Operation Uranus- the code name for the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War(November 19, 1942 – February 2, 1943). The counteroffensive of the troops of three fronts: Southwestern (gen. N. F. Vatutin), Stalingrad (gen. A. I. Eremenko) and Don (gen. K. K. Rokossovsky), with the aim of encircling and destroying the enemy group of troops in the area city of Stalingrad.
Military situation before the operation
By the end of the defensive period Battle of Stalingrad The 62nd Army held the area north of the Tractor Plant, the Barrikady plant and the northeastern quarters of the city center, the 64th Army defended the approaches to its southern part. general offensive German troops was stopped. On November 10, they went over to the defensive along the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front, with the exception of sectors in the areas of Stalingrad, Nalchik and Tuapse. The position of the German troops became more difficult. The front of Army Groups A and B was stretched for 2300 km, the flanks of the shock groups were not properly covered. The German command believed that after many months heavy fighting The Red Army is not in a position to carry out a major offensive. For the winter of 1942/43, the German command planned to hold on to the occupied lines until the spring of 1943, and then go on the offensive again.
The balance of forces on the fronts
Before the start of the operation (November 19, 1942), the ratio of manpower, tanks, aviation and auxiliary forces in this section of the theater of operations according to the "History of the Second World War, 1939-1945" was as follows:
Operation plan
Since September, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff began to develop a counteroffensive plan. On November 13, the strategic counteroffensive plan, codenamed "Uranus", was approved by the Headquarters under the chairmanship of I.V. Stalin. The plan was as follows: the Southwestern Front (commander N.F. Vatutin; 1st Guards A, 5th TA, 21st A, 2nd Air and 17th Air Armies) had the task of inflicting deep strikes from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don from the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya (advance depth approx. 120 km.); The strike force of the Stalingrad Front (64th A, 57th A, 51st A, 8th Air Army) advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes region to a depth of 100 km. The shock groupings of both fronts were to meet in the Kalach-Sovetsky area and encircle the main enemy forces near Stalingrad. At the same time, part of the forces of these same fronts ensured the creation of an external encirclement front. The Don Front, consisting of the 65th, 24th, 66th, 16th air armies, delivered two auxiliary strikes - one from the Kletskaya region to the southeast, and the other from the Kachalinsky region along the left bank of the Don to the south. The plan provided for: to direct the main blows against the most vulnerable sectors of the enemy's defense, to the flank and rear of his most combat-ready formations; strike groups to use terrain advantageous for the attackers; with a generally equal balance of forces in the breakthrough areas, by weakening the secondary areas, create a 2.8-3.2-fold superiority in forces. Due to the deepest secrecy of the development of the plan and the enormous secrecy of the concentration of forces achieved, the strategic surprise of the offensive was ensured.
Operation progress
Start of the offensive
The offensive of the troops of the South-Western and right wing of the Don Fronts began on the morning of November 19 after a powerful artillery preparation. Troops of the 5th tank armies broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian army. The German troops tried to stop the Soviet troops with a strong counterattack, but were defeated by the 1st and 26th tank corps brought into battle, the advanced units of which went into the operational depth, advancing to the Kalach area. On November 20, the strike force of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. On the morning of November 23, the advanced units of the 26th Panzer Corps captured Kalach. On November 23, the troops of the 4th Panzer Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front met in the area of the Sovetsky farm, closing the encirclement ring of the Stalingrad enemy grouping in the interfluve of the Volga and Don. The 6th and main forces of the 4th tank armies were surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units total strength 330 thousand people. By the same time, a large part of the outer front of the encirclement was created, the distance of which from the inner one was 40-100 km.
On November 24, the troops of the Southwestern Front, having defeated the Romanian troops surrounded in the Raspopinskaya area, took 30 thousand prisoners and a lot of equipment. On November 24 - 30, the troops of the Stalingrad and Don fronts, fighting fierce battles with the encircled enemy troops, halved the area occupied by them, squeezing it in the territory of 70-80 km from west to east and 30-40 km from north to south.
In the first half of December, the actions of these fronts to eliminate the encircled enemy developed slowly, because, due to the reduction of the front in the pocket, he condensed his battle formations and organized defenses in equipped positions occupied by the Red Army in the summer of 1942. A significant (more than 3-fold) underestimation of the number of encircled German troops played a significant role in slowing down the offensive.
On November 24, Hitler, having rejected the proposal of the commander of the 6th Army, F. Paulus, to break into southeast direction, ordered to hold Stalingrad in anticipation of outside help. At the end of November, the German troops operating against the outer front of the encirclement were united into the Don Army Group (commanded by General Field Marshal E. Manstein), which also included the encircled group.
Development of events
In the areas of Kotelnikovsky and Tormosin, the Wehrmacht created two strike groups. On December 12, the Goth strike group, which, according to Soviet data, had 9 infantry and 4 tank divisions, 125 thousand people, 650 tanks, which, however, is not confirmed by German sources, went on the offensive from Kotelnikovsky along the railway to Stalingrad, not waiting for the concentration of the Tormosinsky group in order to release the encircled troops. By using, by Soviet version, not confirmed by German sources, a significant superiority in forces in front of the 51st Army, the enemy pushed it back beyond the river. Aksai, where on December 15 his offensive was stopped. On December 19, the enemy resumed the offensive, but was stopped by the troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies on the river. Myshkov, 40 km from the encircled troops. On December 16, the offensive of the troops of the South-Western Front began on Morozovsk and Kantemirovka in order to defeat the enemy in the region of the Middle Don and reach the rear of the Tormosinsky group. During three days of fierce fighting, the enemy's defenses were broken through in five directions. By December 31, the Italian 8th Army and the German task force Hollidt were completely defeated. The 2nd Guards Army, during the counteroffensive on December 24-31, inflicted complete defeat the Goth group, which suffered heavy losses, including 5200 prisoners, and threw it back to Zimovniki, pushing the outer front of the encirclement by 200-250 km. The 57th, 64th and 62nd armies of the Stalingrad Front were transferred to the Don Front for liquidation of encircled troops. On January 1, 1943, the Stalingrad Front was renamed the Southern Front and received the task of advancing in the Rostov direction. By the beginning of January, the position of the encircled troops had worsened. The space occupied by them was shot through by artillery, material reserves were depleted.
Elimination of German resistance
On January 8, 1943, the Soviet command presented the command of the encircled troops with an ultimatum to surrender, but on Hitler's orders, it rejected it. On January 10, the liquidation of the Stalingrad cauldron began by the forces of the Don Front (Operation "Ring"). At this time, the number of encircled troops was still approx. 250 thousand, the number of troops of the Don Front was 212 thousand. The enemy stubbornly resisted, but the Soviet troops moved forward and on January 26 cut the group into two parts - the southern one in the city center and the northern one in the area of the tractor plant and the Barrikady plant. On January 31, the southern group was liquidated, its remnants, led by Paulus, surrendered. On February 2, the northern group was finished. This ended the Battle of Stalingrad.
Operation results
During the Stalingrad offensive operation, two German armies were destroyed, two Romanian and one Italian armies were defeated. 32 divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed, 16 divisions were destroyed. The enemy lost more than 800 thousand people, the losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 485 thousand people, including 155 irrevocable. The conditions for conducting an outstanding operation were created by the Soviet troops during the Stalingrad defensive operation starting from September 1942. “Before the Battle of Stalingrad, history did not know the battle when such a large grouping of troops was surrounded and would have been completely defeated. The defeat of the enemy on the Volga marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole, the expulsion of enemy troops from Soviet territory began. ”- G.K. Zhukov. It should be noted that, of course, it is difficult to talk about the complete defeat of the encircled grouping - after all, a significant part of it was evacuated by air. The encircled group, which did not attempt to break through the internal front of the encirclement, was completely destroyed, down to the last unit. A significant number of the wounded (from the diary of F. Paulus - 42 thousand) were evacuated from the boiler by air, but Paulus does not say how many of the wounded managed to reach " mainland". It should, however, be noted that the very word "evacuation" implies export to the rear, that is, if Paulus correctly used this word, then he meant that all 42 thousand people reached the "mainland".
additional information
Only during the operation "Ring" according to Soviet data 10.01. - 02.02. In 1943, 91,545 were taken prisoner and more than 140,000 (up to 147,200) enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed. According to various sources, from 30 to 42 thousand wounded were taken out of the boiler by air. Only as prisoners before the start of Operation Ring, he lost 16,800 people.
The Soviet command estimated the size of the grouping that was to be surrounded in the final version of Operation Uranus in the range of 80-90 thousand. The initial version had a more modest scale. Didn't underestimate significant influence on the rapid encirclement, which occurred within 4-5 days (instead of the estimated 3 days), but greatly slowed down the liquidation of the encircled troops. Such a large underestimation with a final brilliant result is not the only example in military history. A similar example is the Battle of Novi. The prolonged presence of a huge pocket, which riveted all the forces and attention of the enemy to itself and sharply limited the possible options for its actions on the entire southern wing, allowed the Soviet command to brilliantly build on the success of the encirclement and inflict new huge losses on the enemy.
Memory
At the junction of the troops of the South-Western and Stalingrad fronts (modern village of Pyatimorsk) in 1955, the monument "Connection of Fronts" was erected. Author E. V. Vuchetich, architects L. Polyakov and L. Dyatlov.
On November 19-20, 1942, Soviet troops made a breakthrough on both flanks, on the Don and south of Stalingrad, and began to cover the German armies. The German command did not expect such a large-scale offensive, and all enemy attempts to prevent the encirclement turned out to be belated and weak.
The concept of the operation
The idea of an offensive operation in the area of Stalingrad was discussed at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command already in the first half of September 1942. “At this time,” writes Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, “we were finishing the formation and training of strategic reserves, which consisted largely of tank and mechanized units and formations, armed for the most part with medium and heavy tanks; stockpiles of other military equipment and ammunition were created. All this allowed the Stavka already in September 1942 to draw a conclusion about the possibility and expediency of delivering a decisive blow to the enemy in the near future ... When discussing these issues at the Headquarters, in which General G.K. Zhukov and I took part, it was stipulated that the planned counteroffensive should include two main operational tasks: one - to encircle and isolate the main grouping of German troops operating directly in the city area, and the other - to destroy this grouping.
After the war, the Stalingrad offensive operation, like any victory, had many fathers. N. Khrushchev claimed that, together with the commander of the Stalingrad Front, A. I. Eremenko, presented to the Headquarters at the end of September a plan for a future counteroffensive. Eremenko himself said in his memoirs that he put forward the idea of Stalingrad counterattacks right on the day of his appointment as front commander. It can be said that in the second half of September the idea of a counteroffensive was in the air. Fleet Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov indicated the real author, who took responsibility for the implementation of the plan: “It must be said frankly that with the enormous and sometimes decisive The commander-in-chief determined the success of the battle.
The counteroffensive plan, which received the code name "Uranus", was distinguished by its boldness of design. The advance of the Southwest. The Don and Stalingrad fronts were to deploy on an area of 400 square meters. km. Troops maneuvering to encircle the enemy had to fight a distance of up to 120-140 km from the north and up to 100 km from the south. They planned to create two fronts to encircle the enemy group - internal and external.
“The directions of the Russian strikes,” writes the German general and military historian Kurt Tippelskirch, “were determined by the very outline of the front line: the left flank German group stretched for almost 300 km from Stalingrad to the bend of the Don in the Novaya Kalitva region, and the short right flank, where especially weak forces were located, began at Stalingrad and was lost in the Kalmyk steppe.
Large forces were concentrated in the Stalingrad direction. The Southwestern Front was reinforced: two tank (1st and 26th) and one cavalry (8th) corps, as well as a number of tank and artillery formations and units. The Stalingrad front was reinforced by the 4th mechanized and 4th cavalry corps, three mechanized and three tank brigades. The Don Front received three rifle divisions for reinforcement. In total, in a relatively short period of time (from October 1 to November 18), four tank, two mechanized and two cavalry corps, 17 separate tank brigades and regiments, 10 rifle divisions and 6 brigades, 230 artillery and mortar regiments. The Soviet troops consisted of about 1135 thousand people, about 15 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces. The composition of the air forces of the fronts was brought up to 25 aviation divisions, which had over 1.9 thousand combat aircraft. The total number of settlement divisions in three fronts reached 75. However, this powerful grouping of Soviet troops had a peculiarity - about 60% of the personnel of the troops were young replenishment, which did not yet have combat experience.
As a result of the massing of forces and means in the directions of the main attacks of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, a significant superiority of Soviet troops over the enemy was created: in people - 2-2.5 times, artillery and tanks - 4-5 times or more. The decisive role in delivering strikes was assigned to 4 tank and 2 mechanized corps.
German anti-aircraft battery captured by soldiers of the Soviet 21st Army near Stalingrad
In early November, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, Colonel-General A.M. Vasilevsky, Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov and other representatives of the Headquarters again arrived in the Stalingrad region. Together with the command of the fronts and armies, they were supposed to conduct directly on the ground preparatory work for the implementation of the Uranus plan. On November 3, Zhukov held a final meeting in the troops of the 5th Panzer Army of the Southwestern Front. In addition to the command of the front and the army, it was attended by the commanders of corps and divisions, whose troops were intended for an offensive in the direction of the main attack. On November 4, the same meeting was held in the 21st Army of the Southwestern Front with the participation of the commander of the Don Front. On November 9 and 10, meetings were held with the commanders of the armies, commanders of formations and the command of the Stalingrad Front.
In the northern sector, the 5th tank and 21st armies of the Southwestern Front under the command of N. F. Vatutin, who inflicted main blow, were supposed to advance from the bridgehead southwest of Serafimovich and from the Kletskaya area, were supposed to break through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian army and develop an offensive to the southeast in general direction to Kalach. The troops of the Don Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky - part of the 65th (former 4th tank) and 24th armies - delivered auxiliary strikes in the general direction to the Vertyachiy farm in order to encircle the enemy forces in the small bend of the Don and cut them off from the main German grouping in the area of Stalingrad. The strike force of the Stalingrad Front under the command of A. I. Eremenko (51st, 57th and 64th armies) was tasked with launching an offensive from the region of lakes Sarpa, Tsatsa, Barmantsak in the north westbound to connect with the troops of the Southwestern Front.
Support for the advancing troops was provided by: on the Southwestern Front - the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, on Stalingrad - the 8th Air Army, on the Don - the 16th Air Army. Stalin attached particular importance to the air preparation of the operation. On November 12, the Supreme Commander conveyed to Zhukov that if the air preparation for the operation on the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts was unsatisfactory, then the operation would end in failure. The experience of the war shows, he noted, that the success of an operation depends on air superiority. Soviet aviation must fulfill three tasks: 1) concentrate its operations in the area of attack of the strike units, suppress the German aviation and firmly cover their troops; 2) to break the way for the advancing units by systematic bombing of the German troops standing against them; 3) pursue the retreating enemy troops by systematic bombing and assault operations in order to completely upset them and prevent them from gaining a foothold on the nearest defense lines. great attention was given to strengthening the air armies of the fronts. In November, the 1st Mixed Aviation Corps arrived from the Headquarters reserve to the 17th Air Army, and the 2nd Mixed Aviation Corps arrived to the 8th Air Army. It was also decided to use during the counteroffensive large forces long-range aviation.
The shock groupings of the Soviet troops, concentrated north and south of Stalingrad, were supposed to defeat the flanks of the Stalingrad grouping of the enemy and, with an enveloping movement, close the encirclement around it in the Sovetsky, Kalach area. After the destruction of the Stalingrad grouping of the enemy, our troops were to develop success towards Rostov, defeat the German troops in the North Caucasus, launch an offensive in the Donbass, in the Kursk, Bryansk, Kharkov directions.
The Soviet command, which widely used methods of camouflage and misinformation, this time managed to mislead the enemy about the place, time of the strike and the forces with which it was supposed to deliver it. So, only in order to deceive German air reconnaissance, 17 bridges were built across the Don in various places, but only 5 of them were supposed to be actually used. As noted earlier, the enemy did not expect a large-scale Russian offensive in the Stalingrad area. The greatest threat was seen against Army Group Center. High Command ground forces(OKH) discussed the possibility of a winter offensive by Russian troops against the Rzhev salient; also the likelihood of a Russian offensive against the northern flank of Army Group B with access to Rostov and Sea of Azov. The command of the 6th Army and Army Group B monitored the concentration of Soviet forces on the bridgeheads near Kletskaya and Serafimovich, predicted an imminent enemy offensive in its zone, but underestimated its scale. Thus, despite reports that the Russians were preparing for an offensive, the OKH ordered the offensive to continue to capture Stalingrad, despite the objections of the commander of the 6th Army. Most of the staff generals agreed that the Russians did not have the strength to deliver powerful enough blows, that the enemy was bled white by the battles in Stalingrad, and in this they miscalculated very badly.
A column of Romanian soldiers captured near Stalingrad moves past a truck with Red Army soldiers
Thus, even if the enemy command near Stalingrad in the autumn of 1942 began to notice signs of the impending offensive of the Soviet troops, then it had no clear idea about its scale, time, composition of strike groups, or the direction of the main attacks. Far from the front, the high command of the German troops was even less able to correctly assess true dimensions the danger that threatened his Stalingrad group.
Colonel General Jodl, chief of staff of the operational leadership of the OKW (Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht), subsequently admitted the complete surprise of the Soviet offensive for the high command: “We completely overlooked the concentration of large Russian forces on the flank of the 6th army (on the Don). We had absolutely no idea about the strength of the Russian troops in the area. There used to be nothing here and suddenly it was struck great strength which was of decisive importance. The surprise factor became an important advantage of the Red Army.
Relying on the capture of Stalingrad at all costs and setting more and more new terms for this, the high command used up its reserves in these attempts, and practically lost the opportunity to radically strengthen the position of its troops on the southern strategic flank. In mid-November, the enemy had only six divisions as operational reserves in the Stalingrad direction, which were scattered over a wide front. The command of Army Group "B" began to withdraw some divisions to the reserve, planned to regroup the troops of the 6th and 4th tank armies in order to create a deeper operational formation and strengthen the flanks of their grouping. The 22nd German Panzer Division in the Perelazovsky area and the 1st Romanian Panzer Division behind the 3rd Romanian Army at the turn of the river were withdrawn to the reserve and subordinated to the 48th Panzer Corps. Chir near Chernyshevskaya. South of Stalingrad, in the area east of Kotelnikovo, at the beginning of October, the 4th Romanian army was deployed (initially, its divisions were part of the German 4th tank army) in order to strengthen the right flank of the Stalingrad group. But these measures were belated and insufficient to change the situation radically.
Breakthrough of enemy defense
November 19th. On November 19, 1942, the troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front went on the offensive. Breakthrough of the enemy defenses was carried out simultaneously in several areas. The weather was foggy, non-flying. Therefore, it was necessary to abandon the use of aviation. At 07:30, artillery preparation began with a volley of rocket launchers - "Katyushas". 3500 guns and mortars smashed the enemy defenses. One hour was fired for destruction and twenty minutes for suppression. The artillery preparation inflicted great damage on the enemy.
At 0850 hours, the rifle divisions of the 5th Panzer Army of P. L. Romanenko and the 21st Army of I. M. Chistyakov, together with tanks of direct infantry support, went on the attack. The 14th and 47th Guards, 119th and 124th Rifle Divisions were in the first echelon of the 5th Tank Army. Despite the powerful artillery preparation, at first the Romanians stubbornly resisted. The remaining unsuppressed enemy firing points seriously slowed down the movement of our troops. By 12 o'clock, having overcome the first position of the enemy's main line of defense, the Soviet divisions advanced only 2-3 km. Then the army commander decided to bring into battle the success development echelon - the 1st and 26th tank corps. The enemy defense was still not broken through, and there was no gap for entering the breakthrough of mobile units. Tank formations overtook the infantry and broke through the enemy defenses with a powerful blow. Romanian troops fled, began to surrender. The rear line of the enemy was immediately overcome.
Thus, the mobile group of the 5th tank army - the 1st and 26th tank corps - by the middle of the first day of the offensive had completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense and developed further actions in operational depth, paving the way for the infantry. In the resulting gap (16 km along the front and in depth) in the second half of the day the 8th cavalry corps was introduced.
Artillerymen - guards inspect the captured German 150-mm six-barrel rocket mortars "Nebelwerfer" 41 (15 cm Nebelwerfer 41) on the Stalingrad front
Soviet light tank T-70 with troops on the armor on the Stalingrad front
Soviet soldiers at the T-26 tank on the outskirts of the liberated village near Stalingrad
The enemy resisted by bringing operational reserves into battle. The 1st Romanian tank division (it had only light Czechoslovak and French captured tanks) from the Perelazovsky region was advanced to the front to help its infantry divisions. In addition, the enemy command sent the 7th cavalry, 1st motorized and 15th infantry divisions to the area of Pronin, Ust-Medvedetsky, Nizhne-Fomikhinsky, which temporarily delayed the advance of Soviet units here. Stubborn enemy resistance in front of the front of the 14th Guards Rifle Division created a threat to the right flank of the 5th Tank Army and delayed the advance of the left flank of the 1st Guards Army.
The 21st Army was advancing from the Kletskaya area on a 14 km front. In the first echelon of the army, the 96th, 63rd, 293rd and 76th rifle divisions advanced. The enemy offered stubborn resistance here too: the 96th and 63rd rifle divisions advanced slowly. The 293rd and 76th rifle divisions were more successful in the direction of the main attack. The commander of the 21st Army, Chistyakov, also used his mobile formations to complete the breakthrough of the enemy defenses. A mobile group consisting of the 4th Tank and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was thrown into the attack.
The 4th Panzer Corps, under the command of Major General of the Panzer Troops A. G. Kravchenko, moved in two echelons, along two routes, and solved the task of breaking through the enemy defenses. The right column of the 4th tank corps, consisting of the 69th and 45th tank brigades, on the night of November 20, went to the Pervomaisky state farm, Manoilin and broke through 30-35 km. The left column of the corps, consisting of the 102nd tank and 4th motorized rifle brigades, by the end of November 19, having advanced to a depth of 10-12 km, went to the Zakharov, Vlasov area, where they met stubborn enemy resistance.
The 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps under the command of Major General I. A. Pliev, fighting with the retreating enemy, advanced in the direction of Verkhne-Buzinovka, Evlampievsky, Bolshenabatovsky. In his memoirs, the former commissar of the 3rd cavalry corps Guards Colonel D.S. Dobrushin writes: “The 32nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions marched in the first echelon, the 6th Guards in the second. The order of the corps commander was as follows: to bypass the pockets of enemy resistance - they will either cease to exist on their own, or they will be destroyed by the infantry following the cavalry. On the line of the villages of Nizhnyaya and Verkhnyaya Buzinovka, the enemy, trying to hold back the advance of our units, opened heavy artillery and mortar fire. The artillery of the advancing units, having turned around, took up firing positions. An artillery duel has begun. General Pliev decided to bypass Nizhne-Buzinovka from the south with units of the 6th Guards Cavalry Division and attack the enemy from the rear. “The regiments at a trot went out in the given directions. At this time, units of the 5th and 32nd cavalry divisions, together with T-34 tanks, advanced from the front to the enemy's trench line. The fight had been going on for two hours. The army commander of the neighboring army, General Kuznetsov, drove up and began to express dissatisfaction with the fact that the corps was marking time. At this time, soldiers began to jump out of the enemy's trenches in disarray. It was the cavalry who struck from the rear. Soon the enemy's defense was broken through to the full depth.
As a result, the mobile formations of the shock group of the Southwestern Front completed the breakthrough of the enemy defenses and began to move south into the operational depth of the enemy, destroying his reserves, headquarters and retreating units. At the same time, the infantry divisions, advancing behind the mobile formations, completed the cleansing settlements and captured the remnants of the defeated enemy troops. Our troops advanced 25-35 km, broke through the defenses of the Romanian 3rd Army in two sectors: southwest of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area. The Romanian 2nd and 4th Army Corps were defeated, and their remnants with the 5th Army Corps were flanked.
Romanian prisoners of war taken prisoner in the area of the village of Raspopinskaya near the city of Kalach
Don front. The troops of the Don Front on November 19 also went on the offensive. The main blow was delivered by the formations of the 65th Army under the command of P.I. Batov. At 7 o'clock. 30 min. regiments of heavy guards mortars fired the first salvo. At 8 o'clock. 50 min. the infantry went on the attack. The enemy offered stubborn resistance, counterattacked. Our troops had to overcome the strong resistance of the enemy in an inaccessible area for the advancing. “Let the reader imagine this area: winding deep ravines abut against a chalk cliff, its steep walls rise to 20-25 meters. There is almost nothing to grab onto with your hand. Feet slip on wet chalk. ... It was seen how the soldiers ran up to the cliff and climbed up. Soon the entire wall was strewn with people. They broke, fell, supported each other and stubbornly crawled up.
By the end of the day, the troops of the 65th Army, with their right flank, advanced into the depth of the enemy's position up to 4 - 5 km, without breaking through the main line of his defense. The 304th rifle division of this army, after a stubborn battle, occupied Melo-Kletsky.
Soviet soldiers in the battle for the Krasny Oktyabr plant during the Battle of Stalingrad. November 1942
The assault group of the 13th Guards Division is cleaning houses in Stalingrad
To be continued…
10 seven-year cycles have passed since the operation "Uranus", and at this time you can objectively look at the events. Of course, Stalingrad fought heroically. If it were not for this operation, sooner or later they would have surrendered to the Germans, as other cities surrendered. After Operation Uranus, the Germans never recovered, like an attacking boxer who suddenly fell into a deep knockdown, they could not regain the initiative.
The defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad was not only a landmark event in the war, but also in the entire strategic approach of the Red Army. In his memoirs “The March on Stalingrad”, General Doerr, that for Germany the battle of Stalingrad was the gravest defeat in its history, and for Russia its greatest victory.
Until now, the origins of this event are surrounded by mystery. Let's try to solve this mystery with the help of astrology. Stalin did not trust his generals at the beginning of the war, especially since the summer of 1942 after the tragic defeats on the Kerch Peninsula and near Kharkov. 
Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko
July 23, 1942 Timoshenko was removed from his post as commander of the newly renamed Stalingrad Front. The reasons are more than compelling: for the failure in the offensive near Kharkov in May 42, subsequent retreats, and finally, the encirclement near Millerovo. This event is significant. Timoshenko was People's Commissar of Defense before the war. It was he who corrected the situation in the Finnish War, and it ended relatively well for us, but this is where his merits end. Tymoshenko bears all responsibility for the defeats at the beginning of the war.
And here is 1942. Stalin did not touch him for a very long time, because there was no one to replace him. In the army it is impossible to put an ordinary general in command of the front, only in exceptional cases they take the commander of the army if he distinguished himself in previous battles. At the beginning of the war, few were different, so there was little choice. But, despite everything said, July 23 was a milestone date. Since that time, there were no more large boilers in the Red Army.
Stalin's search for new commanders was reflected even in Koreychuk's play "Front"
, which Stalin edited in the summer of 42 on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad. The plot of the play was that the commander of the front, Lieutenant General Gorlov, a brave participant in the Civil War, and today an ignorant military leader who is behind the times, faces a young, well-educated Major General Ognev. Ognev started the war as a colonel, commanded a division, then an army. At Gorlov's headquarters there are flatterers, sycophants, self-satisfied boors, drunkenness. Ognev openly opposes not only Gorlov, but the whole trend. According to the first version of the play, he independently develops his plan of operation, and without informing anyone, he carries out it with success.
Stalin edited this version: Ognev conveys his plan to a member of the military council of the front, and he to Moscow. The plan is brilliantly implemented. Gorlov was removed from his post, and Ognev was appointed in his place. Stalin wrote the following monologue into the lips of a member of the military council: Stalin says that it is necessary to nominate young, talented generals to leading positions more boldly. We must beat these narcissistic ignoramuses, replace them with others: new, young, talented, otherwise you can ruin the whole great cause».
After the publication of the play in Pravda on August 24 and 27, 1942, an unexpected reaction appeared. On August 28, Timoshenko sent a telegram: “ To Comrade Stalin, the play by Comrade Korneichuk front published in the press deserves special attention. This play has been harming us for centuries, it must be withdrawn, the author brought to justice, those responsible for this should be sorted out. Tymoshenko»
As you can see, this play touched the nerve not only of Timoshenko, who was expelled from Stalingrad with shame. The commanders were given a signal: since it was impossible to fight before. Interestingly, Timoshenko was replaced by Lieutenant General Gordov as commander of the Stalingrad Front. Almost the namesake of the hero of the play. A month later, it was also taken down with a bang. The final version of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation was approved July 30, 1942
. It is this date that is on the maps of this plan, along with the signatures of the then Chief of the General Staff Vasilevsky and the true author of the idea of the operation plan, Colonel Potapov, i.e. Chief Operations Directorate of the General Staff.
Apparently, the idea was born during one of Potapov's reports to Stalin. Iosif Vissarionovich had a habit of working directly with the officers of the General Staff, who personally oversaw this or that direction.
Zhukov, who in his memoirs attributed the development of the plan to himself, in fact, with the permission of the Headquarters, was initiated into the plan of the Stalingrad operation only on September 27, 1942. He writes that on September 12 a meeting was held in the Kremlin, at which Vasilevsky was present. However, Stalin's visit log entry for 12 and 13 September does not record any visit involving Zhukov and Vasilevsky. The first such record for September is dated only September 27th.
Potapov
It is clear that an operation of this magnitude could not be prepared in a month and a half, as Zhukov writes about it. It follows from this that the Stalingrad operation or the counteroffensive plan "Uranus" was being prepared for 3.5 months in the strictest confidence. Only 3 people were devoted to all the details - Stalin, Vasilevsky and Colonel Potapov. Part of the operation was revealed to Zhukov at a meeting at the end of September. And even then only a part, because Zhukov was sure to the last that the main offensive of the Soviet army would take place near Rzhev (Operation Mars), and near Stalingrad there would only be a distracting blow.
The fact that Zhukov did not know the scale of the offensive near Stalingrad is evidenced by this fact. At that meeting on September 27, Zhukov and Konev refused to transfer the reserves of the Western and Kalinin fronts to the Volga. Meanwhile, Operation Mars is a deliberate misinformation of the Germans in order to convince them that the main blow will be against the German Army Group Center. At the end of July, Stalin appointed Zhukov to command the summer Rzhev-Sychevsk operation and hid that it was a distraction from the southern direction. Even more carefully, Stalin concealed the diversionary nature of this operation in November-December 1942.
On Stalin's instructions, the NKVD intelligence "helped" the Germans two weeks before Zhukov arrived here, i.e. told them that from November 15, it was near Rzhev that the main blow would take place. This is described in the memoirs of the Germans. Stalin played out the decisive significance of Operation Mars so stubbornly to the end that for decades to come he led everyone into a sincere delusion. This operation, as a distraction, played one of the decisive roles in the battle of Stalingrad. But Zhukov had no idea about this.
Operation Mars, with modest results, was marked by huge losses. After that, Stalin promoted Zhukov to field marshals. Soviet Union. Everyone, including Zhukov himself, was perplexed - for what? The Germans, based on these data in October-November 1942, transferred an additional 11th field army, led by Field Marshal Manstein, to the West Moscow direction, which was intended to storm Leningrad. Also transferred here another 5 divisions and 2 brigades from Western Europe with the beginning of the offensive of the western and Kalinin fronts. Then another 10 divisions. In this direction, until November 24, 1942, in the Vitebsk region, Hitler held Manstein and only finally understood where the main events were taking place, sent him to Stalingrad.
As noted in his memoirs, the former head of the Vostok department, Reichand Gelem, on November 4, 1942, an important report was received along the Amber line. It said: "According to received from confidant According to information, a meeting of the military council was held under the chairmanship of Stalin, which was attended by 12 marshals and generals. It was decided to bring all offensive operations back on November 15, as far as weather conditions permit. The main blows were from Grozny (direction of Mazdok), in the Upper and Lower Mamon area of the Don region, near Voronezh, Rzhev, near Lake Ilmen and near Stalingrad. It was reported to Hitler on 7 November.
In fact, the southwestern front delivered the main blow not on its right wing near the Upper and Lower Mamon farms against the Italians, but on its left wing against the Romanians. Apparently, this is also part of the misinformation - until the very beginning, only 3 people were privy to all its details. So even Amber's high-ranking informant (most likely one of the 12 listed generals) did not give convincing information about the Stalingrad counterattack. Hitler aimed the company of 1942 at the conquest of the oil-bearing regions of the USSR. In his choice, he was not free, his decision was influenced by the Rockefellers, who sponsored him, and Hitler was forced to obey them.
By the end of 1942, a positive picture was emerging for the German troops. The creation of a powerful grouping in the center and the presence of superior forces in the south gave Hitler no reason to worry about the eastern front. The Fuhrer even decided to use it for personal purposes. On November 7, together with the top generals, he went on vacation to the Alps. The day of November 19 passed quietly for him. The speech of Goebels delivered the day before was printed: “The goal in the east is clear and unshakable, the Soviet military power must be completely destroyed." Only short messages reported weak Soviet counterattacks near Stalingrad.
Operation Uranus began on November 19 for the troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts, and for the Stalingrad Front on November 21. Operation "Mars" began on November 25, the day after the encirclement of Paul's army near Stalingrad. What was the success of the Stalingrad operation? The fact that for the planned encirclement, reserves were created in the form of another front and several armies. All this colossus of tanks, guns, ammunition (there were about 8 million of them on three fronts!), food and fuel had to be prepared and transferred by train to the Stalingrad region in absolute secrecy.
For this, the Volzhskaya rakada (rakada in French - front-line road) was built from Vilovlya station (84 km from Stalingrad) to Sviyazhsk station (on the right bank of the Volga opposite Kazan). The entire line was taken over on 1 November 1942. This meant that railway line about 1000 km were built in a fantastic time of 6 months! No one has ever assembled such railway tracks in such a time frame. The result was a turn in the war. Operation Uranus was prepared in an atmosphere of absolute secrecy - correspondence and telephone conversations were banned, all orders are transmitted to oral only direct performers. All movements of regiments, exit to positions only at night.
Military history has always considered the classic defeat by the Carthaginian Hannibal in 216 BC. Roman legionnaires near the town of Cannes in southeastern Italy. 2158 years after Cannes, Stalingrad will become synonymous with the classic operation to encircle and destroy the enemy. But if such a grandiose operation as the Stalingrad one ended successfully, then planetary constellations should indicate this.
Rice. 2 eclipses
And 2 solar eclipses could become such constellations. August 12, 1942 in the "anti-Russian field" and February 4, 1943 in the "Russian field". These eclipses mark the Battle of Stalingrad. The encirclement itself began and ended at the midpoint between these eclipses - November 15 and 23. This ensured the unexpectedness and surprise of this operation. “We had absolutely no idea about the strength of the Russian troops in the area. Previously, there was nothing here, and suddenly a blow of great force was suddenly dealt, which is of decisive importance.", - wrote one of the German generals.
The eclipse on August 12 is extremely interesting. Firstly, it happened on the star Merak, one of the stars of Ursa Major associated with our territory. Secondly, the eclipse was on Chiron, which indirectly indicates the anti-hero of the Battle of Stalingrad - Paulus (Libra by the Sun). Another rare constellation was at this time - Priapus and Razi connected in one degree with the White Moon - a new light cycle for 4 years turned on, which indicates a bright past program that, after the conjunction of these planets, can be reborn. The Sun was in this degree of the Zodiac on the day of the battle on the Kulikovo field and Borodino, which symbolizes the protection of the Russian egregore.
When superimposed on the map of the III Reich, this connection falls on Jupiter and Mars of the Reich, which means that from that moment on, the military authority of Nazi Germany will steadily decline until the victory of the Soviet army.
Rice tauksquare to Uranus
And finally, in July, a tauksquare was formed in the sky from the Lunar Nodes to Uranus. All the time of the Battle of Stalingrad, he will hold out in key points build up to the cross. It will disintegrate only in January 1943. In what follows, we will follow these constellations.
Uranus is the ruler of the territory of Aquarius and at the same time this was the name of this operation, which led to a turn in the war. Interestingly, Uranus midway from the Moon's Nodes indicates freedom. Despite the incredible contraction from eclipses in its territory, Uranus gets freedom.
In the horoscope of the USSR, the eclipse on August 12 fell on Neptune, which indicates the secrecy and secrecy of the upcoming operation. It was after this eclipse that Operation Uranus was classified. And in the horoscope of Stalin, this eclipse rose in the 5th house of the horoscope for the White Moon, which indicates a fatal period, in best case bright and creative.
Finally, about Paulus, commander of the 6th German Army. If we compare him with Vasilevsky, then we will find they have a lot in common. Both were born under the sign of Libra, both staff officers. Paulus was appointed commander of the 6th Army in early January 1942. Prior to that, he had not commanded a corps, or a division, or even a regiment. He held his last combat position in 1934, commanding a separate tank battalion. Vasilevsky also commanded a regiment in 1930 and was on staff work until 1942. But despite all this, one becomes the chief of the army, and the second chief of the general staff and coordinated the 3 front lines.
Rice Paulus Horoscope
Friedrich Paulus was born on September 23, 1890 at 20:07 near the midpoint. Tall, trim, neat, Paulus invariably wore gloves, because he hated dirt. He took a bath and changed clothes twice a day, for which he was caustically called "noble lord". Maybe this is how the influence of the Sun in the degree of the “black vulture” affected, but also this degree gives a catastrophe after elevation. In his horoscope, we see several alarming circumstances.
First. The exact opposition between the White Moon and Vakshya with Uranus on the cusps of 6-12 houses causes concern. Also here is a tauksquare to the Moon in the 9th house. Undoubtedly, this is one of the main changes in his horoscope, which affected his fate. Uranus lord of the 10th house in the 6th shows a staff worker who may be seen and finest hour. But Vakshya here shows that everything will end in absurdity, even imprisonment, prison (White Moon in the 12th house) abroad (Moon in the 9th house).
Second. White Moon in the 23rd destructive degree of Aries in the "Germanic field". On the one hand, he laid the foundation for destruction German state. But on the other hand, this is the destruction of a villainous country built on satanic ideology.
Third. Another fatal configuration, located at the former opposition, is a stretcher (with the opposition of Chiron - the Moon with Jupiter). The karmic aspects between them give stiffness and oppression, a conclusion, and the Giedi star on his Jupiter says that hundreds of thousands of people will freeze and die under his leadership.
Fourth. The Sun is in the destructive 1 degree of Libra. This is a collective degree of humanity, associated with judgment and condemnation. Indeed, Paulus was imprisoned as a prisoner for 10 years until 1953.
And finally fourth. The Black Moon is in the 4th house of the horoscope, which indicates the negative karma of the family or that it will be betrayed at home. Indeed, Hitler forbade him to surrender, and awarded him the rank of field marshal in the hope that Tom would commit suicide. In addition, given that he was born at the middle point and the Lunar Nodes are on horizontal axis horoscope, then the eclipse will become for him a developer and retribution for past sins.
Now let's turn to eclipses. Solar eclipse August 12 happened on the Black Moon of Paulus in the 4th house at 19 gr. Leo, and the following happened in opposition at 16 gr of Aquarius in the 10th house, thereby marking the encirclement and liquidation of the German group. An eclipse on the Black Moon is considered very difficult - a betrayal at home. Hitler - Taurus, is in turn the 8th sign, the destroyer for Libra.
And now Vasilevsky. Stalin sent him to coordinate 3 fronts near Stalingrad. Only he, one of all knew about true purposes operations. With this mission, as a representative of the Headquarters, he will stay there until the final encirclement. Unfortunately, we only know Vasilevsky's cosmogram - September 30, 1895. It can be assumed that his Moon is in the Russian field. Then the Ascendant falls into the sign of Virgo. At the same time, the Sun is in exact conjunction with Vakshya. Such a person should occupy the golden mean. If he rushes up to the pinnacle of power, then he will face a fiasco. He can get high positions if he doesn't want them. On June 26, 1942, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Before that, Stalin showed him a compromising letter, which listed his shortcomings, saying that he could not be in such a position. When Stalin asked what he thought about this, Vasilevsky replied that it was true. He strongly opposed this appointment. However, he was appointed to this position and in a year went from lieutenant general to marshal.
Vasilevsky, by nature, not a combatant general, was the only one who was fully dedicated to this operation. Rokosovsky, when he arrived at the command post of the southwestern front to coordinate the actions of the fronts, was outraged that the chief of the general staff was actually in command of the front. But he had no idea of the scale of the operation. Front commander Latutin himself did not know this.
It is interesting to look at the transit situation at the beginning of the counterattack on November 19-21 for Vasilevsky's horoscope. These days the Black Moon is in exact opposition to the White Moon. And the transiting White Moon passes along the Sun with Vakshya, closing the tauksquare. All this is preserved for a month, when Paulus's army was surrounded.
The name of the fronts also contains an element of secrecy. Stalin so confused everyone with names that even now it is not easy to figure it out. In July 1942, a huge area from the bend of the Don to Tsimlyansk was entrusted to one front. In August the front was divided in two, although the two fronts were led by the same man, Eremenko. Only in September, with the advent of Rokossovsky, did the division of fronts become a reality. But from October 31, a third front appears, which indicates the formation of Operation Uranus.
Vasilevsky writes that in order to preserve secrecy, the creation of the third front was postponed to the end of October. So the whole front was formalized 2 weeks before the offensive. This indicates a gradual, covert build-up of strength. And so, on November 19-21, a blow was struck terrible force from three sides. main role in this operation, the southwestern and Stalingrad fronts played, occupying positions against the flanks of the German grouping.
In general, the plan for Operation Uranus was simple. From the breakthrough sites on the Don River north of Stalingrad and from the chain of lakes south of the city, the armies fanned out, forming the outer and inner fronts of the encirclement. The middle of the fan was formed by tank and mechanized corps, which had the most penetrating power. They should have been the first to break through towards each other. Hope for a quick completion of the operation was given by the fact that on the flanks of the army of Paulus were Romanian troops, who were not distinguished by their stamina. The Don Front carried out the task of pinning down the encircled enemy and attacked with its right wing with limited targets.
“Send the receiver to get fur gloves” - such a telephone message was sent to the 5th Panzer Army. This meant an infantry attack on November 19 at 8.50. It was at this time that the fronts went on the offensive. This day became the day of the artillery holiday.
This war is special, it should be considered as a battle between the light and the dark. Therefore, when considering astrological chart we pay primarily attention to the revealed good and evil. 8.50 - it was the 3rd sunny day. It is a sunny day that is important for an elective horoscope. 3rd day - the day of Asha Vakhishta, the day of the element of Fire, which was created first and was not defiled by Angromania. Also, this sunny day is dedicated to Airemon, the leader of the Aryan peoples, i.e. directly connected with the Russian egregore.
At the time of the start of Operation Uranus, a fatal cross was formed in the sky with the participation of Uranus, the Lunar Nodes, Chiron, the Sun and Venus. In general, this cross was kept throughout the operation. At this time, Uranus was closest to the Sun and could be seen with binoculars. At 12 o'clock at night, Uranus, like an 8-magnitude star, hung over the heads of the warriors.
The Sun was at the end of Scorpio in the Burnt Path, and by the end of the operation moved to the beginning of Sagittarius - the Diamond Path or the Road of Life. This sign, at best, gives protection and support to a light egregor. This is indicated by the aspect of the septile from the White Moon to the Sun. And transiting Venus and the Suns were exactly on the descendant of the horoscope of the III Reich. This operation symbolized the activation of his enemies. In the horoscope of the USSR, the Sun with Venus affect the White Moon. The White Moon at that time had aspects to three distant planets - a conjunction with Neptune, a sextile with Pluto and a trine to Uranus, and also made a septile to the Sun and Venus. All this speaks of a rare successful constellation for the forces of light.
At the same time, the Black Moon was in yellow (undicile) aspects to Neptune, Chiron, Jupiter. She was also in opposition to Aza, which weakened both of them.
On the Ascending Node, the symbol of evolutionary tasks, was the star of Ursa Major (connection with the Aryan egregore) Fekda. And finally, Jupiter makes trigonal aspects to the Sun and Venus, which speaks of great honors and awards in the near future for those who have embarked on a bright path.
The operation was completed in 4 days. As a result, on November 23 at 16.00, the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts were firmly connected in the area of Kloch and Sovetsky, closing the encirclement. In the early days, Paulus persistently sought permission to break out of the ring and leave Stalingrad, but Hitler ordered to hold out to the end, hoping to unblock the encircled group. It turned out that the Soviet army surrounded 330,000 people. This is much more than our military leaders expected. It was supposed to surround 90-120 thousand Germans. Therefore, the liquidation of the group was so delayed. In itself, the encirclement of such a large group did not mean their instant destruction. Moreover, by the autumn of 1942, the precedents of the encirclement of the Nazis by units of the Red Army demonstrated the high resistance of the enemy to getting into the boiler.
But this time it wasn't like that. The Germans could not transfer tanks from the central front, because they were involved in Operation Mars. The deblockade operation was called "Winter Thunderstorm" and Field Marshal Manstein was already preparing it. But a grouping of German troops went to the deblockade. But this happened only on December 12th. On December 14, there was no one on her way, except for scattered units and the 4th mechanized corps. It was one of those times when popular expression Churchill " the fate of the many depended on the few».
The commander of the 4th Corps Zolsky had no room for error. He must fight, delaying the Germans as long as possible until the concentration of the main forces of the 2nd Guards Army. The battle lasted 5 days and time was won.
If you look at the elective horoscope of this battle on December 12, 1942, you can see that Mars from Ophiuchus closes the main cross of the planets in the period of December 12-18. For us, the greatest danger was on December 12-15, when Mars passed the Burnt Path.
Here, of course, people of the higher zodiac are fighting. If we superimpose the map of Major General Zolsky (March 22, 1897, 20.00 Moscow) on the map of the battle, then a strong Ophiuchus (Moon, Uranus, Saturn) is visible. The entire transit cross was included through this sign. General Ehard House was born on January 8, 1889 in Austria - commander of the 6th German division. He fought with Zolski's army and had to release Paulus. He also had the highest zodiac in the cosmogram - Pegasus (Mars 30 gr Aquarius and Venus 2 gr Pisces). He also closed the entire cross on this connection. Ophiuchus defeated Pegasus and the deblockade failed. After that, the days of Paulus's army were numbered.
Content:
70th anniversary of the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad
The headquarters was located in Golubinsky, a large Cossack village on the right bank of the Don. It was snowing heavily, and the sentries could not see anything already a few meters away. Lieutenant Gerhard Stock called from the 4th Romanian Army in the Kletskaya area. His message, entered in the staff journal, read: "According to the testimony of a Russian officer taken prisoner at the location of the 1st Romanian cavalry division, the expected attack of the Red Army should begin today at five o'clock in the morning." Since there were no other messages and it was already past six, the officer on duty did not wake up the army chief of staff. General Schmidt was furious if he was disturbed because of a false alarm, and this is in recent times happened quite often. The Romanians were especially worried, whose positions were located northwest of the 6th German army.
Soviet sappers in white camouflage disarmed mines all night, getting closer and closer to enemy positions. At seven o'clock in the morning Moscow time (five Berlin time), the Russian artillerymen, having received the Siren command, began preparations for a massive shelling of the Romanian units. One Soviet general said that the white icy fog "was as thick as milk."
Due to poor visibility, the headquarters even discussed the issue of postponing the offensive, but in the end it was decided to act according to a pre-planned plan. The signal for the beginning of the shelling, given by the sound of trumpets, was clearly heard in Romanian troops Oh.
The telephone rang again at the headquarters of the 6th Army. Lieutenant Stock explained to Captain Verkh that the sound signal means preparations for a massive shelling. “I think the Romanians will not survive,” the lieutenant shared his thoughts. “Be that as it may, I will regularly report to you on the situation in units.” This time, Top did not hesitate to wake up General Schmidt.
On the two main sectors of the front, chosen for attacks from the north, 3,500 guns and heavy mortars were to clear the way for twelve infantry divisions, three tank and two cavalry corps.
The first volleys thundered in the morning silence like thunder. In impenetrable fog, observers could not adjust the fire, and this was not required. All objects were shot a few days before the start of the offensive. The shells landed right on target.
The ground shook as if an earthquake had begun. The ice in the puddles cracked, and they looked like old mirrors. The shelling was so powerful that the rumble of guns woke up the 22nd Panzer Division of the Germans, located 30 kilometers from the scene. The division did not wait for orders from above, the situation was already clear. Tanks immediately began to prepare for battle.
Russian soldiers in the positions of the Don and Stalingrad fronts also heard the distant rumble of gun salvos. To all questions about what was happening, the commanders were forced to answer that they knew nothing.
The strictest secrecy was maintained. Until the very outcome of the battle, until its final result became clear, no statements were made. In his speech on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the revolution, Stalin only hinted at the possibility of active action. He said: "There will be a holiday on our street."
An hour later, the Soviet rifle divisions, without waiting for the support of the tanks, moved forward. Batteries "Katyusha" continued shelling blindly, moving the fire deep into the Romanian positions. The guns now hit the second line of defense and the Romanian artillery. Poorly armed Romanian infantrymen, stunned by powerful artillery fire, still put up serious resistance to the Red Army and fought bravely. “The attack is repulsed,” a German communications officer from the 13th Romanian Infantry Division reported to headquarters. A second Russian attack, this time supported by tanks, was also repulsed.
Suddenly, the roar of explosions subsided. Soviet artillery ceased fire. The thick fog only added to the stillness that hung in the air. A few minutes later, the Romanians heard the roar of tank engines. Massive artillery preparation turned the neutral zone into a mess of snow and mud, which greatly hampered the advance of the "thirty-fours". But the tankers, in addition, had to strictly adhere to the narrow passages in the minefields. The sappers sat on the armor behind the turrets of the tanks of the second and third lines. If a tank from the first line was blown up by a mine, the command sounded: "Sappers, forward!" and they, under the fire of the Romanian infantry, fled to lay a new route for the tanks.
The Romanian soldiers fought valiantly, repulsed a few more Russian infantry attacks and knocked out many tanks, and yet they were doomed. Soviet tanks in groups broke through the defense of the Romanians, attacked from the flanks and rear. To save time, the Russian tankers launched a frontal attack on the Romanian positions and completely crushed them around noon. The 4th Tank and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps of the Red Army rushed deep into the location of the 4th Romanian Corps in the Kletskaya area and took a direction to the south. Soviet cavalry on shaggy short Cossack horses, with machine guns behind their backs, galloped after the tanks, almost as fast as they were.
Half an hour later, thirty kilometers to the west, General Romanenko's 5th Panzer Army broke the defenses of the Romanian 2nd Corps. The wide tracks of the "thirty-fours" easily crushed the barbed wire and ironed the trenches. The tanks were followed by the 8th Cavalry Corps. His task was to cover the right flank of the attack and expand the encirclement to the west.
Closer to dinner, the wind dispersed the fog a little, and several squadrons from the 2nd, 16th and 17th Russian air armies took off into the air. Either the airfields of the Luftwaffe were in conditions of worse visibility, or the Germans simply did not want to take risks, but the German planes did not take to the skies that day. “Again, the Russians masterfully took advantage of bad weather, Richthofen wrote in his diary. - Rain, snow, icy fog made flying impossible. It was not possible to prevent the enemy from crossing the Don with bombing strikes.
Until 9.45 the headquarters of the 6th Army was not officially notified of the start of the offensive of the Red Army. Such a slow reaction indicated that at the current moment the situation was regarded as serious, but not catastrophic. Tank attacks even continued in Stalingrad.
At 11:05, General von Sodenstern, Chief of Staff of Army Group B, called Schmidt and said that the 48th Panzer Corps of General Geim had been sent to the area north of Bolshoy to support the Romanian units. (In fact, the corps was advancing in the Kletskaya area, but unexpectedly from Hitler an order came to change the direction of movement, which infuriated Geim.) Zodenshtern believed that parts of the 11th Corps of General Strecker should be transferred to strengthen the defense east of Kletskaya, where the 1st Romanian cavalry division. But so far, only twenty enemy tanks have been seen in this area. The Germans did not consider this a serious danger. At 11.30 one of the regiments of the 44th Austrian Infantry Division received an order to begin moving west in the evening. Meanwhile, units of the 6th Army had already practically lost the opportunity to leave the area of the large bend of the Don. Their freedom of movement was severely restricted.
Despite the increased work of signalmen and additionally laid telephone lines, there was almost no detailed information about what was happening. The first reports began arriving at 6th Army Headquarters more than two hours after the Russian breakthrough. The news was brought by the Red Army soldiers themselves on the armor of their tanks, the 4th tank corps of Major General Kravchenko pierced the combat formations of the 13th Romanian infantry division through and through and was only six kilometers from Gromky. This news sowed panic in the Romanian headquarters. The officers fled in fear, throwing boxes of documents and personal belongings into the trucks. What happened further to the west, where Romanenko's 5th Panzer Army attacked, was generally unknown.
The idea to send the 48th Panzer Corps for a counterattack in the northern direction shows how slave psychology was inherent in the German generals. They unquestioningly carried out even the clearly erroneous orders of Hitler. Usually, the German tank corps had more vehicles than the Soviet tank army, but in the 48th corps there were not enough combat-ready tanks even for a division. In the 22nd Panzer Division of the Germans, only thirty vehicles remained and so little fuel that they had to take it from the Romanians. There was a joke about “saboteur mice” throughout the army, but soon the soldiers were not laughing. The situation kept getting worse.
Conflicting orders only exacerbated the situation. Instead of staying close to Geim's corps, the Romanian 1st Panzer Division deviated from him on the march. In addition, the Russians unexpectedly attacked the headquarters of the Romanian division. During the battle, the radio was out of order - the only means of communication. Communication with the headquarters of General Game was lost for several days.
Perhaps the most surprising thing was that Paulus did not react in any way to what was happening in these difficult days for the Wehrmacht - the general was inactive. The 16th and 24th Panzer Divisions and other units were bogged down in the fighting in Stalingrad. So nothing was done to deliver fuel, ammunition and food to the divisions.
On the afternoon of November 19, Soviet tanks continued to move in columns in southbound. Since there were almost no landmarks in the snowy steppe, the tankers used local residents as guides. But this was not enough. Visibility was so poor that commanders had to navigate by compass. The snow covered deep beams; in some places tall, frost-covered steppe grass peeped out from under the snowdrifts, and beyond that stretched a deceptively flat expanse. Tanks were thrown from side to side so that only soft leather helmets saved the crews from serious damage. And yet, there were numerous fractures, mostly of the arms. Despite this, the tank columns continued to move.
The commanders of the 4th Panzer Corps, which continued to march south of Kletskaya, were especially concerned about the vulnerability of the left flank. German counterattacks could be expected at any moment. The Romanians were no longer able to attack. The blizzard intensified, the snow clogged the viewing slots and made it impossible to aim. Around four it began to get dark, and the commanders ordered the lights to be turned on, otherwise it was impossible to move on.
On the western sector of the breakthrough, tankers from the 26th Corps of General Rodin saw a strong fire ahead. The farmstead was on fire. It was set on fire by the Germans before they began a swift retreat. The enemy, as it were, warned of his presence. Before the tankers had time to turn off the headlights, the German artillery opened fire.
A little to the right, Batkov's 1st Tank Corps stumbled upon the notorious German 48th Tank Corps. The German tankers had not yet corrected the power system, and the narrow tracks of their tanks were bogged down in the snow. The fight in the dark was chaotic. The usual German superiority in tactical skill and coordination was completely lost.
The order of the German command to transfer part of the 11th Corps and the 14th Tank Brigade from Stalingrad to the Kletskaya area to eliminate the enemy's breakthrough was hopelessly late. The headquarters of Army Group B and the 6th Army did not have accurate information and gave orders blindly. General von Richthofen wrote in his diary: "It is impossible to clarify the situation even with the help of aerial reconnaissance." The Russians tried to confuse the enemy even more by striking along the entire front of the 6th Army.
By five o'clock in the evening, when Kravchenko's 4th Panzer Corps had already covered more than twenty kilometers, General Strecker received an order with his 11th Panzer Corps to provide a new line of defense to protect the rear of the 6th Army. The German generals, including Richthofen, still did not understand the true aims of the Red Army. Richthofen wrote home: "Let's hope that the Russians do not reach the railway - the main artery of our supply." It never occurred to the Germans that the Russians were trying to completely encircle the 6th Army.
At 1800, the headquarters of General von Seydlitz received an order: units of the 24th Panzer Division should leave Stalingrad and head to the Peskovatka-Vertyachiy area. At 22.00 (seventeen hours had passed since the start of the Russian offensive), the headquarters of the 6th Army received a categorical order from Colonel General von Weichs to stop the battle in Stalingrad. “Changing the situation in the area of the 3rd Romanian Army requires decisive measures and the fastest possible advance of troops to protect the rear and communication lines of the 6th Army,” the order said. All offensive actions in Stalingrad it was ordered to stop immediately. Tank and motorized units should have been transferred to the west a few hours ago. Since no preparations were made for the transfer of troops, speed was out of the question. In addition, Chuikov's 62nd Army went on the offensive to prevent the Germans from getting out of the city.
The German 16th Panzer Division, which had many Russian defectors, was also ordered to move west towards the Don. Like the 24th Panzer Division, it had to refuel on the way, because it was sorely lacking in Stalingrad. But first of all, the division had to get out of the battle, which she led in the Market area. And although most of the division moved west the next evening, the tanks of its 2nd regiment continued to fight in the city until three in the morning on November 21, by which time 46 hours had already passed since the start of the Russian offensive.
Since the Soviet offensive was developing in the rear of the 6th Army, Paulus still did nothing. He believed that since the battles were taking place outside his area of responsibility, it was better to wait for orders from above.
The headquarters of Army Group "B" also awaited instructions from the Fuhrer. Hitler's desire for petty care led to the fatal passivity of the generals at the very moment when speed in decision-making was required. No one thought about the intentions of the enemy. Having transferred the tank forces of the 6th Army across the Don to protect the rear and left flank, the German command made a fatal mistake. The southern flank of the 6th Army was left completely without cover.
On the morning of November 19, the soldiers of the German 4th Panzer Army clearly heard the roar of artillery cannonade, although they were more than sixty kilometers from the battlefield. The fighters understood that a big offensive had begun, but no one knew exactly what was happening. The commander of one of the battalions of the 297th Infantry Division, Bruno Goebel, suffered from complete obscurity. It was quiet on this sector of the front all day.
The ground was frozen, and the steppe looked dull. A strong wind swept away and carried away fine dry snow, more like white dust. Soldiers from the 37th Infantry Division heard ice floes collide and break on the Volga, floating down the river. At night, the division headquarters received a message that all attacks by the 6th Army in Stalingrad had been stopped.
The next morning was again frosty and foggy. The commander of the Stalingrad Front, General Eremenko, despite persistent calls from Moscow, decided to postpone the start of artillery preparation. Only at ten o'clock did the artillery and Katyusha batteries open fire. Three quarters of an hour later, the Russian troops moved forward along the passages in the minefields, prepared at night by sappers. South of Beketovka, the 64th and 57th armies followed the strike units of the 13th mechanized corps. Twenty kilometers to the south, from the region of lakes Sarpa and Tsatsa, the 4th mechanized and 4th cavalry corps of the 51st army went on the attack.
The soldiers of the German units adjacent to the Romanian 20th Infantry Division saw masses of Soviet tanks roll in waves on the positions of the Romanians. The Germans, of course, did not know the exact number of troops. Goebel got in touch with the commander of a Romanian regiment, Colonel Gross. He had once served in the Austro-Hungarian army and spoke good German. He reported that his regiment had only one horse-drawn 37mm anti-tank gun. And yet the Romanian soldiers, mostly former peasants, fought bravely, knowing full well that they could only rely on themselves. Romanian officers and junior commanders never led the way. Most of the time they spent in the rear, in dugouts with music and alcohol. Soviet reports noted that Romanian defense was stronger than expected.
Goebel saw the attack from an observation post. “The Romanians bravely defended their positions, but they did not have the strength to hold back the pressure of the Russians for a long time,” he later wrote in his diary. The Soviet tanks were advancing rapidly, the snow from under the tracks was flying in all directions. Each car carried on its armor a shock group of eight fighters dressed in white camouflage robes.
The Volga was icebound, because of this, the supply of units attacking south of Stalingrad was difficult. The divisions began to feel the lack of food already on the second day of the offensive. Three days later, there was no bread or meat left in the Russian 157th Rifle Division. To get out of the situation, all trucks, even those at the disposal of the medical service, were sent to deliver food to the advanced units.
On the way back the vehicles took away the wounded, whom the advancing units simply left behind them in the snow.
The enthusiasm of the attackers exceeded all expectations.
The soldiers understood that they were doing it with their own hands. A signalman from the 157th Infantry Division voluntarily went ahead of the tanks, indicating a passage in the minefield. “The long-awaited hour has come when we will shed torrents of enemy blood. Finally, we will avenge our wives, children, mothers, ”the Stalingrad Front’s political administration said in an appeal to the troops. For those who fought near Stalingrad, these days became more memorable than the surrender of German troops and the fall of Berlin.
Soviet soldiers got the opportunity to avenge their desecrated Motherland. True, only the Romanian divisions bore the brunt of the battles with the Soviet army so far. Officers from Goth's headquarters said that the Romanians, at the sight of the Russians, began to have a "trench disease." According to Soviet reports, many Romanian soldiers simply dropped their weapons, raised their hands and shouted "Antonescu kaput!" Captured Romanians were built in columns, but before they were sent to the camps, many were shot. Thus, the Russian fighters settled their scores with the enemy. The fact is that several Soviet corpses were found in the location of the Romanian units. Obviously, this caused a severe reprisal.
The Russians quickly made a breakthrough in a southeasterly direction, but the offensive did not develop quite according to plan. Confusion reigned in the forward units, caused by conflicting orders. Major General Volsky lost control of the lead columns of the 4th Mechanized Corps, which, in their swift movement westward from the salt lakes, became mixed up, and it was now very difficult to locate some of them.
To the north of the parts of Volsky, the 13th mechanized corps of Colonel Tanaschishin was advancing. There were not enough trucks, and the infantry could not keep up with the tanks. Difficulties began when the corps met an enemy much more formidable than the Romanians. The path to Tanaschishin's corps was blocked by the only reserve unit of the Germans on this sector of the front. It was General Leiser's 29th Motorized Infantry Division. The battle took place ten kilometers south of Beketovka, and although the division dealt a tangible blow to the Soviet columns, General Goth received an order to transfer it to protect the southern flank of the 6th Army. Parts of the 6th Romanian army were dispersed, it was almost impossible to create a new line of defense. Even Goth's headquarters was under constant threat. Now only the 6th Romanian cavalry regiment was on the way of the Russian shock groups to the Don.
The success of Leiser's attack showed that if Paulus had formed a strong mobile reserve on the eve of the Red Army's offensive, the Germans would have been able to strike in a southerly direction and break through the still weak encirclement with relative ease. Then German troops could fall on the Russians near Kalach and thus prevent encirclement from the north. However, this did not happen. Neither Paulus nor Schmidt realized the gravity of the situation.
On the morning of Friday, November 20, when artillery preparation was underway south of Stalingrad, Kravchenko's 4th Panzer Corps, having traveled 25 kilometers along the rear of Strecker's divisions, turned to the southeast. Meanwhile, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps attacked the 11th German Corps from the east. Strecker tried to organize the defense of the rear of his units south of the big bend of the Don, where in defensive line the Germans had a gap. However, from the northeast, Strecker's corps was forced to engage in battle with the Soviet 65th Army, which, continuously attacking, did not allow the Germans to transfer troops.
As the Romanians laid down their arms, the Wehrmacht's 376th Infantry Division was forced to turn around and repel the Red Army attacks from the west, while simultaneously trying to get support from the 14th Panzer Division, located somewhat to the south. The Austrian 44th Infantry Division also had to move to the west due to lack of fuel.
The commander of the 14th Panzer Division of the Germans did not have a clear idea of the plans and actions of the enemy. Having first advanced 12 kilometers to the west, at noon the division returned back to the Verkhne-Buzinovka area. On the way, she ran into the flank units of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and entered into battle with them. During the first two days of the offensive, the Germans destroyed 35 Soviet tanks.
The catastrophic shortage of fuel hampered the advance of the German armored and motorized divisions, sent to reinforce the line of defense to the west of Stalingrad. There were also not enough tankers, because many of them, on the orders of Hitler, were used as infantrymen in street fighting in Stalingrad. Only now has it become clear all the pernicious background of the order to transfer horses from the 6th Army to the west. The Russians were advancing, and the Germans could not even use their artillery.
Soviet strike groups wedged deeper and deeper into the enemy defenses. The Romanian army was dying. The officers abandoned their headquarters. As one Soviet journalist wrote, “along the way of the Russian tanks, the road was strewn with the corpses of enemies. There were abandoned guns. Emaciated horses wandered in the ravines in search of vegetation; some of them dragged broken wagons behind them. Puffs of gray smoke rose from the burning trucks. Helmets, hand grenades and ammo boxes were all over the place.” Separate groups of Romanian soldiers tried to continue the resistance, but were soon broken by units of the 5th Panzer and 21st Armies. Main Headquarters The Romanian units were abandoned in such a hurry that tankers from the 26th Corps of General Rodin seized not only staff documents, but also Romanian overcoats. Apparently, their owners fled naked into the frosty night. Most importantly, the advancing Russian columns also seized intact supplies of fuel, which was so lacking in the Red Army.
Meanwhile, the German 22nd Panzer Division was slowly retreating under the onslaught of "thirty-fours" from the 1st Panzer Corps. The next day, the division tried to counterattack, but was surrounded. Having reduced in number of vehicles to a tank company, it nevertheless broke out of the ring and retreated to the south-west, pursued by the Russian 8th cavalry corps.
At the same time, the 26th Panzer Corps Rodin, having destroyed the 1st Romanian Panzer Division, which stood in its way, quickly advanced across the open steppe in a southeasterly direction. Parts were ordered to leave the unfinished enemy behind. It was more important to get to the target point on time. Aerial reconnaissance The Luftwaffe might have noticed that three Russian tank corps were advancing in parallel courses further southeast, closing the encirclement around the 6th Army. But the German aviation was inactive these days, so alarm bells sounded at Paulus's headquarters only on the evening of November 20th.
The only major formation of the Romanians, which still continued to resist, was the grouping of General Laskar. It included the remnants of the 5th Romanian army, dissected by the blows of Russian tanks. Laskar, who received the Knight's Cross for Sevastopol, was one of the few Romanian military leaders whom the Germans really respected. He held on to the last of his strength, counting on the help of the 48th Panzer Corps.
The headquarters of the 6th Army was located 20 kilometers north of Kalach, in Golubinsky. Despite alarming calls, staff officers continued to believe in the best. On November 21, at 7.40 am, a message was sent to the headquarters of Army Group B, which Paulus and Schmidt sincerely considered reliable. They remained confident that the attack of the Russian 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps on the left flank of Strecker's divisions was the main blow, and hoped to rectify the situation by transferring troops from near Stalingrad to the west.
That same morning, only a little later, Paulus received a whole series of shocking messages. From different sectors of the front signaled the seriousness of the situation. The headquarters of Army Group "B" warned of the possibility of attacks from the west and southeast on the southern flank of the 6th Army. A report came that a large enemy tank grouping (meaning Kravchenko's 4th Panzer Corps) was approaching the 6th Army and was already less than twenty kilometers from the German positions. There was a threat of Russian exit to the Don railway. In this case, the supply of the 6th Army with military equipment and food would become impossible. In addition, the Russians would then be able to control most of the bridges and crossings across the Don. The 6th Army did not have enough strength to cope with this threat on its own. On top of all the troubles, the repair bases and warehouses of the army were completely unprotected. Only now Paulus and Schmidt realized that the enemy from the very beginning was striving for complete encirclement. Diagonal Russian attacks from the northwest and southeast converged in the Kalach region.
It was not only Hitler's delusion that the Russians supposedly had no reserves that led to such disastrous consequences. Many German generals, arrogant and arrogant, were inclined to underestimate the enemy. One of the 6th Army said: “Paulus and Schmidt expected an attack, but not like this. For the first time, the Russians used tanks as massively and effectively as we did.” Even Richthofen grudgingly acknowledged the superiority of the Red Army, writing of the Russian advance as "an astonishingly successful strike." Field Marshal von Manstein, in turn, however, much later, said that the headquarters of the 6th Army was too slow to react to what was happening and could not discern the obvious fact that the Russians were initially striving for Kalach, the meeting place of their strike groups.
In the afternoon, most of Paulus's headquarters moved to the Gumrak railway junction in order to be closer to the main parts of the 6th Army. In the meantime, Paulus and Schmidt took off in two light airplanes for Nizhne-Chirskaya, where General Goth called a meeting. In the abandoned Golubinsky, heaps of staff documents were burning down. Black smoke rose from the burning buildings into the sky. The staffers left in a terrible hurry, ignoring the message of the headquarters of Army Group B: "Despite the threat of temporary encirclement, the 6th Army continues to steadfastly hold its positions."
Meanwhile, by November 21, the Germans had no hope that they could hold their positions. Parts of the 16th Panzer Division were delayed, and a gap appeared between Strecker's 11th Corps and other units trying to organize a new line of defense. This was immediately taken advantage of by the 3rd Guards Cavalry Regiment and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Red Army. Strecker's division, subjected to continuous attacks from the north and northeast, was forced to begin a retreat to the Don. The erroneous transfer of tank formations of the 6th Army in the western direction became obvious.
Kalach, the main destination that the three Soviet corps were striving for, was at the same time the most vulnerable point of the German defense. There was no organized defense here: only a few scattered units, a field gendarmerie detachment and an anti-aircraft battery, a transport company and repair shops of the German 15th Panzer Division settled in Kalach for the winter. The first news of serious changes in the situation at the front came here on November 21 at ten o'clock in the morning. The soldiers were surprised to learn that Russian tank columns had broken through the Romanian positions from the northwest and were rapidly approaching Kalach. At about five o'clock in the evening it became known about a breakthrough south of Stalingrad. The Germans did not know that Volsky's mechanized corps had already approached the former headquarters of the 4th Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht and was only 30 kilometers from the village.
Parts of the Germans, located in Kalach, did not have a specific combat order and occupied extremely disadvantageous positions. There were four anti-aircraft batteries on the western bank of the Don, and two more anti-aircraft guns were installed on the eastern bank. The bridge, through which one could get into the village, was guarded by twenty-five soldiers from the field gendarmerie. In Kalach itself, there was only an incomplete rear battalion.
The commander of the 26th Tank Corps, Major General Rodin, ordered the commander of the 19th Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel G.K. Filippov, to seize the bridge leading to Kalach. A column of Filippov's tanks approached the village from the east at dawn on 22 November. At 6.15 am two trophy German tanks and an armored personnel carrier with lights on, so as not to arouse suspicion, drove to the bridge over the Don and opened fire on the guards. Sixteen more Soviet tanks hid in the thick bushes on the river bank. It was the same place from which German tankers August 2 looked at the city.
Several of Filippov's tanks were knocked out, but on the whole the daring plan paid off. The detachment that captured the bridge opened the way for the "thirty-fours". German attempts to blow up the bridge were prevented. Soon the Russian motorized infantry and other tank formations arrived. Two attacks followed, supported by the fire of guns and mortars from the other side of the Don. By noon, Soviet infantry broke into the village. The streets were in chaos. Several heavy guns at the disposal of the consolidated battalion did not open fire. Either they were faulty, or there was no ammunition. Having blown up the repair shops, the Germans plunged into the cars and hastily left Kalach, rushing to Stalingrad to join their units.
On November 23, in the Kalach area, the 4th and 26th tank corps met, attacking from the northwest, and Volsky's 4th mechanized corps, marching from the bridgehead south of Stalingrad. Signaling each other with green flares, the Russian advance units met in the open steppe near Sovetskoye. Later, this meeting was repeated for propaganda purposes and captured by cameras. On the footage of the newsreel, tankers and infantrymen celebrate their success by treating each other with vodka and sausage. It would be interesting to know how this actually happened.
In the location of the German troops, the news quickly spread: “We are surrounded!” On November 22, Protestants celebrated the Day of Remembrance of the Dead. That day, as Kurt Reber, a priest of the 16th Panzer Division, wrote, was a day of "doubt, confusion and horror." True, many did not take the disturbing news too seriously. There had been encirclements the previous winter as well, but they were quickly cleared up. The most far-sighted officers understood that there were simply no fresh units capable of coming to their aid. “It is only now that we have realized the precarious position we are in. So deep in Russia, cut off from their own…” Freitag-Lorigofen recalled.
Forty kilometers to the west, the last center of resistance of the Romanian troops was fading away. Early in the day, General Lascar rejected the Russian offer of surrender. "We will fight without giving up," he said. But his troops had nowhere to wait for help. In addition, the ammunition was running out.
The capture of Kalach by Soviet units put Strecker's 11th Army Corps in a dangerous position. In conditions of complete uncertainty and chaos, the corps fought heavy defensive battles, repelling attacks from three sides at once, having extremely conflicting information at its disposal. All the confusion of these days is reflected in the diary of a German artillery officer.
“20.11. The attack ends??! We change position, move to the north. We have one gun left, all the rest are disabled. 21.11. From early morning - enemy tanks. We are withdrawing from positions, retreating. Our infantry - motorcyclists and sappers - needs cover. Today, even more Romanians, without stopping, passed us to the rear. We're leaving. The Russians are already pushing from two sides. New firing positions. Stand at least a little, then retreat. We build dugouts. 22.11. At 15.30 - alarm. We artillerymen are thrown into battle like ordinary infantrymen. The Russians are coming. The Romanians are on the run. We cannot hold this position. We look forward to the order to withdraw."
During the retreat, the German infantry divisions ran into enemy cavalry units. Since the horses German army not enough, the Germans used Russian prisoners of war instead of draft animals. “We pulled wagons instead of horses,” recalled one Soviet veteran. - Those who could not move quickly were killed on the spot. We dragged carts for four days without any rest.”
In the POW camp near Vertyachey, the Germans selected the healthiest prisoners and took them with them. The rest, sick and helpless people were left to their fate. When units of the 65th Russian army approached the camp, out of ninety-eight prisoners, only two remained alive.
Photographers took pictures that made the blood run cold. Subsequently, the photographs were published, which gave Soviet government an additional reason to accuse the Nazis of war crimes.
The 376th Infantry Division of Edler von Daniels suffered heavy losses. After stubborn fighting, only 4,200 people remained in the division. Russian attacks followed one after another. On November 22, Daniels' fighters retreated along the western bank of the Don to the southeast. Two days later, the division crossed the Don across the bridge near Vertyachey. One of the tank regiments of the 16th Panzer Division was moving in the same direction. The regiment crossed the Don, hoping to join the 11th army corps. On November 23, the tankers were ambushed. Soviet infantrymen in white camouflage coats were armed with anti-tank rifles. Fearing an oncoming battle and experiencing an acute shortage of fuel, the regiment retreated.
The situation was worse than in December 1941, when the Germans retreated from Moscow. Only now the Wehrmacht retreated to the east, returning back to Stalingrad. The hard lessons of the past year did not go to waste. Many soldiers did not have winter clothes. Most of the Romanian and German soldiers wore nothing but brown uniforms. Steel helmets were thrown out as unnecessary. Only a few lucky ones, mostly officers, covered their heads with sheepskin hats. There were burned cars and even anti-aircraft guns on the roadsides. Their exploded trunks resembled the petals of monstrous flowers. Closer to the crossing over the Don, a cemetery of trucks, command vehicles, and communication vehicles began.
On the bridge near Akimovsky, simply ugly scenes were played out. The soldiers shoved each other, fought and even fired, trying to break through to the eastern shore, the weak and wounded were trampled to death. The officers threatened each other with weapons, arguing about whose unit would go first. Detachments of the field gendarmerie, armed with machine guns, did not even try to intervene. Some soldiers, in order to avoid the crush, tried to cross the Don on the ice. However, the ice was relatively strong only near the coast; closer to the rapids, the daredevils lay in wait for treacherous polynyas. Those who fell through the ice were doomed, but no one thought to lend them a helping hand. A comparison with the crossing of the Napoleonic army across the Berezina involuntarily came to mind.
One officer, as unshaven as the soldiers around him, was nevertheless able to stop the outrages at the crossing. Using a pistol as a means of persuasion, he put together a small motley squad and brought relative order to the bridge. Then he organized several cover groups from tankers and artillerymen. To do this, they had to resort to threats again, but in the end the positions were occupied and the Germans began to wait for Soviet tanks or cavalry to appear from the icy fog.
The villages on the east bank of the Don were filled with German soldiers who had fought off their battalions. All of them were busy looking for food and at least some shelter from the terrible cold. Exhausted, exhausted, the Romanians, who had been retreating for a whole week, could not count on help and participation from the Germans. One German officer wrote in his diary: "We forced the Romanians to set up a bivouac away from us." Along the way, the soldiers stumbled upon supply depots, but this only increased the chaos. A tank officer later reported on unrest in the Peskovatka area. Anti-aircraft gunners from the Luftwaffe behaved especially unbridled. They indiscriminately blew up and set fire to buildings and equipment. All the warehouses discovered by the retreating were looted. Mountains of canned food migrated to soldiers' backpacks. Of course, no one had special can openers, and the fighters impatiently opened the cans with bayonets, often not even knowing what was in them. If there were coffee beans, they were immediately poured into a helmet and crushed. Many were simply thrown away. The requisitioners burned brand new ammunition, and those who did not have winter clothes tried to grab at least something for themselves from the fire. Postal workers also burned letters and parcels, many of them contained provisions sent to the soldiers from home.
Terrible scenes played out in field hospitals. “Everyone is running,” wrote one officer from a maintenance team in Peskovatka. “The lightly wounded themselves are forced to look for a lodging for the night.” Some patients spent the night right in the snow. Some people are even less fortunate. Trucks crammed with hastily bandaged wounded stood in the yards in the cold, the drivers fled, leaving their cars, and the living lay interspersed with the corpses. No one cared to bring them food and water. The doctors and orderlies were too busy, and the soldiers passing by paid no attention to the cries for help. Junior commanders, who led detachments of soldiers who had lagged behind their units, checked all the sick and wounded who could walk. Many were sent not for treatment, but for reformation. Even severely frostbitten people were returned to units.
The soldiers and officers of the German units that remained on the western bank of the Don strongly doubted that they would be able to escape. One artillery officer wrote in his diary: “We continue to move towards the Don. What will happen to us? Can we break through and connect with the main forces? Is the bridge still there? Complete suspense and anxiety. On the right and on the left guard detachments cover us, often the road itself looks like a front line. Finally Don! Bridge in place. Just a stone fell from the soul. We cross the river and take up a firing position. The Russians are already attacking. Their cavalry crossed the Don just south of us.
Only twenty-four combat vehicles remained in the 14th Panzer Division of the Germans. “Many tanks had to be blown up, we still didn’t have fuel for them,” one tanker reported later. The crews of the destroyed tanks formed an infantry company armed with carbines and pistols. The commanders were close to despair. On November 25, a divisional intelligence officer unwittingly overheard a conversation between General Hube and the Chief of Staff, Colonel Tapert. After the words “last resort” and “a bullet in the temple,” the officer realized that there was no hope of salvation.
The air temperature dropped rapidly. During the shelling, clods of frozen earth wounded the soldiers no worse than shrapnel. In addition, the severe frost meant that the Red Army, in pursuit of the retreating, would soon be able to easily cross the Don on the ice. And indeed - the next night, the Soviet infantry calmly crossed the river in the Peskovatka area. Early the next morning, the wounded in the field hospital were awakened by volleys of guns and the crackle of automatic bursts. “Everyone rushed to run headlong,” one sergeant later said. - The road is clogged with machinery, shells are exploding everywhere. There is nothing to take out the seriously wounded - there are not enough trucks. A hastily assembled company of soldiers from different units stopped the Russians only on the outskirts of the hospital.
In the evening, the headquarters of the 14th division received an order to destroy "all equipment, documents and equipment that are not absolutely necessary." The division was to move back to Stalingrad. By November 26, only the 16th Panzer Division and units of the 44th Infantry Division remained on the western bank of the Don from the units of the 6th Army. At night, they crossed the Don along the bridge near Lachinsky and ended up on the east bank. The 16th Panzer Division was already moving along this path, only in the opposite direction, when the attack on Stalingrad began.
A company of grenade launchers from the 64th Grenadier Regiment under the command of Lieutenant von Matius covered the approaches to the bridge. The company was ordered to let all the stragglers through and hold the bridge until four in the morning. Then the three-hundred-meter bridge across the Don should have been blown up. At 3:20 Lieutenant Matius confessed to his comrade Oberfeldwebel Wallraf that he was proud to be the last German officer to cross this bridge. Forty minutes later, the bridge was blown up, and the 6th Army was trapped between the Volga and the Don.
The successful offensive strengthened the faith in victory among the soldiers and the Red Army. “We started to beat the Germans, and now the mood is completely different,” one of the fighters wrote to his wife. - Now we will drive the reptiles in the tail and in the mane. A lot of people were taken prisoner. We do not have time to send them to the camps. The Nazis will pay dearly for the tears of our mothers, for all the humiliation and robbery. I've been given winter clothes, so don't worry about that. Everything goes well. I'll be back home soon. I send you five hundred rubles, dispose of them at your discretion.
The soldiers who were in hospitals in those days bitterly regretted that they could not take part in the offensive. “Stubborn battles are going on, and I am lying here like a log,” one Red Army soldier wrote in his diary.
Numerous statements by the Soviet side about the atrocities of the Nazis are almost impossible to verify. Something was undoubtedly exaggerated, and not only for propaganda purposes. But a number of facts, most likely, correspond to reality. The advancing Soviet troops everywhere met women, children and the elderly, expelled by the Germans from their own homes. They carried their miserable belongings on sleds. Many were robbed, depriving them of winter clothes. Vasily Grossman in his memoirs describes many similar cases. Searching the captured Germans, the Red Army soldiers went berserk. Wehrmacht soldiers did not disdain even the most miserable prey - women's scarves, old shawls, pieces of cloth and even baby diapers. One German officer was found to have twenty-two pairs of woolen socks. Exhausted villagers spoke about what they had to endure during German occupation. The Germans rowed everything: cattle, poultry, grain. Old men were flogged, sometimes to death. Peasant households were set on fire, boys and girls were driven to work in Germany. The rest were doomed to starvation.
Often, the Red Army soldiers dealt with the captured Germans with their own hands. Meanwhile, detachments of the NKVD were already operating in the liberated villages. Four hundred and fifty people were immediately arrested for collaborating with the invaders.
Vasily Grossman saw how captured Germans were driven along the roads - a pitiful sight. Many of them were without overcoats and wrapped themselves in torn blankets, intercepted with pieces of wire or ropes instead of belts. “In this vast empty steppe, they were visible from afar. The soldiers passed us in columns of two or three hundred people or in small groups of twenty-five or thirty people. One column, several kilometers long, slowly dragged forward in a row, repeating all the bends of the road. Some Germans who knew Russian shouted: “We don’t want war!”, “We want to go home!”, “To hell with Hitler!” The guards said sarcastically: “Now that our tanks have driven over them, they realized that they war, and before that it never occurred to them. The prisoners were transported to the eastern bank of the Volga on barges. They stood sullenly on the packed decks, tapping their boots and blowing on their hands to keep warm. The sailors watched the prisoners with grim satisfaction. “Let them take a closer look at the Volga,” they said, smiling.
On the railway station Abganerovo, Soviet infantrymen discovered many vehicles, which, judging by the stamps, were captured by the Germans in different countries Europe. French, Belgian, Polish cars were "decorated" with black eagles and the swastika of the Third Reich. For Russian soldiers, the capture of rich trophies became a real holiday. It was doubly pleasant to take away from the predator prey captured in an unrighteous way. However, the obtained trophies exacerbated the problem of drunkenness. The commander of one company, his deputy and eighteen soldiers were severely poisoned after drinking German antifreeze. Three died, the rest were sent to field hospital. The soldiers gorged themselves on trophy stew, which, out of habit, caused them an upset stomach.
The Russian 62nd Army, which was in Stalingrad, was still in a difficult position. Being part of the encirclement ring in which the German 6th Army found itself, Chuikov's army was cut off from east coast Volga and desperately needed ammunition and food.
A huge number of the wounded were waiting to be evacuated. But as soon as any ship tried to cross the Volga, German artillery immediately opened fire. And yet the situation has changed. The attacking Germans were now besieged. Soviet soldiers also had a hard time. The soldiers did not have tobacco, and its supply was not expected in the near future. In order to somehow drown out the craving for smoking, the Red Army sang. The Germans, sitting in their shelters, heard Russian songs, but they no longer shouted insults. They knew that the battle had reached a turning point.
E. Beevor. Stalingrad
The battles of the Great Patriotic War, since the 1990s, have been the subject of fierce controversy. Among the most controversial topics is the winter campaign of 1942-1943. Historians of the Ministry of Defense to this day steadfastly defend the official version that was formed during the existence of the USSR, according to which the Stalingrad Strategic Offensive Operation (SSNO, code name "Uranus") was originally intended to be the main event of the second military winter on the Soviet-German front. Offensive actions in a number of other areas (operations Mars, Jupiter, Polar Star, respectively, on the Western, Kalinin and Northwestern fronts) were conceived solely to solve local problems in the theater of operations. However, an analysis of even published documents and materials shows that everything was exactly the opposite.
WHO DEVELOPED THE PLAN
However, it would not be superfluous to first deal with one seemingly private question: who is the author of the plan for Operation Uranus?
Marshal Georgy Zhukov writes the following in his memoirs: "In order to develop such a major strategic operation as a plan for the offensive of three fronts in the Stalingrad region, it was necessary to base not only on operational conclusions, but also on certain logistical calculations. Who could produce specific calculations of forces and means for an operation of this magnitude?
The answer is obvious to Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun), whose books have become very popular lately. The former Soviet reconnaissance major without any doubt immediately points to the developer: "┘his position in the summer of 1942 was a senior officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff. The rank was colonel, later - Lieutenant General Potapov. in the Main Operational Directorate and that the author of the plan was Colonel Potapov, everyone has known for a long time.
True, "everyone and for a long time" in the GOU General Staff was always obvious: the senior officer-operator of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (in 1942 it was not yet called "chief") with the rank of colonel could not become the sole author of the plan for a strategic operation of a group of fronts - that's right in the system of operations in 1942 it was called SSNO.
There is no doubt: there is a chance to find in the depths of the General Staff the original plan of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation, the directive of the Supreme High Command for its implementation - too. In reality, there are documents on the organization of interaction between the fronts and calculations on the distribution of forces and means. But there certainly is no SSNO plan as such. However, there are plans for front-line offensive operations - each of the three fronts that took part in the SSNO - South-Western, Don, Stalingrad, approved by Stalin.
Now about the difference between such terms as "operational concept", "operational decision" and "operational plan". It's far from the same thing. In short, we can say that the concept of the operation is the direction of the main and other strikes, the method of conducting the operation, and finally, the composition of the groupings of troops and their operational formation. The decision for an operation (again, in a few words) is a plan plus tasks for the troops plus instructions for interaction and control.
AT different periods History in the Soviet and Russian armies, the mentioned documents were called differently, there were sometimes more, sometimes less, but the essence of the set as a whole did not change significantly. The most important of them include: the decision of the commander of the front for an offensive operation, the actual operation plan (the operational part on the map plus a text explanatory note), the calendar plan for preparing the operation, the interaction plan, the reconnaissance plan, the combat control schedule, the plan for creating strike groups, the air defense plan , air army combat plan, communications plan, operational communications scheme, reconnaissance plan, operational camouflage plan, engineer support plan, logistics plan, material supply plan, etc., etc.
The plan of any front-line operation is a set of more than a hundred planning, directive, reporting and information documents. It is developed by the front headquarters together with the chiefs of military branches, special troops and services.
And you can’t do without documents - after all, it’s impossible to fight on a whim. For example, the front headquarters forgot to prepare only one plan - the commandant's service in an offensive operation. As a result, an unimaginable mess arises on all front-line and army roads.
Could, say, create such a set of documents by one - even a very highly trained - officer of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army? Of course no. The development of one and a half hundred documents on each of the three fronts participating in the SSOS was simply beyond the physical capabilities of one person.
The General Staff together with the Headquarters of the Supreme Command could not have been the authors of the plan for such an operation, as Marshal Zhukov writes about in his memoirs (the idea - yes, the decision - yes, but the three plans of the TNF - no). The development of such documents is beyond the functions of these governing bodies.
As for the document attributed to Colonel Potapov, it certainly exists in reality. Only this is not a plan of operation, but a plan. Most likely, it is not even called a plan, but "considerations" or "proposals" for the defeat of enemy troops near Stalingrad. In form, the document, presumably, is a map (the so-called operational part at the headquarters) with several sheets attached explanatory note with calculations.
There is no doubt about one thing - it is unlikely that the operator-operator developed this document on his own initiative. Most likely the General Staff and its operational management received a similar task after a preliminary discussion by the General Headquarters of the general plan for the winter campaign of 1942-1943, where the Stalingrad operation occupied the place strictly allotted to it by the Supreme Commander and Chief of the General Staff. The question arises - what?
THE NUMBERS SHOW
To understand the role and place of operations "Uranus" and "Mars", historians should first of all refer to the documents of the Headquarters and the General Staff. However, they are still classified.
If these documents were available to researchers, then the dispute about which operation is the main one and which one is "fettering" would disappear on its own. The most interesting thing is that several alternatives winter campaign 1942-1943. Of course, they were discussed.
The fact that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Headquarters and the General Staff of the Red Army did not attach decisive importance to the Stalingrad offensive operation is noticeable by the distribution of forces and means on the Soviet-German front on November 19, 1942 (see table from the 12-volume "History of the Second World War") .
Even according to these data, in two sectors of the front - from Lake Ladoga to Kholm and from Kholm to Bolkhov, which accounted for 36% of the length of the Soviet-German front, there were more than half of the personnel of the active army, artillery, aviation and 60% of tanks. At the same time, in the section from Novaya Kalitva to Astrakhan, where the main blow in the campaign was supposedly being prepared, the number of forces and means was 18-20%, and only in aviation - over 30%. But these 30% in absolute terms are quite a bit - over 900 aircraft. It turns out that 300 aircraft per front, allegedly operating on the main theater of operations.
It is not clear from what considerations the official historians who prepared this table proceeded. After all, she sends the official version of the history of the Great Patriotic War to a knockout. It is not serious to consider, after studying the above figures, that the main attack was planned in the Stalingrad region, because they contradict one of the essential principles military art - the massing of forces and means in the direction of the main attack.
By the way, any officer-operator knows how crafty the data of the table is. There is no doubt - in order to support the official version, the indicators of the Stalingrad, South-Western and Don fronts pulled by the ears to the max (at the same time underestimating the data of the fronts of the Western theater), using many well-proven counting techniques.
Say, 15,501 guns and mortars - is it a lot or a little compared to 24,682? At first glance, the difference is obvious. However, it will not be so obvious if we decompose the figures first separately by guns, then - separately by mortars. Then - by caliber and type. Finally - and most importantly - on the provision of ammunition. And only then can something be compared and analyzed. If the official version of history does not provide such data, then the advantage of the fronts located in the center and north over the southern ones is even greater.
Note that the table below reflects the troops of the active army only. If we add here the strategic reserves (according to their operational purpose), then the picture will be even more in favor of the Western theater of operations. To draw unambiguous conclusions on this issue, we need a Plan for the formation and operational purpose of the strategic reserves of the Red Army of the corresponding period of the war (it is quite possible that the document was called differently at that time). It has not been published anywhere. However, this does not mean its absence. If it is not given, then it contradicts official version war.
There are enough other reservations to understand: the strategic reserves prepared for the autumn of 1942 were by no means intended to develop success on the southwestern sector of the Soviet-German front. In particular, the same 12-volume "History of the Second World War" says that a significant part of the Stavka's strategic reserves in the fall of 1942 were formed and located east and southeast of Moscow - in the regions of Tambov, Balashov and Saratov. Note that this is official data. In fact, there were many more such areas. German intelligence many of them have been installed. And based on the information of their residents, the Germans quite reasonably expected that the main events of the winter campaign would unfold in the Western strategic direction.
CANNOT BE CHANGED
The campaign plan cannot be radically changed after it has been developed, approved, and the state, the country's armed forces have begun to implement it. Red arrows on the maps can be redrawn within a day. However, it is not clear how it is possible to transfer hundreds of thousands and millions of tons of ammunition, fuel, food, and other material and technical means (which were stockpiled ahead of time in the places of the planned main operations of the next campaign) to new areas, to redeploy strategic reserves - it is not clear. Repeated military shipments of this magnitude are simply impossible by definition.
Let's just give one example. At that time on railways countries used only locomotive traction. In order to carry out planned military transportation in accordance with the plan of the next campaign, it was necessary to concentrate an enormous amount of coal at the junction stations. And it was precisely on those in the strip of which it was planned to deliver the main blows to the enemy. In order to change something significantly in the plan of the campaign after the completion of transportation (hundreds of thousands of wagons, by the way), it is no longer possible to give the command - "Stop! Back! Everything to the original!". There will not even be burnt coal for locomotives. Procurement of new fuel reserves will take a significant amount of time. And in terms of timing, this will be just the next campaign.
In other words, the state and its armed forces from a certain moment become hostages own plans. There is a kind of strategic "zugzwang" or a forced sequence of operational-strategic moves. As Napoleon used to say, the wine is uncorked - and it must be drunk. Like it or not, but the operation "Mars" will have to be carried out.
Let's say they planned success on the Western theater of operations, but it came out in a completely different place - in the South-West. It is required to regroup strategic reserves and materiel there as soon as possible. Yes, in a relatively short time it will be possible to redeploy several bomber air divisions to another theater of operations. However, together with the aircraft, it is necessary to organize the transfer of at least 15 refills of high-octane aviation gasoline, hundreds of thousands of tons of aviation weapons. Without this, air divisions will be guns without cartridges. And for military transportation of this scale, tens of thousands of so-called conditional wagons and a period of time equal to 2-3 months are required. But during these 8-12 weeks, the enemy's success at the front will be localized.
It should be noted that this is where the answer to the question is rooted - why Paulus, together with his army, concentrated on a relatively small area of \u200b\u200bthe territory, practically without fighter aviation and anti-aircraft artillery cover, were not subjected to massive air strikes. It seemed to be simpler: bombard the encircled Germans with bombs from above until the white flag was thrown out. But! There were no planes, and - more importantly - bombs. All problems were solved by attacks of infantry and tanks after artillery preparation, incurring considerable losses.
On November 23, 1942, the Germans were surrounded near Stalingrad. But in order to develop success in the direction of Rostov, there were no large operational-strategic reserves at hand. The city - the gates of the North Caucasus - was 300 km away. Erich von Manstein covered a similar distance in 1941 in a similar situation in just four days. The Germans had no operational reserves between Stalingrad and Rostov. But the Red Army did not have them either.
Some pause in the actions of the Soviet troops gave the Germans the opportunity to make the necessary regroupings and organize a deblocking strike. First Major Reserve Betting - 2nd guards army- arrived in the South-Western strategic direction only in mid-December (note that on November 1, 1942, there were five combined arms armies). It was used not for the development of the Stalingrad success (or the final defeat of the 6th German Army), but for a counterattack on the divisions of the Don Army Group breaking through to the troops of Paulus. At the same time, the Germans were feverishly withdrawing their formations and units from the huge North Caucasian trap. For the same reasons - lack of forces and means - the liquidation of the encircled group near Stalingrad dragged on for two and a half months. As a result, an incorrect assessment of the situation by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the summer and autumn of 1942, when drawing up a plan for the upcoming winter campaign, led to the defeat of our troops near Kharkov in February-March 1943.
YOU SHOULD REVIEW
Why does Soviet historical science so carefully bypass the sharp corners of the most interesting campaign of the Great Patriotic War? After all, there was simply no more intriguing (and highly instructive) period in the history of the Soviet-German armed confrontation, in terms of strategy and the opportunities provided by the course of events for the Red Army. In the winter of 1942-1943, there was a very real possibility of the military crushing of Germany. In any case, it was possible to inflict a severe defeat on the entire southern wing of the German Eastern Front. But the military-political leadership of the USSR missed this opportunity. Although such chances, as evidenced by the global military history, are provided to the opposing sides quite rarely. Winter 1942-1943 is one of the clearest examples of this kind.
It must be assumed that in the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and General Staff The Red Army was very clearly aware of what a "window of opportunity" was formed as a result of the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad. However, political and military leaders could no longer radically change the plan for the winter campaign. This primarily explains the incompleteness of many operations after Stalingrad on the southern wing of the front in the winter of 1943. In other words, significant errors crept into the assessment of the situation and the subsequent planning of military operations. Nobody wants to admit to them, especially at the level of the top military-political leadership (in the USSR, it could not be wrong by definition), and still no one wants to.
Why has not yet been made public the most interesting documents The rates of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army related to this period of armed confrontation on the Soviet-German front? Because if these documents are published, then there will be no stone left unturned from the official version of the history of the Great Patriotic War.
In this case, numerous myths instantly disappear. We list only a few of them: "the main efforts in the winter campaign of 1942/43 were concentrated on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front", "the most important strategic operation of the campaign was to be the counteroffensive near Stalingrad", "The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command most carefully developed the initial operation - strategic counteroffensive near Stalingrad", "planning and organizing the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, the Headquarters provided for the fettering of enemy forces by active operations of troops in the western, northwestern directions and in the North Caucasus." As soon as the documents are opened, everything previously published will have to be revised and rewritten.
And the most important conclusion is that there was no true and complete history of the Great Patriotic War, and no. And, apparently, it will not appear soon. However, the values great victory near Stalingrad, the above reasoning does not detract at all. Recall that during the pivotal battle in the Pacific on June 4, 1942 - the battle in the Midway Atoll area - the situation evolved in a highly random way in favor of one side or the other. What can I say - that's the war. In the end, the Americans won, and they are rightfully proud of it. And if mistakes were made by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army during the war, this should be the subject of analysis, and not concealment.
The number of forces and means in the active army by sectors of the strategic front by November 19, 1942
|
Sections of the strategic front |
Section length km/% |
Number of forces and means* |
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|
People thousand people/% |
guns and mortars pcs/% |
tanks pcs/% |
aircraft pcs/% |
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|
From the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga |
Karelsky, 7th dep. army |
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|
From Lake Ladoga to Kholm |
Leningradsky, Volkhovsky, North-Western |
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|
From Holm to Bolkhov |
Kalininsky, Western, Moscow defense zone |
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|
From Bolkhov to Novaya Kalitva |
Bryansk, Voronezh |
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|
From Novaya Kalitva to Astrakhan |
Southwestern, Donskoy, Stalingrad |
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|
In the North Caucasus |
Transcaucasian |
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|
12 fronts, one zone, one otd. army. |
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* Excluding the Air Defense Forces of the country and the Navy, as well as anti-aircraft guns and 50-mm mortars.
