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On November 19, 1942, Soviet troops launched Operation Uranus to encircle the Stalingrad group of the Wehrmacht. As a result, 300 thousand German troops ended up in the boiler. Despite desperate attempts Nazi troops break out of the encirclement, they failed to do so. The Germans capitulated, more than 90 thousand soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, including the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus. Near Stalingrad Nazi Germany suffered a crushing defeat. This battle changed the course of World War II. About how the Red Army managed to achieve strategic success - in the material RT.

• Captured Nazis on the streets of Stalingrad
• RIA News

“People just fell from the sky. They fell from above to the ground and again found themselves in the Stalingrad hell, ”said in an interview with the publication Der Spiegel 94-year-old Hans-Erdman Schönbeck, who was surrounded by the Red Army at the end of 1942. The former Wehrmacht soldier recalled how his colleagues tried to board a plane that was leaving the battlefield.

German soldiers and officers called the battle for Stalingrad hell on earth and red Verdun (meaning the unsuccessful offensive Kaiser troops on the French position in 1916 ). The Nazi soldiers, who did not know serious defeats, were amazed at the capabilities that the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) demonstrated.

Soviet troops defeated the invaders during the operation, codenamed "Uranus". Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky in his book "The Work of All Life" argued that code names all the strategic operations of the Red Army came up personally People's Commissar Defense Joseph Stalin.

The counteroffensive began on November 19, 1942 with successful attacks on the Romanian positions located on the flanks of the Stalingrad group. On November 23, 1942, the most combat-ready German units landed in the Red Army cauldron, and on February 2, 1943, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, commander of the 6th Army, capitulated.

• Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, commander of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht, captured by Soviet troops
• RIA News
• Georgy Lipskerov

"No step back!"

The Battle of Stalingrad began on July 17, 1942, after the Wehrmacht troops crossed the Chir River. The 6th Army of General Friedrich Paulus was supposed to cover the left flank of the Nazi troops operating in the North Caucasus from counterattacks. Capture of Stalingrad as important transport hub was designed to ensure the success of the Germans in the south of the USSR.

Having lost industrially rich Ukraine, in the summer of 1942 Soviet Union was in the most difficult position. July 28, 1942 Joseph Stalin signed famous order No. 227, which forbade even a forced retreat and received the name "Not a Step Back" among the people.

Initially, the Wehrmacht concentrated 14 divisions of about 270 thousand people from Army Group B in the Stalingrad direction. Subsequently, the grouping to capture Stalingrad was increased to 1 million.

In the second half of July, the Nazis were opposed by about 160,000 Soviet troops. The Red Army was inferior to the enemy troops in tanks, artillery and aircraft. As a result of the regrouping in November, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) increased the number of troops in the Stalingrad region to 800 thousand people.

Thus, before the start of Operation Uranus, the Red Army was unable to concentrate on the front, the length of which was up to 850 km, superior to the enemy strength. Moscow was still under the threat of a strike, and the Supreme High Command decided not to risk a massive transfer of troops from Central Russia.

• Joseph Stalin
• globallookpress.com

In the context of a shortage of human and material resources, non-standard actions were required to defeat the Wehrmacht near Stalingrad. According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, one of the main keys to the success of Uranus was the brilliantly conducted intelligence operations on disinformation of the Nazi command.

red herring

Back in March 1942, the Stavka was aware that Hitler had set his generals the task of occupying the southern part of the USSR, masking preparations for the next attack on Moscow. At the same time, the Soviet leadership was aware that the Wehrmacht had enough forces to launch an offensive against the capital in the event of a weakening of the positions of the Red Army in Central Russia.

Also on topic

On the eve of the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Russian Ministry of Defense declassified archival materials...

As General Sergei Shtemenko recalled, in the summer of 1942, "the Soviet command did not have the opportunity to ensure decisive action to defeat the advancing enemy grouping in a short time."

The reason for the lack of reserves, as the RF Ministry of Defense explains, was not only the need to defend Moscow, but also the frequent offensive operations initiated by Stalin.

The situation near Stalingrad largely saved Soviet intelligence. In 1942, the Abwehr (German military intelligence and counterintelligence agency) received a lot of disinformation information of an operational-strategic nature. The headquarters sought to hide from the Nazis the fact of the concentration of units of the Red Army in the Stalingrad region.

For this purpose, a diversionary operation called "Mars" was carried out. Soviet scouts should have convinced German generals that the Red Army under the command of Georgy Zhukov will launch a large-scale counteroffensive in the Rzhev region (200 km west of Moscow), and not near Stalingrad.

According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, if the disinformation measures had not achieved their goal, Operation Uranus could have ended in failure. The victory of the Nazis in the Battle of Stalingrad would have led to the entry into the war against the USSR of Turkey and Japan and the inevitable defeat of the Soviet Union.

Scouts and analysts of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces knew that the Germans were monitoring Zhukov's movements. His appearance on separate sections front was interpreted as a sign of the activation of the Red Army. The famous commander skillfully performed the role assigned to him, and this helped to confuse the Nazi command.

“Zhukov was appointed by Stalin to manage the Central Front in order to mislead the Germans about the real plans of the USSR,” Mikhail Myagkov, chairman of the scientific council of the Russian Military Historical Society (RVIO), explained in an interview with RT. “The Wehrmacht knew about the authority of Marshal Zhukov and, of course, had to assume that since such a strong commander was placed at the head of the Central Front, it means that the main forces of the Red Army would be located there.”

• Army General Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (left)
• RIA News
• Peter Bernstein

The operation near Rzhev under the leadership of Zhukov really began in the second half of November 1942. However, it was not as large-scale as the Abwehr expected, and pursued a strategic plan that was the same as Uranus.

The fact that the Headquarters managed to outwit the Germans is evidenced by the erroneous forecasts of the Wehrmacht commanders. In particular, the head of the department "Foreign armies of the East" of the General Staff ground forces In Germany, Reinhard Gehlen was sure that the Red Army would inflict the main blow on the 9th Army of the Center group, which was located just near Rzhev, in the fall.

“On the German Eastern Front, it is more and more convincingly confirmed that the point of application of the main efforts of the upcoming operation is in the sector of Army Group Center.<…>The preparation of the enemy for an offensive in the south is not being carried out so intensively to believe that a major operation in the south in the near future will begin simultaneously with the expected offensive against Army Group Center, ”Gelen reported on November 6, 1942.

The head of intelligence of the 9th Army, Colonel Georg Buntrok, reported in a report received by the headquarters of Army Group Center: "The enemy is preparing for a major offensive against the 9th Army, intending to strike from the eastern and western sides of the (Rzhevsky) trapezoid ..."

Buntrock believed that the Red Army was going to "surround the troops stationed in it (trapezoid), destroy the 9th Army, break through the front line, eliminate Army Group Center and consolidate the victory with a triumphant advance to Smolensk and taking it by storm."

Secret "Uranus"

In an interview with RT, Mikhail Myagkov noted that the Soviet command made maximum effort to keep Operation Uranus secret. According to the expert, the cost of the defeat of the Red Army at Stalingrad was too high. The Soviet army was supposed to deliver a powerful and completely unexpected blow.

“Radio silence was introduced, troop movements were carried out at night, documents on the start of the counteroffensive were written by hand, and not dictated to the machinists. It was also decided to make a distraction in the form of an offensive operation on the Central Front. The Wehrmacht was misinformed about the Red Army's offensive plans and did not expect a serious blow on the Southern Front, ”Myagkov said.

The expert believes that the Headquarters came to the right conclusion, deciding that it was near Stalingrad that a radical turning point in the war with Germany would be made. Success directly on the battlefields of the Red Army was ensured thanks to the improvement of the training system for military personnel. Environment German group carried out by trained and well-armed soldiers.

“The experience gained by the Soviet army during the two years of the war also played its role, and, importantly, the army learned to interact different kinds and types of troops,” Myagkov explained.

According to the expert, due to the fact that Soviet army for quite a long time held back the onslaught of the enemy, the rear was significantly strengthened, the production of weapons was established, and new formations were formed.

• Soviet soldiers storm a house in Stalingrad, February 1943
• RIA News
• George Zelma

“Sufficient forces were accumulated for a decisive counteroffensive, when soviet soldiers and the officers, remembering the shed blood of their comrades-in-arms, broke the enemy and reached from Stalingrad to Berlin itself. Bid Soviet leadership turned out to be true, and the victory on southern front really brought success in the war as a whole, ”summed up Myagkov.

The battles of the Great Patriotic War, since the 1990s, have been the subject of fierce controversy. Among the most controversial topics is the winter campaign of 1942-1943. Historians of the Ministry of Defense to this day staunchly defend the official version that developed back in the period of the existence of the USSR, according to which the Stalingrad Strategic Offensive Operation (SSNO, code name "Uranus") was originally intended to be the main event of the second military winter on Soviet-German front. Offensive actions in a number of other areas (operations Mars, Jupiter, Polar Star, respectively, on the Western, Kalinin and Northwestern fronts) were conceived solely to solve local problems in the theater of operations. However, an analysis of even published documents and materials shows that everything was exactly the opposite.

WHO DEVELOPED THE PLAN

However, it would not be superfluous to first deal with one seemingly private question: who is the author of the plan for Operation Uranus?

Marshal Georgy Zhukov writes the following in his memoirs: "In order to develop such a major strategic operation as a plan for the offensive of three fronts in the Stalingrad region, it was necessary to base not only on operational conclusions, but also on certain logistical calculations. Who could produce specific calculations of forces and means for an operation of this magnitude?

The answer is obvious to Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun), whose books have become very popular in recent times. The former Soviet reconnaissance major without any doubt immediately points to the developer: "┘his position in the summer of 1942 was a senior officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff. The rank was colonel, later - Lieutenant General Potapov. in the Main Operational Directorate and that the author of the plan was Colonel Potapov, everyone has known for a long time.

True, "everyone and for a long time" in the GOU General Staff was always obvious: the senior officer-operator of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (in 1942 it was not yet called "chief") with the rank of colonel could not become the sole author of the plan for a strategic operation of a group of fronts - that's right in the system of operations in 1942 it was called SSNO.

There is no doubt: there is a chance to find in the depths of the General Staff the original plan of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation, the directive of the Supreme High Command for its implementation - too. In reality, there are documents on the organization of interaction between the fronts and calculations on the distribution of forces and means. But there certainly is no SSNO plan as such. However, there are plans for front-line offensive operations - each of the three fronts that took part in the SSNO - South-Western, Don, Stalingrad, approved by Stalin.

Now about the difference between such terms as "operational concept", "operational decision" and "operational plan". It's far from the same thing. In short, we can say that the concept of the operation is the direction of the main and other strikes, the method of conducting the operation, and finally, the composition of the groupings of troops and their operational formation. The decision for an operation (again, in a few words) is a plan plus tasks for the troops plus instructions for interaction and control.

AT different periods history in the Soviet and Russian armies the mentioned documents were called differently, there were sometimes more, sometimes less, but the essence of the set as a whole did not change significantly. The most important of them include: the decision of the commander of the front for an offensive operation, the actual plan of the operation (the operational part on the map plus a text explanatory note), calendar plan preparation of the operation, interaction plan, reconnaissance plan, schedule combat control, strike force plan, air defense plan, air army combat plan, communications plan, operational communications scheme, reconnaissance plan, operational camouflage plan, engineering support plan, plan logistic support, delivery plan material resources etc., etc.

The plan of any front-line operation is a set of more than a hundred planning, directive, reporting and information documents. It is developed by the front headquarters together with the chiefs of military branches, special troops and services.

And you can’t do without documents - after all, it’s impossible to fight on a whim. For example, the front headquarters forgot to prepare only one plan - the commandant's service in an offensive operation. As a result, an unimaginable mess arises on all front-line and army roads.

Could, say, create such a set of documents by one - even a very highly trained - officer of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army? Of course no. The development of one and a half hundred documents on each of the three fronts participating in the SSNO was simply beyond the scope of physical abilities one man.

Neither could the General Staff, together with Supreme High Command, which Marshal Zhukov writes about in his memoirs (the idea - yes, the decision - yes, but the three plans of the TNF - no). The development of such documents is beyond the functions of these governing bodies.

As for the document attributed to Colonel Potapov, it certainly exists in reality. Only this is not a plan of operation, but a plan. Most likely, it is not even called a plan, but "considerations" or "proposals" for the defeat of enemy troops near Stalingrad. In form, the document, presumably, is a map (the so-called operational part at the headquarters) with several sheets attached explanatory note with calculations.

There is no doubt about one thing - it is unlikely that the operator-operator developed this document on his own initiative. Most likely the General Staff and its operational management received a similar task after a preliminary discussion by the General Headquarters of the general plan for the winter campaign of 1942-1943, where Stalingrad operation occupied the place strictly allotted to her by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff. The question arises - what?

THE NUMBERS SHOW

To understand the role and place of operations "Uranus" and "Mars", historians should first of all refer to the documents of the Headquarters and the General Staff. However, they are still classified.

If these documents were available to researchers, then the dispute about which operation is the main one and which one is "fettering" would disappear on its own. The most interesting thing is that several alternative options winter campaign 1942-1943. Of course, they were discussed.

What Supreme Commander, Headquarters and the General Staff of the Red Army did not attach decisive importance to the Stalingrad offensive operation, noticeable by the distribution of forces and means on the Soviet-German front on November 19, 1942 (see table from the 12-volume "History of the Second World War").

Even according to these data, in two sectors of the front - from Lake Ladoga to Kholm and from Kholm to Bolkhov, which accounted for 36% of the length of the Soviet-German front, there were more than half of the personnel active army, artillery, aviation and 60% tanks. At the same time, on the section from Novaya Kalitva to Astrakhan, where main blow in the campaign, the number of forces and means was 18-20%, and only in aviation - over 30%. But these 30% in absolute terms are quite a bit - over 900 aircraft. It turns out that 300 aircraft per front, allegedly operating on the main theater of operations.

It is not clear from what considerations the official historians who prepared this table proceeded. After all, she sends the official version of the history of the Great Patriotic War to a knockout. It is not serious to consider, after studying the above figures, that the main attack was planned in the Stalingrad region, because they contradict one of the essential principles military art - the massing of forces and means in the direction of the main attack.

By the way, any officer-operator knows how crafty the data of the table is. There is no doubt - in order to support the official version, the indicators of the Stalingrad, South-Western and Don fronts pulled by the ears to the max (at the same time underestimating the data of the fronts of the Western theater), using many well-proven counting techniques.

Say, 15,501 guns and mortars - is it a lot or a little compared to 24,682? At first glance, the difference is obvious. However, it will not be so obvious if we decompose the figures first separately by guns, then - separately by mortars. Then - by caliber and type. Finally - and most importantly - on the provision of ammunition. And only then can something be compared and analyzed. If the official version of history does not provide such data, then the advantage of the fronts located in the center and north over the southern ones is even greater.

Note that the table below reflects the troops of the active army only. If we add here the strategic reserves (according to their operational purpose), then the picture will be even more in favor of the Western theater of operations. To draw unambiguous conclusions on this issue, we need a Plan for the formation and operational purpose of the strategic reserves of the Red Army of the corresponding period of the war (it is quite possible that the document was called differently at that time). It has not been published anywhere. However, this does not mean its absence. If it is not given, then it contradicts the official version of the war.

There are enough other reservations to understand: the strategic reserves prepared for the autumn of 1942 were by no means intended to develop success on the southwestern sector of the Soviet-German front. In particular, the same 12-volume "History of the Second World War" says that a significant part of the Stavka's strategic reserves in the fall of 1942 were formed and located east and southeast of Moscow - in the regions of Tambov, Balashov and Saratov. Note that this is official data. In fact, there were many more such areas. German intelligence managed to establish many of them. And based on the information of their residents, the Germans quite reasonably expected that the main events of the winter campaign would unfold in the Western strategic direction.

CANNOT BE CHANGED

The campaign plan cannot be radically changed after it has been developed, approved, and the state, the country's armed forces have begun to implement it. Red arrows on the maps can be redrawn within a day. However, it is not clear how it is possible to transfer hundreds of thousands and millions of tons of ammunition, fuel, food, and other material and technical means (which were stockpiled ahead of time in the places of the planned main operations of the next campaign) to new areas, to redeploy strategic reserves - it is not clear. Repeated military shipments of this magnitude are simply impossible by definition.

Let's just give one example. At that time on railways countries used only locomotive traction. In order to carry out planned military transportation in accordance with the plan of the next campaign, it was necessary to concentrate an enormous amount of coal at the junction stations. And it was precisely on those in the strip of which it was planned to deliver the main blows to the enemy. In order to change something significantly in the plan of the campaign after the completion of transportation (hundreds of thousands of wagons, by the way), it is no longer possible to give the command - "Stop! Back! Everything to the original!". There will not even be burnt coal for locomotives. Procurement of new fuel reserves will take a significant amount of time. And in terms of timing, this will be just the next campaign.

In other words, the state and its armed forces with a certain moment become hostages own plans. There is a kind of strategic "zugzwang" or a forced sequence of operational-strategic moves. As Napoleon used to say, the wine is uncorked - and it must be drunk. Like it or not, but the operation "Mars" will have to be carried out.

Let's say they planned success on the Western theater of operations, but it came out in a completely different place - in the South-West. It is required to regroup strategic reserves and materiel there as soon as possible. Yes, in a relatively short time it will be possible to redeploy several bomber air divisions to another theater of operations. However, together with the aircraft, it is necessary to organize the transfer of at least 15 refills of high-octane aviation gasoline, hundreds of thousands of tons of aviation weapons. Without this, air divisions will be guns without cartridges. And for military transportation of this scale, tens of thousands of so-called conditional wagons and a period of time equal to 2-3 months are required. But during these 8-12 weeks, the enemy's success at the front will be localized.

It should be noted that this is where the answer to the question is rooted - why Paulus, together with his army, concentrated on a relatively small area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe territory, practically without fighter aviation and anti-aircraft artillery cover, were not subjected to massive air strikes. It seemed to be simpler: bombard the encircled Germans with bombs from above until the white flag was thrown out. But! There were no planes, and - more importantly - bombs. All problems were solved by attacks of infantry and tanks after artillery preparation, incurring considerable losses.

On November 23, 1942, the Germans were surrounded near Stalingrad. But in order to develop success in the direction of Rostov, there were no large operational-strategic reserves at hand. The city - the gates of the North Caucasus - was 300 km away. Erich von Manstein covered a similar distance in 1941 in a similar situation in just four days. The Germans had no operational reserves between Stalingrad and Rostov. But the Red Army did not have them either.

Some pause in the actions of the Soviet troops gave the Germans the opportunity to make the necessary regroupings and organize a deblocking strike. First Major Reserve Betting - 2nd guards army- arrived in the South-Western strategic direction only in mid-December (note that on November 1, 1942, there were five combined arms armies in the Stavka reserve). It was used not for the development of the Stalingrad success (or the final defeat of the 6th German Army), but for a counterattack on the divisions of the Don Army Group breaking through to the troops of Paulus. At the same time, the Germans were feverishly withdrawing their formations and units from the huge North Caucasian trap. For the same reasons - the lack of forces and means - the liquidation of the encircled group near Stalingrad dragged on for two and a half months. As a result, an incorrect assessment of the situation by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the summer and autumn of 1942, when drawing up a plan for the upcoming winter campaign, led to the defeat of our troops near Kharkov in February-March 1943.

YOU SHOULD REVIEW

Why is the Soviet historical science walks so carefully sharp corners the most interesting campaign of the Great Patriotic War? After all, there was simply no more intriguing (and highly instructive) period in the history of the Soviet-German armed confrontation, in terms of strategy and the opportunities provided by the course of events for the Red Army. In the winter of 1942-1943, there was a very real possibility of the military crushing of Germany. In any case, it was possible to inflict a severe defeat on the entire southern wing of the German Eastern Front. But the military-political leadership of the USSR missed this opportunity. Although such chances, as world military history testifies, are provided opposing sides rare enough. Winter 1942-1943 - one of clear examples of this kind.

It must be assumed that in the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and General Staff The Red Army was very clearly aware of what a "window of opportunity" was formed as a result of the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad. However, political and military leaders could no longer radically change the plan for the winter campaign. This primarily explains the incompleteness of many operations after Stalingrad on the southern wing of the front in the winter of 1943. In other words, significant errors crept into the assessment of the situation and the subsequent planning of military operations. Nobody wants to admit to them, especially at the level of the highest military-political leadership (in the USSR, it could not be wrong by definition), and still no one wants to.

Why has not yet been made public the most interesting documents The rates of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army related to this period of armed confrontation on the Soviet-German front? Because if these documents are published, then there will be no stone left unturned from the official version of the history of the Great Patriotic War.

In this case, numerous myths instantly disappear. We list only a few of them: "the main efforts in the winter campaign of 1942/43 were concentrated on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front", "the most important strategic operation campaign was supposed to be a counteroffensive near Stalingrad", "The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command most carefully developed the initial operation - the strategic counteroffensive near Stalingrad", "planning and organizing the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, the Headquarters provided for the fettering of enemy forces by active operations of troops in the western, northwest directions and in the North Caucasus." As soon as the documents are opened, everything previously published will have to be revised and rewritten.

And the most important conclusion is truthful and complete history The Great Patriotic War did not exist, and does not exist. And, apparently, it will not appear soon. However, the values great victory near Stalingrad, the above reasoning does not detract at all. Let's remember: during the turning battle on pacific ocean On June 4, 1942 - the battles in the Midway Atoll area - the situation was extremely random in favor of one side or the other. What can I say - that's the war. In the end, the Americans won, and they are rightfully proud of it. And if mistakes were made by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army during the war, this should be the subject of analysis, and not concealment.