December 27, 1932 in Moscow, the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR M. I. Kalinin, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. M. Molotov and the secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR A. S. Yenukidze signed Resolution No. 57/1917 “On the establishment of a unified passport system for the USSR and mandatory registration passports”
The regulation on passports established that all citizens USSR at the age of 16,
permanently residing in cities, workers' settlements, working in transport, in state farms and in new buildings, are required to have passports. In passportized areas, the passport was the only document proving the identity of the owner. All previous certificates that previously served as a residence permit were cancelled. Mandatory registration of passports with the police was introduced no later than 24 hours upon arrival at a new place of residence. An extract has also become obligatory - for all those who left the boundaries of a given settlement completely or for a period of more than two months; for everyone leaving their former place of residence, exchanging passports; prisoners; arrested, held in custody for more than two months.
Apart from summary about the owner (first name, patronymic, last name, time and place of birth, nationality) in the passport were indicated: social status(“worker”, “collective farmer”, “peasant-individualist”, “employee”, “student”, “writer”, “artist”, “artist”, “sculptor”, “handicraftsman”, “pensioner”, “dependent” , “without certain occupations”), permanent residence and place of work, passing a mandatory military service and a list of documents on the basis of which the passport was issued. Enterprises and institutions were to require passports (or temporary certificates) from those hired, indicating in them the time of enrollment in the state. Initially, it was prescribed to carry out passportization with mandatory registration in Moscow, Leningrad (including a hundred-kilometer strip around them), Kharkov (including a fifty-kilometer strip) during January - June 1933. Their territories with hundred-fifty-kilometer strips around them were declared regime. In the same year, it was supposed to complete work in other regions of the country that were subject to passportization.
In this article we will try to find out the real causes of the famine of 1932-1933 in the USSR.
Since 1927, the Soviet leadership has been heading towards collectivization. At first it was supposed to unite in collective farms by 1933 1.1 million farms (about 4%). Further, plans for collectivization changed several times and in the fall of 1929 they decided to switch to complete collectivization.
On January 5, 1930, the draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the terms of collectivization, edited by Stalin, was approved. Collectivization was to take place in the main grain-growing regions in 1-2 years.
This decision served as an impetus for the unwinding of repressions against the prosperous rural population.
The richest and most efficient peasants were dispossessed. About 2.4 million peasants were forcibly taken to remote areas of the country. Approximately 390 thousand of them died in the process.
A huge number of the youngest and most efficient peasants fled to the cities. The growth of the urban population in 1929-1931 amounted to 12.4 million people, which is several times higher than the natural population growth.
One of the prerequisites for the famine was the socialization of livestock. As a result of attempts to force the selection of livestock, the peasants began its mass slaughter.
Here is the data on the number of cattle by year:
- 1928 - 70 540;
- 1929 - 67 112;
- 1930 - 52 962;
- 1931 - 47 916;
- 1932 - 40 651;
- 1933 - 38 592.
The amount of draft power (horses), which was the main working tool, was more than halved. In 1932, the fields were overgrown with weeds. Even units of the Red Army were sent to weeding. Due to the lack of labor resources and draft power, from 30% to 40% of grain remained in the field not harvested.
Meanwhile, the grain procurement plan increased from year to year.
Causes of the famine of 1932-1933
The chairmen of the collective farms were instructed to hand over all the available grain, which was done. The rest of the bread was taken from the peasants by force, often sliding down to the use of violence and sadism. Seeing what was happening in the village, Sholokhov wrote a letter to Stalin.
Here is an excerpt from Stalin's reply to Sholokhov's letter:
“... respected grain growers of your region (and not only your region) carried out the “Italian” (sabotage!) and were not averse to leaving the workers, the Red Army - without bread. The fact that the sabotage was quiet and outwardly harmless (without blood) does not change the fact that the respected grain growers, in fact, waged a "quiet" war against the Soviet regime. A war of exhaustion, dear comrade. Sholokhov ... It is clear as daylight that the respected grain growers are not such harmless people as it might seem from afar ... "
From this letter it is very clear that the famine was provoked on purpose. The peasants had to be forced to work, and to work a lot, seven days a week, from morning to night. To work more than they worked at one time for the landowners.
As a result of the activities carried out by the country's leadership in the villages famine broke out. The scale of the victims was enormous. About 8 million people died of starvation. About 4 million people died in Ukraine. About 1 million in Kazakhstan. The rest of the victims fell on the Volga region, the North Caucasus and Siberia.
Causes of the famine of 1932-1933 obvious, they were not hidden even at that time. The famine was caused by the leadership of the USSR, which denied the natural laws of the economy, did not skillfully manage the country's agriculture. Instead of trying to stimulate the development of agriculture, an attempt was made to frighten the peasants with hunger and force them to work. Such a policy is generally characteristic of the era of Stalin's rule and is essentially anti-human.
Now, it would seem, in our story we can put an end to it. However… Whole line modern (non-Stalinist and non-Soviet) historians, such as Zhukov, Yulin, Pykhalov and others, who have unambiguous wide recognition in scientific circles, bring a slightly different view of the events of 1932-1933. I will try to briefly outline the essence of this view.
Widely available known fact, what in Russian Empire At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, a great famine happened with a frequency of about once every ten years, covering periodically one or the other provinces of the country. The most terrible hunger strikes occurred in 1891-1892 and in 1911. Comparing the average mortality for the five years preceding the famine of 1891-1892 with the mortality during the famine of 1891-1892, it is easy to see that the number of deaths in the famine years increased by about 1.3 million people.
It is not a fact that these 1.3 million died precisely from starvation, but it is clear that diseases caused by systematic malnutrition and the consumption of various surrogates, such as quinoa, tree leaves, etc., as well as poisoning by grain contaminated with ergot and other similar diseases.
The tsarist government systematically took measures to combat hunger, trying to feed the starving regions, but the lack of developed infrastructure and roads often led to disastrous results. There were several reasons for systematic hunger strikes. Primarily natural conditions, much more complex than Western Europe and consequently lower yields. The lack of land of the peasants. Extensive production methods.
1932-1933 were lean years. Ergot and other grain diseases were observed to be widespread. These misfortunes are superimposed by the sabotage of grain harvesting, which was carried out by opponents of the Bolsheviks, setting up broad sections of the peasants against the Soviet regime. Part of the grain was hidden in the pits. As you know, this storage method led to grain spoilage and its transformation into a poison for the body.
When we try to find out where, for example, 4 million people who died of starvation in Ukraine in 1932-1933 came from, it turns out that this number was calculated according to empirical formulas based on population censuses that took place once every 5 or even 10 years .
Meanwhile, there are clear mortality data for each year, based on registry office records. So the average death rate in Ukraine for the five years preceding the famine of 1932-1933 is 515 thousand people a year. In 1932, the death rate was 668 thousand people. In 1933, the death rate was 1 million 309 thousand people. After carrying out the calculations, we come to the conclusion that the number of deaths in two hungry years increased by 945 thousand people, that is how many deaths can be attributed to the events associated with the hunger strike. Even if we add up all the dead in Ukraine for 1932-1933, there are not even 2 million people, not to mention the figure of 4 million that was given earlier.
Contrary to popular belief, during the hunger strike of 1932-1933, the USSR was very cheap and large quantities sold grain abroad, it should be noted that in fact the export of grain was stopped at that time. Grain procurement plans have been drastically reduced. Emergency aid was provided to starving areas.
In this situation, much depended on the actions local authorities. It should be recalled that people who allowed the hunger strike paid the price for it, falling under the rink of purges and repressions in 1937.
Such a historical view translates the events of 1932-1933 from a planned action of the Holodomor into a nationwide tragedy of the USSR, one of serious problems facing the new Soviet government.
However, in order to finally get to the bottom of the truth, you need to shovel the entire Internet, and possibly raise a bunch of historical documents.
The kingdom of heaven to all who were victims of the tragedy of 1932-1933.
The Holodomor is a massive famine that engulfed vast territories and led to significant human casualties within the territory of Ukrainian SSR in the first half of 1933 against the background of the famine in the USSR in 1932-1933. Political opponents of the Bolsheviks called the organization of the famine in Ukraine during this period their worst crime.
The economically unjustified forced collectivization in the USSR in 1929-1930 led to a sharp decline in agricultural production, including bread. However, the grain procurement plan was increased. In 1930, 7.7 million tons of grain was exported from Ukraine, which was mainly used to cover the country's export obligations. In 1931, the republic again had to deliver the planned 7.7 million tons, while the grain harvest dropped to 5 million tons.
In 1931, in five regions of the USSR - in Western Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Urals, the Middle and Lower Volga - due to drought there was a crop failure, which significantly reduced the country's grain resources. Incompetent agricultural policies and the extensive export of grain from the 1931 crop made the situation critical. In 1932, an even greater decline in food production followed, and primarily due to the main grain-producing regions of the USSR - the grain regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the Kuban. By the beginning of autumn 1932, the country began to experience difficulties in providing the urban population with food. By the beginning of the spring of 1933, the food situation in the whole country was difficult - there were food shortages even in Moscow and Leningrad and in a number of military districts of the Red Army. starved Western Siberia, Ural, Middle and Lower Volga, Central Chernobyl region. But the situation in Ukraine, the North Caucasus and Kazakhstan was extremely acute.
In the early 1930s, all grain was confiscated from the Ukrainian village according to state procurements. Where bread was not found, food products were confiscated from the debtors for grain procurement in the form of "fines in kind". And since mass slaughter of livestock began even before collectivization, as a result, the plan for meat was only 10-12% fulfilled. The meat was exported to large industrial centers but it was not in the village.
Deprived of food peasant families could not live to see the next harvest. In early 1932, famine spread throughout Ukraine and the Kuban. The leaders of the Communist Party of Ukraine repeatedly appealed to Stalin with a request to reduce the deflated bread plan. However, no concessions were made.
Pumping grain out of the hungry republic required iron discipline, complete obedience. In August 1932, the the death penalty for the theft of collective farm property (the Law on "five spikelets"). Across the country, by the beginning of 1933, in less than five months, 54,645 people were convicted under this law, of which 2,110 highest measure punishment. To knock out the remnants of grain from the cities, 112,000 party members, people who did not know the problems of the village, were sent to the villages. Districts that could not cope with the delivery of grain were entered into the "black lists". There were 86 districts of the republic in the "black list".
On November 27, 1932, at a joint meeting of the Politburo and the Central Executive Committee, Stalin explained the difficulties with grain procurements by "penetration of anti-Soviet elements into the collective farms and state farms, which organized sabotage and breakdowns." The Pravda newspaper of December 4 and 8, 1932, called for a decisive struggle against the kulaks, especially in Ukraine. On January 24, 1933, the Allied Central Committee accused the Communist Party of Ukraine of failing to collect grain, of blunting Bolshevik vigilance, and sent Central Committee Secretary Pavel Postyshev to Ukraine. 237 secretaries of district committees, 249 chairmen of district executive committees, and more than half of the chairmen of collective farms were dismissed from their posts.
Death from starvation took on a massive scale in early March 1933. The OGPU kept records of the dead only until April 15, 1933. According to these reports, the number of victims for four and a half months amounted to 2 million 420 thousand 100 people. Cases of cannibalism - 2500.
According to domestic historians, the number of victims in Ukraine is determined at 7 million 200 thousand people. According to the commission of the US Congress, this figure is 10 million people. In 2003, French demographers came to the conclusion that in 1932-1933 Ukraine was missing 4.6 million people.
According to Russian scientists, 2 million people died in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and 2-2.5 million in the RSFSR. At the same time, the data of registry offices indicate that both in Ukraine and in other republics of the USSR, people died regardless of their nationality.
In February 1933, when the famine in Ukraine and the North Caucasus assumed gigantic proportions, and the collective farm bins turned out to be empty before the sowing campaign, the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars "On assistance in sowing to the collective farms of Ukraine and the North Caucasus" was adopted, according to which seed loans were allocated to these regions . The famine was eliminated only by the beginning of 1934.
Among both historians and politicians, no consensus has been reached regarding the causes that led to the Holodomor. There is a point of view according to which the mass death of the population of Ukraine from starvation was largely caused by conscious and purposeful actions Soviet leadership. At the same time, an alternative opinion is expressed that these events were an unforeseen consequence of radical economic reforms in the late 20s - early 30s of the twentieth century in the USSR.
The UN recognized the famine of 1932-1933 as a tragedy of Ukraine and other republics former USSR. At the 58th session of the UN General Assembly (2003), most of the CIS member countries, including Russia and Ukraine, adopted a Joint Statement in which they expressed sympathy for the millions of Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs and representatives of other peoples who became victims of famine in the USSR. The events of the 1930s are called "tragedy", not "genocide" in the statement.
According to the decree of President Leonid Kuchma of 1998, on the last Saturday of November, Ukraine celebrates the Day of Remembrance of the Holodomor Victims. Since 2000, this date has been celebrated as the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Holodomors and Political Repressions.
In November 2006, President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko signed the law "On the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine" adopted by the Verkhovna Rada. Holodomor is recognized by law as genocide Ukrainian people. Public denial of the Holodomor, according to the law, is considered "a desecration of the memory of millions of victims of the Holodomor, a humiliation of the dignity of the Ukrainian people and is illegal."
On November 14, 2008, the Kremlin's press service released a message from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, in which Medvedev criticized Kyiv's position on the Holodomor, stating that it was aimed at dividing peoples, and called on Ukraine to begin work on developing joint approaches.
On May 22, 2009, the Security Service of Ukraine opened a criminal case on the fact of the genocide in Ukraine in 1932-1933. Kyiv calls the Bolshevik regime guilty of the genocide.
The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources
"The Law of the Five Spikelets"
First about the bad. Terrible hunger, which broke out in the south of the country, claimed many lives. His main reason became a ruthless seizure of grain from the peasants, mainly for export. People died in whole villages, there were horrific cases of cannibalism.
Adopted a law on protection socialist property, called by the people "the law of five spikelets." Theft of collective farm property was punishable by execution with confiscation of property or imprisonment for at least 10 years, also with the seizure of property. If she had, of course...
Now for the little joys. On the Day of Defense of the Red Capital, skating in gas masks was held. Simple but exotic! Vechernyaya Moskva told about another new entertainment - Canadian hockey: “The match is played on a field almost half the size of our hockey fields. There are six people in a team. Hockey players do not play with a ball, but with a flat puck.
It's hard to imagine, but already in the early thirties, some people had TVs! Stalin, for example, has a dozen or two of his associates. Therefore, this newspaper note is for them: “On May 1, 1932, a festive broadcast about the parade and demonstration of workers took place. Filming took place on Pushkinskaya Square, on Tverskaya Street and on Red Square. On the evening of May 1, the film was shown to viewers.
Now about literary matters: Nikolai Ostrovsky completed the novel “How the Steel Was Tempered”, and Mikhail Sholokhov put the last point in “Virgin Soil Upturned”. No one, not even the authors themselves, knows that they have created masterpieces. But Andrei Platonov's book "Happy Moscow" was lost in time, and its title is painfully outdated ...
Valery Burt
—Mendel and Isaac broke the rules traffic. They are stopped by a traffic police inspector and offered to pay a fine. And the Nobel Prize winners... Mendel and Isaac violated traffic rules. They are stopped by a traffic police inspector and offered to pay a fine. - And the laureates Nobel Prize also pay a fine? asks Mendel. The inspector apologizes and lets them go. - Are you a Nobel Prize winner? Isaac wonders. - No, of course not, but can I ask something?
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—This happened a long time ago when Mao Zedong himself died. Then a whole batch of Chinese carpets was brought to stores in one city. The carpets were very beautiful, in… This happened a long time ago when Mao Zedong himself died. Then a whole batch of Chinese carpets was brought to stores in one city. The carpets were very beautiful, all in colors and patterns; people quickly bought them up and hung them on the walls. It was only after this that cases sudden death at night. Very often people began to die from a broken heart. And the ambulance did not have time to come to them. In this city a woman lived with her son. The son was already an adult. And they had a two-room apartment. And so the mother slept in the big room, and the son in the small one. And then one day a woman bought such a large Chinese carpet. She, of course, hung it on the wall in a large room and admired it all day with her son. And at night a terrible cry was heard from a large room. The son got scared and called the police. The police enter a large room and see: a dead woman is lying on the bed; and she has no wounds or bruises, only an expression of mortal horror on her face. No one understands anything, and one policeman, an experienced lieutenant (he was later taken as an investigator), guessed to turn off the light. It became dark and everyone saw a terrifying picture. On the wall, the coffin glows, Mao Zedong lies in it. In his hands, folded on his chest, a candle burns with green fire. Eyes are open and looking at people. The experienced lieutenant immediately turned on the light. And again there is nothing, only a carpet hangs on the wall, different colors overflows. Then everyone understood that people were dying of fear when they saw the coffin with Mao Zedong at night. And it was the Chinese who embroidered on their carpets with specially phosphorescent threads. In the light you can't see anything, but in the dark it glows. So they said goodbye to their leader.
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By the beginning of the 1930s, it was clear to the leadership of the USSR what to avoid big war with the imperialist states will not succeed. Stalin wrote about this in his article “On the Tasks of Business Executives” as follows: We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we will be crushed.”
Having set the task of industrializing the country in 10 years, the leadership of the USSR was forced to come to an accelerated collectivization of the peasantry.
If initially, according to the collectivization plan, only 2% of peasant farms were to be collectivized by 1933, then according to the accelerated collectivization plan, collectivization in the main grain-producing regions of the USSR was to be completed in a year or two, that is, by 1931-1932.
By collectivizing the peasants, Stalin sought to enlarge the farms. It was relatively easy to seize products from large farms. Agricultural products were the main export, providing currency for accelerated industrialization. And most importantly, only large, mechanized farms in climatic conditions our country could give marketable bread.
The main problem of the peasants of Russia was the weather and climatic conditions, the short warm season, and, consequently, the high burden of agricultural labor.
Chayanov with the help of careful statistical analysis labor efforts, incomes and expenses of peasant farms proved that the excessive burden of labor can become a significant constraint on the growth of the duration of labor and its productivity.
The law of A.V. Chayanov, if it is expressed in simple terms, says that the burdensomeness of labor prevents the peasant from raising labor productivity, and when prices for his products rise, he prefers to curtail production.
In accordance with Chayanov's law, under the NEP middle peasant began to eat better than in tsarist times, but practically ceased to produce marketable grain. During the years of the NEP, peasants began to consume 30 kg of meat per year, although before the revolution they consumed 16 kg per year.
This indicated that a significant part of the grain was redirected by them from deliveries to the city to improve their own nutrition. By 1930, small-scale production reached its maximum.
It was prepared by different sources, from 79 to 84 million tons of grain (in 1914, together with the Polish provinces, 77 million tons).
The NEP allowed a slight increase in agricultural production, but the production of marketable grain was halved. Previously, it was given mainly by large landowners, liquidated during the revolution.
The shortage of marketable grain gave rise to the idea of consolidating agricultural production through collectivization, which, in the geopolitical conditions of that time, became forced necessity, and they set about it with Bolshevik inflexibility.
For example, by October 1, 1931, collectivization in the Ukrainian SSR covered 72% of arable land and 68% of peasant farms. More than 300 thousand "kulaks" were deported outside the Ukrainian SSR.
As a result of the restructuring economic activity peasants, associated with collectivization, there was a catastrophic decline in the level of agricultural technology.
Several objective factors of that time worked to reduce agricultural technology. Perhaps the main one is the loss of incentive to hard work, which has always been the work of the peasant in the "suffering".
In the autumn of 1931, more than 2 million hectares of winter crops were not sown, and losses from the 1931 harvest were estimated at up to 200 million poods, threshing in a number of areas took place until March 1932.
In a number of districts, seed material was handed over to the grain procurement plan. Most of the collective farms did not make settlements with the collective farmers for workdays, or these payments were meager.
Labor activity has fallen even more: “they will take it away anyway”, and food prices in the cooperative network have become 3-7 times higher than in neighboring republics. This led to the mass departure of the able-bodied population "for bread." In a number of collective farms, from 80 to 100% of able-bodied men left.
Forced industrialization led to a much greater than expected outflow of people to cities and industrial areas. The population of cities grew by 2.5-3 million a year, and the vast majority of this increase was due to the most able-bodied men in the village.
In addition, the number of seasonal workers who did not live permanently in the cities, but went there for a while in search of work, reached 4-5 million. The shortage of workers markedly worsened the quality of agricultural work.
In Ukraine, one of important factors there was a sharp reduction in the number of oxen used as the main tax in the process of collectivization. Peasants slaughtered cattle for meat in anticipation of its socialization.
Due to the growth of the urban population and the increased shortage of grain, the procurement of food resources for industrial centers began to produce at the expense of feed grain. In 1932, half as much grain was fed to livestock as in 1930.
As a result, in the winter of 1931/32, there was the most dramatic reduction in the number of working and productive livestock since the beginning of collectivization.
6.6 million horses died - a quarter of the still remaining draft cattle, the rest of the cattle was extremely exhausted. The total number of horses in the USSR decreased from 32.1 million in 1928 to 17.3 million in 1933.
By spring sowing 1932 Agriculture in the zones of “complete collectivization” came virtually without draft cattle, and the socialized cattle had nothing to feed.
Spring sowing was carried out in a number of areas by hand, or plowed on cows.
So, by the beginning of the spring sowing season of 1932, the village approached with a serious lack of draft power and a sharply deteriorating quality of labor resources. At the same time, the dream of “plowing the land with tractors” was still a dream. The total power of tractors reached the figure planned for 1933 only seven years later, combine harvesters were just beginning to be used
Decrease in the incentive to work, the decline in the number of working and productive livestock, the spontaneous migration of the rural population predetermined a sharp decline in the quality of basic agricultural work.
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As a result, the fields sown with grain in 1932 in Ukraine, the North Caucasus and other regions were overgrown with weeds. But, the peasants, driven into the newly created collective farms, and having already the experience of “will be taken away anyway”, were in no hurry to show miracles of labor enthusiasm.
Even parts of the Red Army were sent to weeding work. But this did not help, and with a fairly tolerable biological harvest in 1931/32, sufficient to prevent mass starvation, grain losses during its harvest increased to unprecedented proportions.
If in 1931, according to the NK RKI, about 20% of the gross grain harvest was lost during harvesting, then in 1932 the losses were even greater. In Ukraine, up to 40% of the harvest remained in the vine; in the Lower and Middle Volga, losses reached 35.6% of the total gross grain harvest.
By the spring of 1932, the main grain-producing regions began to show acute shortage food
In the spring and early summer of 1932, in a number of districts, starving collective farmers and individual farmers mowed down unripe winter crops, dug out planted potatoes, and so on.
Part of the seed aid provided by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in March-June was used as food.
As of May 15, 1932, according to Pravda, 42% of the entire sown area was sown.
By the beginning of the harvesting campaign in July 1932, more than 2.2 million hectares of spring crops were not sown in Ukraine, 2 million hectares of winter crops were not sown, and 0.8 million hectares were frozen.
The American historian Tauger, who studied the causes of the famine of 1933, believes that the crop failure was caused by an unusual combination of a set of reasons, among which drought played a minimal role, the main role was played by plant diseases, an unusually widespread pest and grain shortage associated with the drought of 1931, rains in sowing and harvesting time.
Are the causes natural or low level agricultural technology, due to the transitional period of the formation of the collective farm system, but the country was threatened with a sharp drop in the gross grain harvest.
In an attempt to rectify the situation, by a decree of May 6, 1932, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks lowered the grain procurement plan for the year. In order to stimulate the growth of grain production, the grain procurement plan was reduced from 22.4 million tons to 18.1 million, which is just over a quarter of the forecasted harvest.
But, the forecasts of grain yields that existed at that time, based on their biological productivity, significantly overestimated the real indicators.
So the grain procurement plan in 1932 was drawn up on the basis of preliminary data on a higher harvest (in reality it turned out to be two to three times lower). And the party-administrative leadership of the country, after reducing the grain procurement plan, demanded strict observance plan.
Harvesting in a number of areas was carried out inefficiently and belatedly, the ear was re-stacked, sprinkled, stacking was not carried out, torpedo heaters were used without grain traps, which even more increased the considerable loss of grain.
The intensity of harvesting and threshing of the 1932 crop was extremely low - "they will take it away anyway."
In the autumn of 1932, it became clear that in the main grain-producing regions, the grain harvesting plan was catastrophically not being fulfilled, which threatened starvation for the urban population and frustrated plans for accelerated industrialization.
So in Ukraine, at the beginning of October, only 35.3% of the plan was completed.
The emergency measures taken to speed up procurement did little. By the end of October, only 39% of the annual plan was completed.
Expecting, as in the previous year, non-payment for workdays, collective farm members began to plunder grain en masse. In many collective farms, advances in kind were issued, significantly exceeding the established norms, and inflated norms for public catering were indicated. Thus, the management of the collective farm bypassed the norm for the distribution of income only after the plans had been fulfilled.
On November 5, in order to intensify the struggle for grain, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine proposes to the People's Commissariat of Justice, regional and district committees, along with the development of broad mass work, to ensure a decisive increase in assistance to grain procurements from the justice authorities.
Required to oblige judiciary out of turn to consider cases on grain procurements, as a rule, by visiting sessions on the spot with the use of severe repressions, while providing a differentiated approach to individual social groups, applying especially harsh measures to speculators, grain dealers.
In pursuance of the decision, a decree was issued, which spoke of the need to establish special supervision of prosecutors over the work administrative bodies regarding the use of fines in relation to farms that are far behind the grain delivery plan.
On November 18, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine adopts a new tough resolution, which plans to send 800 communist workers to the villages, where “kulak sabotage and the disorganization of party work have taken the most sharp character". https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/Resolution_of_the_Politburo_of_the_Central Committee_KP (b) U_18_November_1932_“On_measures_to_strengthen_grain procurements”
The resolution outlines possible repressive measures against collective farms and individual farmers who do not fulfill grain harvesting plans. Among them: 1. A ban on the creation of in-kind funds on collective farms that do not fulfill the procurement plan
2. A ban on the issuance of advances in kind on all collective farms that are unsatisfactorily fulfilling the grain procurement plan, with the immediate return of grain illegally given in advance.
3. Seizure of grain plundered from collective farms, from various kinds of grabbers and loafers who do not have workdays, but have stocks of grain.
4. To bring to court, as embezzlers of state and public property, storekeepers, accountants, accountants, supply managers and weighers, hiding bread from accounting and compiling false accounting data in order to facilitate theft and theft.
5. The importation and sale of all, without exception, manufactured goods should be stopped in districts and individual villages, especially those that perform unsatisfactory grain procurement.
After the release of this decree, excesses began in the field with its implementation, and on November 29, the Politburo of the Central Committee (b) U issued a decree, which indicated the inadmissibility of excesses. (Attachment 1)
Despite the adopted decisions, both the delivery plan and
threshing of bread was significantly delayed. As of December 1, 1932, in Ukraine, on an area of 725 thousand hectares, grain is not threshed.
Therefore, although the total volume of grain exports from the village through all channels (harvesting, purchases at market prices, the collective farm market) decreased in 1932-1933 by about 20% compared with previous years, due to low harvests, and with such exports practiced cases of virtually complete seizure of the harvested bread from the peasants. Famine began in the areas of mass collectivization.
The question of the number of victims of the famine of 1932-1933 became the scene of a manipulative struggle, during which the anti-Soviet of Russia and all post-Soviet space sought to increase as much as possible the number of "victims of Stalinism". The nationalists of Ukraine played a special role in these manipulations.
The theme of the mass famine of 1932-1933 in the Ukrainian SSR actually became the basis of the ideological policy of the leadership of post-Soviet Ukraine. Monuments to the victims of the famine, museums and exhibitions dedicated to the tragedy of the 1930s were opened all over Ukraine.
Expositions of exhibitions sometimes acquired a scandalous character due to obvious frauds. historical material(Annex 3)
In 2006, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine declared the Holodomor a genocide of the Ukrainian people, carried out with the aim of "suppressing the national liberation aspirations of Ukrainians and preventing the construction of an independent Ukrainian state."
AT Russian Federation anti-Soviet forces widely used the famine of 1932-33 as a weighty argument in the justice of transferring the country to the rails of capitalism. During Medvedev's presidency The State Duma passed a resolution condemning the actions Soviet authorities who organized the famine of 1932-33.
The ruling says:
“As a result of the famine caused by forced collectivization, many regions of the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus suffered. The peoples of the USSR paid a huge price for industrialization ... About 7 million people died in the USSR in 1932-1933 from hunger and diseases associated with malnutrition.
Almost the same number of those who died from the famine of 1932-33 was given by Goebbels' propaganda during the Second World War
A well-known domestic historian and archivist, V. Tsaplin, who headed the Russian state archive economy calls the figure of 3.8 million people
In the school textbook on the history of Russia, valid since 2011, edited by Sakharov total number victims of famine is defined as 3 million people. It also states that 1.5 million people died of starvation in Ukraine
The venerable ethnographer Professor Urlanis, in his calculations of losses from starvation in the USSR at the beginning of the 30s, gives a figure of 2.7 million
According to V. Kozhinov, collectivization and famine led to the fact that in 1929-1933 the death rate in the country exceeded the death rate in the previous five years of the NEP (1924-1928) by one and a half times. It must be said that a similar change in mortality rates in Russia has taken place since 1994 compared to the second half of the 1980s.
According to Dr. historical sciences Elena Osokina, the number of registered deaths exceeded the number of registered births, in particular, in the European part of the USSR as a whole - by 1975 thousand, and in the Ukrainian SSR - by 1459 thousand.
If we are based on the results of the All-Union Census of 1937 and recognize natural mortality in Ukraine in 1933 as the average natural mortality for 1927-30, when there was no famine (524 thousand per year), then with a birth rate in 1933 of 621 years, in Ukraine there was natural increase population equal to 97 thousand. This is five times less than the average increase in the previous three years.
It follows that 388,000 people died of starvation.
The materials “On the state of registration of the population of the Ukrainian SSR” for 1933 give 470,685 births and 1,850,256 deaths. That is, the number of inhabitants decreased due to hunger by almost 1380 thousand people.
Approximately the same figure for Ukraine is given by Zemskov in his famous work"On the issue of the scale of repressions in the USSR".
The Institute of National Memory of Ukraine, naming the ever-increasing number of victims of the Holodomor every year, began to collect martyrology, "Books of memory" of all those who died of hunger. Requests were sent to all settlements Ukraine on the number of deaths during the Holodomor and their national composition.
It was possible to collect the names of 882510 citizens who died in those years. But, to the disappointment of the initiators, among those people who the current Ukrainian authorities are trying to present as victims of the famine of the 1930s, not the largest part actually died of starvation or malnutrition. A significant part of the deaths were from domestic causes: accidents, poisoning, criminal murders.
This is described in detail in Vladimir Kornilov's article “Holodomor. Falsification of a national scale. In it, he analyzed data from the "Books of Memory" published by the Institute of National Memory of Ukraine.
The authors of the regional “Books of Memory”, out of bureaucratic zeal, entered into the registers of all the dead and those who died from January 1, 1932 to December 31, 1933, regardless of the causes of death, sometimes duplicating some names, but could not get more than 882,510 victims, which is quite comparable with the annual (!) mortality in modern Ukraine.
While, increasing every year, the official number of "victims of the Holodomor" reaches 15 million.
Things are even worse with the proof of the "genocide of the Ukrainian people." If we analyze the data for those cities of Central and Southern Ukraine, where local archivists decided to meticulously approach the matter and not hide the nationality column, which is “inconvenient” for the east of Ukraine.
For example, the compilers of the “Book of Memory” attributed 1,467 people to the “victims of the Holodomor” in the city of Berdyansk. The cards of 1184 of them indicate nationalities. Of these, 71% were ethnic Russians, 13% Ukrainians, 16% - representatives of other ethnic groups.
As for the villages and towns, there you can find different numbers. For example, data on the Novovasilyevsky Council of the same Zaporozhye region: out of 41 “victims of the Holodomor”, whose nationalities were indicated, 39 were Russians, 1 was Ukrainian (2-day-old Anna Chernova died with a diagnosis of “erysipelas”, which can hardly be attributed to starvation ) and 1 - Bulgarian (cause of death - "burned out"). And here are the data for the village of Vyacheslavka in the same region: out of 49 deceased with the indicated nationality, 46 were Bulgarians, 1 each was Russian, Ukrainian and Moldavian. In Friedrichfeld, out of 28 "victims of the Holodomor", one hundred percent are Germans.
Well, the lion's share of the "victims of the Holodomor", of course, was given by the most populated industrial eastern regions. Especially a lot of them turned out to be among the miners. Absolutely all deaths from injuries received in the production of Donbass or in mines are also attributed by the compilers of the Book of Memory to the results of the famine.
The idea of compiling "Books of Memory", which obligated regional officials to look for documents related to the Holodomor, led to an effect that the campaign's initiators did not expect.
Examining the documents that local executive officials included in the regional “Books of Memory of the Victims of the Holodomor”, you do not find a single document confirming the thesis that then, in the 30s, the authorities took actions whose purpose was to deliberately cause famine, and even more so completely exterminate the Ukrainian or any other ethnic group on the territory of Ukraine.
The then authorities - often direct order Moscow - made sometimes belated, sometimes clumsy, but sincere and persistent efforts to overcome the tragedy and save people's lives. And this in no way fits into the concept of modern falsifiers of history.
Attachment 1
Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee (b) U of November 29 "On the implementation of the Politburo resolutions of October 30 and November 18",
1. The resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) U on funds in collective farms in the localities is simplified and distorted. The Central Committee warns once again that the application of this decision is a matter that requires great flexibility, knowledge of the actual situation in the collective farms.
It is absolutely wrong and unacceptable to simply and mechanically take out all the funds for grain procurement. This is especially wrong in relation to the seed fund. Withdrawal of collective farm funds and their verification should not be carried out indiscriminately, not everywhere. Collective farms must be skillfully selected in such a way as to really reveal abuses and hidden grain there.
A more limited number of checks, but checks that give serious results, expose saboteurs, kulaks, their accomplices, and decisively crack down on them will have a significant more pressure to other collective farms where the check has not yet been carried out than a hasty, unprepared check a large number collective farms with little results.
Need to apply various forms and methods of this verification, individualizing each collective farm. In a number of cases it is more advantageous to use covert verification of funds without informing the collective farm about the verification. Where it is obviously known that the check will not give serious results and is not profitable for us, it is better to refuse it in advance.
The export of at least part of the seed should be allowed only in special exceptional cases, with the permission of the regional party committees and with the simultaneous adoption of measures that really ensure the replenishment of this fund from other intra-kolkhoz sources.
For the unauthorized export of at least part of the seed fund, the regional committees in relation to the PKK, and the PKK in relation to their authorized representatives, must apply strict penalties and immediately correct the mistakes made.
2. In the application of repression both to individual farmers, and especially against collective farms and collective farmers, in many areas they are already straying to their mechanical and indiscriminate use, hoping that the use of naked repression in itself should give bread. This is a wrong and certainly harmful practice.
Not a single repression, without the simultaneous deployment of political and organizational work cannot give the desired result. Whereas well-calculated repressions, applied to skillfully selected collective farms, repressions carried through to the end, accompanied by appropriate party-mass work, give desired result not only on those collective farms where they are used, but also on neighboring collective farms that are not fulfilling the plan.
Many grass-roots workers feel that the use of repression frees them from the need to carry out mass work or makes it easier for them to do so. Just the opposite. It is the use of repression as last resort exposure makes our party work more difficult.
If we, taking advantage of the repression applied to the collective farm as a whole, to the administrators or to accountants and others officials collective farm, if we do not achieve the consolidation of our forces on the collective farm, if we do not achieve the consolidation of the activists in this matter, if we do not achieve real approval of this repression on the part of the mass of collective farmers, then we will not obtain the necessary results in relation to the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan.
In cases where we are dealing with an exceptionally unscrupulous, stubborn collective farm that has fallen entirely under kulak influence, it is necessary first of all to ensure support for this repression from the surrounding collective farms, to achieve condemnation and organize pressure on such a collective farm. public opinion surrounding collective farms.
All of the above does not at all mean that enough repressions have already been applied and that at present a really serious and decisive pressure has been organized in the districts on the kulak elements and organizers of the sabotage of grain procurements.
On the contrary, the repressive measures envisaged by the decisions of the Central Committee in relation to the kulak elements both in the collective farms and among the individual peasants have still been very little used and have not yielded the necessary results due to indecision and hesitation where repression is undoubtedly necessary.
3. The fight against kulak influence on the collective farms is, first of all, the fight against theft, against the concealment of grain on the collective farms. It is a fight against those who deceive the state, who directly or indirectly work against the grain procurements, who organize the sabotage of the grain procurements.
And yet it is precisely this that receives quite insufficient attention in the districts. Against thieves, grabbers and plunderers of grain, against those who deceive the proletarian state and collective farmers, simultaneously with the use of repression, we must raise the hatred of the collective farm masses, we must ensure that the entire mass of collective farmers stigmatize these people as kulak agents and class enemies.
Appendix 2
Discussion of falsifications of the Holodomor theme in social networks.
1. The falsifications of the “Holodomor” continue to this day and take the form of a spectacle, not even a criminal one, but something like a procession of feeble-minded backward clowns. So recently, the Security Service of Ukraine was caught on a fake of the exhibition "Ukrainian Holocaust" held in Sevastopol - photos were given out by scammers from the Ukrainian special services as photographs of the "Holodomor".
Without batting an eyelid, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine, Valentin Nalyvaychenko, admitted that "some" of the photographs used in Sevastopol at the Holodomor exhibition were not genuine, because allegedly in Soviet time all (!) photographs of 1932-33 from Ukraine were destroyed, and now “it is possible to find them with with great difficulty and only in private archives. This suggests that even in the archives of the special services there are no photo evidence
2. Cases of well-proven hunger are characterized by alimentary dystrophy. Most patients do not die, but become emaciated, turn into living skeletons.
The famine of 1921-22 showed mass dystrophy, the famine of 1946-47 - mass dystrophy, Leningrad blockade hunger- also mass dystrophy, prisoners Nazi concentration camps- total dystrophy.
Swelling of the starving people of 1932-33 is recorded everywhere, while dystrophy is very, very rare. There is evidence that swelling indicates poisoning, stored in improper conditions, grain.
The grain was hidden in earthen pits, the grain was not cleaned from fungi, which caused it to deteriorate, becoming poisonous and life-threatening. So, often, people died from grain poisoning by cereal pests, such as smut and rust.
