This article examines the history of the "Northern Territories Problem" (NTP) in the context of the Cold War in Asia. Particular attention is paid to the reasons why this issue was not resolved.

The history of the problem is well known. Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered to the Allies in August 1945. The Declaration limited Japanese sovereignty to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and smaller islands that were designated by the Allies. The problem was that, based on the new political realities, to draw a state border between Japan and Soviet Union, as well as fix it in a peace treaty.

However, the coalition allies had already begun to be drawn into the Cold War, and the first clashes between the US and the USSR took place in East Asia around Korea and Japan. Thus, the international settlement of the Japanese question was not completed. According to Article 2 of the Peace Treaty concluded on September 8, 1951, Japan renounced all rights, title and claims to Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin, however, the contract did not indicate in whose favor this refusal was carried out. The Soviet Union took part in the Peace Conference, but refused to sign the treaty. During the conference, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru emphasized that the southern Kuriles, Kunashir and Iturup were recognized by the Russian Empire as Japanese territory, while the islands of Shikotan and Habomai were part of Hokkaido and, accordingly, Japan [Sanfuransisuko 1951: 302-303] . Since then, more than fifty years have passed, but the peace treaty between Russia and Japan has not been concluded.

Naturally, the parties repeatedly made attempts to reach an agreement. Among other things, Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro negotiated with the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev in 1955-1956. However, they could not come to an agreement on the issue of the Peace Treaty, limiting themselves to signing the Joint Declaration, according to which the two smaller islands, the Habomai ridge and Shikotan, were to pass to Japan along with the signing of the Peace Treaty. In 1960, the Soviet Union unilaterally abandoned the Joint Declaration after Japan signed a new Security Treaty with the United States.

Since then, the Kuril Islands complex has been the subject of a dispute between the two capitals, with the Japanese side insisting that the "Northern Territories" were not part of the ceded Kuril Islands. The PST as a whole is perceived in Japan as the "problem of the four islands", in accordance with the Tokyo Declaration, signed by President B. Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro in October 1993.

PST has become the object of serious research by many scientists [see. Kimura 2001; Wada 1999; Iwashita 2005]. However, most of them focused on the consideration of bilateral relations between Japan and the USSR (since 1991 - Russian Federation), while the positions of the United States and Great Britain, which were the main initiators of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in best case received very little attention. Thus, the PST is still perceived as a subject of bilateral geopolitical dialogue.

The Cold War is certainly not discounted and continues to play important role, however, is considered a peripheral factor, which is perceived by most analysts as an ideological and geopolitical confrontation between the US and the USSR, the center of which was Europe, while Asia occupied a secondary place. The PST did not owe its existence to the Cold War, but was largely influenced by it and largely shaped by its events. Without understanding the nature of the Cold War in Asia and its consequences for the NTP, one cannot understand the origin, evolution and possible solution of this problem.

The Cold War in Asia is inherent specific features. Unlike Europe, where a bipolar system emerged after the emergence of NATO in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in 1956, Asia went through a series of dramatic transformations that included national liberation movements, decolonization, civil wars and even revolutions, and their apogee was the creation of the Chinese People's Republic(PRC) in October 1949 and the invasion of South Korea by communist North Korea in June 1950. The Korean War was the reason for which Japan did not sign the Peace Treaty with all interested parties.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty left unresolved territorial disputes between China, the USSR and both Koreas. Completion Korean War and Khrushchev's new doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" helped soften the Asian political climate. Nevertheless, active hostilities were replaced by a real cold war, both within the states themselves and on international level. In Japan, the internal cold war was no less violent than in other countries, the issue split the new Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Moscow, as will be shown below, opinions are also divided, although in lesser degree. As a result, the process of agreeing on a peace treaty with the USSR was interrupted.

Origins of the PST in Post-War Asia

As is commonly believed, the PST originates from the Yalta Allied Conference in January-February 1945 and the subsequent military occupation of the Kuril Islands by the Soviet Union, when Roosevelt and Churchill made concessions to Stalin in exchange for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan. However, careful research shows that this problem is a much more complex and profound issue that appeared even before the US-UK-USSR coalition was formed. It originates from the pre-war geopolitical games of Moscow and Tokyo in 1939-1941, from the period marked by the resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. Litvinov and the arrival of V. Molotov, whose geopolitical attitudes are well illustrated by the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact", imprisoned in August 1939

It was Molotov who raised the issue of the Kuril Islands in 1940, hinting at their possible transfer to the Soviet Union during negotiations with Japan on a non-aggression pact, which were subsequently curtailed [Aleksandrov-Agentov 1994: 54]. In his comments on the Japanese version of this document, he tied the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact to "the return of the previously lost territories of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles" [Tikhvinsky 2005: 269]. Molotov's remark shows that he did not know or chose to forget that the "Northern Territories" never belonged to Russia. Such a proposal, of course, was rejected by Japan, and instead, in April 1941, the Neutrality Pact was signed. The Kuriles have become a latent problem in relations between Tokyo and Moscow.

Soviet foreign policy was based not only on ideology, but also on geopolitical thinking, which was professed by both the "inflexible" Molotov and even such "pro-Western" diplomats as Deputy Foreign Ministers I. Lozovsky and I. Maisky. In December 1941, immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Lozovsky noted the possibility of reviewing the entire Soviet border after the victory over the Axis. He especially emphasized that the USSR should not allow a situation to arise after the war when "Japanese warships will cut off our access to the Pacific Ocean," mentioning, in particular, the Kuril Straits. Lozovsky's idea was voiced to Stalin and Molotov before the arrival of British Foreign Minister Eden. By the beginning of 1942, the Soviet Politburo created two commissions to work on a peace treaty and the configuration of the post-war world order [Documents 1995: 114-115]. In January 1944, Deputy Minister Maisky delivered a report "On the preferred future world order", which was mainly devoted to Europe, and Asia was mentioned only in passing. The report recommended that the Soviet Union refrain from participating in the war with Japan, but it contained persistent calls to "return" South Sakhalin (taken from Russia in 1905) and "transfer to us" the Kuril Islands (ceded to Japan under the Treaty of 1875) [ Documents 1995: 125, 133; Soviet 1999: 20, 35]. Thus, the "Yalta decision" was hatched in Moscow a year before the relevant conference.

The Japanese side was also engaged in geopolitical calculations. Faced with the defeat of Germany, the Japanese leadership resorted to the mediation of the Soviet Union. The Neutrality Pact was in effect until April 1946, although Molotov warned Japanese Ambassador Sato on April 5, 1945 that the Pact would not be extended [Slavinsky 1995: 304]. The Japanese authorities were ready to cede the "Northern Kuriles", wanting Stalin to meet them halfway. However, this maneuver was in vain. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan.

Contradictions in views on the occupation of Japan are already noticeable under President Truman's directive No. 1 of August 15, 1945, according to which the United States was to occupy the main part of Japan, and the Soviet Union only South Sakhalin; The Kuril Islands were not even mentioned in it. The next day, Stalin wanted to get an occupation zone in Northern Hokkaido and ran into a firm refusal. So between former allies conflicts began over the occupation of Japan, especially the Kuril Islands. A modern Russian historian also believes that the conflicts between the former allies over Japan and China date back to that period [Essays 2002: 333]. By October 1945, Stalin had become hostile to the United States on issues such as control of Japan and Korea. The meeting of the three foreign ministers in Moscow in December 1945 marked the transition from allied relations to confrontation.

Korean War, San Francisco Treaty and PST

The conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Japan took place in September 1951 in San Francisco in the atmosphere of the growing tension of the Cold War and the fighting in Korea. The Soviet Union sent a delegation to San Francisco, but refused to sign the Treaty, mainly because representatives of the People's Republic of China were not invited to the Conference [Kapitsa 1996: 125]. In the face of deteriorating military situation The Japanese Communist Party also asked the Soviet Union not to sign the Treaty [Shimotomai 2004].

Some of its features are also connected with the position of the states of the Eastern bloc, which had a negative attitude towards the Treaty. Thus, in Article 2, Japan renounced the rights to six territories, including the Kuril Islands, but did not indicate in favor of which states the waiver was carried out. This issue has been studied by Professor Hara Kimie and other researchers [Hara 2005]. Some see this as a "trap" set by John Foster Dulles (principal author of the Treaty and architect of the Conference) to prolong Japan's security dependence on the US by keeping it at odds with its neighbors, especially the Soviet Union.

Opinions on the Taiwan issue were also divided, as Britain recognized the Chinese Communist government, while the US supported Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government. As a result of the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, Japan in the eyes of the United States quickly turned from a defeated enemy into an important regional ally. The agreements reached at the San Francisco Conference, including the Security Treaty, in economic terms were favorable enough for Japan to enable it to focus on rebuilding its economy. Meanwhile, Stalin was mired in the Korean War, which continued until his death in March 1953.

Bipolar negotiations (1955–1972)

During the Cold War, the PST became part of an intense rivalry, a zero-sum game. However, a number of attempts have been made to resolve this issue. From a historical point of view, the détente that followed Stalin's death opened up the possibility of a change of position, especially for the Soviet leadership.

The leaders who succeeded Stalin, primarily Khrushchev, professed a different approach to outside world. East Asia, too, was expected to be influenced by Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" policy, which replaced Stalin's belief in the inevitability of war between the communist and capitalist worlds.

Bipolarity also gave rise to internal differences in views on relations with the USSR, which was especially noticeable in Japan, where in December 1955 a faction was formed in the LDP under the leadership of Yoshida, which opposed the new approach of the Hatoyama-Kono faction to regulating relations with the USSR.

In October 1954, Khrushchev visited Beijing to discuss with Mao Zedong new policy"peaceful coexistence" in Asia, and they issued a joint declaration in which both demonstrated their intention to normalize relations with Japan.

In January 1955, a little-known Soviet official A. Domnitsky personally met with Hatoyama. Following this event, the Asian socialist states unanimously announced their desire to normalize relations with Japan. Even the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK expressed a similar intention in his statement of February 25, 1955 [Simotomai 2006: 159].

The negotiation process is well documented by Professor Tanaka Takahiko and other scholars, and is also described in the memoirs of Ambassador Matsumoto Shun'ichi and journalist Kubota Masaaki [Tanaka 1995]. Khrushchev first hinted at the possibility of the return of the smaller islands, Habomai and Shikotan, to Japan in August 1955. In the negotiations that took place in London [Kubota 1983: 32-34], Japan's position was quite flexible. Matsumoto himself was inclined to conclude a peace treaty on the above terms. However, this was followed by a chain reaction within the Japanese elites, and Tokyo began to raise the bar, which was common occurrence domestic politics during the Cold War.

The term PST, which had been in oblivion for several years, suddenly reappeared when Shimoda Takezō, head of the treaty department of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, used it in his speech to Parliament on March 10, 1956. Under the leadership of his boss, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and former diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru, Takezō may have played a key role in coining the term. Against the backdrop of increased domestic political pressure, Shigemitsu sought to take control of the negotiation process and began a new round of discussions in 1956, demanding that Moscow resolve the issue based on the return of all four islands. Faced with stiff resistance from the Soviet authorities, Shigemitsu changed his position and in August 1956 was already inclined to conclude a peace treaty on the terms of the return of only Habomai and Shikotan. However, the Japanese cabinet rejected his proposal.

Here the logic of the Cold War intervened. On September 7, 1956, Dulles informed Shigemitsu that if Japan agrees to sign a peace treaty with the USSR on the condition of returning only two islands to it, then the United States may not return Okinawa to Japan [Tanaka 1995: 266].

According to a declassified CPSU document on Japan policy, a week before Prime Minister Hatoyama's visit in October 1956, the Soviet Foreign Ministry reported that a group of members of parliament led by Ikeda were openly resisting attempts to rapprochement with Moscow, despite the fact that that some circles, including the business communities of the Kansai area, are favorable to improved relations with the communist bloc [Report 1956]. The Cold War and the zero-sum game were at their peak, and Hatoyama decided to go to Moscow to sign only the Joint Declaration. This is evidenced by a number of documents published both in Japan and in Russia. Among other things, part of the documents on the October 1956 talks was published in Moscow in 1996 [Source 1996: 116]. There is a difference between the Russian and Japanese versions: the former lacks the phrase "including territorial question" after the words "negotiations on a peace treaty", while the second mentioned phrase contains; the corresponding document was published in March 2005 by Ishikawa, the former secretary of Kono Ichiro, in the materials of his personal archive [Asahi shimbun 15.03.2005]. There was a noticeable difference in opinion between Prime Minister N. Bulganin and Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Gromyko, who included this wording in the text, on the one hand, and Khrushchev, who insisted on its exclusion, on the other.

Indeed, the divergence of opinions within the Soviet elite was all too obvious. In his memoirs, Khrushchev criticizes Stalin for his "inability" to conclude a peace treaty. Gromyko also criticizes Molotov at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1957 for obstructing the rapprochement of positions with Japan [Molotov 1998: 231]. Molotov refutes this statement. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Central Committee of the CPSU, including the USSR ambassadors to the PRC (Yudin) and the DPRK (Puzanov), stated that "class enemies such as Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov" were against reconciliation with Germany and Japan [Molotov 1998: 595], although Malenkov appeared to be a reformist. Perhaps Khrushchev's reformist intentions ran into hidden resistance from the nomenklatura elite. One of the negotiators of those years, academician S. Tikhvinsky, still criticizes Khrushchev's "voluntarism" [Tikhvinsky 2001: 155]. Tikhvinsky was Matsumoto's counterpart in London. He described Khrushchev's new course at the London talks as "voluntarism." However, he changed his mind somewhat in 2006 when he criticized Khrushchev not for not raising the issue of the two smaller islands, but for denouncing the 1956 Declaration in 1960. Obviously, the change in position was due to new policy of President Putin.

I am inclined to attribute the differences in opinion to the fact that in October 1956 Khrushchev faced - in the form riots in Poland and Hungary, with the consequences of his campaign to debunk the Stalin personality cult, as well as the North Korean crisis, which arose under the influence of Kim Il Sung's leadership style and personality cult. V. Kovyzhenko, at that time - head. Japanese sector of the international department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, was also busy monitoring the situation in North Korea[Shimotomai 2006; Lankov 2002: 154-93].

The absence of the aforementioned persons at the signing ceremony of the Joint Declaration on October 19 gave Japan the opportunity to play on the differences of opinion between Khrushchev and Bulganin-Gromyko. Ambassador Matsumoto secured Bulganin's consent to simultaneously publish the Gromyko-Matsumoto letter, which contained the wording " peace talks, including the territorial issue (author's italics)" [Tanaka 1995: 150].

In 1960, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke took a course towards rapprochement with the United States on the basis of a revised Security Treaty. Then the USSR unilaterally renounced the Joint Declaration, thus further moving away from Japan.

Under the leadership of the pro-American government of Ikeda, in 1961 a new concept was formulated, the essence of which was that the disputed islands were not part of the Kuril chain. In other words, the PST turned from a diplomatic decision into a propaganda tool for provoking anti-Soviet sentiments among the Japanese people [Wada 1999: 275].

Negotiations on the PTA during the period of "détente"

Only fundamental changes in the configuration on the world stage could change the balance of power between Tokyo and Moscow. The bipolar system that developed during the Cold War, by the 1970s, as the economic rise of Japan and the European Community, became increasingly "multilateral". In the Asian context, it took on a new dynamism when the "détente" between the US and China in 1972 brought the Cold War in Asia into a new dimension. This shift left the Soviet elites in a state of shock, and they began to reassess their relationship with Japan. The rise of China's status and its ensuing rivalry with the USSR opened a new window of opportunity for discussion of the PST.

Moscow sought to counter the US-China rapprochement with its recognition of Japan as a new economic power. Associate Professor S. Vasilyuk believes that Japan and the USSR had common interests– China and oil [Vasilyuk 2005]. In addition, after the "oil shock" Japan was in dire need of the energy resources of Siberia. Moscow and Tokyo held a series of talks that began with Gromyko's visit to Tokyo in January 1972, a month before Nixon's trip to China. The negotiations culminated in the visit of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei to Moscow in October 1973.

During his visit, Gromyko not only smiled, but also did not behave in the usual manner of the Soviet leadership, which referred to the PST as "an already solved problem." During talks with Prime Minister Sato Eisaku on January 27, he hinted at a possible return to the "1956 formula". If Kapitsa's memoirs are to be believed, Prime Minister Sato did not respond to this, but in turn hinted at the possibility of Japan's assistance in the implementation of the project to build a pipeline from Irkutsk to Nakhodka.

Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai also supported Japan's "fair" demand for the return of the Northern Territories, and China continued to adhere to this line throughout the 1970s. Moscow was unable to prevent the normalization of relations between Japan and China in October 1972, but Soviet diplomats saw that Japan was unwilling to move further on this issue. Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi, during his visit to Moscow in October 1973, made it clear that Japan and China were not secret negotiations, and their relations do not affect the ties between the USSR and China.

The apogee of "détente" in relations between the USSR and Japan came when General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Prime Minister Tanaka confirmed that "after the end of the war, unresolved issues remained." According to Kapitsa, they agreed to continue working in order to conclude a Peace Treaty in 1974. However, nothing came of this, and subsequently misunderstandings even intensified: Tanaka insisted that the "unresolved problem" covered four islands, while Brezhnev and his entourage were of the opposite opinion. .

In 1974, Tanaka was forced to resign due to the Lockheed scandal and was replaced by Miki Takeo. As a dissident from the LDP, Miki also sought to find a solution to the PST, but his government proved to be weak and divided. In December 1976, Fukuda Takeo became the new prime minister.

New Deal Fukuda was called "multilateral", which meant the lack of focus on clearly defined forces. He sought to use economic leverage to achieve foreign policy goals. China and ASEAN, as well as the USSR, were the "natural targets" of his efforts. Despite the expansion of economic cooperation, political relations stagnated. By 1978, Sino-Soviet relations were so tainted that China insisted on including in its treaty with Japan an anti-hegemony clause (which was directed against the Soviet Union). The USSR, in turn, instead of the Peace Treaty proposed to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

Japan tended to sign a treaty with a dynamic and reformist China, rather than with a gerontocratic and stagnating USSR. Japanese businessmen in more interested in the Chinese, not the Soviet market, and their economic success reduced the need for Soviet energy supplies. Thus, even such a small chance for a settlement was lost, and the cautious optimism of the early 1970s was replaced by pessimism by the end of the decade. Soviet invasion to Afghanistan in 1979 finally spoiled Soviet-Japanese relations.

Beginning in 1981, Japan began to celebrate February 7 (the day the Shimoda Treaty of 1855 was signed) as "Northern Territories Day", reminding the Japanese of the Russian occupation. This further pushed the issue further.

Perestroika and the end of the USSR

Perestroika of 1985-1991 gave a new chance to improve Soviet-Japanese relations. Its initiator, Mikhail Gorbachev, was more popular with the Japanese than with his own compatriots. Mutual perception has changed radically. Relations with the Soviet Union began to be widely and openly discussed in Japan. However, both parties failed to agree on the settlement of the "unresolved issue" [Panov 1992].

Until the 1980s, Soviet leaders viewed the territorial issue as part of a separate geopolitical game that only the General Secretary and his advisers could play. During the Cold War, the "territorial question" could be resolved relatively easily, subject to a decision by the Secretary-General, since domestic political resistance was unlikely. However, by 1991 it began to seem that even the most popular and powerful leader of the country was unable to resolve this issue. On the one hand, perestroika provided an unprecedented opportunity, but, on the other hand, it limited the possibilities of its implementation.

At the first stage, in 1985-1988, the beginning of perestroika had a strong impact on Japanese-Soviet relations, but this was followed by silence on both sides. At the second stage, in 1989-1991, both sides had high hopes for the upcoming first official visit of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to Japan, but in fact it was too late for Gorbachev to get involved in the solution of this issue.

The period of "stagnation" in Soviet-Japanese relations left a heavy legacy for both states. After Tanaka's visit in 1973, for almost twenty-five years not a single leading Japanese leader who could make decisions visited Moscow. Only in 1998 did Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo come to Russia on an official visit. Between 1985 and 1991 the only chairman of the government of Japan who had at least some understanding and experience of contacts with the Soviet Union was Nakasone Yasuhiro.

Under Uno Sosuke, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Takeshita Noboru, a new concept of "extended equilibrium" was born in Gaimusho.

Japanese foreign ministers did not have much influence on the country's foreign policy due to their usually short tenure. All important decisions actually prepared and adopted by the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The influence of Abe Shintaro even increased after he left the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs and remained until his illness limited his opportunities.

The initial reaction to Gorbachev as the new Soviet leader was indifference. Prime Minister Nakasone himself, who in March 1985 came to the funeral of Gorbachev's predecessor K. Chernenko, was an exception. During the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR E. Shevardnadze to Tokyo in January 1986, some changes were outlined. During this period, Gorbachev made several significant adjustments to domestic and foreign policy and delivered his historic speech in Vladivostok in July 1986. Behind the scenes, Shevardnadze boldly suggested "going back to 1956", thereby acknowledging the existence of the territorial issue and the possibility of the return of Habomai and Shikotan . However, Gromyko criticized Shevardnadze's position, and Gorbachev did not support it either [Kovalenko 1996: 209].

In 1987, the gulf separating the two states became even wider. Gorbachev's planned visit to Japan was postponed, and even visits by the Soviet Foreign Minister became rare events. As a result, the Japanese Foreign Ministry has adopted a "wait and see" approach. Kazuhiko Togo, a former employee of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, in his recent work refers to the opposition of some forces that resisted the expansion of Japanese-Soviet relations [Togo 2007].

In 1989-1991 a new stage began in both countries. Despite the fact that on highest level relations reached an impasse, the initiative began to come from the scientific community, which was a new phenomenon in Soviet politics. In June-July 1988, a number of scholars came up with fresh ideas and views on bilateral relations. By 1990, their position became more encouraging, they formulated arithmetic theories from "two plus alpha" (G. Kunadze) to three (V. Zaitsev) and, ultimately, four islands (A. Zagorsky).

What is striking is the growth in the number of researchers in both countries who began to complement the leading role of foreign affairs agencies, although they could not replace it. Concepts and wording have also changed. By the end of 1989, both sides were moving towards achieving positive result. It was a delayed reaction to a radical shift in perception in the West and the fall of communist regimes in the states of Eastern Europe that marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War.

At the instigation of Shevardnadze, who in January 1989 proposed contacts at the party level to the LDP General Secretary Abe, Japan's ruling party, represented by the LDP, entered the game. new policy Abe began to downgrade the role of the "territorial issue" and expand the scale of Soviet-Japanese relations. During his conversation with Gorbachev in January 1990, Abe did not even mention the word "territorial question" and offered to solve "problems that cause headaches with wisdom", which received appreciated from Gorbachev.

Such diversity actors in Japanese politics coincided with the emergence of new political figures in the Soviet Union. B. Yeltsin, who headed the radical opposition in the Supreme Soviet, visited Japan in January 1990 and proposed a "five-stage solution." Although this was perceived as a tactical maneuver, in fact it became a manifesto of new political forces, which quickly gained strength and by the beginning of 1991 began to pose a real threat to Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership.

Despite Abe's unexpected death, his successor Ozawa Ichiro inherited his approach to dealing with the Soviet Union. In April 1990, his mentor, Kanemaru Shin, dared to talk about the return of only two islands. Ozawa linked the territorial issue to other points such as economic cooperation. His idea was not naive, as critics later characterized it, who called it "an economic way to buy islands" [Gorbachev 1995: 264; Kozyrev 1995: 295]. In general, this plan consisted of "economic cooperation with Japan in response to the political initiatives of the Soviet side." This approach was directly reflected in Academician Shatalin's "500 Days" program of economic reforms, published in the summer of 1990. By the mid-1990s, both sides began to express cautious optimism.

Meanwhile, the Cold War in Asia began to fade. This was evidenced not only by the thaw in relations between Beijing and Moscow, but even to a greater extent by the USSR's recognition of South Korea after the Seoul Olympics in 1988, which helped to significantly ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea was dissatisfied with the normalization of relations between South Korea and the USSR. At the same time, Kim Yong Nam, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, in response to Shevardnadze's desire to recognize South Korea, hinted at the DPRK's possible support for Japan in its attempt to regain the "Northern Territories" [Shimotomai 2004: 160].

By the autumn of 1990, however, the political climate in Moscow had changed again. Gorbachev lost his influence. The era of the CPSU was over, and the presidential system that replaced it did not function properly. A similar trend was observed in foreign policy. By the 1990s, the once powerful and monolithic Politburo was replaced by amorphous structures [Ligachev 1992: 4; Klyutikov 1996]. Their interaction and modus operandi varied from case to case and were poorly coordinated. former minister Foreign Affairs Kozyrev in his memoirs emphasized this phenomenon in connection with the "Japanese problem" in 1990-1993.

As the "sovereign republics" declared their independence, the collapse of the USSR became more and more possible, and Gorbachev's relationship with Yeltsin became more and more complicated. Gorbachev had to contend with two opposition forces: the growing "Soviet bureaucratic" opposition from his own circle and the "republican democratic" opposition. Although Gorbachev called his policies "centrist", by February 1991 he was in direct conflict with Yeltsin's radical approach. Reactionary-conservative sentiments intensified in Gorbachev's team. Experts on Russian foreign policy such as Kozyrev and Kunadze openly opposed Gorbachev's initiatives towards Japan.

The most characteristic example of an increase in the number of actors with a Japanese side is Ozawa's visit to Moscow in March 1991. During the trip, Ozawa directly offered an "impressive economic aid in exchange for the islands", which caused downright opposite effect.

Official visit Gorbachev to Japan in April was important, but less significant than expected. Gorbachev really turned to the history of states; he handed over lists of Japanese prisoners of war and other prisoners who died in Siberia, and also promised to introduce a visa-free regime for visiting the Northern Territories of their former residents. The parties agreed to continue negotiations on a peace treaty using the "positive elements of previous agreements", and also openly discussed the applicability of the 1956 Declaration and the relationship between the Kuriles and the "four islands". This was the state of affairs until, after a failed coup attempt in August 1991, the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in December 1991 unilaterally announced the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Cold War in Asia

Introduction Introduction The Vietnam War is one of the largest military conflicts of the second half of the 20th century, which left a noticeable mark on culture and occupies a significant place in the recent history of the United States and Vietnam. The war began as a civil war in South Vietnam; later, North Vietnam and the United States intervened with the support of a number of other countries. Thus, on the one hand, the war was fought for the reunification of the two parts of Vietnam and the creation united state with communist ideology, and on the other hand, for maintaining the split of the country and the independence of South Vietnam. As events unfolded, the Vietnam War became intertwined with the parallel civil wars in Laos and Cambodia. All fighting in Southeast Asia from the late 1950s to 1975 is known as the Second Indochina War. The Vietnam War is one of the largest military conflicts of the second half of the 20th century, which left a noticeable mark on culture and occupies a significant place in the recent history of the United States and Vietnam. The war began as a civil war in South Vietnam; later, North Vietnam and the United States intervened with the support of a number of other countries. Thus, on the one hand, the war was fought for the reunification of the two parts of Vietnam and the creation of a single state with communist ideology, and on the other hand, for maintaining the split of the country and the independence of South Vietnam. As events unfolded, the Vietnam War became intertwined with the parallel civil wars in Laos and Cambodia. All fighting in Southeast Asia from the late 1950s to 1975 is known as the Second Indochina War.

The division of Vietnam and the beginning of the war According to the Geneva Accords, the territory of Vietnam was temporarily divided along the 17th parallel into two parts that are not sovereign states. North Vietnam came under the control of the Viet Minh and became the territory of the DRV. South Vietnam remained under the authority of the local administration appointed by the French, and even before the agreements, France managed to formally grant independence to Vietnam. Here, the pro-French emperor Bao Dai was in power. The reunification of the country was supposed to be carried out after the general free elections, which were to take place no later than mid-1956. According to the Geneva Accords, the territory of Vietnam was temporarily divided along the 17th parallel into two parts that are not sovereign states. North Vietnam came under the control of the Viet Minh and became the territory of the DRV. South Vietnam remained under the authority of the local administration appointed by the French, and even before the agreements, France managed to formally grant independence to Vietnam. Here, the pro-French emperor Bao Dai was in power. The reunification of the country was supposed to be carried out after general free elections, which were to be held no later than mid-1956. After the Geneva Accords, the US set out to replace France as a counterweight to communist forces in Vietnam. The American administration made a bet on Ngo Dinh Diem, a US supporter.

In October 1955, Diem ousted Emperor Bao Dai from power in a rigged election, after which he proclaimed the creation of a sovereign Republic of Vietnam, in violation of the Geneva Accords. The elections were thwarted, and the prospect of Vietnamese reunification was pushed back indefinite term. The Diem regime very soon began to acquire the features of a dictatorship. Opposition to the Diem regime was suppressed using the pro-government media and the police. Diem began repressions against the communist underground that remained in the country after 1954, although it was weak and did not pose a real threat to him. The repression was effective; faced with the threat of the complete liquidation of their movement, the South Vietnamese communists decided to start an armed struggle. Since the autumn of 1957, a low-intensity guerrilla war has been going on in South Vietnam.

The final stage of the war (yy) After the signing of the armistice agreement, the South Vietnamese troops, richly supplied with military equipment from the United States, numbered more than a million people, military establishment North Vietnam stationed on the territory of the South, numbered more than two hundred thousand soldiers. The ceasefire agreements on the territory of South Vietnam were not implemented. Both the communists and government troops divided the territory under their control during the fighting. The economic crisis in South Vietnam in 1974 contributed to the decline in the fighting qualities of government troops. Everything large quantity the territories of South Vietnam fell under the rule of the communists, the government troops of South Vietnam suffered losses. The successful operations of the communists at the end of 1974 showed the low combat capability of the armed forces of South Vietnam. During the offensive operation carried out in March-April 1975, the communists defeated most South Vietnamese units. At 11:30 am on April 30, 1975, the Communists raised their banner over the Independence Palace in Saigon. The war ended.

Losses of the sides Vietnam War casualties Vietnam war casualties USA: 58,000 dead (including 47,000 combat losses); 303 thousand wounded; 1800 missing (as of mid-2007). USA: 58 thousand dead (including 47 thousand combat losses); 303 thousand wounded; 1800 missing (as of mid-2007). South Vietnam: data vary; the loss of military personnel is approximately 250 thousand dead and 1 million wounded, the loss of civilians is unknown. South Vietnam: data vary; the loss of military personnel is approximately 250 thousand dead and 1 million wounded, the loss of civilians is unknown. According to official Vietnamese government figures released in 1995, a total of 1.1 million North Vietnamese army soldiers and NLF guerrillas died during the war, as well as 4 million civilians in both parts of the country. According to official Vietnamese government figures released in 1995, a total of 1.1 million North Vietnamese army soldiers and NLF guerrillas died during the war, as well as 4 million civilians in both parts of the country.

As you remember, the site decided to start a series of articles that we devoted to fairly deep and serious topics. Last time we considered the question of why the USSR collapsed, this time we want to consider a no less serious, and from a historical and analytical point of view, a very interesting episode called the Cold War. Many representatives of the younger generation have heard about this, and someone even witnessed these events and remembers all the tense moments of this conflict. Now many people use this concept as a common noun, in the situation " bad world”, but, nevertheless, today, in the political aspect, the Cold War is again relevant, but this is a topic for a separate article. Today we will briefly consider the Cold War of the period of relations between the USSR and the USA.

What is a cold war

The Cold War is a period of time when there was a confrontation between the two superpowers, and as you understand it was between the USSR and the USA. This concept was used because both countries were not engaged in a gun war. And in all other, mostly peaceful ways. It seems that diplomatic relations were maintained between the countries, and sometimes the peaks of confrontation subsided, meanwhile, a quiet struggle was constantly waged, in all spheres and directions.

The years of the Cold War are considered from 1946 to 1991. The beginning of the Cold War fell on the end of World War II, and the end - on the collapse of the USSR. The essence of the Cold War was to establish world domination one of the countries and defeat the other.

Causes of the Cold War

After the end of the Second World War, when both superpowers considered themselves victorious in this war, they wanted to build the world conjuncture at their own discretion. Each of them wanted to dominate the world, while one and the other countries had diametrically opposed systems state government and ideology. Subsequently, such a confrontation will become part of the ideology of the two countries, in the Soviet Union they wanted to destroy America and establish communism throughout the world, and the United States wanted to "save" the world from the USSR.

If we analyze everything that happened, then we can say with confidence that this is an artificial conflict, since any ideology must have its enemy, and both the USA for the USSR and the USSR for America were ideal options as an enemy. Moreover, the Soviet people hated the mythical enemies of the Americans, although the inhabitants of America themselves were normally perceived, exactly like the Americans - they were afraid of the mythical "Russians" who do not sleep, but think how to conquer and attack America, although they had nothing against the inhabitants of the union themselves . Therefore, it is safe to say that the Cold War is a conflict of leaders and ideologies, inflated because of their own ambitions.

Cold War politics

First of all, both countries tried to enlist the support of other countries in their course. The United States supported all the countries of Western Europe, when the USSR supported the countries of Asia and Latin America. In fact, during the Cold War, the world was divided into two confrontational camps. And neutral countries there were units.

Most of all, the aggravation of the political situation was caused by the conflicts of the Cold War, in particular, we will single out only two of them: the Berlin and Caribbean crises. It was they who became the catalyst for the deterioration of the situation, and the world was actually on the verge of a nuclear war, which, fortunately, was prevented and defuse the situation.

The constant race, and in everything, was also part of the Cold War. First of all, there was an arms race, both countries developed different kinds weapons: new military equipment, weapons (mostly mass destruction), missiles, spy equipment, etc. There was also a propaganda race on television and in other sources, fierce propaganda against the enemy was constantly carried out. The race was not only in the military sphere, but also in science, culture and sports. Each country sought to overtake the other.

Both countries constantly watched each other, and spies and intelligence agents were present on both sides.

But, probably, to a greater extent, the Cold War took place on foreign territory. When the situation accumulated, both countries installed long-range missiles in countries neighboring the enemy, for the USA it was Turkey and the countries of Western Europe, while for the USSR it was the countries of Latin America.

Results of the Cold War

Many often wonder who won the Cold War? Probably. America won the Cold War because it ended this war the fall of its enemy, and the main reason for the end of the Cold War is the collapse of the USSR, not the fact that it was not the work of American intelligence services.

If we talk about the results, then none of the countries (USA and Russia) made any useful lessons, except for those that the enemy does not sleep and is always ready.

If there had been no Cold War, then all the enormous potential of the two countries could have been used in peaceful purposes: space exploration, new technologies, etc. It is possible that mobile phones, the Internet, etc. would have appeared 20 years earlier, scientists, instead of developing weapons, would have been solving various world mysteries, of which there are a huge number.

We do not want a single inch of foreign land. But we will not give our land, not a single inch of our land, to anyone.

Joseph Stalin

The Cold War is a state of contradiction between the two dominant world systems: capitalism and socialism. Socialism represented the USSR, and capitalism, in a major way, the USA and Great Britain. Today it is popular to say that the Cold War is a confrontation between the USSR and the USA, but at the same time they forget to say that the speech of the British Prime Minister Churchill led to the formal declaration of war.

Causes of the war

In 1945, contradictions began to appear between the USSR and other participants anti-Hitler coalition. It was clear that Germany had lost the war, and now the main question is the post-war structure of the world. Here, everyone tried to pull the blanket in his direction, to take a leading position relative to other countries. The main contradictions were in European countries: Stalin wanted to subordinate them to the Soviet system, and the capitalists sought to prevent soviet state to Europe.

The causes of the Cold War are as follows:

• Social. Rallying the country in the face of a new enemy.
• Economic. The struggle for markets and resources. The desire to weaken the economic power of the enemy.
• Military. An arms race in the event of a new open war.
• Ideological. The society of the enemy is presented exclusively in a negative connotation. The struggle of two ideologies.

The active stage of the confrontation between the two systems begins with the atomic bombing of the United States Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If we consider this bombing in isolation, then it is illogical - the war is won, Japan is not a competitor. Why bomb cities, and even with such weapons? But if we consider the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, then in the bombing appears the goal is to show the potential enemy their strength, and to show who should be the leader in the world. And the factor of nuclear weapons was very important in the future. After all, the atomic bomb appeared in the USSR only in 1949 ...

The beginning of the war

If we briefly consider the Cold War, then its beginning today is associated exclusively with Churchill's speech. Therefore, they say that the beginning of the Cold War is March 5, 1946.

Churchill's speech March 5, 1946

In fact, Truman (President of the United States) said more specific speech from which it became clear to everyone that the cold war had begun. And Churchill's speech (it is not difficult to find and read it on the Internet today) was superficial. It talked a lot about the Iron Curtain, but not a word about the Cold War.

Stalin's interview of February 10, 1946

On February 10, 1946, the Pravda newspaper published an interview with Stalin. Today this newspaper is very hard to find, but this interview was very interesting. In it, Stalin said the following: “Capitalism always breeds crises and conflicts. This always creates the threat of war, which is a threat to the USSR. Therefore, we must rapidly restore Soviet economy. We must prioritize heavy industry over consumer goods.”

This speech of Stalin turned over and it was on it that all Western leaders relied, talking about the desire of the USSR to start a war. But, as you can see, in this speech of Stalin there was not even a hint of the militaristic expansion of the Soviet state.

The real start of the war

To say that the beginning of the Cold War is connected with Churchill's speech is a bit illogical. The fact is that at the time of 1946 it was just the former Prime Minister of Great Britain. It turns out a kind of theater of the absurd - the war between the USSR and the USA is officially started by the former Prime Minister of England. In reality, everything was different, and Churchill's speech was just a convenient pretext, on which it was later profitable to write everything off.

The real beginning of the Cold War should be attributed to at least 1944, when it was already clear that Germany was doomed to defeat, and all the allies pulled the blanket over themselves, realizing that it was very important to gain dominance over the post-war world. If you try to draw a more accurate line for the start of the war, then the first serious disagreements on the topic of “how to live on” between the allies happened at the Tehran conference.

The specifics of the war

For correct understanding processes that took place during the Cold War, you need to understand what this war was in history. Today, more and more often they say that it was actually the third world war. And this is a huge mistake. The fact is that all the wars of mankind that were before, including the Napoleonic wars and World Wars 2, these were the warriors of the capitalist world for the rights dominated in a certain region. The Cold War was the first global war where there was a confrontation between two systems: capitalist and socialist. Here it may be objected to me that in the history of mankind there were wars, where at the forefront was not capital, but religion: Christianity against Islam and Islam against Christianity. In part, this objection is true, but only from happiness. The point is that any religious conflicts cover only part of the population and part of the world, while the global cold war has engulfed the whole world. All countries of the world could be clearly divided into 2 main groups:

1. Socialist. They recognized the dominance of the USSR and received funding from Moscow.
2. Capitalist. Recognized US dominance and received funding from Washington.

There were also "indefinite". There were few such countries, but they were. Their main specificity was that outwardly they could not decide which camp to join, therefore they received funding from two sources: both from Moscow and from Washington.

Who started the war

One of the problems of the Cold War is the question of who started it. Indeed, there is no army here that crosses the border of another state, and thereby declares war. Today you can blame everything on the USSR and say that it was Stalin who started the war. But this hypothesis is in trouble with the evidence base. I will not help our "partners" and look for what motives the USSR could have for the war, but I will give the facts why Stalin did not need the aggravation of relations (at least not directly in 1946):

• Nuclear weapon. In the United States it appeared in 1945, and in the USSR in 1949. You can imagine that the overly prudent Stalin wanted to aggravate relations with the United States when the enemy has a trump card up his sleeve - nuclear weapons. At the same time, let me remind you, there was also a plan for the atomic bombing largest cities THE USSR.
• Economy. The United States and Great Britain, by and large, made money on the Second World War, so they had no economic problems. The USSR is another matter. The country needed to restore the economy. By the way, the USA had 50% of the world GDP in 1945.

The facts show that in 1944-1946 the USSR was not ready to start a war. And Churchill's speech, which formally started the Cold War, was not delivered in Moscow, and not at its suggestion. But on the other hand, both opposing camps were extremely interested in such a war.

As early as September 4, 1945, Memorandum 329 was adopted in the United States, in which a plan was developed atomic bombings Moscow and Leningrad. In my opinion, this is the best proof of who wanted war and aggravation of relations.

Goals

Any war has goals, and it is surprising that our historians for the most part do not even try to define the goals of the Cold War. On the one hand, this is justified by the fact that the USSR had only one goal - the expansion and strengthening of socialism by any means. But Western countries were more resourceful. They sought not only to spread their world influence, but also to inflict spiritual blows on the USSR. And it continues to this day. The following goals of the United States in the war in terms of historical and psychological impact can be distinguished:

1. Make a substitution of concepts at the historical level. Note that under the influence of these ideas today everyone historical figures Russia, who bowed before Western countries, presented by ideal rulers. At the same time, everyone who advocated the rise of Russia is presented by tyrants, despots and fanatics.
2. The development of an inferiority complex among Soviet people. They tried to prove to us all the time that we are somehow not like that, that we are guilty of all the problems of mankind, and so on. Largely because of this, people so easily perceived the collapse of the USSR and the problems of the 90s - it was a "retribution" for our inferiority, but in fact the enemy simply achieved the goal in the war.
3. Blackening of history. This stage continues to this day. If you study western materials, then there our whole history (literally all) is presented as one continuous violence.

There are, of course, pages of history with which our country can be reproached, but most of the stories are sucked out of thin air. Moreover, liberals and Western historians for some reason forget that it was not Russia that colonized the whole world, it was not Russia that destroyed the indigenous population of America, it was not Russia that shot Indians with cannons, tying 20 people in a row to save cannonballs, it was not Russia that exploited Africa. There are thousands of such examples, because every country in history has hard-hitting stories. Therefore, if you really want to poke around in the bad events of our history, be kind enough not to forget that Western countries have no less such stories.

Stages of war

The stages of the Cold War are one of the most contentious issues, since it is very difficult to calibrate them. However, I can suggest dividing this war into 8 key phases:

• Preparatory (193-1945). Still walking World War and formally the “allies” acted as a united front, but there were already disagreements and everyone began to fight for post-war world domination.
• Beginning (1945-1949). The time of complete US hegemony, when the Americans manage to make the dollar a single world currency and strengthen the country's position in almost all regions except those in which the USSR army was located.
• Razgar (1949-1953). The key factors of 1949, which make it possible to single out this year as a key one: 1 - the creation of atomic weapons in the USSR, 2 - the economy of the USSR is reaching the indicators of 1940. After that, an active confrontation began, when the United States could no longer speak with the USSR from a position of strength.
• First détente (1953-1956). The key event was the death of Stalin, after which the beginning of a new course was announced - the policy of peaceful coexistence.
• A new round of crisis (1956-1970). Events in Hungary led to a new round of tension, which lasted almost 15 years, which also included the Caribbean crisis.
• Second détente (1971-1976). This stage of the Cold War, in short, is associated with the start of the work of the commission to relieve tensions in Europe, and with the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki.
• Third crisis (1977-1985). A new round, when the cold war between the USSR and the USA reached its climax. Main point confrontation - Afghanistan. In terms of military development, the countries staged a "wild" arms race.
• End of the war (1985-1988). The end of the Cold War falls on 1988, when it became clear that the “new political thinking” in the USSR was ending the war and so far only de facto recognized the American victory.

These are the main stages of the Cold War. As a result, socialism and communism lost out to capitalism, since the moral and psychic influence of the United States, which was openly directed at the leadership of the CPSU, achieved its goal: the leadership of the party began to put their personal interests and benefits above socialist foundations.

Forms

The confrontation between the two ideologies began in 1945. Gradually, this confrontation embraced all spheres of public life.

Military confrontation

The main thing military confrontation The Cold War era is a struggle between two blocs. On April 4, 1949, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was created. NATO included the USA, Canada, England, France, Italy and a number of small countries. In response, on May 14, 1955, the OVD (Warsaw Pact Organization) was created. Thus, there was a clear confrontation between the two systems. But again, it should be noted that the first step was taken by the Western countries, which organized NATO 6 years earlier than the Warsaw Pact appeared.

The main confrontation, about which we have already partially spoken, is atomic weapons. In 1945, this weapon appeared in the United States. Moreover, in America they developed a plan to strike with nuclear weapons at 20 major cities USSR, using 192 bombs. This forced the USSR to do even the impossible to create its own atomic bomb, the first successful trials which took place in August 1949. In the future, all this resulted in an arms race on a huge scale.

Economic confrontation

In 1947, the United States developed the Marshall Plan. Under this plan, the United States provided financial assistance to all countries affected by the war. But there was one limitation in this plan - only those countries that shared the political interests and goals of the United States received assistance. In response to this, the USSR begins to provide assistance in post-war reconstruction to countries that have chosen the path of socialism. Based on these approaches, 2 economic blocks were created:

• Western European Union (ZEV) in 1948.
• Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in January 1949. In addition to the USSR, the organization included: Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria.

Despite the formation of alliances, the essence has not changed: ZEV helped with US money, and CMEA helped with USSR money. The rest of the countries only consumed.

In the economic confrontation with the United States, Stalin took two steps that had an extremely negative impact on the American economy: on March 1, 1950, the USSR moved from calculating the ruble in dollars (as it was around the world) to gold backing, and in April 1952, the USSR, China and Eastern European countries are creating an alternative trade zone to the dollar. This trading zone did not use the dollar at all, which means that the capitalist world, which previously owned 100% of the world market, lost at least 1/3 of this market. All this took place against the backdrop of economic miracle THE USSR". Western experts said that the USSR would be able to reach the level of 1940 after the war only by 1971, but in reality this happened as early as 1949.

Crises

Crises of the Cold War

Event	the date
	1948
Vietnam War	1946-1954
	1950-1953
	1946-1949
	1948-1949
	1956
	Mid 50s - mid 60s
	Mid 60s
War in Afghanistan

These are the main crises of the Cold War, but there were others, less significant. Next, we will briefly consider what the essence of these crises was, and what consequences they led to in the world.

Military conflicts

Many people in our country do not take the Cold War seriously. We have an understanding in our minds that war is “drawn swords”, weapons in hand and in the trenches. But the Cold War was different, although even it was not without regional conflicts, some of which were extremely difficult. The main conflicts of those times:

• The split of Germany. Formation of Germany and the GDR.
• Vietnam War (1946-1954). It led to the division of the country.
• War in Korea (1950-1953). It led to the division of the country.

Berlin Crisis of 1948

For a correct understanding of the essence of the Berlin crisis of 1948, one should study the map.

Germany was divided into 2 parts: western and eastern. Berlin was also in the zone of influence, but the city itself was deep in eastern lands, that is, in the territory controlled by the USSR. In an effort to put pressure on West Berlin, the Soviet leadership organized its blockade. It was a response to the recognition of Taiwan and its admission to the UN.

England and France organized an air corridor, supplying residents West Berlin everything necessary. Therefore, the blockade failed and the crisis itself began to slow down. Realizing that the blockade leads to nothing, the Soviet leadership removes it, normalizing life in Berlin.

The continuation of the crisis was the creation of two states in Germany. In 1949 western lands were converted to Federal Republic Germany (FRG). In response, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was created in the eastern lands. It is these events that should be considered the final split of Europe into 2 opposing camps - West and East.

Revolution in China

In 1946, a civil war broke out in China. The Communist bloc staged an armed coup seeking to overthrow the government of Chiang Kai-shek from the Kuomintang Party. The civil war and revolution became possible thanks to the events of 1945. After the victory over Japan, a base was created here for the rise of communism. Starting in 1946, the USSR began supplying weapons, food and everything necessary to support the Chinese communists who were fighting for the country.

The revolution ended in 1949 with the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), where all power was in the hands of the Communist Party. As for the Chiang Kai-shek, they fled to Taiwan and formed their own state, which was very quickly recognized in the West, and even admitted to the UN. In response, the USSR leaves the UN. This is an important point because it has big influence to another Asian conflict, the Korean War.

Formation of the State of Israel

From the first meetings of the UN, one of the main issues was the fate of the state of Palestine. At that time, Palestine was actually a British colony. The division of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state was an attempt by the US and the USSR to strike at Great Britain and its positions in Asia. Stalin approved of the idea of ​​creating the state of Israel, because he believed in the power of the "leftist" Jews, and expected to gain control over this country, gaining a foothold in the Middle East.

The Palestinian problem was resolved in November 1947 at the UN Assembly, where the position of the USSR played a key role. Therefore, we can say that Stalin played a key role in the creation of the state of Israel.

The UN Assembly decided to create 2 states: Jewish (Israel" Arab (Palestine). In May 1948, Israel's independence was declared and immediately the Arab countries declared war on this state. The Middle East crisis began. Great Britain supported Palestine, the USSR and the USA supported Israel. In In 1949, Israel won the war and immediately a conflict arose between the Jewish state and the USSR, as a result of which Stalin severed diplomatic relations with Israel.The US won the battle in the Middle East.

Korean War

The Korean War is an undeservedly forgotten event that is little studied today, which is a mistake. After all, the Korean War is the third in the history of human casualties. During the war years, 14 million people died! More casualties in only two world wars. The large number of casualties is due to the fact that this was the first major armed conflict in the Cold War.

After the victory over Japan in 1945, the USSR and the USA divided Korea ( former colony Japan) on zones of influence: reconciled Korea - under the influence of the USSR, South Korea- under the influence of the United States. In 1948, 2 states were officially formed:

• Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Zone of influence of the USSR. The leader is Kim Il Sung.
• The Republic of Korea. US zone of influence. The leader is Lee Seung Mann.

With the support of the USSR and China, on June 25, 1950, Kim Il Sung starts a war. In fact, it was a war for the unification of Korea, which the DPRK planned to end quickly. Factor quick victory was important, because this was the only way to prevent the United States from intervening in the conflict. The beginning was promising, the UN troops, which were 90% American, came to the aid of the Republic of Korea. After that, the DPRK army retreated and was close to collapse. The situation was saved by Chinese volunteers who intervened in the war and restored the balance of power. After that, local battles began and the border between North and South Korea was established along the 38th parallel.

First détente of the war

The first détente in the Cold War occurred in 1953 after the death of Stalin. An active dialogue began between the opposing countries. Already on July 15, 1953, the new government of the USSR, headed by Khrushchev, announced its desire to build new relations with Western countries, based on a policy of peaceful coexistence. Similar statements were made from the opposite side.

A major factor in stabilizing the situation was the end of the Korean War and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel. Wishing to demonstrate to the Western countries the desire for peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev brought Soviet troops from Austria, having obtained a promise from the Austrian side to maintain neutrality. Naturally, there was no neutrality, just as there were no concessions and gestures from the United States.

Detente lasted from 1953 to 1956. At this time, the USSR established relations with Yugoslavia, India, began to develop relations with African and Asian countries, which had only recently freed themselves from colonial dependence.

A new round of tension

Hungary

At the end of 1956, an uprising began in Hungary. locals, realizing that the position of the USSR after the death of Stalin became noticeably worse, raised an uprising against the current regime in the country. As a result, the cold war came to its critical point. For the USSR there were 2 ways:

1. Recognize the revolution's right to self-determination. This step would give all the other countries dependent on the USSR the understanding that at any moment they could leave socialism.
2. Suppress the rebellion. This approach was contrary to the principles of socialism, but only in this way it was possible to maintain a leading position in the world.

The 2nd option was chosen. The army crushed the rebellion. For suppression in places it was necessary to use weapons. As a result, the revolution was won, it became clear that the "detente" was over.

Caribbean crisis

Cuba - small state near the United States, but it almost brought the world to a nuclear war. At the end of the 50s, a revolution took place in Cuba and Fidel Castro seized power, who declared his desire to build socialism on the island. For America, this was a challenge - a state appeared near their border, which acts as a geopolitical enemy. As a result, the United States planned to resolve the situation by military means, but were defeated.

The Krabi Crisis began in 1961, after the USSR secretly delivered missiles to Cuba. This soon became known, and the US President demanded to withdraw the missiles. The parties escalated the conflict until it became clear that the world was on the verge of a nuclear war. As a result, the USSR agreed to withdraw its missiles from Cuba, and the United States agreed to withdraw its missiles from Turkey.

"Prague Vienna"

In the mid-1960s, new tensions arose, this time in Czechoslovakia. The situation here strongly resembled the one that was earlier in Hungary: democratic tendencies began in the country. Basically, young people opposed the current government, and the movement was headed by A. Dubcek.

A situation arose, as in Hungary - to allow for a democratic revolution, meant to give an example to other countries that the socialist system could be overthrown at any moment. Therefore, the Warsaw Pact countries sent their troops to Czechoslovakia. The rebellion was suppressed, but the suppression caused outrage throughout the world. But it was a cold war, and, of course, any active actions of one side were actively criticized by the other side.

Detente in the war

The peak of the Cold War came in the 1950s and 1960s, when the aggravation of relations between the Soviet Socialist Republic and the United States was so great that a war could break out at any moment. Beginning in the 1970s, the war was detente and the subsequent defeat of the USSR. But in this case, I want to focus briefly on the United States. What happened in this country before "détente"? In fact, the country ceased to be popular and came under the control of the capitalists, under which it is to this day. One can say even more - the USSR won the Cold War from the USA in the late 60s, and the USA, as the state of the American people, ceased to exist. Capitalists seized power. The apogee of these events is the assassination of President Kennedy. But after the United States became a country representing the capitalists and oligarchs, they already won the USSR in the Cold War.

But let us return to the Cold War and détente in it. These signs were indicated in 1971 when the USSR, the USA, Britain and France signed agreements on the start of the work of a commission to solve the Berlin problem, as a point of constant tension in Europe.

final act

In 1975, the most significant event of the détente era of the Cold War took place. In that year, a pan-European meeting on security was held, in which all the countries of Europe took part (of course, including the Soviet Socialist Republic, as well as the USA and Canada). The meeting was held in Helsinki (Finland), so it went down in history as the Helsinki Final Act.

As a result of the congress, an Act was signed, but before that there were difficult negotiations, primarily on 2 points:

• Freedom of the media in the USSR.
• Freedom to leave "from" and "to" the USSR.

The commission from the USSR agreed to both points, but in a special formulation that did little to oblige the country itself. The final signing of the Act was the first symbol that the West and the East can agree among themselves.

New aggravation of relations

In the late 70s and early 80s, a new round of the Cold War began, when relations between the USSR and the USA heated up. There were 2 reasons for this:

The United States in the countries of Western Europe placed medium-range missiles that were capable of reaching the territory of the USSR.

The beginning of the war in Afghanistan.

As a result, the Cold War came to new level and the enemy engaged in their usual business - an arms race. It hit the budgets of both countries very painfully and ultimately led the United States to a terrible economic crisis in 1987, and the USSR to defeat in the war and subsequent collapse.

Historical meaning

Surprisingly, in our country the Cold War is not taken seriously. The best fact that demonstrates the attitude to this historical event here and in the west, this is the spelling of the name. In our country, the "Cold War" is written in quotation marks in all textbooks and with capital letter, in the west - without quotes and with a small one. This is the difference in attitude.

It really was a war. Just in the understanding of people who have just defeated Germany, war is weapons, shots, attack, defense, and so on. But the world has changed, and in the Cold War contradictions and ways to resolve them have come to the fore. Of course, this resulted in real armed clashes.

In any case, the outcome of the Cold War is important, because the USSR ceased to exist as a result of it. This ended the war itself, and Gorbachev received a medal in the United States "for victory in the cold war."

Recently US Secretary of State John Kerry paid a visit to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. The US press noted that the main purpose of Kerry's trip was to strengthen relations with the five named states. The means of strengthening is economic partnership. However, Western analysts representing the so-called alternative press believe that Washington is developing a confrontation with Russia in the region.

Recall that John Kerry's visit to Central Asia ended two weeks ago. The US Secretary of State visited five states: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. This visit was literally historic. The coverage is impressive: five countries in a row. It was a frank demonstration of the buildup of American influence in the region. And the demonstration was addressed, of course, to Moscow.

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AT American media wrote that the main purpose of D. Kerry's visit was to strengthen relations with the states of Central Asia through economic partnership. As for Russia, our analysts treated the reports of the American press with distrust. What is this "partnership"? Especially with Turkmenistan, where not only there is no democracy, but there is even an example of its direct opposite! However, these analysts may look to the side Saudi Arabia or Qatar, where from time to time they cut off the heads of pederasts and where there is no (and is not planned) democracy either. The United States is quite successfully cooperating with these monarchies, and even the petrodollar was jointly invented.

One of the strongest states in the region, Kazakhstan (a member of the EAEU, the SCO and the CSTO), cordially received the overseas envoy. “Recently in New York, I met with US President Barack Obama, we discussed issues of bilateral cooperation. From the first days of independence of our republic, which will turn 24 in December, we have been cooperating with your country, and the people of Kazakhstan are grateful for the constant support of our sovereignty and economic development. Today, about 500 companies with American capital are operating in our country. We are focused on continuing this work,” Tengrinews.kz quotes Nursultan Nazarbayev as saying to John Kerry.

Kazakhstan is one example. The biggest. Of course, the United States will carry out "bilateral cooperation" with other countries as well.

South Front analysts believe that the recent visit of US Secretary of State John Kerry to the countries Central Asia demonstrates the importance of the states of the region for Washington, including in the context of negative trends in US foreign policy in Afghanistan, where the local government, seated in chairs by White House specialists, is weakening, while the Taliban and its allies are strengthening.

Kerry and the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan at a meeting in Samarkand openly discussed areas of cooperation affecting a variety of areas: the economy, water security, education.

American analysts believe that this list of areas is rather formal. This is only a cover, but in reality there was also a discussion " additional questions' in 'individual countries'. It is easy to predict, the authors of the article write, that the purpose of Kerry's visit and American policy in general are issues related to Afghanistan and Russia.

Afghanistan and IS activities.

The borders between the states of Central Asia and Afghanistan are attracting the attention of politicians due to the increased activity of militants of all sorts and calibers. Here are the Taliban, who were trying to capture the city of Kunduz, and the ISIS, whose formations are beginning to densely concentrate there. IS militants generally consider this area a springboard for further expansion into Central Asia.

The threat is also growing in the south. Earlier, the number of IS militants increased on the borders of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

Along with this, analysts note "serious internal problems" of the countries of Central Asia.

All this is of great concern not only to the Central Asian states themselves, but also to the leadership of those countries that have influence in the region: first of all, Russia, the United States and China (the latter is conducting economic expansion here).

As for Russia, at the recent CSTO Collective Security Summit, it announced plans to create a joint border security initiative. Several states of Central Asia were invited to participate in the initiative. According to American analysts, additional Russian and Kazakh armed forces are already deployed in the region as part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (since June 2015). Chinese intelligence specialists are cooperating with them.

The general structure of the deployed unified armed forces in Tajikistan includes border protection units (troops of Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, as well as Russian and Kazakh military advisers) and separate military formations from Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus (the contribution of the latter is small), stationed on the territory 201st Russian military base, in the vicinity of Dushanbe, Kulyab and Kurgan-Tube. In addition, there are units of the CSTO and the regional anti-terrorist structure (RATS) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes Russian, Kazakh and Chinese intelligence forces.

However, not all countries support the efforts of the CSTO. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, for example, are discussing their own joint operations to fortify and protect their borders. These countries have previously preferred "to avoid close cooperation with the CSTO," analysts remind.

According to experts, the reason for such an attitude towards the CSTO is the ambitions of state leaders. Ashgabat and Tashkent are currently trying to establish a bilateral security partnership.

Of course, the United States paid attention to this.

Washington, like Moscow, is concerned about the growth of aggression in Afghanistan, and at the same time is interested in strengthening cooperation in the field of security with the states of Central Asia in order to challenge Moscow as the dominant power providing security in the region from a military point of view.

Analysts say Washington's motives in Central Asia are clear. However, the devil is in the details: the details of how the United States intends to "strengthen cooperation" in the field of security in the region are hidden in the "fog".

However, experts believe that something can be assumed.

Turkmenistan could grant the United States permanent use of the Mary 2 base (located near Turkmenistan's border with Afghanistan).

Another possible plan is US support for a joint Uzbek-Turkmen border security initiative.

Another "topic" could be an increase in the US presence in Tajikistan. Tajikistan is considered one of Russia's closest allies in Central Asia, and therefore Washington would like to increase its influence here.

Of course, so far none of these forms of cooperation has been fully confirmed. Nevertheless, analysts believe that the Kremlin may pay attention to these "attempts". "Division of efforts" will make holes in the regional security system of Russia. Recent Afghan events made clear that US military efforts are unlikely to enhance regional security. As a matter of fact, American forces it's just not enough.

Experts believe that only the combined forces of Russia and Kazakhstan will be able to “quickly and effectively” counter the threat of ISIS. The military of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do not have the appropriate military equipment; the armed forces of these countries are not able to act effectively. Well, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, as noted above, are trying to avoid participating in joint CSTO events.

Analysts, however, take it upon themselves to assert that, on the whole, Russia, China, Kazakhstan and other states of Central Asia assess the existing threats correctly.

However, the unstable situation on the borders of the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan leads to the fact that the confrontation between the United States and Russia is unfolding "across the entire former Soviet periphery."

You will not argue with this, we will add from ourselves. Otherwise, it would not have been a cold war, but an ardent friendship of peoples. So in Syria, there are also two coalitions against ISIS: one with the Russians, and the second - you know with whom.