defense, formed the so-called group of Colonel Kursakov (about 900 sabers) . She switched to partisan actions and went out to her own only in January 1943.

By the time the mobile front group under the command of V.V. Kryukov was divided into the Kursakov group and the units from 165 tanks remaining on the bridgehead of the 20th Army, with which the 6th Tank Corps entered the battle, only memories remained. The 22nd tank brigade consisted of 2 T-34s, 3 T-70s, 2 T-60s. 100th Tank Brigade - 2 KB, 5 T-34s, 5 T-60s. The 200th Tank Brigade had 2 T-34s, 3 T-70s, and 2 T-60s. On November 30, these tanks were placed at the disposal of the commander of the 1st Guards Motor Rifle Division, and the headquarters and rear of the brigades were withdrawn to the rear. Even then, the date for the start of the second phase of the operation was set. Front commander I.S. Konev was ordered to equip the 6th tank corps with materiel at the expense of tanks being repaired and arriving from factories by December 11th.

After the failure of the initial plan of the operation and the almost complete destruction of the success development echelon represented by the group of V.V. Kryukov, the formations of the 20th Army continued fighting in the form of successive destruction of the strongholds of the enemy's first line of defense in the breakthrough sector. The failure of the attacks, even in the presence of artillery support, forced the commanders to look for solutions at the tactical level. Gradually, the formation of infantry assault groups became more widespread. A typical example are the actions of the 148th and 150th rifle brigades during the assault on the village of Khlepen on the left flank of the army's offensive. The brigades were subordinate to the headquarters of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps and, according to the original plan, were to attack Sychevka. However, in reality, they had to solve the problem of expanding the bridgehead on the western coast of Vazuza. Khlepen was located on the bank of the river, which went around the village, forming a high steep bank. The center of defense was an old stone church, around which there were bunkers and trenches. Attempts to storm the village in the previous days did not bring success, the church was not broken and served as a reliable defense against artillery fire. Success was brought by the creation of two assault groups, which managed to stealthily get close to the church at night and, having captured it, ensure the advance of the brigades on Khlepen. The strength of the fire of this strong point is given by the number of machine guns captured there - 60 (!!!) pieces. Having six dozen MG-34 machine guns, the Germans defending in the village of Khlepen could, even after intensive artillery processing of positions, create a sufficient density of machine-gun fire to prevent the advance of our infantry. The difficulties of assaulting the village with the engineering equipment of the defense system were aggravated for two months. The artillery densities of the 1942 model did not provide an effective solution to the problem of suppressing defensive fire, and only decisive actions at the tactical level brought success.

During December 1 and 2, the rifle formations of the 20th Army finally cleared the strongholds of the first line of defense from the enemy, capturing Kholm-Berezuisky, Gredyakin and Khlepenya. The struggle for the second lane of defense still did not promise success. The 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division and the 20th Guards Division were never able to capture Bolshoe and Maloye Kropotovo, which were defended by the arrived German reserves. The unsuccessful offensive of the 20th Army led to personnel changes. On December 3, a new commander, Lieutenant General Khozin, who previously led the 33rd Army, arrived in the 20th Army. On December 4, the 20th Army, led by a new commander, once again went on the offensive, but again had no success. Soviet intelligence noted the arrival of trains with reserves by rail from Sychevka. On December 5, the units of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps remaining on the bridgehead, by order of the front, were withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Vazuza. On December 6, in order to put themselves in order, evacuate and restore damaged tanks, the 93rd, 11th, 25th, 80th, 31st and 32nd tank brigades were officially withdrawn from the first line. Some brigades by that time no longer had combat-ready tanks. So, the 31st tank brigade lost the last tanks on November 30 during the battle for Bolshoe Kropotovo. The 25th tank brigade was withdrawn to the rear on November 29, with 1 KB and 3 T-60s combat-ready.

On December 7, by order of the front command, the 30th Guards and 248th Rifle Divisions entered the 20th Army. On December 8, the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle and 20th Guards Rifle Divisions were withdrawn to the rear, replaced by the 336th Rifle Division, cast from the 31st Army. The decision to continue the offensive was made, late in the evening of December 8, 1942, a directive was issued VGK rates No. 170700, in which the Western Front was instructed:

“... during 10-11.12, break through the enemy defenses in the Bol. Kropotovo - Yarygino and not later than 15.12 capture Sychevka, 20.12. withdraw at least two rifle divisions to the Andreevskoye district to organize a closure, together with the 41st Army of the Kalinin Front, of the encircled enemy”; (Russian archive: Great Patriotic War: Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Documents and materials. 1942 ... P.462).

It can be seen from the directive that the breakthrough sector of the 20th Army narrowed, but at the same time offensive mission troops of the neighboring 29th Army (Yarygino is a village on the banks of the Gzhat, about 15 km south of the dividing line between the two armies).

December 9 and 10 were held in separate skirmishes of private importance. Soviet troops were preparing for the offensive, the newly arrived German units - for defense.

The second phase of the operation of the 20th army.

On the one hand, the planning of the operation in the form of several crushing blows did not contribute to an effective breakthrough of the defense and the development of the offensive. On the other hand, even in conditions when the troops of the 41st Army were defeated, the operation as a whole did not lose its meaning. At the same time, the continuation of the offensive of the 20th Army and the introduction of a mobile group into the breakthrough remained relevant. The task of connecting with the troops of the Kalinin Front from the very beginning was auxiliary, and the exit to the rear of the Rzhev group of Germans could be carried out without interaction with the 41st Army. Moreover, the pinning down of three enemy tank divisions surrounded by rifle and mechanized corps to the south of Bely promised hope for success both in the offensive of the 22nd and 39th armies against the Oleninsky enemy grouping, and in the offensive of the 20th army.

The strike force of the 20th Army, according to the new offensive plan, consisted of seven rifle divisions (326, 251, 336, 243, 247th rifle divisions, 30th and 42nd guards rifle divisions), the 8th guards rifle corps (26 1st Guards Rifle Division, 148th and 150th Rifle Brigades). The formations operating in the direction of the main attack received the support of tanks. Tasked with capturing the ill-fated Maly Kropotovo, the 30th Guards Rifle Division was supported by the 9th Guards Tank Brigade (2 KB, 3 T-34s and 9 T-60s). The 243rd Rifle Division, advancing south of it, received the 20th Tank Brigade (1 KB, 8 T-34s, 3 T-70s and 9 T-60s). Aimed at Zherebtsovo, the 247th Rifle Division is the 18th Tank Brigade (11 T-34s, 3 T-70s and 10 T-60s). The 9th Guards and 20th Tank Brigades were cast from the 29th Army and occasionally participated in the battles on December 4-6. The mobile group now consisted of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, the 6th and 5th Tank Corps.

The 6th Tank Corps, withdrawn from the battle, received a new commander - Colonel I.I. Yushchuk, who distinguished himself during a breakthrough from the encirclement at the end of November. In the first decade of December, the corps was replenished with people and equipment. By December 11, 1942, the tanks of the 6th Tank Corps were combined into two tank brigades: the 22nd (7 KB, 31 T-34, 7 T-70, 10 T-60, and a total of 55 tanks) and the 100th ( 33 T-34s, 5 T-70s and 8 T-60s, for a total of 46 tanks). Thus, the total strength of the 6th Panzer Corps by the beginning of the second stage of the operation was 101 tanks. The 200th tank brigade of the 6th tank corps was not immediately brought into battle, waiting for replenishment from the repair bases of the front. The replenished tank corps, in cooperation with the 30th Guards Rifle Division, was to advance from the "top" of the bridgehead, breaking through between Bolshoi and Maly Kropotovo. After breaking through the defense, the remnants of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps were to enter it. The 5th Tank Corps, Major General of the Tank Forces K.A. Semenchenko, was also introduced into the composition of the advancing troops from the reserve of the Western Front. Initially, the hull was intended for the second phase of Operation Mars. Now, according to the Soviet command, the formation of K.A. Semenchenko was to become that “last battalion”, the blow of which would bring down the defenses of the 9th Army. The 5th Tank Corps included the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade and three tank brigades:

"24th (21 KB tanks, 27 T-30s and T-60s), 41st (19 T-34s, 12 T-70s, 21 T-30s and T-60s) and 70th (27 T- 34, 13 T-70 and 20 T-60). The 5th motorized rifle brigade and motorized rifle battalions of tank brigades "were fully staffed" (TsAMO F.208, op.50660ss, d.7, l.109).

However, if in the initial phase of the operation a strike by two tank corps could lead to a breakthrough of the defense on the eastern face of the Rzhev salient, then in December 1942 the situation changed significantly. The same thing happened that happened during the "meat grinders" of the First World War, when the defender pulled units and formations from neighboring sectors of the front to the breakthrough site, compacting the identified direction of the main attack. In December, the 78th Infantry and 9th Panzer Divisions defended themselves against the Vazuz bridgehead, and the 5th Panzer Division, withdrawn from the first line, was in the immediate rear. In addition, the 2nd Panzer Division from the 3rd Panzer Army arrives in the reserve of the 9th Army. The 3rd Panzer Army and its formations were in no way constrained by the Soviet offensive, and therefore forces could be freely transferred from its composition to the rescue of Model's army. On November 18, 1942, the 2nd Panzer Division had 11 Pz.IIs, 10 Pz.IIIs with a 50 mm short gun, 8 Pz.IIIs with a 50 mm long gun, 12 Pz.IIIs with a 75 mm 24 -caliber gun, 4 Pz.IV with a 75-mm 24-caliber gun, 8 Pz.IV with a long-barreled gun, one command tank. The German side also did not pass personnel reshuffles. Instead of von Arnim, the post of commander of the XXXIX Panzer Corps was taken over by Lieutenant General Robert Martinek. The entry of fresh forces by the Soviet command was largely countered by the entry of the 9th Panzer Division, which took up defensive positions in Maly and Bolshoy Kropotovo, centers of resistance that stopped the Soviet offensive in the first phase of the operation. To the south it was defended by the 78th Infantry Division.

The offensive began on December 11, 1942 at 10.10 am with artillery preparation, which lasted 50 minutes. Refusing to use the 5th and 6th Panzer Corps as an echelon of success, both Panzer Corps were brought into battle as a means of supporting the infantry in the direction of the main attack. The 6th Panzer Corps was aiming at jointly with the 30th Guards Rifle Division mastering the hated knot of resistance in Maly Kropotovo. The corps of K.A. Semenchenko was attached to the 243rd Infantry Division. He had to fulfill the task that the mobile group of Colonel N.A. Kropotin did not solve in the first phase of the operation: to deliver a blow in the direction of Sychevka, which provided the left flank of the offensive of the Kryukov mobile group. In addition, the offensive of the two tank corps was bordered by the offensive actions of rifle divisions. On the northern flank, the 336th Rifle Division with the 20th Tank Brigade was to advance on Bolshoye Kropotovo. On the southern flank, the 247th Rifle Division with the 9th Guards and 18th Tank Brigades was to advance on Zherebtsovo and Yurovka.

The relatively short artillery preparation did not lead to the suppression of the German fire system along the entire offensive front, and the formations that went on the offensive at 11.00 did not achieve decisive results. The attacks of the 30th Guards Rifle Division and the 6th Tank Corps built in two echelons on Maloye Kropotovo were repulsed. The densely built knots of resistance of the Germans actively supported each other with fire. All three brigades of the 5th Panzer Corps advancing on Podosinovka came under flanking fire from Zherebtsovo. The losses of the 5th Panzer Corps on the first day of the offensive amounted to 17 KB tanks, 20 T-34 tanks and 11 T-70 tanks, the 5th motorized rifle brigade lost more than 50% of its personnel. However, the effective support of the neighbors did not have the best effect on the fate of the German garrison of Zherebtsovo: by the evening of the first day of the offensive, the 247th Infantry Division and the 18th Tank Brigade broke into the village at the cost of losing 2 T-34s, 3 T-70s and 5 T-60s.

The capture of Zherebtsovo allowed the 243rd Rifle Division and the 5th Tank Corps to capture Podosinovka on the second day of the offensive. But as a result of several German counterattacks, she was lost. The corps of K.A. Semenchenko gradually melted, on the day of December 12, he lost 4 KB, 9 T-34s and 10 T-70s. Operating as part of three brigades (December 11, the 200th Tank Brigade received 23 T-34s from repairs, and the same number on December 12), the 6th Tank Corps did not achieve success in mastering the "heart" of the German defense - Maly Kropotovo. The unsuppressed system of fire pressed the infantry to the ground, and the tanks that rushed forward without the support of the infantry were destroyed. All this turned the Russian villages fortified with barbed wire and bunkers into a kind of forts Douaumont and In the French fortress of Verdun during the First World War.

Already on the third day of the offensive, the command was forced to combine the remaining tanks of the 5th and 6th tank corps into two consolidated brigades - the 22nd and 41st. The first had 2 KB, 19 T-34s, 6 T-60s and T-70s (27 in total), the second had 1 KB, 6 T-34s, 9 T-70s and 22 T-60s (38 in total). ). The same operation had to be done with tank infantry support brigades. The 20th and 9th Guards Tank Brigades handed over their serviceable tanks to the 18th Tank Brigade and were withdrawn to the rear. The first transferred 3 T-34s, 1 T-70 and 5 T-60s, the second - 1 KB and 3 T-60s. The 18th tank brigade, together with the 247th rifle division, defended Zherebtsovo, guarding the southern flank of the offensive. During the offensive on December 13, the scenario of the development of events in previous days was repeated: the unsuppressed fire system of the German "Forts Douaumont and Vaud" - Podosinovka and Maly Kropotov prevented the advance of the infantry. By the evening, 6 T-34s and 2 T-60s remained from the consolidated 22nd Tank Brigade. The attack on Podosinovka developed in the same vein, with 24 tanks remaining from the consolidated 41st Tank Brigade.

On December 14, the subordinates of the 20th army of the formation received an order signed by the chief of staff of the army Vashkevich. The second paragraph in it was instructed to look for a solution at the tactical level:

“To solve problems under private combat orders Nos. 079, 080, create assault detachments, including shooters, mortarmen, machine gunners, anti-tank rifles, sappers with explosives, one or two tanks and escort guns to capture individual bunkers, as well as to block separate knots of resistance.

On the same day, the 379th Rifle Division (castled from the 5th Army) was brought into battle, replacing the 243rd Rifle Division, which was unsuccessfully advancing on Podosinovka. The newly arrived division was given 24 tanks left over from the 5th Panzer Corps. Attempts by units of the 379th Rifle Division in the following days to capture Podosinovka by assault groups were not successful. This result is not surprising, given the lack of time for preparation and familiarization with the enemy by units of the 379th Infantry Division, as well as very conditional support by tanks.

Finally, on December 18, the commander of the 20th Army, in order No. 079, put a bullet in the offensive with the words:

"To all formations within the operational boundaries at the turn reached by units of the first echelon, dig a continuous trench with a full profile."

The battle is over. In the second half of December, I.S. Konev sent proposals to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to continue the operation with the transfer of the main attack on the city of Rzhev (which was unsuccessfully stormed in August and September 1942). However, these proposals remained unanswered. The Western Front went on the defensive. However, I.S. Konev retained the post of front commander and later commanded fronts in various sectors of the Soviet-German front. "Mars" definitely had a negative impact on the career of N.I. Kiryukhin, who did not hold the post of army commander until the end of the war. Also, the actions of P.M. Arman, who by the time of his death in August 1943, commanded a tank brigade, were not positively evaluated.

The offensive of the 20th Army became a classic positional stalemate, the battle for the "forester's hut", which was rich in the history of the First World War. For 25 days of fighting, the following were used (in shots): 82-mm mines - 182.3 thousand pieces, 120-mm mines - 68.0 thousand pieces, 76-mm regimental - 55.7 thousand pieces, 76-mm divisional - 139.2 thousand pieces, 122-mm howitzer - 68.3 thousand pieces, 122-mm cannon - 18.0 thousand pieces, 152-mm howitzer - 18.1 thousand pieces, 152-mm cannon - 31.9 thousand pieces. According to the headquarters of the Western Front, the losses of the troops of the front for 25 days of fighting amounted to 15,753 people killed, 43,874 people wounded. At the same time, the advance of the army troops was more than modest.

The offensive of the 39th Army in the Young Tud area.

The events of November-December 1942 to the west of Rzhev, like a mirror, reflect the main problems of delivering restraining blows. On the one hand, on a secondary sector of the front, enemy forces are limited, which favors the attacker. On the other hand, for a pinning blow in a secondary direction, it is impossible to single out forces that are at least comparable to the direction of the main blow. As a rule, there is no success development echelon in the form of a tank or mechanized corps in the auxiliary strike sector, and the use of tank troops is limited to direct infantry support.

The primary task of Zygin's 39th Army was to pin down German reserves and assist the advance of the 22nd Army. Of course, the task of the troops was not set so abstractly, and in a form tied to the terrain, it consisted in "taking the big Molodoy Tud - Rzhev in the Urdom, Zaitsevo sector and then in cooperation with the 22nd Army and the shock group of the Western Front - the settlement of Olenino." The offensive of the 39th Army was supposed to be carried out by four rifle divisions operating on a wide front. In the first echelon, the 135th Rifle Division of Colonel V.G. Kovalenko, the 158th Rifle Division of Colonel M.M. Busarov and the 373rd Rifle Division of Colonel K.I. Sazonov were to advance. After breaking through the first line of defense, the 348th Rifle Division of Colonel I.A. Ilyichev was to be introduced into battle. Support for the advancing rifle divisions was to be provided by the 81st Tank Brigade of Colonel K.A. Malygin and the 28th Tank Brigade of Colonel D.I. Kuzmin. The idea of ​​holding blows permeated the entire Red Army, and the offensive of Zygin's army was "Mars" in miniature. In addition to the main blow, it was supposed to deliver two auxiliary blows on the right and left flanks of the army. For the first, the 100th Rifle Brigade and a regiment of the 186th Rifle Division were assigned, for the second - the 136th Rifle Brigade, supported by two regiments of the 178th Rifle Division.

At the same time, it should be noted that by the autumn of 1942 the technique of conducting operations had grown noticeably in comparison with previous offensives. For example, in the 879th regiment of the 158th rifle division, the 1st battalion was trained as an assault. Older soldiers were replaced by youth, the battalion was withdrawn to the rear in October for intensive combat training. Particular attention was paid to interaction with tanks. The regiment was supposed to be supported by 10 T-34 tanks and 14 T-70 tanks of the 29th Tank Regiment of the Malygin Brigade. Training was carried out on terrain similar in its relief to the strip forthcoming offensive. Bunkers, strongholds were built on the impromptu test site, wire fences were installed, and minefields were simulated. A company of submachine gunners of the regiment conducted training in the role tank landing. Appropriate measures were taken to ensure the surprise of the strike. The aforementioned 158th Rifle Division surrendered its sector to the 135th Rifle Division and entered the positions of the upcoming offensive only on the night of November 24, replacing the 386th Rifle Regiment of the 178th Rifle Division. On the same night, the sappers removed their minefields, and on the night of November 25 they made passages in the minefields of the enemy.

The main enemy of the 39th Army was the 206th Infantry Division, stretched out on a 42-kilometer front. Such a density of construction did not provide effective defense. In fact, the defense of the division was a chain of defense points, the gaps between which reached several kilometers. At the same time, the Soviet offensive zone affected the flanks of the neighbors of the 206th Infantry Division - the 251st and 253rd Infantry Divisions. However, in the rear of the XXIII Corps there were strong mobile reserves: the Grossdeutschland Motorized Division and the 14th Motorized Division. If necessary, they could quickly advance to the breakthrough areas and "seal" them with defense or counterattacks.

Artillery preparation in the offensive zone of Zygin's army began somewhat later than in other sectors of the Rzhev salient. The guns rumbled only at 9.15 am on November 25th. The processing of German positions by artillery lasted only an hour. Considering that the density of artillery was rather low - just over 50 barrels per kilometer of the front - the main work had to be done by infantry and tanks. The tanks quickly managed to overcome the frozen river Tudovka and, together with the infantrymen, rushed to the attack.

The deepest of all, having covered 5 km in a day, the 100th Rifle Brigade advanced into the depths of the German defense. The 879th regiment of the 158th division was especially successful in the direction of the main attack, the first echelon of which was a trained assault battalion. Subsequently, the practice of preparing the 1st battalion of rifle regiments as an assault one became typical for the offensives of the Red Army in the second period of the war. The neighboring 881st regiment of the same division performed worse, not least because it did not have assault groups. The tactics of the assault groups were being tested in combat, becoming more widespread in Verdun on the Rzhev ledge, but had not yet become standard for advancing units and formations.

Already by 18.00 on the first day of the offensive, units of the "Grossdeutschland" and the 14th Motorized Division began to arrive to the rescue of the 206th Infantry Division. The first to arrive, as was typical of the Mars, were the motorcyclists, in this case the motorcycle battalion of the "Grossdeutschland". The commander of the XXIII Army Corps, General Gilpert, was in no hurry to bring the entire 14th Motorized Division into battle, because he was not yet sure that the site of the 206th Infantry Division was the only place for the offensive of the Soviet troops. The division was fully committed to combat only the next day. The tank regiment of "Grossdeutschland" also advanced to the battlefield. In fact, instead of one division stretched along the front, the advancing Soviet troops were opposed by almost three divisions, supported by tanks.

On the afternoon of November 27, several counterattacks were carried out by the approaching motorized units, which did not lead to drastic change environment. On the night of November 28, the Germans were forced to withdraw the front to the line Zaitsevo - Urdom - Bryukhanovo. Now the city of Urdom became the main stronghold of the German defense.

The 348th Infantry Division was introduced into the battle. Soon Urdom fell. However, the appearance of German reserves in the offensive sector of the 39th Army made the situation close to a stalemate. Supported by units of "Grossdeutschland" and the 14th Motorized Division, the regiments of the 206th Infantry Division began to provide significant resistance to the advance of the 39th Army. The most logical decision in this situation was to change the direction of the blow. It was on this path that G.K. Zhukov, who coordinated the Mars operation, went, shifting the breakthrough site closer to Rzhev. The 30th Army of the Western Front was to join the offensive scheduled for December 7th. The Soviet side in "Mars" owned the initiative, and therefore the command could move units and formations between different sectors of the front with complete impunity. The Germans, who were defending near Rzhev, could only watch with annoyance, the units being removed from their positions. They were replaced with the expansion of the defense lines by their neighbors and subsided in an unknown direction. So the 16th Guards, 375th and 220th Rifle Divisions were transferred to the new breakthrough site. Castling was also carried out within the 39th Army. The 135th Rifle Division, 130th and 136th Rifle Brigades moved to the left flank of the army.

The second phase of the offensive of the 39th Army began a little earlier than the offensive of the 20th Army in the Sychevka area. On December 7, the regrouped Soviet troops dealt a powerful blow to the German fortifications near Trushkovo on the left flank of the old offensive zone. The blow fell on the junction between the 14th motorized and 251st infantry divisions. The offensive developed successfully, the units of the 14th Motorized Division, beaten in previous battles, began to retreat, and by noon the attackers captured the village of Gonchuki in the depths of the German defense, three kilometers south of Trushkovo. In the next two days, under the blows of the 39th Army, the Germans were forced to withdraw their units to the right and left of the Gonchuks in order to avoid bypassing the flanks. On December 10, Zygin brought into battle the remnants of the 81st and 28th tank brigades, armed with repaired tanks. And again, the 14th motorized division turned out to be the “weak link” - the defense at the Gonchuks was broken through, and the attackers advanced to the forests southwest of the village.

However, success was fleeting: the “fire brigade” of the defense of the Rzhev salient, the Becker battle group, arrived at the site of the 14th motorized division. During the entire Soviet offensive, she rushed between different sectors, entering into battle at the decisive moments of the battle. The infantrymen mounted on motor vehicles could move from one sector to another in a matter of hours, and the very idea of ​​holding blows lost its meaning in many respects. The first action of the Becker group was to intercept the communications of the tanks that had broken through to the south of the Gonchuks.

On the night of December 11, reinforcements arrived from the 30th Army, the 16th Guards and 220th Rifle Divisions transferred from the Rzhev region. However, the defenders also received reserves. In addition to Becker's group, a motorcycle battalion of the 2nd Panzer Division arrived. The general offensive of the 39th Army began at noon on December 13 with an intensive four-hour artillery preparation. The main blow was taken by Becker's group and the Rekum combat group of the 251st Infantry Division, assembled from units pulled from different formations. It was not possible to achieve a breakthrough of the defense, but the temporarily surrounded remnants of two tank brigades were released. Attacks and counter-attacks continuously replaced each other. The advancing Soviet troops were opposed by a mosaic of infantry, motorized infantry, tank, motorcycle units and self-propelled guns of several German divisions.

The fighting continued with unrelenting tension until December 17, and then began to subside as the combat effectiveness of the attacking Soviet troops decreased.

The offensive of the 22nd army in the Luchesa valley.

Certain difficulties in using tanks north of Bely, in the valley of the Luchesa River, were noted by the command of the Kalinin Front even at the initial stages of preparing the operation. However, doubts were resolved in favor of the use of a large mobile formation - the 3rd mechanized corps of M.E. There can be only one explanation for such a decision: the command of the Kalinin Front stubbornly groped weak spots in the German defense and reasonably assumed the weakness of the chain of strongholds in difficult terrain. The place for the strike was quite well chosen - at the junction of the 86th and 110th infantry divisions. To break through the German defenses, 80 thousand people, 270 tanks, 7 artillery regiments and 3 anti-tank regiments were concentrated. There were no separate infantry support brigades in the 22nd Army. Yushkevich's army was supposed to advance along a narrow winding river valley, which was surrounded on both sides dense forests. Twenty kilometers to the highway Olenino - Bely had to go through a narrow corridor, not being able to maneuver.

In accordance with the principles of operations adopted in the Red Army, infantrymen went into battle on the first day, whose task was to break into the German defense front and open the way deep into the 3rd mechanized corps. Artillery preparation for the attack began at 07:30 on 25 November. An hour and a half later, the infantrymen of the 238th Infantry Division of Colonel I.V. Karpov and the 185th Infantry Division of Colonel M.F. Andryushchenko went on the attack. In the afternoon, tank brigades of the corps of M.E. Katukov joined the rifle divisions. In contrast to the meat grinder in the offensive zone of the 20th Army, the breakthrough of the front in the Luchesa Valley occurred already on the first day of the operation: the defense on the right flank of the 86th Infantry Division was broken through. To the north of Bely, a 4-kilometer gap was formed, into which two rifle divisions and the 3rd mechanized corps of the 22nd army of V.A. Yushkevich moved.

The reaction of the headquarters of the 9th Army to the crisis that arose was typical of parrying the offensives of the Kalinin Front: battle groups of mobile formations were hastily thrown into the breakthrough area. Already in the evening of November 25, a battalion of motorized infantry of the motorized division "Grossdeutschland" was raised on alarm, which advanced into the Luchesa valley and blocked it near the village of Starukhi. The offensive of the 22nd Army in the snow-covered forest and the river valley developed extremely slowly.

The loss in the pace of advance played into the hands of the Germans. The breakthrough site was identified, and soon, in addition to mobile reserves, separate battalions and regiments, withdrawn from the infantry divisions in the unattacked sections of the Rzhev salient, entered the battle. Moreover, since the direction of the strike was determined, it became possible to withdraw parts from the formations stretched along the front: the possibility of a strike on them was now more than illusory. The first to arrive was a battalion from the neighboring 110th Infantry Division, stretched along the front for 30 km. Then a battalion from the 253rd and 216th infantry divisions were sent to the Luchesa valley. Against the advancing Soviet troops, a barrier was built from parts of four various connections. After two days of unsuccessful attempts to break through along the Luchesa on the evening of November 27, the commander of the 22nd Army decided to shift the direction of the main attack to the south. The 49th tank brigade of M.E.Katukov's corps castled on the right flank of the offensive.

Despite the fact that during the night regrouping the Soviet tank units spent a lot of time wandering in the forest, the shift in offensive emphasis brought a positive result. On the afternoon of November 28, the 49th tank and 10th mechanized brigades broke through the defenses of the German reserves and moved east, to the Olenino-Bely highway. The Germans managed to avoid disaster only thanks to the arrival of the Keller battle group (the two remaining battalions grenadier regiment motorized division "Grossdeutschland"). She took up defense in the path of the advancing Soviet troops and stopped their advance. In the battle that broke out the next day, units cast by Yushkevich on the right flank managed to push Keller even further and by evening were only 8 km from the desired highway. The gap in the construction of the German troops, measured between the Keller group and the bent flank of the 86th Infantry Division, was already 12 km. On November 30, the fighting continued with the same ferocity. The attackers were opposed by a full regiment of "Grossdeutschland" and two battalions (two thirds of the regiment) of two infantry divisions. To restore the number of defenders, the rear was "combed", and the StuGIII self-propelled gun division was thrown to the rescue of Keller's group. Both sides suffered heavy losses. Of the 270 tanks of the 3rd mechanized corps, almost half have already turned into immobilized, charred skeletons on the banks of the Luchesa, pitted with funnels.

The battle moved into the phase of a struggle to the point of exhaustion. Yushkevich still had a fresh tank regiment (30 tanks) and a rifle brigade in reserve. With their help, he hoped to finish off the reserves transferred by the Germans and break through to the highway. The regrouping of the 49th Tank Brigade was again undertaken: the main idea of ​​the offensive was to use the open flank of the defenders. Yushkevich planned to push him back to the north and open the way for his troops to the highway. The fresh 39th separate tank regiment of Major A.F. Burda and the 114th rifle brigade were supposed to give weight to the attack.

December 1 was, according to the Germans, the most difficult day of the battle in the Luchesa valley. A strong snowstorm interfered with Soviet artillery, but at the same time deprived the Germans of the opportunity to use the most maneuverable means of combat - aviation. The move to bypass the "hanging in the air" flank was a success, and the attackers advanced four kilometers to the highway, at the same time expanding the breakthrough to the north. Keller's group was thrown back to the northeast, its commander was mortally wounded. To parry the crisis, another battalion of the 253rd Infantry Division from the XXIII Corps and a battalion of self-propelled guns StuGIII "Great Germany" from the Bely region were sent to Luchesa. The next day, the advance of the Soviet infantry and tanks to the highway continued, and it turned out to be at a distance that allowed mortar shelling - only two kilometers. The expansion of the breakthrough allowed Yushkevich to release additional forces, castle them on the right flank of the shock group of the 22nd Army and repeat the successful pressure maneuver on the open flank. Now the Germans already "felt with their backs" the Olenino - Bely highway. However, this result cost the 22nd Army dearly: out of 270 tanks, 200 had already been lost, losses in rifle formations reached 60% of the number. Yushkevich decided to go for broke and withdrew one regiment from the 155th Infantry Division with the task of once again bypassing the open flank of the Germans with the support of the remnants of the tanks of the corps of M.E. Katukov. The regrouping of troops was supposed to take several days, and the start of the next phase of the offensive was scheduled for 0900 on December 7th.

In the meantime, there was a lull in the Sychevka area: the 20th Army was regrouping forces and restoring wrecked tanks. This allowed the Germans to transfer to Luchesa that last battalion, which decides the fate of the battle. The "Fire Brigade of the 9th Army" - Becker's battle group, which had already shown its best side in the battle on Vazuza, acted as the last straw. Becker's group was reinforced by the 2nd Motorcycle Battalion of the 2nd Panzer Division, a "Grossdeutschland" artillery battalion, 3 tanks and 2 self-propelled guns. The transfer, which began on December 4, was carried out partly by rail, partly by road of the Grossdeutschland division. Already in the early morning of December 6, Becker's group took up its starting position for a counterattack. They outstripped the Soviet offensive by exactly one day. The counterattack undertaken by the Becker group turned out to be completely unexpected and disrupted the preparation of the Soviet offensive. Yushkevich nevertheless decided not to change his plans, and on the morning of December 7, the 22nd Army tried to implement the previously conceived maneuver, but ran into the strengthened enemy defenses and, having lost the remnants of tanks, stopped. Attempts to regain the initiative in the following days were unsuccessful, and on December 12, Yushkevich received an order to withdraw the 3rd mechanized corps from the battle for rest and replenishment. For the failure of the offensive, he paid with his position: Major General M.D. Seleznev took his place at the head of the 22nd Army. At the same time, the Becker battle group was withdrawn from the battle and sent to the Young Tud area. Its place was to be taken by much stronger reserves, released after the liquidation of the "cauldron" south of Bely. This was the von der Meden Group of the 1st Panzer Division, the Praun Group of the 129th Infantry Division, the 12th and 20th Panzer Divisions. However, it was not possible to cut off the wedge driven into the German defense. The forests surrounding the Luchesa valley, which had previously slowed down the advance of the 22nd Army, now interfered with the counterattack of large German infantry and tank forces. Attempts in the 20th of December to break through to the west along the Luchesa valley, repeating the route of the Soviet offensive, also failed. On January 1, Model ordered a halt to attacks against the salient in the Luchesa area. Stretching out to the Olenino - White "appendix", filled with skeletons of tanks and guns, until the evacuation of the 9th Army from the Rzhev ledge, it was a kind of monument to the difficulties in an offensive in a closed area.

The failure of the offensive in the Luchesa Valley did not affect appreciated M.E.Katukov as a tank commander. Moreover, according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of January 30, 1943, he received a promotion. M.E.Katukov was appointed commander of the newly formed 1st Tank Army. The army included the 3rd Mechanized Corps, which participated in the offensive of the 22nd Army, and the long-suffering 6th Tank Corps, transferred from the 20th Army of the Western Front.

Breakthrough of the 41st Army south of Bely.

If on the Western Front of I.S. Konev the strikes of the 20th, 31st, 33rd and 5th armies were divided in time, then all three (not counting the 3rd and 4th shock armies advancing on Velikiye Luki) the shock groupings of the Kalinin Front were to go on the offensive at the same time. The multiplicity of strikes by the front command was justified by the need to pin down enemy reserves:

"The use of tanks of the Oleninsky direction will be impossible due to the fettering of their actions by units of the 39th Army."

The most powerful of the advancing armies was the 41st Army of Major General G.F. Tarasov. Since the 2nd mechanized corps was expelled from Tarasov's army, only one mobile group was created. It included the 1st mechanized corps of M.D. Solomatin and the 6th Stalinist rifle corps of Major General S.I. Povetkin. The latter consisted of one rifle division (150th colonel N.O. Gruz) and four rifle brigades (74th, 75th, 78th and 91st). No attempts were made to create a semblance of N.A. Kropotin’s group in the 20th Army from tank and rifle formations to protect the right flank. Sent to the 41st Army at the request of G.K. Zhukov, two additional mechanized brigades (47th and 48th) remained under army subordination and did not receive clear tasks to cover the flank.

A serious problem for all Soviet strike groups in "Mars" was the lack of major communications along the offensive axis. The 41st Army was no exception to this rule. The terrain in the offensive zone was wooded, moreover, in the process of the offensive it was necessary to force the rivers Vishenka, Vienna and Nacha.

Among the factors favoring the offensive was the composition of the troops defending south of Bely. In the offensive zone of the 41st Army, the defense was occupied by the 2nd airfield division, prepared much worse than the linear units of the Wehrmacht. However, receiving information about the Soviet offensive prompted the Germans to take whole line measures to prepare mobile reserves and move them to probable directions of attack. As early as October 31, the battle group Kassnitz was formed from two motorized infantry battalions of the "Grossdeutschland" division. She was transferred to the area northeast of Bely. On November 19, the 1st Panzer Division withdrew from its position east of Sychevka (that is, in the zone of the Western Front) and headed for the Bely region, on the western face of the Rzhev salient. Thus, the first German reserve appeared on the horizon, the presence of which was not envisaged by the calculations of the headquarters of the Kalinin Front.

Formally, the Kalinin Front launched the offensive before anyone else in Mars: artillery preparation began in the area of ​​​​the breakthrough of the 41st Army at 6.00 on November 25, 1942. to break through the divisions went on the attack. Soon, two regiments of the 2nd airfield division and a regiment of the 246th infantry division were crushed. Their remnants rolled back, opening the way to the east for the Soviet success development echelon.

Before the start of the operation, the 1st mechanized corps of M.D. Solomatin consisted of 15,200 personnel, 10 KB tanks, 119 T-34, 95 T-70, 44 76-mm guns, 56 45-mm guns, 102 82-caliber mortars mm, 18 mortars with a caliber of 120 mm, 8 M-13 installations. It is clearly seen that the mobile unit of the Red Army of the latest formation still bore all the shortcomings that were characteristic of the tank corps of 1942. The corps included quite a lot of artillery of 45-mm and 76-mm caliber, which almost completely compensated for the needs of an independent tank formations in anti-tank, battalion and regimental artillery. However, there was no artillery of 122-mm caliber and above in the corps. This significantly reduced the ability of M.D. Solomatin’s corps to break even a hastily organized defense in the depths of the enemy’s formation, after entering the breakthrough.

At 15.30 on November 25, the 1st mechanized corps began to advance to enter the breakthrough. In contrast to the offensive of the 20th Army, in this case there was no break in the original plans. The corps was part of a full-fledged breakthrough, he did not need to fight for the second line of defense. From the very beginning of the operation, units of the 41st Army and the left flank of the success development echelon were drawn into positional battles for the town of Bely, devouring reserves. So, already on the first day of the offensive, the 150th Rifle Division of the 6th Rifle Corps got bogged down in battles south of Bely. By the evening of November 25, the 219th tank brigade of the corps of M.D. Solomatin joined it. In fact, Tarasov's army fought two battles of a different nature, but related to each other: one for the city of Bely, the second - a duel with gradually approaching enemy reserves in the depths of the formation of German troops. The town of Bely was in the hands of the Germans since the autumn of 1941 and was an important center of resistance for the 9th Army. This was understood by both the German and Soviet command. The task of the offensive of the 41st Army was formulated as "to defeat the enemy's Belsk grouping and capture the city of Bely."

The situation was immediately assessed by the German command as critical. The breakthrough of the front made it necessary to build a defense front south of Bely and to restrain the spread of Soviet tanks into the depths of the defense. The commander of the XXXXI Panzer Corps, Garpe, who was responsible for the defense of the city, demanded that all the tank reserves of the 9th Army be placed at his disposal. Understanding the seriousness of the situation, Model gave orders to the 12th, 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions to begin their transfer to the Belyi area. However, the arrival of three panzer divisions was expected no earlier than a few days later. The first to arrive on 30 November was the 12th Panzer Division. It was necessary to defend Belyi and hold back the advance of the troops of the two Soviet corps to the east with the forces of the units of the XXXXI Panzer Corps already involved in the battles. The task of defending the city of Bely proper was assigned to Harpe by the commander of the 1st Panzer Division, Walter Krueger. The remnants of the 352nd regiment of the 246th infantry division, the 41st motorized regiment of the 10th motorized division, as well as the incoming battle group Kassnitz "Grossdeutschland" were subordinated to him. From the composition of his own division, Kruger could most quickly use the von Wittersheim battle group as part of the II battalion of the 113th Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the I Battalion of the 33rd Panzer Regiment, supported by a division of the 73rd Artillery Regiment. The task of deterring the offensive of the corps of M.D. Solomatin was assigned to the von der Meden combat group from the motorcycle battalion and the 1st motorized infantry regiment of the Kruger division. At the same time, a motorcycle battalion (K-1) of the 1st Panzer Division was advancing to the line of the Nacha River, which lay in the path of the Soviet offensive. His task was to hold out until the approach of tank and motorized infantry regiments.

To the shores icebound The beginnings of the 1st mechanized corps left by 20.00 on November 27. The 35th, 37th and 65th mechanized brigades captured the crossings and engaged in battle with the motorcyclists of the 1st Panzer Division and the von der Meden battle group.

As expected, the two mechanized brigades transferred by G.K. Zhukov as a replacement for the second mechanized corps were used by the command of the 41st Army not to protect the flank. More precisely, only one of the brigades was used in this capacity. On the evening of November 27, the 48th Mechanized Brigade was placed as a mobile reserve behind the front of the 74th Rifle Brigade. The 47th Mechanized Brigade of Colonel I.F. Dremov was sent by the commander of the 41st Army to bypass Bely along with the 91st Rifle Brigade. The dispersal of the forces of the mobile group between the flank cover and the assault on Belyi simultaneously led to a weakening of the spearhead of the main attack. The right-flank 37th mechanized brigade of the corps of M.D. Solomatin moved forward on a wide front without any infantry support, relying only on its motorized infantry.

On November 28, each side brought fresh forces into battle in order to achieve a turning point in the battle. The German units defending Bely launched a counterattack at the base of the wedge driven into their defenses, but did not achieve noticeable results. On the contrary, the Soviet command made a "knight's move", which seriously changed the operational situation around Bely. The commander of the 41st Army, Tarasov, decided to take advantage of the advance of the corps of M.D. Solomatin in depth and bypass the flank of the White troops defending. In the morning, the 91st Rifle Brigade threw back the left flank of the 41st Motorized Regiment southeast of Bely, and after several hours of fighting in a snowstorm, the 47th Mechanized Brigade was brought into battle. The brigade of I.F. Dremov was able to quickly move north, bypassing Bely. It was decided to use the emerging success and transfer the 19th mechanized and 219th tank brigades to the same sector. Bely's attack from the rear seemed the most promising solution to the problem of capturing this important German stronghold.

The offensive of the 1st mechanized corps to the east on November 28 continued, but there were less and less forces left at the point of impact. Only the 37th mechanized brigade moved forward, advancing to the southeast, bypassing the Nachi line occupied by motorcyclists of the 1st Panzer Division. The other two brigades that had come out to Nacha were fighting for bridgeheads on the east bank of the river. Having not received the promised mechanized brigades from Tarasov, M.D. Solomatin suspended the offensive. It was assumed that the collection of all forces for a strike into the depths of defense would be possible after the fall of Bely and the release of the brigades and divisions involved in his capture. The offensive of the 1st Mechanized Corps froze in anticipation of a decisive battle for Bely, which was to take place on November 29-30. The question was whether the Soviet troops would have time to capture the city before the arrival of reserves hurrying from all sides, or whether they would be pushed back from it by counterattacks of numerous “battle groups”.

On the morning of November 29, the 47th mechanized brigade continued its offensive to the north, encountering virtually no resistance. By evening, Dremov's tankers reached the Obsha River and captured the road leading to the White Road, depriving the German garrison of the main line of communications. The city was semi-surrounded outside world it was connected only by a wooded area without any roads less than 10 km wide. Troops in Bely could now receive ammunition and food only by air. However, the attacks of the Soviet infantry from the south and southeast on Bely had not yet brought the desired result, although the forces of the defenders were already running out. Already at 13.30, General Model pointed out to Harpe main task days:

"Outpost White to keep at any cost."

It was necessary to hold out not for days, but for hours: the 12th Panzer Division was 30 km from Bely and was preparing to enter the battle at the Nacha line.

The last assault on Bely, which promised success, took place on November 30. The 150th Rifle Division and the 91st Rifle Brigade, supported by the 19th Mechanized Brigade, resumed attacks on the southern and southeastern sectors of the city's defenses. However, they were opposed by four regiments of infantry and motorized infantry of the Germans (352nd infantry, 113th tank-grenadier, fusilier "Great Germany" and 41st motorized infantry regiments), and still failed to break their resistance. On the same day, the advance detachment of the 12th Panzer Division, the motorcycle battalion of the formation (K-22), entered the battle. Motorcyclists usually raced ahead during the "blitzkrieg" period. Now they were the first to reach the lines of defense. At 15.00 on November 30, the motorcyclists began to change units of von der Meden on Nacha. By evening, the main forces of the 12th Panzer Division pulled up, replacing the almost completely defeated (he even lost his commander in the battles) motorcycle battalion of the 1st Panzer Division. Another motorcycle battalion - the motorcyclists of "Great Germany" - advanced to the Obshcha River in order to block the advance of the 47th mechanized brigade or even free the supply lines of troops in Bely.

The next four days were spent in continuous German counter-attacks, which they were allowed to carry out by the arrival of reserves. However, these counterattacks, as well as the retaliatory attacks of the Soviet troops, have not yet brought any decisive result to either side. For example, to attack the flank of the 47th mechanized brigade that had engulfed Bely, the Huppert battle group was created in the 1st Panzer Division. On the afternoon of December 3, she tried to cut the communications of the brigade, but ran into fierce resistance. On the morning of December 4, the attack was repeated, but did not bring success to the Germans. Dremov’s motorized riflemen and infantrymen of the 91st rifle brigade of Colonel F.I. greater stability their positions.

Only on December 6, with counter attacks from Bely and Nacha, the defense of the rifle and mechanized brigades was broken and most of the Dremov brigade was surrounded. So one of the two mechanized brigades was lost, which were supposed to defend the southern flank of the offensive of the corps of M.D. Solomatin. The second, 48th separate mechanized brigade of Colonel Sheshshubakov, by December 5-6, took up defense together with the 75th, 76th and 78th rifle brigades along the right flank of the tank wedge of the 1st mechanized corps driven into the German defense. The advance of the 48th brigade from the reserve was more than timely: clouds were gathering on the flank, the German counterattack was to begin any day.

The counteroffensive was not long in coming. To coordinate the divisions assigned to the counterattack from Army Group North, the XXX Army Corps, headed by General Fretter-Pico, arrived. The main strike force of the counteroffensive was the 19th Panzer Division, whose right flank was covered by units of the 20th Panzer Division. On November 18, 1942, the 19th Panzer Division had 7 Pz.Kpfw.II tanks, 37 Pz.Kpfw.38 (t) tanks, 8 Pz.Kpfw.III tanks with a short-barreled gun, 3 Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks with a short-barreled cannon, 10 Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks with a long-barreled gun and 3 command tanks armed only with machine guns. Thus, the vast majority of the division's tanks (with the exception of ten Pz.Kpfw.IV with long-barreled guns) were obsolete types. However, in the absence of a serious barrier on the flank of the corps of M.D. Solomatin, even the mass of light tanks carried a mortal danger. The 78th Rifle Brigade was defending in the offensive zone planned by the Germans along a front of almost 5 km. On December 7, through snow 40 cm deep, the 19th Panzer Division began its offensive. In order to ensure surprise, the attack began without artillery preparation. Bypassing the few nodes of resistance, the division quickly moved forward. On the second day of the offensive, she cut off the main supply road for the mobile group of the 41st Army, and on the third day she came into contact with units of the 1st Panzer Division advancing from the Bely region. The reaction of the Soviet command, expressed in the withdrawal from Nacha to the flank of the 65th Tank Brigade, was belated. The encirclement ring around the units of the 6th Rifle and 1st Mechanized Corps closed. To be precise, with the blow of the XXX Corps, the troops of Povetkin and Solomatin were cut in two. Outside the "cauldron", on the front of the Vishenka River, the 75th and 78th rifle brigades, the 65th and 219th tank brigades and most of the 150th rifle division gathered. The 19th, 35th, 37th and 48th mechanized brigades, the 74th and the remnants of the 91st rifle brigade were in the encirclement ring. In order to reduce the front, the brigades of the Solomatin corps retreated from the Nacha line to the west, gathering in a compact group south of Bely. Soon, Major General Tarasov was removed from command of the 41st Army, and G.K. Zhukov personally led the army.

The first attempt to break through the encirclement was made on the morning of 8 December. It did not bring success, and until December 14, a fierce struggle was going on along the perimeter of the "cauldron" between several encircled brigades and four German tank divisions. Finally, on the evening of December 14, M.D. Solomatin received permission from G.K. Zhukov to break through, that is, the opportunity to break through to his own without the task of holding the territory captured during the November offensive. On the evening of December 15, the units located on the western face of the "cauldron" began to break through, and by dawn on December 16, the battered units of the 6th Rifle and 1st Mechanized Corps were withdrawn from the encirclement. According to the report of the commander of the 1st mechanized corps, compiled on the basis of the operation, the losses of the corps in 20 days of fighting amounted to 2280 people killed and 5900 wounded. Of this number, 1,300 people were killed in the encirclement, about 3,500 people were injured. Only about 4,000 of the 15,200 people who were in the corps at the start of the fighting managed to return to the location of the 41st Army. The losses of the 6th Rifle Corps were at least comparable to these figures.

The failure of the offensives of the three armies of the Kalinin Front became fatal for the career of M.A. Purkaev. An old associate of G.K. Zhukov was exiled to the Far East. The dismissed commander of the 41st Army, General G.F. Tarasov, was given the opportunity to rehabilitate himself: in February - March 1943, he led the 70th Army in the offensive of K.K. Rokossovsky. However, the offensive was generally unsuccessful, Tarasov was again dismissed and died in Hungary in the autumn of 1944 as deputy commander of the 53rd Army. The Directorate of the 41st Army was disbanded, and no more army with this number appeared in the Red Army until the end of the war. The actions of M.D. Solomatin were recognized as adequate to the situation, and he retained the post of commander of the mechanized corps until the end of the war.

The results of the operation.

Mars is one of clear examples the emergence of a positional crisis at a qualitatively new level of development of military equipment and operational art. Tanks, which in the First World War became one of the tools for solving the problem of breaking through the front, in the Second World War themselves often turned out to be victims of new means of struggle. Anti-tank guns mowed down the advancing tanks with the same terrifying speed and efficiency as machine guns and rapid-fire guns stopped infantrymen on the Marne. late autumn In 1942, tanks increasingly began to collide with anti-tank artillery in its most dangerous variant - with self-propelled guns fully protected by anti-cannon armor. In the diary of the German Lieutenant Burk, captured in the battles for Podosinovka and quoted in the report on the combat operations of the 20th Army, it is written:

“We thought we were already dead, but a long assault gun saved us. This day I will never forget. Finally, the attack is repulsed.

The "Long Assault Gun" is a StuGIII self-propelled gun with a long-barreled 75mm gun. Only one self-propelled gun could decide the fate of the stronghold of defense. In the "Conclusions" section of the report of the headquarters of the 20th Army on the participation of self-propelled guns of this type in "Mars", in particular, it says:

"We should organize as soon as possible a reliable fight against the enemy's self-propelled guns, which often frustrated our offensive impulse."

The defender had at his disposal powerful, maneuverable and long-range means of combating the tanks of the attacker. A massive tank attack that crushed the defenses of the First World War, a quarter of a century later, could easily choke. Hundreds of tanks, which turned out to be filled with the battlefields of "Mars", testify to this more than eloquently.

In the operational plane, "Mars" shows us the emergence of a positional crisis due to the appearance of mobile formations in the warring armies. The task of defending an extended front is in itself a very complex task due to the uncertainty of the enemy's plans. The defender does not know in advance which point will be hit, and therefore the success or failure of a defensive operation depends to a large extent on the ability to quickly maneuver reserves. It is possible to defend effectively with a significant number of mobile formations. This factor manifested itself most clearly in the battles on the western face of the Rzhev salient, in the zone of the Kalinin front. On the whole, the troops of the front successfully solved the problem of breaking through the front, but after breaking the defenses of the infantry divisions, they collided in the depths of the defense with the mobile reserves of the Germans. Parts of the German tank and motorized divisions, moving on cars and motorcycles, formed a new front on the path of Soviet tanks and infantry that had broken through into the depths, and also launched counterattacks. The forces of six German mobile formations fell upon two mechanized corps of the Kalinin Front: the 1st, 12th, 19th and 20th tank divisions, the motorized division "Grossdeutschland" and the 1st SS cavalry division. In the Young Tud area, the 14th motorized division and units of the "Great Germany" participated in repelling the Soviet offensive. In addition to the initially motorized formations, vehicles were used to transfer usually infantry, for example, the Becker group. It was difficult to pin down the mobile reserves of the defender, who in most cases were in the depths of the defense. Therefore, an alternative to the dubious strategy " Brusilov breakthrough”, that is, to pin down part of the enemy forces with auxiliary strikes, was the planning of the operation, taking into account the order of forces to combat operational reserves.

Planning to deal with operational reserves was the main problem of the Red Army in "Mars", the consequence of which is the failure of the entire operation. The reason for this was the unsatisfactory work of intelligence at all levels. The scouts did not reveal the operational and strategic reserves of the German command. This was especially evident in the offensive of the 41st Army of the Kalinin Front. The 1st Mechanized and 6th Rifle Corps advanced as if there were no threats at all on their right flank. However, it was on the right flank of the advancing corps that a strong blow was dealt by enemy tank formations represented by the 19th and 20th tank divisions. Also, the troops of the 20th Army of the Western Front were not focused on the appearance of enemy reserves. An OKH intelligence report dated December 3, 1942 noted:

“A comparison of the forces involved by the enemy with operational targets clearly indicates that the enemy underestimated the strength of our defense; in particular, as the defecting chief of staff of the 20th Cavalry Division confirms, he was amazed at the appearance of "reliable German reserves" at the decisive moments of the attack. The enemy did not count on these forces. On the maps that came to us, no German reserves are noted ”(Glantz D. Op. cit., S. 230).

Adequate to reality information about the enemy's reserves could affect the form and methods of conducting the operation. In particular, this could force the command of the Kalinin Front to abandon the dispersion of forces and concentrate two mechanized corps in the 41st Army zone. One corps could advance in depth, while the second could carry out the task of covering the right flank of the offensive.

But even if we assume that intelligence has identified German reserves, and the command of the fronts has accordingly built up tank and mechanized formations, the hope for the success of "Mars" still remains illusory. At the end of 1942, the Soviet command, although quite far advanced in creating independent mechanized formations, still did not have a full-fledged formation of the German tank division class. Even the newest mechanized corps were poor in artillery and in the depths of the German defense could only count on 76-mm guns, more suitable for fighting enemy tanks than for crushing even hastily built defenses. Air support, which could theoretically replace the lack of howitzer artillery, was weak due to heavy weather conditions. Near Stalingrad, Soviet tank and mechanized corps were able to avoid a collision with large enemy operational reserves in the initial phase of the operation. In "Mars" the operational situation was more complicated, and the shortcomings of the Soviet tank forces became more pronounced, becoming fatal for the development of the operation as a whole.

The underestimation of reserves was exacerbated by mismanagement of the operation. One of the most serious miscalculations of the commander of the Western Front, I.S. Konev, was the rush to enter the front’s success development echelon into the breakthrough, despite the fact that the task of the first day of the operation was not completed and the troops of the 20th Army did not reach the second line of defense. In fact, no breakthrough was formed, and the success development echelon represented by the 6th Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Corps was introduced not into a breakthrough, but into battle. The cavalrymen and tankers who were crossing over occupied the crossings, which could be used to advance to the artillery bridgehead. Moreover, there were only two crossings instead of four according to the original plan. If I.S. Konev had delayed the introduction of the mobile front group into the breakthrough, then by November 28 the situation would have been quite ripe for a normal crossing of mobile units. As a result of a successful move with a flank attack by the 251st Rifle Division and the 80th Tank Brigade, the troops of the 20th Army by the end of November 28 formed a bridgehead that almost corresponded to the planned one. This would make it possible to use all four crossings prepared by sappers across the Vazuza for the Kryukov group to move forward, and not to squeeze the cavalry corps in single file along one crossing. The rush to bring the mobile group into the breakthrough also prevented the transfer of artillery to the bridgehead. The crossings were occupied by tanks and cavalry, and the artillery regiments took part in the battles for the second line of defense only in the second phase of the offensive of the 20th Army.

In general, the battle developed according to the laws of the genre of positional "meat grinders" of the Western Front in the First World War. The moment of surprise acted at best for the first few days of the offensive. Subsequently, the defender transferred regiments and divisions from neighboring sectors of the front and from the reserve to open areas of attack, and compacted the defenses in the emerging offensive zones. Faced with increasing resistance, the attacker also brought into battle reserves and formations withdrawn from neighboring armies. Both sides threw more and more units into battle. The advancing hoped that the new "last battalion" brought into battle would become a straw breaking the camel's back. The defender tried his best to prevent it. As a result, large forces of both sides accumulated in a relatively small area of ​​the terrain, abundantly watering the earth with their blood under a hail of shells and bullets.

At the same time, it is impossible not to note the positive aspects in the actions of the Soviet troops, which manifested themselves during Operation Mars. These include, for example, the increased efficiency of the repair and restoration services of the Red Army. In the 20th Army, due to the centralization of repair services, a kind of tank repair plant was created, capable of repairing tanks of all types and working according to a single plan. During the 25 days of the operation, this plant repaired 270 tanks out of 300 evacuated. With a different organization of repair services, such a mass of tanks would have to be repaired three times longer. In fact, the same tank "scrolled" several times. Thus, under the influence of the experience of the war, a system was created to make up for losses with repairs, which created the impression of a many-headed dragon in the enemy, in which new ones immediately grew in place of cut heads.

Also, the tactics of assault groups were becoming more widespread in the Red Army. Practice has shown that no amount of artillery and tank support is able to completely destroy the defender's fire system. The advancing rifle battalions and regiments had to independently suppress the revived machine-gun nests with the power of their weapons. The system "artillery destroys, infantry occupies" did not work in the conditions of the Second World War. Small but well-trained groups of fighters became the key to victory, destroying resistance centers and opening the way for tanks and the bulk of the infantry.

The offensive of the Kalinin and Western fronts in the Rzhev region cost the Red Army dearly. According to official national statistics on losses, the Soviet troops in "Mars" lost 70,374 people killed and missing, 145,300 wounded. For comparison, losses in two and a half months of fighting since the start of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad amounted to 485 thousand killed and wounded, but at the same time they brought a victory of strategic importance. "Mars" turned out to be only an investment in future victories. The chain of battles for Rzhev significantly weakened the German 9th Army. One of the main heroes of the battle, the 1st Panzer Division, was withdrawn from the army and sent to the West for re-staffing. On the Eastern Front, she reappeared only in the autumn of 1943 and in turning point simply did not participate in the Kursk Bulge. All other formations participating in repelling the Soviet offensive near Rzhev and Sychevka suffered significant losses. So, already in mid-December, the 78th Infantry Division was assessed as "incompetent", although it was one of the best divisions of the Wehrmacht. The losses suffered by the formations of the 9th Army became a significant factor in the planning and conduct of the summer campaign of 1943 by the German command. But neither Zhukov nor Model knew about this in January 1943.

A new blow to the enemy (Newspaper "Pravda" 11/29/1942)
"The other day, our troops went on the offensive in the area east of the city of Velikiye Luki and in the area west of the city of Rzhev. Overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, our troops broke through the heavily fortified defensive line of the enemy. In the area of ​​the city of Velikiye Luki, the German front was broken through for 30 km In the area west of the city of Rzhev, the enemy front was broken through in three places: in one place with a length of 20 km, in another sector with a length of 17 km, and in a third sector with a length of up to 10 km.In all these directions, our troops advanced in depth from 12 to 30 km Our troops interrupted the railways Velikie Luki - Nevel, Velikiye Luki - Novosokolniki, as well as the Rzhev - Vyazma railway.
The enemy, trying to delay the advance of our troops, is conducting numerous and fierce counterattacks. Enemy counterattacks are successfully repulsed with heavy losses for him ... "

"TASS bulletin of front-line information" 11/29/1942.
"... In the area of ​​​​the Rzhev-Vyazma railway, the Germans threw into battle two regiments of infantry and 50 tanks. The Soviet soldiers threw back the Nazis and moved forward. Many German soldiers and officers and 20 destroyed tanks remained on the battlefield. Having exterminated several hundred Nazis, our units forced the enemy to retreat... ...The operational report briefly says: Our units cut the most important railway line that feeds the center of enemy resistance. Our units moved forward, the enemy suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. "

Instead of a prologue

Paradoxically! The more you learn about the battles at the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead in November-December 1942, the less the reasons for our failures become clear.

We have collected, perhaps, the most extensive and reliable material on the military operations of the Western Front in "Operation Mars", but the "picture" is becoming more and more "blurred". The only thing that can be said with complete certainty is that we found and buried more than 1,500 soldiers and officers who died in this operation, unfortunately, this is less than 10% of the total number of losses of the 20th Army alone ...

This publication has been compiled solely for the purpose of acquainting the reader with one of the many "forgotten operations" of the Great Patriotic War. Here you will not find arguments, conjectures and conclusions - this is just a story about the war ...

From official sources:
"The 20th Army of the second formation was created on November 30, 1941 on the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of November 29, 1941 ... In August 1942, as part of the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation, the army carried out. Subsequently, until March 1943. in cooperation with other troops defended Rzhev-Vyazma border ..."
According to victory.mil.ru

Few people know about the Sychevsk offensive operation (November - December 1942) - there is practically no official information about it: this operation is not mentioned in multi-volume works about the Great Patriotic War. Only occasionally in the memoirs of military leaders slip a couple of lines about "battles local importance"on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead ... ( this text was written quite a long time ago... at present, everyone and sundry write about Operation Mars, one has only to look at the articles and publications mentioned on this page- A. Tsarkov) A possible reason for this is the Battle of Stalingrad, which eclipsed with its success the less successful operation of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, which took place just two hundred kilometers from the capital. Forests are burning with autumn fire Red from the north wind. 3a hillside forty days in a row The old Russian city of Rzhev is on fire... Alexey Surkov Alexander Tvardovsky "I was killed near Rzhev" I was killed near Rzhev, In the nameless swamp In the fifth company, on the left, On a hard hit. I didn't hear the break I didn't see that flash Right into the abyss from the cliff - And neither the bottom nor the tire. And all over this world Until the end of his days No buttonholes, no straps From my tunic. I am where the roots are blind Looking for food in the darkness; I - where with a cloud of dust Rye walks on the hill; I am where the cock crow At dawn on the dew; I - where are your cars The air is torn on the highway; Where blade of grass to blade of grass A river of grass spins, - Where for the wake Even mother won't come. Count up, alive How long ago Was at the front for the first time Named suddenly Stalingrad. The front was burning, not subsiding, Like a scar on the body. I'm dead and don't know Is our Rzhev finally? Did our There, on the Middle Don? .. This month has been terrible. Everything was on the line. Is it until autumn Don was already behind him And at least the wheels Did he escape to the Volga? No, it's not true. Tasks Toy not won by the enemy! No, no! Otherwise Even dead - how? And the dead, the voiceless, There is one consolation: We fell for our country But she is saved. Our eyes have faded The flame of the heart went out On earth in faith They don't call us. We have our fighting Do not wear medals. You - all this, alive. We have one consolation: What was not in vain fought We are for the Motherland. Let our voice not be heard, - You must know him. You should have, brothers, Stand like a wall For the dead are cursed This punishment is terrible. It's a formidable right We are forever given - And it's behind us This is a bitter right. In the summer, in forty-two, I am buried without a grave. Everything that happened after Death has betrayed me. All that, maybe for a long time You are familiar and clear But let it be According to our faith. Brothers, maybe you And don't lost, And in the rear of Moscow They died for her. And in the Volga distance Hastily dug trenches And they came with fights To the border of Europe. It is enough for us to know which was undoubtedly That last span On the military road. That last span What if you leave That stepped back There is nowhere to put your foot. That line of depth For which rose From behind your back The flame of the forges of the Urals. And the enemy turned You are west, back. Maybe brothers And Smolensk has already been taken? And you crush the enemy On the other side, Maybe you are towards the border Already up! Maybe... May it come true Holy oath word! - After all, Berlin, if you remember, It was named near Moscow. Brothers who are now on the mend Fortress of the enemy land, If the dead, the fallen If only we could cry! If the volleys are victorious Us, dumb and deaf, Us, who are devoted to eternity, Resurrected for a moment - Oh faithful comrades, Only then would be in the war Your happiness is immeasurable You got it completely. In it, that happiness is undeniable Our bloodline Ours, torn by death, Faith, hate, passion. Our everything! We didn't cheat We are in a tough fight Having given everything, they did not leave Nothing to yourself. Everything is listed on you Forever, not forever. And alive not in reproach This voice is your thinkable one. Brothers, in this war We didn't know the difference. Those who are alive, those who have fallen, - We were equal. And no one in front of us Of the living not in debt, Who from the hands of our banner Caught on the run So that for a holy cause, For Soviet Power Just maybe exactly Fall further. I was killed near Rzhev, He is still near Moscow. Somewhere, warriors, where are you, Who is left alive? In cities of millions In the villages, at home in the family? In military garrisons On land that is not ours? Oh, is it yours? Alien, All in flowers or in snow... I bequeath my life to you, What can I do more? I bequeath in that life you happy to be And motherland Continue to serve with honor. Grieve - proudly Without bowing your head Rejoicing is not boastful In the hour of victory itself. And keep it holy Brothers, your happiness - In memory of a warrior brother, who died for her. Boris Slutsky "Kropotovo" In addition to the roof of the Reichstag, the Bryansk forests, Sevastopol cannonade There are fronts that did not vote. These also need to be heard. Many people know where it is Nameless Borodino: This is Kropotovo, near Rzhev, Turn left off the road. There were no more than twenty houses there. How much is left, I don't know. At the Russian vast land - in the chest That village is like a through wound. Political instructors dropped out completely. Ninety-five commanders. And the village (firebrands and coals) Passed from hand to hand. And there is no medal for Kropotovo? Not, They didn't give him a medal. I am writing, and now there is, of course, dawn And rye yellow gave, And, probably, the harvester goes through the rye, Or the tractor is uprooting its stumps, And freely pass all the boundaries, And they don't know, they don't hear, they don't smell... Alexander Tsarkov "Memory" Near Sychevka, near Rzhev, At the source of the Dnieper - Where is the soldier's prowess I found the way Where the explosions were And thundered "Hurrah!" Where sweat and blood The earth choked. Who was killed near Sychevka, Killed near Rzhev Where is the "Eternal Flame" What is their memory? Those who, despising death, Got up on the attack Who stepped into immortality - And disappeared... How many lives have been given We are this war!? Their names sound Like a scream in the silence... I close my eyes And I see soldiers What lies under Sychevka, They lie under Rzhev. Their relatives were informed They've been filed. About fallen heroes Forgotten country. But as long as we're alive Our memory lives on Near Sychevka, near Rzhev, At the source of the Dnieper...

On December 4 at 9.30 artillery preparation began. Artillery and mortar batteries "RS" for 30 minutes fired at the suppression of visible points of the enemy.

Overhead was the uninterrupted roar of bombers and attack aircraft. The weather was perfect, and our aviation dominated the air, making waves of continuous raids on Front edge and firing positions of the enemy (by the way, this is practically the only mention of the actions of our aviation during the entire offensive - ed.).

At 10.00, units and formations of the army on the entire front went on the offensive, but being met by strong enemy artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire from revived firing points, they lay down.

The enemy on the entire front of the 20th Army put up fierce resistance and did not allow our troops to break through to the Sychevka-Rzhev railway, actively using self-propelled artillery, which quickly went into open positions and fired from short stops, shooting our infantry and tanks.

The Germans continued to throw in reinforcements, drawing up their reserves from all sides.

1.12.1942 Order 8GvSK
"... Despite my repeated orders and demands, the commanders of formations and their deputies for political affairs still do not pay attention to the issue of burying soldiers and commanders who died bravely for our Motherland. As a result, the corpses of killed soldiers and commanders were left on the battlefield unburied. The corpses of the killed soldiers and officers of the enemy are not buried. I order: to bury the corpses of soldiers and commanders on the battlefield in the bands and in the areas of operation of the units and bury the corpses of the enemies, pulling them into shell craters. Commander of the 8GvSK Guards Major General Zakharov "

2.12.1942 Order No. 030 331 of the Bryansk Proletarian SD Active Army
“Recently, there have been cases when the corpses of fighters are brought to the village for burial. The commander of the division ordered:
the removal of the corpses of fighters for burial in the settlements (rear) to prohibit and bury them on the battlefield. In the rear for the burial of corpses, I allow only the average command staff.
Chief of Staff Major Suchkov
Military commissar senior battalion commissar Garatsenko"
TsAMO RF 331SD inventory 1 case 7 sheet 122

Newspaper "Izvestiya" 03.12.1942 Thursday #284
"In the area of ​​the Rzhev-Vyazma road, our units captured a village turned by the enemy into a fortified defense center. Up to 500 German soldiers and officers were destroyed in the battles for this village ..."

The next major offensive, the purpose of which was to cut the Sychevka-Rzhev railway and, advancing in a north-western direction, to encircle the enemy’s Rzhev grouping together with units of the Kalinin Front, was scheduled for December 11, 1942. By December 11, the troops of the 20th Army numbered more than 80,000 people, excluding the remnants of the mobile group (together with spare parts and rear institutions, 112,411 people). The army included one guards and two conventional rifle divisions, as well as the 5th Tank Corps.

At 10 am on December 11, artillery preparation began, which lasted 50 minutes. Simultaneous fire was fired by mortar batteries and all army and divisional artillery.

From the diary of a captured German officer:
“In the morning, unimaginable firing of artillery, Stalin’s “organs” and tanks began at our positions. We were subjected to such fire that it is truly impossible to describe, to find suitable words.
It seemed that the end of the world had come. We sat in our trenches, hoping that a direct hit wouldn't hit us all. This hell went on for an hour. When it ended, I wanted to get out, but I had to hide again, because. tanks moved towards us. I alone counted up to 40 heavy tanks from my trench. Two of them went to my trench, one behind, the other in front. You could go crazy. We thought we were already dead. This day I will never forget. Finally, the attack is repulsed."

At 11 am, units of the 20th Army went on the offensive on the entire front. Fresh divisions were brought into battle. During the day and night, the assault on the front line continued. The enemy offered stubborn resistance in all directions. The strongholds changed hands several times. Our troops were unsuccessful. It was not possible to break through to the Sychevka-Rzhev railway. By December 12, only 26 tanks remained from the practically newly formed 6TK, from the fresh 5TK - 30 tanks, infantry losses could not be counted (they did not have time to draw up lists for the replenishment that arrived, give out mortal medallions - units went into battle right from the march).

How Sychevka was taken
March 8, 1943

Central Front, 8 March. /SPETSKORR.TASS/. Sychevka was an important stronghold of the German troops. The tactical significance of this city is great. District center Smolensk region - Sychevka - located on the railway line Rzhev-Vyazma. Sychevka is the largest highway junction connecting it with many cities of the Smolensk region. Seven highways radiating from the city lead to Rzhev, Vyazma, Bely, Zubtsov, Gzhatsk and other settlements.

The German command turned Sychevka into a large supply base for its troops operating in a number of sectors of the front. There were large quartermaster bases, warehouses of ammunition, military equipment, fuel, here at one time the headquarters of the German tank corps, hospitals and other logistics facilities were located. The successful offensive actions of the Soviet troops southwest of Rzhev and west of Gzhatsk jeopardized the communications of the German garrisons, strongholds located along the western bank of the Kasni River and on both banks of the Vazuza - northwest of Sychevka. An immediate threat was created for the city itself.

Our troops, developing the offensive, shot down the advanced units of the Germans and, preventing the Nazis from gaining a foothold on intermediate lines, drove them out of dozens of settlements.

The advance of our troops in this area created real threat enemy's main lines of communication. The Germans were forced to transfer their number of new infantry and artillery units for defense.

Two days ago, Soviet infantry, artillery and tank units operating southwest of Rzhev came close to the city from the north.

In the area of ​​the railway station and around Sychevka, the fascists built engineering structures, concentrated mainly along the Kasni and Vazuza rivers. Numerous bunkers were connected by a dense network of trenches. All approaches to the city were under heavy enemy artillery fire.

As our units approached the northern and northeastern parts of Sychevka, the Germans pulled up to the battle area a large number of artillery and mortar batteries. The Nazis tried at all costs to stop the advance of our fighters.

During the battles for the Sychevsky bridgehead, the German units suffered heavy losses. Many stronghold garrisons were completely destroyed. prisoners German soldiers showed that on March 6 there were 120 soldiers in their company, on March 7, 87 remained, and after the battle in which they were captured, several people remained alive.

Pulling up forces to the city area, the Germans weakened the right flank of their grouping. Our units crossed the Kasnya River, crushed the enemy's strongholds on its western bank and engaged in battles with the main enemy forces operating southeast of Sychevka.

Unexpectedly for the Nazis, the forward detachments of the Soviet troops appeared in close proximity to Sychevka from the southeast and south side. The Germans attempted to transfer part of their forces here from their left wing, but all the Nazis' efforts to hold back the onslaught on the city from the south ended in failure for the enemy. One by one, suburban villages were recaptured from the Nazis.

Skillfully using the evening for reconnaissance of the enemy's defenses, our subunits accumulated for the attack, and by three o'clock in the morning broke into the city from several directions.

The decisive actions of the assault groups, supported by artillerymen, drove the enemy out of the city. By seven o'clock in the morning, Soviet soldiers cleared Sychevka of the Germans. Having lost about eight thousand soldiers and officers in the battles in the Sychev direction and outside the city, the German units retreated in disarray.

In the battles for Sychevka, our units captured rich trophies: 8 aircraft, 310 tanks, 40 guns of various calibers, 250 machine guns, 22 locomotives, 215 wagons and railway tanks, as well as many shells, mines, cartridges and other military equipment.

Not weakening the offensive impulse, the Soviet troops continue to move west.
E.Kaplansky

"On the fortieth anniversary of the Victory, my grandmother went in search of her father's grave. The village of Zherebtsovo turned out to be 200 km from Moscow. Grandmother recalls that the places there are swampy, the roads are bad, transport does not go. She got to the place on a tractor with a trailer, and the locals lent her rubber boots to get through the swamps. To her chagrin, there was no personal grave, all the remains of the dead were transferred to one mass grave, located in the village of Aristovo, Petrakov village council. The grave is landscaped and fenced with a metal fence, inside which a monument to a soldier and a woman was erected ..."
ELENA PULINA, Pavlovo (Newspaper "U.T.Ya" Nizhny Novgorod, 20.06.2002)

Alexander Tsarkov
Head of the Military Archeology Group "Seeker" 24.04.2003/08.11.2003/25.11.2007/25.11.2008
Materials used: ZhBD 20A - TsAMO RF F373 O6631 D56, ZhBD 2GvKK - TsAMO RF F2GKK O1 D31, ZhBD 30GvSD - TsAMO RF FOND 30GvSD O1 D7, ZhBD 336SD - TsAMO RF FOND 336SD O1 D13, ZhBD 415SD - TsAMO RF O1 D19, Combat orders 42Gv.KSD - TsAMO RF, Report on military operations 5TK MKF5TK - TsAMO RF, Report on military operations 6TK MKF6TK - TsAMO RF, ZhBD 5MSBR - TsAMO RF F3366 O1 D4
Used photos from the book Rzhev cornerstone ..., from Militaria magazine, (c) Histoire & Collections and from the personal archive of Alexander Tsarkov.

David Glantz

The largest defeat of Zhukov The catastrophe of the Red Army in Operation Mars 1942

From the publisher's annotation: “One of the least known pages of the Second World War, Operation Mars, ended in a failure of truly colossal proportions. The operation, which aimed to dislodge the German army from its bridgehead west of Moscow, cost the Soviet Union approximately 335,000 dead, missing, and wounded and over 1,600 tanks. However, this battle is not mentioned at all in Soviet literature: historical defeat was hidden by the post-war Stalinist censorship…”

In the book, on page 479, there are "Supplements to the Applications" (as stated in the book, "These supplements include material not included in the 1999 English edition of the book and kindly provided by the author during the translation period"), among which our particular interest was the following: "From the reports of the 6th tank corps" (p. 500); “From the reports of the 2nd GvKK” (p. 506), as well as “The battle of the 20th army at the turn of the river. Vazuza" (p. 540). All these materials are taken from our site, but without our consent! On July 5, 2006, we received a letter from David Glantz apologizing for this misunderstanding - apology accepted! “I should indeed have contacted you before forwarding them to AST (which I did late in the publication process). In this case, I did so because I thought they were important to the subject and would be to readers as well - and I assumed the aim of those who placed them on the web-site were similar to mine - that is, to expose as many details as possible about this operation. In my enthusiasm to include the documents, I simply forgot to give due credit to where they came from. David Glantz "However, claims to the "scientific editor" of this book, Mr. Isaev, remained - his phrase "This is an idiot Tsarkov ..." makes us sincerely surprised. While waiting for a public apology and refutation of what was said! (still waiting for an apology... already 2009 is "on the nose" ;-)

http://www.1942.ru/book/glants/glants_mars42.htm

Lost Link

If an ordinary chain loses one or more links, then it is easy to notice - it simply falls apart. If you pull out not one or two, but all ten links from the chain historical events, then at first glance the integrity of the picture in the eyes of subsequent generations is not violated. For many decades in mass consciousness 1942, the second year of the Great Patriotic War, was associated only with the battle for Stalingrad. For those who took a more serious interest in the history of the war, it was a year of dramatic turns in the counter-offensive near Moscow in January-April, a year of unsuccessful battles near Kharkov and in the Crimea in May. Sometimes they also recalled the attempt to break through the blockade of Leningrad, which ended in encirclement, by the forces of the ill-fated 2nd shock army; commander A.A. Vlasov became a traitor in captivity. In the Brezhnev era, when A.A. Grechko, the country has learned quite a lot about the battle for the Caucasus. One way or another, the history of the war was written and outwardly seemed whole and unshakable.

However, in reality, very significant battles in terms of their scale and significance fell out of the field of view of historians. From the chain of operations to Soviet-German front not just separate links were torn out, but entire fragments, pieces of operations connected by one goal. This can be compared, for example, with the exclusion from the history of the First World War of the battle for Verdun, one of the symbols of the positional "meat grinder" on the Western Front. The city of Rzhev became the Verdun of the Soviet-German front, around which fierce battles of a positional nature were fought for almost a year. The actions of the Soviet troops in the Rzhev region were so deeply hidden from prying eyes that there is no intelligible description of them even in the four-volume book “Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945”, which was closed with the heading “secret”, published in the late 1950s. . An outside observer could have the wrong impression that peace and grace reigned in the western direction in the summer and autumn of 1942, and the god of war turned his entire attention to the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. A. Tvardovsky's poem "I was killed near Rzhev" left a strange feeling. On the one hand, Rzhev was intuitively perceived as a front-line city. On the other hand, the vast majority had no information about any significant military operations associated with this city.

The history of war has long been an instrument of ideology. Although the expediency of total varnishing of reality in this case was by no means obvious. Concealment of large-scale military operations was simply unrealistic. Many of the participants in the battles for Rzhev wrote memoirs, episodes of the battles on the Western Front in 1942 were cited as tactical examples in textbooks. The film “General Shubnikov’s Corps” was even filmed, the plot of which quite unequivocally falls on the actions of the 1st mechanized corps of M.D. Solomatina near Rzhev in late November and early December 1942

The collapse of the USSR led to the fall of previously insurmountable barriers between independent historians and operational documents of armies, corps and divisions that participated in various operations of the Great Patriotic War, stored in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense in Podolsk. This made it possible to analyze the events according to all the rules, taking into account documents and memoirs from both sides. And while domestic military science was in a stupor due to the lack of guidelines for further development, foreigners took advantage of the opportunity to make a scientific discovery. This was done most effectively by David M. Glantz, who studied the most big fight for Rzhev - Operation Mars, which was carried out in November-December 1942. By that time he was a retired colonel american army(retired in 1993 after thirty years of service). Colonel Glantz was not new to the study of military operations on the Soviet-German front. Back in 1979, he took part in the creation of the US Army's Combat Studies Institute, where he analyzed the operations of the Soviet army. His first work was devoted to the offensive of the Red Army in Manchuria in August 1945. In 1983 he became director of Soviet operations at the USArmy War College.Glantz's significant achievement in this position was the holding of week-long conferences on military operations on the Soviet-German front with the involvement of direct participants in the events (for obvious reasons, then these were The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front, 22 June - August 1941: Proceedings of the Fourth Art of War Symposium, Garmisch, October 1987 (Cass Series on Soviet Military Experience, 2) is one of the most informative studies to date. th events of the summer of 1941. In 1987, Glantz founded the Journal of Soviet Military Studies, renamed in connection with the collapse of the USSR into the Journal of Slavic Military Studies. The work of Glantz, well known in the West, is short description throughout the Great Patriotic War “When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler”, published in 1993. From the title of the book, one can draw a quite unambiguous conclusion about the actual attitude of Glantz to the Red Army and its roles in the war. In a word, a scientific discovery was made by an experienced researcher. Firstly, as a historian who is well versed in the issue under study, and secondly, as a professional military man who understands the mechanism for the development of operations.

The Battle of Rzhev will forever go down in the history of the Great Patriotic War as one of its most significant and tragic pages. Today they argue about the very term "Battle of Rzhev", since a number of historians believe that we should not talk about the battle for the city of Rzhev, but about a series of offensive operations of the Kalinin and Western Fronts of the Red Army against German Army Group Center.

You can discuss terms. It is possible to revise the account of the losses of the Soviet troops, since there are authors who mix irretrievable and total losses, thus increasing the death toll to one and a half million Soviet soldiers and officers, while there were 155,791 dead. Finally, one can try to argue about the very need for battles for the city of Rzhev, and about whether or not taking it was of decisive importance for the course of hostilities. But it is indisputable that the Rzhev battle became one of the bloodiest battles in the history of wars, it was not for nothing that the expression “Rzhev meat grinder” came into use, and the second Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation (November 25 - December 20, 1942) was the only military defeat of Marshal Zhukov.

Why did this happen, what are the reasons for such gigantic losses?

Strategic

Operation "Mars" - as the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive was called in the documents of the headquarters - and operation "Uranus" (the Battle of Stalingrad) were two parts of a single plan. All actions near Rzhev had the main goal - to divert the command of the Wehrmacht from Stalingrad. Failures in the Rzhev direction were compensated by the encirclement and defeat of the Paulus army. In part, this point of view is confirmed by the memoirs of one of senior leaders Soviet intelligence in the 1930s - 1950s, lieutenant general that state security P. A. Sudoplatova. He writes that during the radio game with the German command (Operation "Monastery"), the Germans deliberately "leaked" information about the impending offensive in the Rzhev region, thereby pulling the Wehrmacht forces away from Stalingrad.

Even during the war, Rzhev and Stalingrad seemed to be direct participants in the events in some way. similar friend on a friend. The unprecedented fierceness of the battles, bloody street battles, the desire of the top leadership to defend these points at any cost - indeed, there was a similarity. The only difference is that Rzhev is, as it were, "Stalingrad on the contrary." Rzhev was occupied by German troops, and they considered this city as "the gateway to Berlin." For Hitler, it became a matter of prestige to take Stalingrad and not give up Rzhev. Stalin considered it a matter of prestige to defend Stalingrad and take Rzhev.

In case of failures, the behavior of the command of the German and Soviet sides was also similar: they refused to see reality, passing off wishful thinking. So, in November 1942, Hitler said in a speech on the radio: “They wanted to take over Stalingrad ... and there is nothing to be modest: it has already been taken ...”. And this is just before the start of the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops. G.K. Zhukov in December 1942 awarded the command of the 39th Army with a nominal watch "For the capture of the city of Olenino", although the village of Olenino was liberated only on March 4, 1943.

Tactical

A number of historians, mainly representatives of local history of the Tver region, including O. Kondratiev and S. Gerasimova (by the way, it was she who introduced the term “Battle of Rzhev”, which is disputed by representatives of Soviet military historical science), believe that the reason for the gigantic The losses of the Red Army during the battles near Rzhev became obvious tactical blunders of the Soviet command and poor preparation for the offensive.

The Red Army advanced in the winter in a wooded area against a well-prepared and equipped German defense tied to the local terrain. Near Rzhev, a wide enveloping military maneuver was impossible, which brilliantly succeeded in the steppes near Stalingrad. The frontal onslaught in the narrow space along the roads, among the snow and forests, nullified the numerical advantage of the Red Army. There was no quick and decisive breakthrough.

Having repelled the onslaught of the Western Front, the Wehrmacht command launched flank attacks on units of the Kalinin Front, which broke through, but failed to expand the breakthrough zone. Some Soviet units were surrounded.

Under such conditions, the Soviet command showed examples of often completely senseless military operations. The memories of the surviving participants in these battles have been preserved about how a regiment of the Red Army was thrown into battle again and again on some well-fortified village occupied by the Germans, without any fire support. People go on the attack in a chain, they are shot almost point-blank, the attack chokes, but after some time it is repeated again and again until 8 or 9 fighters remain in the ranks. They are taken to the defense, the regiment is strengthened by replenishment, and after two or three days everything repeats itself from the beginning: people go in a chain through a snow-covered field shot through from all sides, and the combat mission again remains unfulfilled.

In general, most of those who write today about the Battle of Rzhev agree that its history has not yet been written. It is replete with secrets and white spots, and is still waiting for its researcher.

By November 1942, in the western direction of the Soviet-German front, in a strip 1050 km wide, from Kholm to Bolkhov, there were 30% of the rifle, cavalry, tank and mechanized formations available in the Red Army. More than 26% of infantry and 42% of tank divisions were deployed here from the enemy side. In accordance with the concept of the upcoming campaign, formulated by A. Hitler on October 14 in Operational Order No. 1, the German troops were required "by all means to keep the achieved lines from any attempt by the enemy to break through them." At the same time, it was planned to concentrate the main efforts in defense in the zone of Army Group Center. According to the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, it was against her that one should expect main blow Red Army. Therefore, on the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge, well-developed engineering lines were prepared in advance, the separation depth of which reached 80–100 km.

As for the leadership of the USSR, it saw the general military-political goal of the upcoming campaign as seizing the strategic initiative in the armed struggle and thereby achieving a turning point in the war. At the first stage, it was planned to defeat the enemy in the Stalingrad region, after which, after striking at Rostov, go to the rear of his North Caucasian grouping and prevent its withdrawal to the Donbass. At the same time, it was planned to launch an offensive in the Upper Don region with its subsequent development on Kurs, Bryansk and Kharkov. In the western direction, in turn, it was necessary to carry out an offensive operation, which received the code name "Mars".

The troops of the Kalinin and the right wing of the Western fronts were involved in it. In accordance with the final plan of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, the main blow was planned to be delivered by groupings of two fronts in converging directions. It was planned to break through the enemy defenses on the first day of the offensive, after which mobile groups would be brought into battle. By the end of the third - fourth day, they were supposed to connect in the area southwest of Sychevka and thereby complete the encirclement of the German 9th Army. For the simultaneous dissection of it into parts, a number of other blows were provided.

So, in the zone of the Kalinin Front, whose troops were led by Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev, the 3rd shock army was to lead an offensive on Velikie Luki and Novosokolniki (Velikolukskaya operation). His 41st Army struck from the west of the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge, south of the city of Bely, and the 22nd Army along the river valley. Luchesa. The 39th Army entered the battle at the top of the ledge.

By decision of the commander of the Western Front, Colonel-General I.S. Konev, the 31st and 20th armies delivered the main blow south of the city of Zubtsov. On the right flank of the shock group, the 30th Army went on the offensive, and on the left - part of the forces (one rifle regiment) of the 29th Army. A week after the start of the operation, it was planned to bring the 5th and 33rd armies into battle with the task of defeating the Gzhatsk grouping of the enemy and reaching the near approaches to Vyazma.

The German 9th Army of Colonel-General V. Model, which opposed the Soviet troops, united three army and two tank corps (a total of 18 infantry, 1 airfield, 1 airborne, 1 tank division, two battalions of assault guns). The army reserve included two tank, two motorized, one cavalry divisions and a tank battalion. In addition, three tank divisions from the reserve of Army Group Center (12th, 19th and 20th) were concentrated in the rear of the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge.

Timely revealing the preparation of the Kalinin and Western fronts for the offensive, V. Model, in an order dated November 16, 1942, demanded, in addition to maintaining constant combat readiness, to create mobile groups in each corps and infantry division, designed to be transferred to threatened areas. In addition, the maneuver of army mobile reserves was planned in advance. To solve this problem, as of November 20, there were 302 serviceable tanks of various modifications.

The main blow in the Kalinin Front was delivered by the 41st Army of Major General G.F. Tarasov. It included five rifle divisions, the 1st mechanized corps of Major General M.D. Solomatina, the 47th and 48th mechanized brigades and the 6th Stalinist volunteer rifle corps, Major General S.I. Povetkin (one rifle division and four rifle brigades) - a total of 116 thousand people and 300 tanks. She was ordered to break through the enemy defenses south of the city of Bely, expand the breakthrough in the western and northern directions and connect with the 20th Army of the Western Front. It was necessary to act in a wooded area with a limited number of roads. At the same time, it was necessary to force the rivers Vishenka, Vena and Nacha.

In the offensive zone of the army, part of the forces of the 246th Infantry Division and the 2nd Airfield Division, whose combat potential and level of training were significantly inferior to other formations, occupied the defense. With this in mind, the enemy command concentrated a strong reserve in the area of ​​the city of Bely - the 1st Panzer Division and a battle group consisting of two motorized infantry battalions of the Great Germany motorized division.

On the morning of November 25, rifle formations, after a three-hour artillery preparation, attacked the front line of the enemy’s defense, broke through it on the move and rushed into the valley of the river. Cherry. But here they met strong resistance from strongholds located on its steep western bank, and were also subjected to counterattacks by divisional reserves. In a situation where there was a threat of disruption of the launched offensive, Major General G.F. Tarasov ordered the 1st mechanized corps (224 tanks, of which KV - 10 and T-34 - 119) to be brought into battle.

During November 26, his brigades completed the breakthrough enemy defense and set about building on the success. By the end of the third day of the offensive, the penetration depth of the army mobile group was 33 km. At the same time, the group acted in isolation from the rest of the troops, having significant gaps in order of battle and open flanks.

By December 1, all the reserves of the 41st Army were committed to the battle, but there was no decisive turning point in the course of the operation. The enemy, stubbornly defending in the strongholds blockaded by the Soviet troops, not only attracted and dispersed their forces in a wide band, but also, gaining time, created the conditions for launching a counterattack. His strong groupings, going on the offensive on December 6-7, soon surrounded the 6th Rifle and 1st Mechanized Corps. During the week, they repelled the attacks of parts of four German tank divisions and completed the breakthrough from the encirclement only by dawn on December 16, having lost a large number of people, guns, mortars and almost all tanks.

Commander of the 22nd Army (80 thousand people and 270 tanks) of the front, Major General V.A. Yushkevich decided to break through the enemy defenses with the forces of the 238th and 185th rifle divisions without involving tanks in direct infantry support, and then bring into battle the 3rd mechanized corps of Major General M.E. Katukov. By the end of the third day, having overcome 20 km, he was supposed to cut the Olenino-Bely highway, then part of the forces to attack north, towards the 39th Army, and partly to the south, to Bely, to connect with the 41st Army. In reserve were one rifle brigade and a separate tank regiment. It was necessary to act in a narrow corridor, which was limited to the valley of the river. Luchesa. On both sides it was surrounded by dense forests, which made it extremely difficult to maneuver with forces and means.

The strike force of the army went on the offensive on November 25 after an hour and a half of artillery preparation. During the day of the battle, rifle divisions, with the support of two brigades of the 3rd mechanized corps, were able to separate sections penetrate the enemy defenses for 1–2 km. Nevertheless, his command already in the evening of the same day began to put forward tactical reserves to threatened areas. Their arrival predetermined the fact that during November 26 the advance of the Soviet troops did not exceed 1 km.

The next day, all the brigades of the 3rd mechanized corps were introduced into the battle, but even they could not overcome the stubborn resistance of the enemy. Major General V.A. Yushkevich decided to change the direction of the main attack and during the night to regroup the main forces of the corps from the left flank to the right. However, by that time, part of the forces of the German division "Grossdeutschland" had been advanced here. The use of army reserves did not lead to decisive success, which, at the cost of heavy losses, only slightly advanced.

On November 30 and December 1, stubborn battles were fought in the entire offensive zone of the army. By December 3, its advanced units were only 2–5 km from the Olenino-Bely highway. But by that time, more than 200 out of 270 tanks had already been lost. Tank and mechanized brigades, operating in isolated areas, in wooded areas, were unable to fully use their shock and maneuver capabilities, break through into the depths of enemy defenses in a short time and build on success. All this allowed the German command, as well as in the zone of the 41st Army, to gain time and make timely maneuvers with reserves. All subsequent attempts by the 22nd Army to reach the Olenino-Bely highway, which continued until December 12, were unsuccessful.

The purpose of the offensive of the 39th army (more than 92 thousand people, 227 tanks) of the front was to attract enemy reserves and prevent their transfer to other directions. It was achieved by performing two consecutive tasks: first, the capture of the Molodoy Tud-Rzhev highway in the Urdom, Zaitsevo sector and then in cooperation with the 22nd Army and the shock group of the Western Front - the settlement of Olenino.

Army Commander Major General A.I. Zygin planned to deliver the main blow in the center of the strip with the forces of the 158th, 135th and 373rd rifle divisions, with the support of the 28th and 81st tank brigades. The 348th Rifle Division was allocated to the second echelon, and the 101st Rifle and 46th Mechanized Brigades were assigned to the reserve. Other blows were delivered: on the right flank - the 100th rifle brigade and a regiment of the 186th rifle division, on the left - the 136th rifle brigade, two regiments of the 178th rifle division and three tank regiments.

In the zone of the upcoming offensive of the army, 42 km wide, the German 206th and part of the forces of the 251st and 253rd infantry divisions occupied the defense. They concentrated their efforts on holding separate strongholds, the gaps between which reached several kilometers. However, this shortcoming was compensated by the presence in the rear of strong mobile reserves - two motorized divisions (14th and "Grossdeutschland").

As in other formations of the Kalinin Front, the offensive in the zone of the 39th Army began on November 25 with artillery preparation lasting 1 hour. Since the density of guns and mortars was low (50 units per 1 km), it was not possible to suppress the enemy at the forefront and, especially, in tactical depth. Forcing the river on the move. Young Tud rifle companies, supported by the 28th and 81st tank brigades, came under heavy fire from mortars and machine guns and withdrew to their original position.

But success was achieved in the directions of other strikes: on the right flank, the advance of the Soviet troops was 5, and on the left - 4 km. Major General A.I. Zygin planned to develop the offensive, strengthening the flank groups at the expense of the forces and means deployed in the center of the zone. However, the commander of the front forces demanded that the original plan of the operation be followed and that the maximum enemy forces be "pinned down" here in order to make it easier for the 41st and 22nd armies to fulfill their tasks.

During November 26, the main forces of the 39th Army again crossed the river. Young Tud and by the evening advanced with battles for 2 km. The next day, regiments of the second echelons of three rifle divisions were introduced into the battle, but this did not make a turning point in the course of hostilities. At the same time, flank groupings, without receiving additional reinforcement, were unable to develop initially achieved success and got involved in heavy fighting with the enemy. Soon they were subjected to his strong counterattacks, part of their forces was surrounded, and the other was thrown back to its original position.

Ignoring the situation on the flanks, the army commander decided to continue the offensive in the center, in the direction of the settlement of Urdom. The ensuing fighting continued without interruption for two days. In their course, rifle formations lost up to 50% of their people, and tank brigades lost more than half of their armored vehicles. In the end, Urdom managed to be released, but at the same time, the main strike force of the army lost almost all the tanks remaining by that time. After that, she completely lost her offensive capabilities.

In such an environment, G.K. Zhukov ordered to shift the breakthrough site to the left flank of the army, closer to Rzhev. The second stage of its offensive began on 7 December. At first, it developed successfully: rifle units broke through the enemy defenses and created the conditions for the 28th and 81st tank brigades, which received new tanks, to enter the battle. But the latter, having pulled ahead, were surrounded by approaching enemy reserves. Heavy fighting continued until December 17, and then began to subside as the combat effectiveness of the troops decreased. Soon the army received an order to go on the defensive.

The strongest grouping of forces and equipment in Operation Mars was created in the offensive zones of the 31st and 20th armies of the Western Front. Here, 14 rifle divisions were concentrated on one section of the breakthrough. At the same time, the density of forces and means was: guns and mortars - up to 100, and tanks - up to 20 units per 1 km. the main role in the offensive, the 20th Army, Major General N.I. Kiryukhin, which included seven rifle divisions, the 1st Guards Moscow Motorized Rifle Division, the 8th Guards Rifle Corps (one rifle division and two rifle brigades), eight tank brigades, 53 artillery regiments - a total of 114 thousand people, 1310 guns and mortars , 151 tanks. The army had the task of breaking through the defenses of the German troops, cutting the Sychevka-Osuga railroad, capturing Sychevka and linking up with the advanced units of the Kalinin Front.

Four rifle divisions and five tank brigades were assigned to the first echelon, the 8th Guards Rifle Corps to the second echelon, and the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division to the reserve. The mobile group consisted of three tank brigades. It was intended to develop an offensive to the southeast, in the direction of Sychevka. In addition, in the army zone, it was planned to bring into battle a front-line cavalry-mechanized group (KMG) under the command of Major General V.V. Kryukov. It included the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 6th Tank Corps (166 tanks, of which KV - 18, T-34 - 85, T-70 - 30, T-60 - 33) . KMG was supposed to move to the northeast in order to encircle the Rzhev grouping of the enemy.

Units of the 102nd Infantry and 5th Panzer Divisions of the enemy took up the defense in the direction of attack of the strike force of the Western Front. Literally a few days before the Soviet troops went on the offensive, the 78th Infantry Division also arrived here, which was supposed to replace the 5th Panzer Division at the forefront. The strongest fortifications were created on a narrow four-kilometer stretch between the Osuga and Vazuza rivers. German divisions located in a number of strongholds in the vicinity large villages. Between them were wood-and-earth firing points (bunker) with a density of 10-15 per square meter. km. At a distance of 4-5 km from the front line was the second defensive line. It was based on battalion districts in the settlements of Maloye Petrakovo, Bolshoe and Maloye Kropotovo, Podosinovka and Zherebtsovo. The approaches to them were covered by obstacle courses, anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields.

The offensive of the 31st and 20th armies began on November 25 at 07:50 with artillery preparation. However, even before dawn, a strong wind blew and snow began to fall, which completely ruled out the adjustment of the fire. He ceased to be aimed and was conducted over the squares. Aviation was completely inactive due to non-flying weather. As noted in the operational summary of the front: “A snowstorm on the first day of the offensive brought artillery preparation almost to naught, since visibility was from 100 to 200 meters. In view of this, the enemy's fire system in necessary measure was not violated ... ".

An hour and a half later, in the zone of the 31st Army (Major General V.S. Polenov), on the plain between the Osuga and Vazuza rivers, the enemy positions were attacked by the 88th, 239th, 336th rifle divisions, the 32nd and 145th tank brigades. They were met with heavy fire from unsuppressed strongholds and by noon lost 50% of their men and almost all of their tanks. Subsequent attempts to break through the front line of defense of the 102nd Infantry Division proved futile, and the army stopped playing an active role in the operation on the very first day.

The right-flank formations of the 20th Army did not achieve any tangible results either. And only the actions of one 247th rifle division, which, with the support of the 240th tank brigade, launched an offensive in the center of the army zone, turned out to be effective. She crossed Vazuza on the ice on the move and captured a small bridgehead on its western coast. In an effort to develop success, Major General N.I. Kiryukhin on the night of November 26 began advancing the second echelon, reserve and mobile group - the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division and three tank brigades, respectively.

But the failure on the right flank of the 20th Army threatened to disrupt the entire plan of the operation, since the loss of time allowed the German command to transfer reserves from the depths. Therefore, the commander of the troops of the front, Colonel-General I.S. Konev decided to use the bridgehead (3 km wide and up to 1.5 km deep) captured by the 247th division to enter the breakthrough of the cavalry-mechanized group. However, it was impossible to quickly bring such a number of troops into battle from it. In addition, only two roads led to it, which were under the constant influence of artillery and enemy aircraft.

In the second half of November 26, the brigades of the 6th Panzer Corps launched an offensive from a bridgehead in a completely unfamiliar area, without reconnaissance and artillery support. By the end of the day, they lost up to 60% of tanks from enemy anti-tank artillery fire, and only one tank battalion managed to break through the Rzhev-Sychevka railway. Within three days he took possession of a number of settlements, but soon he was left almost without fuel. An attempt to bring the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps into the gap in order to build up the force of impact ended, in fact, in the defeat of its main forces. Acting at night on unfamiliar terrain, the cavalry units fell into enemy prepared fire bags and most of them were destroyed by artillery-mortar and machine-gun fire. A specially created tank group, which accompanied transport vehicles with fuel and ammunition, could not break through the railroad tracks.

Rifle units, individual cavalry and tank units continued fruitless attacks on German strongholds until December 5th. Then the remnants of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps were withdrawn from the battle, as well as all the separate tank brigades that provided direct support to the infantry. There were almost no combat-ready tanks left in them. So, in the 25th tank brigade, after its withdrawal to the rear, there were one KB and three T-60s.

On December 8, the Western Front received a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to continue the offensive. This time, he was given the task of “breaking through the enemy’s defenses in the Bolshoe Kropotovo, Yarygino sector on December 10-11 and capturing Sychevka no later than December 15, withdrawing at least two rifle divisions to the Andreevsky area on December 20 to organize a closure together with the 41st Army Kalinin Front surrounded by the enemy.

In accordance with the decision of the commander of the troops of the Western Front, the main blow, as before, was delivered by the 20th Army, in command of which, instead of Major General N.I. Kiryukhin was joined by Lieutenant General M.S. Khozin. It was reinforced by six rifle divisions, units and subunits of various branches of the armed forces. In addition, now the right-flank formations of the 29th Army were involved in the offensive.

The mobile group of the front included the 6th and 5th tank and 2nd guards cavalry corps. 6th Tank Corps, which was headed by Colonel I.I. Yushchuk, managed to get 101 tanks, of which KV - 7 and T-34 - 67. It was planned to enter the battle for a joint defense breakthrough with rifle divisions and subsequent penetration into its depth between Bolshoi and Maly Kropotovo. Following him, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, weakened in previous battles, was to advance. 5th Tank Corps Major General K.A. Semenchenko (160 tanks, including KV - 21, T-34 - 46) had to develop an offensive against Sychevka.

Drawing conclusions from the unsuccessful experience of breaking through enemy defenses at the first stage of the operation, the command of the Western Front reduced the offensive lines of rifle divisions to 1-1.5 km and brought the density of guns and mortars to 130 units per 1 km of the breakthrough area. Prior to the start of artillery preparation, reconnaissance in combat was carried out by the forces of assault groups and detachments in order to destroy enemy firing points. However, she did not justify the hopes placed on her, as did the artillery fire raids that followed. Their effectiveness against well-fortified strongholds was low.

The second stage of the offensive on Vazuza began on 11 December. But the lack of suddenness of a second strike in conditions when the combat capability of the troops was weakened due to the failure of the first offensive did not allow success. Rifle and tank formations and units were drawn into the battles for fortified settlements, and acted in separate directions, solving separate tactical tasks. All this led to great losses in people and equipment. Already on the third day of the offensive, the command of the Western Front was forced to combine the remaining tanks of the 5th and 6th tank corps into two consolidated brigades. But by December 20, they were left without combat vehicles.

Obelisk in honor of the liberation of Rzhev from Nazi invaders. Mound of Glory, the city of Rzhev, Tver region. Architects A. Usachev and T. Shulgina, sculptors V. Mukhin, V. Fedchenko and I. Chumak. Opened 1 August 1963

Having liberated a territory 11 km wide and 6 km deep, the 20th Army did not complete its task. At the same time, her losses amounted to 57,524 people, of which 13,929 were killed and 1,596 were missing. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps lost 6617 people (killed, wounded and missing), the 6th Tank Corps - two full-time tanks, the 5th Tank Corps - almost all military equipment in just three days of fighting. And, in general, the losses of the Kalinin and Western fronts in the operation "Mars" amounted to more than 215 thousand people, including 70,400 - irrevocably, as well as 1363 tanks. The positive results of the operation can only be attributed to the fact that the Soviet troops participating in it attracted significant enemy forces, deprived the German command of the freedom to maneuver with the reserves that it needed to strengthen its grouping, which delivered a deblocking blow in December 1942 in the Stalingrad direction.

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