In "Prolegomena to any future metaphysics..." Kant outlines two ways of investigating categories. The first is focused on finding and systematizing actually existing in ordinary language, concepts (words), which are constantly encountered in any experimental knowledge.

The second consists in constructing, on the basis of previously developed rules, a complete speculative scheme of rational concepts, independent of any historical conditions human life, nor on the content of the processed material.

Kant himself chooses the second path, which ultimately leads to the cold heights of the Hegelian Absolute Spirit. But his main idea that the structures of being depend, even on universally universal, but still human definitions, turned out to be more fruitful precisely on the first path. This path led to the development of a linguistic interpretation of categories, which was stimulated by the research of Wilhelm Humboldt.

As already shown, the main function of categories is to introduce a certain order into some undivided or unorganized integrity. This order, one way or another, is expressed (or displayed) in the language.

Lexical composition language and the totality of categories basically coincide, and any word, insofar as it generalizes, acts as category for a certain set of things. Thanks to this coincidence, even a person who is completely unaware of the existence theoretical schemes categorical analysis or synthesis, "sees" the world in a certain way ordered only because he uses his native language to describe it.

Language, just like categories, is not derived by each individual directly from his individual experience. Language has a pre-experimental (a priori) nature. Each individual person receives it as the legacy of a long line of past generations. But like any heritage, language, on the one hand, enriches, and on the other hand, binds a person before and independently of him by established norms and rules. Being, in relation to the knowable, subjective, the norms and rules of the language, in relation to the knower, are objective.

But if thinking can still be represented as absolutely pure (empty) thinking (Hegel and Husserl perfectly demonstrate this), then speech is unthinkable as absolutely “pure speech”, devoid of any definite content. Any conversation is a conversation about something. This "something" is the subject of speech, singled out and fixed in the word. Therefore, in words, as lexical units of language, both the primary division of being and the primary synthesis of sensory impressions are already taking place.

The history of the language does not have a clearly defined beginning. No matter how far back in time our research goes, wherever we find people, we find them already talking. But it is impossible that in the thinking of people who possess the word, those initial articulations of being and thought that already exist in language are completely absent. The notion of pure thinking, devoid of any content, working "on idle" is an abstraction that grows only on the soil of Cartesian cogito. Real thinking is never pure "thinking about nothing", it always has an intentional character, i.e. it is always directed at an object, there is always thinking about something definite.

At first glance, it seems that language, as a sign system, is completely neutral with respect to thought, which can be expressed in any arbitrarily chosen sign system: sound, graphic, color, etc. But in this case, it turns out that thought arises before language and is only expressed in it. Thinking is clothed in sounding speech as in a form (more precisely, as in one of possible forms) external expression of already existing own content.

The actual relationship between thought and language is much more complex. This becomes noticeable when the question of their genesis is raised.

Phylogeny (historical development), as a rule, is reproduced in individual development- ontogeny. As studies by J. Piaget have shown, the formation of categories in the mind of a child occurs after he has mastered the corresponding language structures. First, the child masters complex syntactic turns, such as "because", "where", "after", "despite", "if", etc., which serve to express causal, spatial, temporal, conditional - t .e. categorical relations.

Categories are not derived from subject experience, but are mastered along with mastering the language and are fixed, first of all, in skills. speech communication. They are recognized much later than they begin to be used in language practices. Apparently, and the order historical development The categories were the same. First, unconscious unconscious use, and only then (much later) comprehension.

Exist organic bond categories with certain types of quite real practical issues, each of which can be formulated with the direct use of the corresponding category: Where? - In which space? When? - In which time? etc. But vice versa, each category can be expressed as a question. " What is this?" category entities; "Where when?" - categories space and time; "What?, How much?" - quality and quantity; "Why?" - category causes; "What for?" - goals.

We ask being about those aspects, properties and characteristics that constitute the sphere of our vital interests. In the linguistic interpretation of the category, there are lines along which fragments and relations of interest to us are separated from total weight and appear before us as objects of our close attention. Each category represents a certain perspective in which we see being from a special point of view, and all together they form a kind of functional unity, fixed in the language system. Everyone who speaks the language is involved in this system, but this does not at all mean intentionality and full awareness of its application. Man, as Sartre notes, "is not so much a speaking being as a spoken one," and the language knows the person, perhaps to a greater extent than the person knows the language.

The culture of each community, like its language, is different from the culture and language of any other community. This gives us every reason to assume that the dividing lines that language draws along the "body" of being can form worlds that have different configurations. This idea was first expressed in the well-known hypothesis of linguistic relativity, called, after its authors, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.

“We dissect nature,” Whorf says, “in the direction suggested by our native language. We single out certain categories and types in the world of phenomena not at all because they (these categories and types) are self-evident ... We dissect the world, organize it into concepts and distribute meanings in this way and not otherwise, mainly because we are parties to an agreement that prescribes such a systematization ... It is impossible to determine a phenomenon, thing, object, relationship, etc., based on nature; definition always implies an appeal to the categories of a particular language.

The essence of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity is that the organization of the world of our experience depends on the categorical structure of a particular language, so even the same event can look completely different, depending on the language used. language tools. Indeed, a world in which "The rooster calls the hens with his crow" is different from a world in which "the crow of the rooster sets the hens in motion."

By accepting this hypothesis, we transfer the categories from the spheres of Aristotelian being, Kant's pure reason, or the Hegelian Absolute Idea into the sphere human language and we say goodbye to the hope that inspired these thinkers to discover (or create) an absolutely complete and complete system of categories, which would be single and unique "for all times and peoples." By placing the categories in the structures of language, we recognize that it is not being as such or consciousness in general that finds expression in them, but the concrete life world of a person belonging to a certain culture and historical epoch.

The idea of ​​the connection of categories with the immediate life world of a person is being developed in modern versions of phenomenological-existential philosophy. In the traditional sense, categories serve, first of all, to highlight and designate what is most important and significant for a person. But what seems important and significant from the point of view of the whole - a cultural community, for example - may be completely indifferent to a single, "this" person. For individual person the most important thing may be that which directly affects him, concerns precisely and only his individual being: his fears and hopes, aspirations and complexes, doubts and fears. Thus, in the context of philosophical research, completely non-traditional, so-called "existential categories" appear, such as, for example: "death", "fear", "abandonment", "care", etc.

Summing up our analysis, we can say the following. Regardless of the context of their interpretation, philosophical categories represent extremely broad generic definitions of being. How extreme common childbirth, they themselves do not have a higher genus standing above them and, therefore, cannot be, like concepts, defined by referring to a higher genus, with an indication of the specific difference. They are determined not through higher genera, but by establishing relationships with other categories. The concepts that are included in the semantic field of each category are subordinate to it and express one or another of its aspects, shades and specific forms of manifestation. The relationship between categories and concepts can be illustrated as follows.

Any concept has a specific subject area or volume, which includes a set of subjects covered by this concept. So, for example, the scope of the concept "table" is the set of all possible tables, and the concept of "house" is the set of all possible houses. It is clear that, since we mean not only actually existing, but also all possible tables or houses, the scope of each of these concepts is an infinite set, so we cannot say which of these concepts has a larger volume and which one has a smaller one. However, there are concepts, the relations between which are such that they make it possible to unambiguously determine which of the two compared infinities is greater. So, for example, an infinite number of birches is clearly less than an infinite number of trees, and an infinity of trees is less than an infinity of plants. We get a hierarchical series of concepts in which each subsequent one includes the previous one as its own. constituent part: birch - tree - plant - Live nature- nature - being. The concept completes this series, which exhausts the possibility of further expansion of the volume. This is the philosophical category, which acts as the broadest possible generalization, the absolute limit of further expansion of the subject area.

Concepts lower levels generalities outline the boundaries of the subject areas of specific sciences, and act as categories of a particular science, since they perform (within the area limited by them) the same role of limiting generalizations. For example, if the subject of philosophy is being, then nature is the subject of natural science in general, Live nature- the subject of biology, plant- Botany, and probably some kind of science is being studied at the Forestry Academy, the subject of which is only trees.

So, we found out that the role of philosophical and scientific categories in knowledge is extremely important. However, one universal system categories do not exist. On the different stages historical development, different types of categories become dominant in practical and spiritual activity, or, what is the same, various principles structuring of being and thinking. In general, each categorical conceptual system can be likened to a net that we throw into the ocean of being, in the hope of catching the Golden Fish of Absolute Knowledge. But each time this network brings to the surface only what the interwoven cells capture by us.

Linguistic terminology - a set of terms of the science of language. T. l. is an integral and main part of the metalanguage of linguistics, i.e. special language, with the help of which the properties are described natural language acting as a language-object. T. l. reflects the conceptual apparatus of various national scientific traditions, linguistic trends and schools, as well as the linguistic theories of individual authors. Therefore, T. l. exists not as a single semiological system, but as a "system of systems". This is due, in particular, to the so-called. polymorphism of linguistic terms, when the same term can denote different concepts in different scientific directions and national linguistic traditions (for example, a morpheme in Russian tradition is a generic term, and in French functional linguistics it is a species term, while a moneme acts as a generic one) or when the same linguistic phenomenon is denoted by different terms (cf. ablaut in it. traditions , apophony - in French). Similar terms with similar reference, but referring to different concepts and schools, can be qualified as quasi-synonyms (cf. also topic - topic, rheme - commentary). Besides, in T. l. there are complete synonyms, or doublets. They appear as a result different origin terms (recursion - indentation, distribution - distribution, linguistics - linguistics, linguistics), morphonological and morphological variation (geminate - geminat, morph - morph, one-root - one-root), syntactic variation (linguistic stylistics - linguo-stylistics, linguistic poetics - linguopoetics). The ambiguous correlation of expression and content planes is also reflected in T. l. as a polysemy of terms. The reasons for it may be the rethinking of old concepts, i.e., a new stage in the study of the object, and other processes associated with the accumulation of knowledge. Often found so-called. categorical ambiguity of terms - metonymic transfer of the type "action, process - result" (attraction, borrowing) or "area of ​​knowledge - "- object" (morphology, phonetics, semantics). Homonyms should be distinguished from ambiguous terms (adverb as dialect and adverb as a part of speech, topic as a term actual articulation sentences and theme as an Indo-European verb stem).
T. l. can be described in various aspects(synchronous and historical), can be classified according to various grounds. So, universal terms are singled out, denoting general categories, which are found in all languages ​​of the world (subject, predicate, sentence, theme, rheme, temporality), and unique ones, denoting phenomena specific to k.-l. language or group of languages ​​(cf. the term breed for Semitic languages). General scientific terms adjoin universal terms, the number of which in T. l. small (cf. system, structure, law). In T. l. also includes individual terms that belong to a certain author's concept and do not go beyond its limits (for example, kinema and akusma in I. A. Baudouin de Courtenay).
In its own way inner form linguistic terms are divided into motivated, where there is a semantic and structural correlation of its constituent morphemes with the morphemes of a given language (cf. front-lingual, back-palatal, flat-slit in Russian phonetic terminology), and unmotivated, among the latter, in addition to borrowings (see), also include tracing paper (see), which, in particular, form the basis of Russian. grammatical terminology (noun, preposition, pledge, person, etc.). These terms, being a literal translation of the corresponding Greek. and lat. terms became completely unmotivated (cf. also the unmotivated term directly constituents - tracing paper of the English immediate constituents). A. V. Isachenko attributed such terms to terms-names, in contrast to motivated terms-descriptions.
According to the genetic trait in the composition of the Russian. T. l. the terms originally Russian (linguistics, letter, stress), borrowings (ausla-ut, pidgin, shifter, sandhi, anakoluf) and those created on the basis of Greek-lat. term elements (microsociolinguistics, inessive, zoonym, inton-nema).
According to the composition, one-word (monolexeme) terms and terms-phrases (polylexemic) are distinguished, the number of which in Russian. T. l. is approx. 60% (cf. offer members, inconsistent definition, the main form of the phoneme). The latter should be distinguished from the addition of terms - a combination of two or more independent terms, cf. monophthongization //ascending diphthong, prototypical properties//subject, component analysis // lexical meaning the words. Among the ways of forming one-word terms in the composition of T. l. stand out: semantic - terminology of a word of a common language, often with a metaphorical transfer, cf. field, nest (of words), tree (of dependencies); this is also joined by the transfer of terms from other sciences, with their complete or partial rethinking (cf. A. A. Reformatsky’s differential and integral): word-building: suffixation (variance, variability, contextualization), prefixation (subtext, subordination, overdialect) , basic composition (word form, sound-type, group phoneme, two-focal). special role Greek-Lat play in the formation of terms.
elements, the combinational possibilities of which are practically unlimited. At the same time, the morphemic status of these elements is not always amenable to a clear definition, cf. von-ema, allo-fon, mor(pho)-f about n-o-logy. Various linguistic disciplines and directions prefer different principles of terminology. Thus, onomastic terminology is built almost entirely on Greek-Lat. elements (cf. topoanthro-ponim, astronomy, theonym). The theory of generative grammars, on the contrary, in its terminology prefers the term-metaphor, which is also reflected in Russian. English equivalents. terms (cf. ring, packaging, withering context).
Historical study of Russian. T. l. associated primarily with the development of grammatical terms. First grammar terms arose as a result of the transfer of the corresponding Greek and Latin words to glory, soil. The translators and creators of the first handwritten grammars (for example, the article “On the Osm Parts of the Word”, 14th century; “Donat” by Dm. Gerasimov, 1522; “Adelfotis”, 1591) sought to make the terms motivated and understandable by means of a literal translation (calque), because Slavic morphemic composition words did not possess these properties, cf. matrimony - conjugation (tracing-paper lat. conjugatio). In the grammars of L. Zizania (1596) and M. Smotrytsky (1619), a number of original terms appear, reflecting the grammatical structure of the Church Slavs. language. So, Zizaniy introduced the term instrumental case, Smotrytsky introduced the trace. terms: interjection (instead of difference), participle; systematized those that already existed: a noun (instead of the former, a real one), an adjective (instead of an attached one), a nominative case, a genitive case (instead of a nominal, rbdny) and some others. grammatical terminology starts from " Russian grammar» M. V. Lomonosov (1755), which was preceded by the grammars of I. Ludolph (1696) and V.E. Ado-durov (1731). Of the 230 terms of the Russian Grammar, half still exist today.

their status, correlation, interaction

(on the example of the functional-semantic category ‘intensity’)

In the field of topical and controversial issues modern linguistics Attention is drawn to the problem of considering such a dominant category of language as the category of intensity in relation to quantitative and expressiveness.

Quantity as a universal conceptual category, being refracted in the sphere of other categories, finds one of its expressions in the language category of intensity through the possibilities of representing quantitative modifications of the attribute value. When considering the correlation of the category of intensity with the category of quantitativeity, one can rely on the fundamental thoughts of de Courtenay, expressed in the work “Quantitativeness in Linguistic Thinking”. He notes that "... one of the sides of universal being is a whole complex of quantitative representations, covered, that is, dissected and united (integrated), by mathematical thinking", and highlights the quantitative intensity as an expression of the quantity (degree) of a feature [Baudouin de Courtenay 1963: 312 -313]. Relevant for modern linguistics is his idea about the correlation in the language of the category of quantity, which is an abstract category of human thinking, with the category of quality: “comparison different degrees quality gave, on the one hand, different grammatical degrees, and on the other hand, the designation of different degrees of intensity ... ". And finally, his idea is important that “the meaning of the tension and intensity of some elements of linguistic thinking appears most expressively in the field of semantics, both from the intellectual, mental, extrasensory side, and above all from the sensual side” . De Courtenay's concept stimulates the study of qualitative quantitative relations as such, as well as in their relationship with other types of relationships.

A broad interpretation of intensity also goes back to the ideas of S. Balli, who understands the term 'intensity' as “all differences that come down to the category of quantity, magnitude, value, strength, etc., regardless of whether we are talking about specific ideas or abstract ideas" and further elaborates that "... quantitative difference or difference in intensity is one of those general "categories" into which we introduce any objects of our perception or our thought" [Bally 1961: 203].

The category of intensity is included in the content plan of both the linguistic category of quality and the linguistic category of quantity, therefore, it is associated with the qualitative-quantitative category of the measure. However, the intensity category is not synonymous with the measure category, since the intensity indicates the development of a feature within the measure and does not entail a change in this quality. It follows from this that the category of intensity is a particular variety of the category of quantity, namely, “non-discrete, continuous quantity”, which is determined “by means of measurement” [Panfilov 1976: 3].

The category of intensity in the field of concepts, along with the category of measure of quantity, is also correlated with the category of gradualness (E. Sapir, and others). Relevant for modern linguistics is the idea of ​​E. Sapir that any graded value is not absolute, but relative and contains the idea of ​​comparison. In his work "Psychology of Graduation" the connection between the categories of quantity and intensity is also affirmed, and the primacy of the latter as expressing an approximate quantity is emphasized. E. Sapir distinguishes between grading in relation to the norm and in relation to comparability, that is, it was he who established the opposition of graduated and point concepts. So, he notes: “the logical norm between them (polar signs - S.S.) is felt by a person not as a true norm, but rather as a blurred zone in which ordered in opposite directions quality” [Sapir 1985: 54].

On the one hand, the gradualness is subjective, because it depends on the perception of the individual and the characteristics speech situation, on the other hand, it directly depends on the collective idea developed in society about the norm as some neutral manifestation of a qualitative feature for certain objects of reality.

The term ‘intensity’ in its application to semantics in the last quarter of the 20th century has received significant distribution in linguistics, which is associated with the development functional grammar, expressive style. However, with comparatively large volume literature anyway. dedicated to research range of problems associated with this term, it has not yet received a generally accepted interpretation. The incomplete representation of the corresponding terminology in linguistic dictionaries also testifies to the poor development of this problem.

Some researchers define intensity as a functional-semantic category: “intensity is a functional-semantic category, since it expresses the meaning high level generalization, is characterized by different levels of means of expression and the field organization of these means” [Sheigal 1990: 11]. Others - the intensity is associated with the denotative-significative and connotative aspects of the word.

Intensity, therefore, is closely related to the category of quantity and is in direct connection with the category of emotionality and expressiveness. Although the semantics of amplification has been disclosed in a number of studies on the material of different levels of language, primarily lexical, nevertheless, its status and relationship with related categories remains debatable. In the works devoted to the range of these problems, there is an understanding of intensity as an increase in expressiveness, as a dominant component that is systematically realized in affective speech.

It is significant that S. Bally, in connection with the tasks of studying stylistics, considers “emotional intensity”, since, in his opinion, stylistics explores “... the expressive facts of the language system from the point of view of their emotional content, that is, the expression in speech of phenomena from the realm of feelings and action of speech facts on feelings. His idea about the impossibility of reducing all means of intensification to lexical ones is also very valuable. In particular, he refers to the means of intensification both the section of linguistics, which he called "affective syntax", and prosodic.

As in the study of S. Balli, in the article by E. Sapir "Psychology of Graduation" the idea is raised about the interaction of intensity with emotionality, namely with " emotional aspect» in terms of expressing the relationship between the participants in the communicative act. Considering grading in its relationship with the norm and subjective judgments(emotionality), E. Sapir also touches on the category of appraisal. At the same time, he points out that “after a person has gained experience in determining what society accepts and rejects, what it evaluates (highlighted by us - S.S.) as well known , and what, as unknown or unusual, he begins to accept contrasting qualities as having, in general, an absolute, so to speak, nature.

Last quarter of XX and early XIX centuries are characterized by a sharply increased interest of linguists in the problem under consideration, which is probably due to the priority position of semantics in the linguistics of this period, called the "semantic explosion" (), as well as the anthropocentric approach to language.

One of the debatable issues of modern linguistics is the question of the correlation between the category of intensity and the category of expressiveness. In modern general and particular linguistic literature devoted to this issue, the category of intensity is usually included in the category of expressiveness (, etc.). So, he believes that there is a narrow and broad interpretation of the category of expressiveness: “In broad sense expressiveness is understood as the expressiveness of speech, which arises on the basis of such semantic properties language units, as emotionality, evaluativeness, figurativeness ... In a narrow sense, expressiveness is considered as intensity, as an amplification contained in the meaning of the word (highlighted by us - S.S.) the degree of manifestation of some feature” [Sternin 1983: 123]. Intensity and expressiveness are also understood as a measure and a “measurable property of speech” (, etc.). In particular, he notes that “... if for the intellectual function the opposition is relevant - yes / no, then for the expressive function the opposition is relevant - stronger / weaker, and for the emotional function - good / bad. Thus, expressiveness is measured by intensity, and emotionality by evaluativeness” [Shakhovsky 1975: 17], and points out that “intensity is a measure of the degree of expressiveness, a measure of figurativeness, expressiveness, evaluativeness… The degree of intensity is a measure of expressiveness” [Turansky 1992: 29].

The research also reflects the idea of ​​correlation between the category of intensity and the category of expressiveness as a cause and effect (, etc.). Thus, he notes that “…between intensity and expressiveness there are not inclusive, but causal relationships…” [Livanova 1995: 22]. However, the interpretation of these categories as being in a cause-and-effect relationship, in our opinion, is not correct enough, since cause and effect are ontological categories presented as two situations connected by a logical proposition. Obviously, we can only talk about this or that relationship and interdependence of such categories as intensity and expressiveness. The similarity of the semantics of expressiveness and intensity is also determined by the fact that “expression is based on a deliberate discrepancy between any linguistic or speech means language standards, i.e., the most regular, stable models” [Kharchenko 1976: 68].

Thus, intensity is understood by us as a category associated with such a quantitative qualification of a phenomenon that demonstrates a deviation from the “regulatory zone” (). At the same time, we consider it necessary to emphasize its dual nature: on the one hand, it has an ontological status as a category that lies within the framework of quantitative relations, i.e., it has an extralinguistic referent, on the other hand, receiving the character of emphasis, it switches to the connotative level of language and speech, interacting with the category of expressiveness.

Literature

Bali Sh. French style / S. Bally. - M., 1961. - 394 p.

Baudouin de Quantity in linguistic thinking / de Courtenay // Selected works on general linguistics. - M., 1963. - V.2. - S. 311-324.

Expressive vocabulary colloquial use/ . - Novosibirsk, 1986. - 230 p.

Sapir E. Psychology of graduation / E. Sapir // New in foreign linguistics. Issue. 16. - M., 1985. - S. 43-78.

Sternin I. A. About three types of expressiveness of the word / // The structure of linguistic stylistics and its main categories. - Perm, 1983. - S. 123-127.

The distinction between evaluativeness, imagery, expression and emotionality in the semantics of the word / // Russian language at school, 1976. - No. 3. - S. 66-71.

The problem of distinguishing expressiveness and emotionality as semantic categories linguistics / // Problems of semasiology and linguistic stylistics. - Ryazan, 1975. Issue. 2. - S. 3-25.

Gradation in lexical semantics / . - Kuibyshev, 1990. - 95 p.

Introduction

The question of the mental basis of language structures and their speech realizations is considered in the modern linguistic paradigm as one of the most important. In this regard, research within the framework of the relatively recently declared itself conceptual linguistics - a field of linguistics focused on the analysis of the genesis, development and functioning of language structures in terms of their conditionality by a mental substrate, the most important component of which are discrete elements of consciousness - concepts (concepts), which are capable of being grouped into complex structures called conceptual categories. The latter have already been the subject of quite numerous studies, but have not received any uniform interpretation. The purpose of this article is to give an overview of the history of the issue of conceptual categories and propose a possible taxonomy of their essential characteristics and functions.

1. Information from the history of the issue

For the first time the term “conceptual categories” was introduced into scientific use by O. Jespersen in his classical work“Philosophy of Grammar”, which was published in 1924, O. Jespersen admits that “along with syntactic categories, or besides them, or behind these categories, depending on the structure of each language, in the form in which it exists, there are also extralinguistic categories independent of more or less random facts existing languages. These categories are universal in that they apply to all languages, although they are rarely expressed in those languages ​​in a clear and unambiguous way. (…) For lack of a better term, I will call these categories conceptual categories.” Without excluding the traditional approach to the study of languages ​​- from form to content (semasiological approach), O. Jespersen, like his contemporary F. Bruno, considers important the method of studying a language with inside, from the inside, going from content to form, thus laying the foundations of onomasiology.

It is with this approach that it becomes clear that significant role which conceptual categories play in the success of linguistic research, and the question arises of defining their ontology and functions.

The term “conceptual categories”, as noted above, belongs to O. Jespersen; however, it would be erroneous to assume that the theory of conceptual categories as the mental substratum of language began to develop only with the works of this researcher. It should be recognized that even before O. Jespersen, linguistic literature suggested the existence of a certain mental entity that precedes linguistic (especially grammatical) constructions and underlies them.

There is reason to believe that W. von Humboldt was the first to substantiate the existence of a “universal component” of a language (or, rather, languages) from the proper linguistic positions in connection with his typological studies and the creation of a morphological classification of languages. S. D. Katsnelson sums up Humboldt's statements on this topic found in various works as follows: “Universal categories are mostly mental forms of logical origin. They form a system that is common ground language, but not directly included in the structure of the language. At the same time, they cannot be called properly logical, since, being turned towards grammar, they reveal specific features. One might say that they constitute the realm of "logical grammar," which is essentially neither logic nor grammar; it is an ideal system that does not coincide with the categories of individual languages. In every separate language categories of ideal logic are transformed into specific grammatical categories. Although Humboldt's "universal categories" are not quite Jespersen's "conceptual categories" (which is quite natural: Humboldt is mostly a typologist, and Jespersen is a grammarian), nevertheless, the coincidence of the essential characteristics of both is striking.

Some time passes, and G. Paul in his work “Principles of the History of Language”, published in 1880, dwells in sufficient detail on such categories, calling them “psychological categories” in accordance with the traditions of his time and in the spirit of the neo-grammatical teaching. G. Paul believes that any grammatical category arises on the basis of psychological ones, and the first is nothing more than an external expression of the second. As soon as the effectiveness of the psychological category begins to be revealed in linguistic means, this category becomes grammatical. Note that this provision obviously echoes Humboldt's idea of ​​"transforming" the universal categories he considers into specific grammatical categories. According to Paul, with the creation of the grammatical category, the effectiveness of the psychological category is not destroyed. The psychological category is independent of language (cf. O. Jespersen's statement quoted above about the extralinguistic nature of conceptual categories and that they do not depend on more or less random facts of existing languages.); existing before the emergence of the grammatical category, it continues to function after its occurrence, due to which the harmony that originally existed between both categories can be broken over time. The grammatical category, according to Paul, being associated with a stable tradition, is to a certain extent a “frozen” form of the psychological category. The latter always remains something free, alive, taking on a different shape depending on individual perception. In addition, a change in meaning very often contributes to the fact that the grammatical category does not remain an adequate psychological category. Paul believes that if a tendency to equalization subsequently appears, then a shift in the grammatical category occurs, in which peculiar relationships may arise that do not fit into the categories that existed before. Further, the author makes an important methodological conclusion concerning the linguistic value of the analysis of the processes of interaction between “psychological” and grammatical categories: "The consideration of these processes, which we can trace in some detail, gives us at the same time the opportunity to judge the initial emergence of grammatical categories that are inaccessible to our observation."

At about the same time as O. Jespersen, the French linguist G. Guillaume developed the theory of the conceptual basis of the language. Not received enough attention and deserved appreciation during the life of the author, now G. Guillaume's theory is the object of close study and analysis. Considering the issues of the language analysis method, the essence of the linguistic sign, the genesis of the word and its systemic nature, and others, G. Guillaume constantly refers to the conceptual factor, strives to study the mental and linguistic in their close relationship. Before the publication in 1992 of G. Guillaume's book “Principles of Theoretical Linguistics”, his concept was known to the Russian-speaking reader primarily thanks to the works of E.A. And although these authors differ in the interpretation of some provisions of Guillaume's linguistics, both scholars note the most important place in it of the conceptual component.

At present, there is every reason to believe that G. Guillaume managed to create his own linguistic school, called “vector linguistics”, or “psychosystematics”. On its principles, descriptions of individual subsystems of the English language (for example, the name and article, as well as the verb) have already been created. Among the students and followers of G. Guillaume are R.-L. Wagner. P.Imbs, R.Lafont, B.Potier, J.Stefanini, J.Moynier, M.Mollo, J.Maillard and others. Giving an assessment to their linguistic works, L.M.Skrelina considers close attention to to specific linguistic facts, which comes from G. Guillaume, and the desire to consider them “from the inside”, from the side of the signified, starting from conceptual categories when explaining the functioning of elements in speech.

Following O. Jespersen, II Meshchaninov raises the question of the nature of conceptual categories. The first work of the scientist, which laid the foundation for the development of his theory of conceptual categories, was published in 1945. It was followed by another whole line works devoted to this problem. The impetus for these studies was the insufficient elaboration of the question of the relationship between language and thinking, especially the fact that “the establishment of a common point of view on the relationship between language and thinking was largely hampered by blind and categorical borrowing from textbooks of logic and psychology, which boils down to attempts to interpret linguistic facts. from the point of view of the provisions developed in them. The facts of the language were illuminated from the outside, instead of receiving their explanation within themselves. In addition, the typological studies conducted by I.I. Meshchaninov led the scientist to the idea that the differences between languages ​​are not absolute, but relative in nature and relate mainly to the form of content explication, while such concepts as objectivity and action, subject, predicate , object, attribute with their modal nuances, as well as relationships between words in a sentence are common to all languages. The identification of this universal mental substratum became a problematic in the works of I.I. Meshchaninov, connected with the analysis of conceptual categories.

Among other most famous domestic researchers who contributed to the development of the topic of the mental foundations of the language, one should mention S.D. Katsnelson. S. D. Katsnelson develops this topic in relation to three main areas of linguistic research: general grammar and theory of parts of speech; the problem of generating an utterance and speech-thinking processes; typological comparison of languages. Let's consider all three of these areas in more detail.

Opposing formal understanding parts of speech, based on the allocation of formal features and specific categories from words, which are formed on the basis of inflectional morphology, S.D. Katsnelson, following L.V. . The taxonomy of the elements of the language, therefore, is carried out by him on an onomasiological basis - from meaning to form (compare the above points of view on this issue by O. Jespersen and F. Bruno). According to S. D. Katsnelson, “in the very meanings of words, regardless of whether they are inflectional or according to the norms of a different morphology, there are some strong points that allow us to talk about nouns, adjectives, etc.”. Conceptual and semantic categories serve as such “strongholds”.

In the theory of speech generation, S.D. Katsnelson adheres to the understanding of the process of speech generation that is typical for representatives of generative semantics, in which the initial structure of the generative process and one of the basic concepts of the whole concept is a proposition. The latter is understood as a kind of mental content expressing a certain “state of affairs”, an event, a state as a relationship between logically equal objects. As part of the proposition, the members-bearers of the relation and the relational predicate linking them are distinguished. Moreover, each of the members of the proposition in itself is neither a subject nor a direct object, but as part of the sentences that have arisen on the basis of the proposition, it can appear in any of these syntactic functions. “The proposition contains an element of figurativeness and in this respect reflects reality more directly than a sentence. Like a picture, it depicts a holistic episode, without prescribing the direction and order of consideration of individual details. Propositions, acting as operational schemes at the initial stage of the speech-generating process, although they are focused on a certain semantic content, but by themselves, without filling the “places” they open with certain meanings, they are not meaningful enough to serve as the basis for their further transformation into sentences. These structures need special units, completing propositional functions. Concepts are such units. As can be seen from these reasonings of the scientist, not only the existence of a certain mental substrate, which has a non-linguistic character and serves as the basis of the speech-producing process, is allowed, but also its heterogeneity, complex structuring is noted.

As for typological research, according to S.D. Katsnelson, the involvement of the content side in the orbit of these studies is necessary due to at least the fact that in the field of content, languages ​​also show features of both similarities and differences. Emphasizing the fundamental possibility of transition from the semantic system of one language to semantic system another language, the scientist focuses on the universal, universal thought processes that underlie speech-creative activity. On the other hand, “the transition from the logical-semantic system to the idio-semantic system of a given language does not present significant difficulties, since, remaining within the same language, we always know when the configuration of conceptual components forms a value fixed by the norm and when more than one corresponds to it, but multiple values. When we encounter a new language for us, these boundaries disappear due to a different distribution of conceptual components between meanings compared to the one with which we have become accustomed. It is the conceptual components of meanings that are the sine qua non condition for their typological (interlingual) congruence.”

It is possible to sum up S. D. Katsnelson's views on the significance of the mental pre-linguistic substrate as follows: “Thinking categories form the basis of the grammatical structure, since they help to comprehend sensory data and transform them into propositions.”

Research in line with this issue was further developed in the works of A.V. Bondarko in connection with the development by this author of the category of the functional-semantic field, as well as his analysis of the functional-semantic, semantic/structural categories. Of particular note is the article by A.V. Bondarko “ Conceptual categories and language semantic features in grammar”, which is specially devoted to the consideration of the correlation of these entities and the analysis of the linguistic semantic interpretation of conceptual categories. The article also considers the question of the universality of conceptual categories. In general, it should be emphasized that A.V. Bondarko, repeatedly noting close connection of his theoretical research with the views of O. Jespersen and I.I. Meshchaninov, expresses at the same time his own, somewhat different attitude to the problem under consideration. Relying on the theory of conceptual categories, A.V. Bondarko at the same time somewhat departs from it. The direction chosen by him is determined by the desire to consistently interpret the categories under consideration as linguistic categories that have linguistic content and linguistic expression. This is also related to the refusal of the scientist from the term “conceptual category”, because, as he believes, this term gives reason to think that they mean logical concepts, not language categories.

Introduction
The question of the mental basis of language structures and their speech realizations is considered in the modern linguistic paradigm as one of the most important. In this regard, research within the framework of the relatively recently declared itself conceptual linguistics - a field of linguistics focused on the analysis of the genesis, development and functioning of language structures in terms of their conditionality by a mental substrate, the most important component of which are discrete elements of consciousness - concepts (concepts), which are capable of being grouped into complex structures called conceptual categories. The latter have already been the subject of quite numerous studies, but have not received any uniform interpretation. The purpose of this article is to give an overview of the history of the issue of conceptual categories and propose a possible taxonomy of their essential characteristics and functions.
1. Information from the history of the issue
For the first time the term “conceptual categories” was introduced into scientific use by O. Jespersen in his classic work “Philosophy of Grammar”, which was published in 1924. O. Jespersen admits that “along with syntactic categories, or besides them, or behind these categories , depending on the structure of each language, in the form in which it exists, there are still extralinguistic categories that do not depend on the more or less accidental facts of existing languages. These categories are universal in that they apply to all languages, although they are rarely expressed in those languages ​​in a clear and unambiguous way. (…) For lack of a better term, I will call these categories conceptual categories.” Without excluding the traditional approach to the study of languages ​​- from form to content (semasiological approach), O. Jespersen, like his contemporary F. Bruno, considers it important to study the language from the inside, from the inside, going from content to form, thus laying , fundamentals of onomasiology.
It is with this approach that the essential role that conceptual categories play in the success of linguistic research becomes obvious, and the question arises of determining their ontology and functions.
The term “conceptual categories”, as noted above, belongs to O. Jespersen; however, it would be erroneous to assume that the theory of conceptual categories as the mental substratum of language began to develop only with the works of this researcher. It should be recognized that even before O. Jespersen, linguistic literature suggested the existence of a certain mental entity that precedes linguistic (especially grammatical) constructions and underlies them.
There is reason to believe that W. von Humboldt was the first to substantiate the existence of a “universal component” of a language (or, rather, languages) from the proper linguistic positions in connection with his typological studies and the creation of a morphological classification of languages. S. D. Katsnelson sums up Humboldt's statements on this topic found in various works as follows: “Universal categories are mostly mental forms of logical origin. They form a system that is the general basis of the language, but is not directly included in the structure of the language. At the same time, they cannot be called properly logical, since, being turned towards grammar, they reveal specific features. One might say that they constitute the realm of "logical grammar," which is essentially neither logic nor grammar; it is an ideal system that does not coincide with the categories of individual languages. In each individual language, the categories of ideal logic are transformed into specific grammatical categories. Although Humboldt's "universal categories" are not quite Jespersen's "conceptual categories" (which is quite natural: Humboldt is mostly a typologist, and Jespersen is a grammarian), nevertheless, the coincidence of the essential characteristics of both is striking.
Some time passes, and G. Paul in his work “Principles of the History of Language”, published in 1880, dwells in sufficient detail on such categories, calling them “psychological categories” in accordance with the traditions of his time and in the spirit of the neo-grammatical teaching. G. Paul believes that any grammatical category arises on the basis of psychological ones, and the first is nothing more than an external expression of the second. As soon as the effectiveness of the psychological category begins to be revealed in linguistic means, this category becomes grammatical. Note that this provision obviously echoes Humboldt's idea of ​​"transforming" the universal categories he considers into specific grammatical categories. According to Paul, with the creation of the grammatical category, the effectiveness of the psychological category is not destroyed. The psychological category is independent of language (cf. O. Jespersen's statement quoted above about the extralinguistic nature of conceptual categories and that they do not depend on more or less random facts of existing languages.); existing before the emergence of the grammatical category, it continues to function after its occurrence, due to which the harmony that originally existed between both categories can be broken over time. The grammatical category, according to Paul, being associated with a stable tradition, is to a certain extent a “frozen” form of the psychological category. The latter always remains something free, alive, taking on a different shape depending on individual perception. In addition, a change in meaning very often contributes to the fact that the grammatical category does not remain an adequate psychological category. Paul believes that if a tendency to equalization subsequently appears, then a shift in the grammatical category occurs, in which peculiar relationships may arise that do not fit into the categories that existed before. Further, the author makes an important methodological conclusion regarding the linguistic value of the analysis of the processes of interaction between “psychological” and grammatical categories: “Consideration of these processes, which we can trace in some detail, at the same time gives us the opportunity to judge the initial emergence of grammatical categories that are inaccessible to our observation.”
At about the same time as O. Jespersen, the French linguist G. Guillaume developed the theory of the conceptual basis of the language. Not received enough attention and deserved appreciation during the life of the author, now G. Guillaume's theory is the object of close study and analysis. Considering the issues of the language analysis method, the essence of the linguistic sign, the genesis of the word and its systemic nature, and others, G. Guillaume constantly refers to the conceptual factor, strives to study the mental and linguistic in their close relationship. Before the publication in 1992 of G. Guillaume's book “Principles of Theoretical Linguistics”, his concept was known to the Russian-speaking reader primarily thanks to the works of E.A. And although these authors differ in the interpretation of some provisions of Guillaume's linguistics, both scholars note the most important place in it of the conceptual component.
At present, there is every reason to believe that G. Guillaume managed to create his own linguistic school, called “vector linguistics”, or “psychosystematics”. On its principles, descriptions of individual subsystems of the English language (for example, the name and article, as well as the verb) have already been created. Among the students and followers of G. Guillaume are R.-L. Wagner. P.Imbs, R.Lafont, B.Potier, J.Stefanini, J.Moynier, M.Mollo, J.Maillard and others. Giving an assessment to their linguistic works, L.M.Skrelina considers close attention to to specific linguistic facts, which comes from G. Guillaume, and the desire to consider them “from the inside”, from the side of the signified, starting from conceptual categories when explaining the functioning of elements in speech.
Following O. Jespersen, II Meshchaninov raises the question of the nature of conceptual categories. The first work of the scientist, which marked the beginning of his development of the theory of conceptual categories, was published in 1945. It was followed by a number of other works devoted to this problem. The impetus for these studies was the insufficient elaboration of the question of the relationship between language and thinking, especially the fact that “the establishment of a common point of view on the relationship between language and thinking was largely hampered by blind and categorical borrowing from textbooks of logic and psychology, which boils down to attempts to interpret linguistic facts. from the point of view of the provisions developed in them. The facts of the language were illuminated from the outside, instead of receiving their explanation within themselves. In addition, the typological studies conducted by I.I. Meshchaninov led the scientist to the idea that the differences between languages ​​are not absolute, but relative in nature and relate mainly to the form of content explication, while such concepts as objectivity and action, subject, predicate , object, attribute with their modal nuances, as well as relationships between words in a sentence are common to all languages. The identification of this universal mental substratum became a problematic in the works of I.I. Meshchaninov, connected with the analysis of conceptual categories.
Among other most famous domestic researchers who contributed to the development of the topic of the mental foundations of the language, one should mention S.D. Katsnelson. S. D. Katsnelson develops this topic in relation to three main areas of linguistic research: general grammar and theory of parts of speech; the problem of generating an utterance and speech-thinking processes; typological comparison of languages. Let's consider all three of these areas in more detail.
Speaking against the formal understanding of parts of speech, based on the allocation of formal features and specific categories from words, which are formed on the basis of inflectional morphology, S.D. Katsnelson, following L.V. The category considers the meaning of the word. The taxonomy of the elements of the language, therefore, is carried out by him on an onomasiological basis - from meaning to form (compare the above points of view on this issue by O. Jespersen and F. Bruno). According to S. D. Katsnelson, “in the very meanings of words, regardless of whether they are inflectional or according to the norms of a different morphology, there are some strong points that allow us to talk about nouns, adjectives, etc.”. Conceptual and semantic categories serve as such “strongholds”.
In the theory of speech generation, S.D. Katsnelson adheres to the understanding of the process of speech generation that is typical for representatives of generative semantics, in which the initial structure of the generative process and one of the basic concepts of the whole concept is a proposition. The latter is understood as a kind of mental content expressing a certain “state of affairs”, an event, a state as a relationship between logically equal objects. As part of the proposition, the members-bearers of the relation and the relational predicate linking them are distinguished. Moreover, each of the members of the proposition in itself is neither a subject nor a direct object, but as part of the sentences that have arisen on the basis of the proposition, it can appear in any of these syntactic functions. “The proposition contains an element of figurativeness and in this respect reflects reality more directly than a sentence. Like a picture, it depicts a holistic episode, without prescribing the direction and order of consideration of individual details. Propositions, acting as operational schemes at the initial stage of the speech-generating process, although they are focused on a certain semantic content, but by themselves, without filling the “places” they open with certain meanings, they are not meaningful enough to serve as the basis for their further transformation into sentences. These structures need special units to complete propositional functions. Concepts are such units. As can be seen from these reasonings of the scientist, not only the existence of a certain mental substrate, which has a non-linguistic character and serves as the basis of the speech-producing process, is allowed, but also its heterogeneity, complex structuring is noted.
As for typological research, according to S.D. Katsnelson, the involvement of the content side in the orbit of these studies is necessary due to at least the fact that in the field of content, languages ​​also show features of both similarities and differences. Emphasizing the fundamental possibility of the transition from the semantic system of one language to the semantic system of another language, the scientist focuses on the universal, universal human thought processes that underlie speech-creative activity. On the other hand, “the transition from the logical-semantic system to the idio-semantic system of a given language does not present significant difficulties, since, remaining within the same language, we always know when the configuration of conceptual components forms a value fixed by the norm and when more than one corresponds to it, but multiple values. When we encounter a new language for us, these boundaries disappear due to a different distribution of conceptual components between meanings compared to the one with which we have become accustomed. It is the conceptual components of meanings that are the sine qua non condition for their typological (interlingual) congruence.”
It is possible to sum up S. D. Katsnelson's views on the significance of the mental pre-linguistic substrate as follows: “Thinking categories form the basis of the grammatical structure, since they help to comprehend sensory data and transform them into propositions.”
Research in line with this issue was further developed in the works of A.V. Bondarko in connection with the development by this author of the category of the functional-semantic field, as well as his analysis of the functional-semantic, semantic/structural categories. Of particular note is the article by A.V. Bondarko “Conceptual categories and linguistic semantic functions in grammar”, which is specially devoted to the consideration of the relationship between these entities and the analysis of the linguistic semantic interpretation of conceptual categories. The article also considers the question of the universality of conceptual categories. In general, it should be emphasized that A.V. Bondarko, repeatedly noting the close connection of his theoretical research with the views of O. Jespersen and I.I. Meshchaninov, at the same time expresses his own, somewhat different attitude to the problem under consideration. Relying on the theory of conceptual categories, A.V. Bondarko at the same time somewhat departs from it. The direction chosen by him is determined by the desire to consistently interpret the categories under consideration as linguistic categories that have linguistic content and linguistic expression. This is also related to the rejection of the term “conceptual category” by the scientist, since, as he believes, this term gives reason to think that logical concepts are meant, and not categories of language.
A significant contribution to the study of the conceptual sphere of thinking in its relation to language was made by the American linguist W. L. Chafe. In his most famous work, The Meaning and Structure of Language, he considers meaning from the point of view of the conceptual (ideational) theory of language. This theory states that ideas or concepts are real entities in the minds of people and that they are denoted by sounds through language so that they can be transferred from the mind of one individual to the mind of another. WL Chafe believes that the conceptual structure and the surface structure are different things: and if the surface structure is represented by the material means of language and given to us in sensory perception, then the concepts are deep inside the human nervous system. According to W. L. Chafe, we cannot make conceptual spectrograms, x-rays, or tape recordings in order to examine them slowly and carefully. Among other processes, W.L. Chaif ​​in his book considers the process of communication from the point of view of the use by communicants of the conceptual apparatus that they have, analyzes the problem of combining an increasing inventory of concepts with a strictly limited set of linguistic symbols, writes about the non-linear nature of concepts. He characterizes the mechanism of communication as the excitation and activation by the speaking means of the language of conceptual entities in the mind of the listener. At the same time, W. L. Chafe is fully aware of the complexity of the study of the conceptual sphere: “To say that concepts exist does not mean that we are able to single them out in the blink of an eye in our minds or that we have satisfactory ways of representing them. and review."
Having briefly described the most basic research in the field of conceptual categories in the historical aspect, let us proceed to the presentation of the actual theoretical aspects of this problem.
2. Functions of conceptual categories
As soon as one has to admit the existence of human mind conceptual categories, then full height the problem of their ontological status arises, the definition of that sphere, that “floor” of consciousness where they are rooted, as well as their relationship to the phenomena of reality and categories of logic and language.
On this occasion, researchers express different points of view, often not devoid of some duality, and sometimes internal inconsistency. So, O. Jespersen, establishing the extralinguistic nature of conceptual categories, insists in his further presentation that it is always necessary to remember that they must have a linguistic meaning. O. Jespersen believes that we want to understand linguistic (linguistic) phenomena, and therefore it would be wrong to get down to business without taking into account the existence of language in general, classifying objects and concepts without regard to their linguistic expression.
Reflecting on the status of conceptual categories, I.I. Meshchaninov strongly points out the need to distinguish them from the categories of logic and psychology and characterizes them as follows: “We have to trace in the language itself, in its lexical groupings and correspondences, in morphology and syntax, the expression of those concepts, which are created by the norms of consciousness and form sustained schemes in the language. These concepts, expressed in the language itself, albeit in a non-grammatical form grammatical concept, remain within the linguistic material. Therefore, they do not come out of the total number of language categories. At the same time, expressing in the language the norms of the acting consciousness, these concepts reflect the general categories of thinking in its real manifestation, in this case in the language. However, in one of his subsequent works, I.I. Meshchaninov, contradicting his previous views, interprets conceptual categories as a kind of logical-grammatical categories.
To a large extent, the point of view of S.D. Katsnelson, according to which concepts and meaningful grammatical functions, due to their direct or indirect conditionality to extralinguistic reality and due to the variety of ways of their expression in the language, within certain limits they are independent of the language. Since, however, the mode of expression is not "neutral" in relation to the content, the study of linguistic content is impossible without taking into account the conditions for its distribution among the forms of the language.
Interesting in terms of analyzing the problem under consideration is the concept of A.V. Bondarko, who considers it necessary to distinguish between conceptual (logical, mental) categories and bilateral linguistic unities such as the functional-semantic fields he establishes. These fields include semantic elements in the interpretation of this particular language and specific elements of the expression plan also of this particular language. This implies the interpretation of these fields as unities located on the surface level, which, however, does not mean that the connection with the deep level is excluded. The author sees such a connection in the fact that the semantic functions, the carriers of which are the elements of this field, are a “surface” realization of a certain “deep” invariant conceptual category or a complex of such categories. So, we can assume that the proper conceptual categories, which have a universal character, refer to deep level, while the concrete language semantic interpretation of a given conceptual category, the organization of linguistic means that serve to express given value, the distribution of the semantic load between morphological, syntactic, lexical and word-formation means - all this belongs to the surface level.
A.V. Bondarko proposes the idea of ​​highlighting several levels of the contensive side of the language. Semantics, according to his point of view, exists both at the deep and at the surface level. Deep semantics is characterized by him as not having a specific language organization and interpretation and not assigned to certain linguistic means. Surface semantics, based on deep semantics, refers already to a given, specific language. Deep conceptual invariants here appear in variants, the general configuration of which and many details are characteristic of this particular language. Thus, conceptual categories play functionally active role and in relation to deep semantics, where they are implemented in variants of generally valid ones that do not have specific language specifics, and in relation to surface semantics, where they are implemented in such variants that constitute a specific feature of this particular language or group of languages, unlike other languages.
In one of his subsequent works, A.V. Bondarko comes to the idea of ​​the need to distinguish between conceptual categories. He distinguishes two types: fundamental conceptual categories, which are obligatory and universal, and non-fundamental categories - optional and non-universal. Such a division of semantic and conceptual categories testifies to a subtle analysis of the object of study and to the scientist's awareness of the complexity and versatility of systemic relations between entities that are not given to a person in direct sensory perception. Unfortunately, we have to state that the reverse side of such a classification is its some cumbersomeness, not always a clear enough identification of the relationship between the proposed levels, sometimes the lack of a clear delimitation of one level from another. Not quite clear, for example, is the difference between non-fundamental conceptual categories and categories of surface semantics. Apparently, realizing this, A.V. Bondarko writes that, perhaps, non-functional conceptual categories should be called not conceptual categories, but in some other way.
So, what is the place of conceptual categories in the structure of human consciousness and what are their functions? I.I. Meshchaninov’s position on this issue seems to be quite correct: “They serve as the connecting element that ultimately connects the linguistic material with the general structure of human thinking, and therefore with the categories of logic and psychology.” There are several very important ideas in this judgment. Firstly, it is shown that conceptual categories are, as it were, bidirectional: on one side they are turned to universal logical and psychological categories and laws and through them are connected with objective reality; on the other hand, they are turned to the linguistic material and find their expression in the facts of the language (cf. the property of “two-facedness” of conceptual categories noted by A.I. Varshavskaya). Secondly, the conceptual categories, located between the logical-psychological and linguistic ones, are not in the proper sense either one or the other; they have their own, relatively independent status. Thirdly, in the above statement by I.I. Meshchaninov, the idea of ​​the “multi-story” nature of human consciousness is unequivocally expressed, where each “floor” is directly connected with the neighboring ones, relatively independent of them due to the presence of specific functions, and together with all forms a single building of the human mentality .
O. Jespersen was also right, distinguishing between conceptual and language sphere and thus establishing the non-identity of conceptual and linguistic categories: “More than once we will have to state that grammatical categories are in best case symptoms or shadows cast by conceptual categories; sometimes the “concept” behind a grammatical phenomenon turns out to be as elusive as the Kantian thing-in-itself.”
Thus, conceptual categories are mental categories relevant to the language, oriented, on the one hand, to the logical-psychological categories, and on the other, to the semantic categories of the language. Representing the result of human experience mediated by the universal laws of thought, they, in turn, are the basis of the semantic structures of the language, a necessary prerequisite for the functioning of the language system as a whole. The following two remarks should be made here.
First. Saying that the conceptual categories in the genetic plan, as it were, “anticipate” the linguistic categories, precede them, it is necessary to take into account the fact of the heterogeneity of conceptual categories. So, if the conceptual category of quantitativeity is formed in consciousness and then takes shape in the language as a result of reflecting the quantitative parameters of objects of reality, then such conceptual categories as modality - and in particular its axiological type, “come” not from reality, but from a person, are determined activity of human consciousness, its ability to a very complex and non-unidirectional interaction with external environment. N.A. Kobrina distinguishes the following three types of conceptual categories. The first type is those that represent a reflection of reality in the form of forms and objects of thought (that is, they coincide with concepts in philosophy). These are certain semantic entities that are reflected in semantics, either in lexical groupings of words, or in part-speech classes, depending on the level of consideration, or rather, understanding of the object. For such conceptual categories, the boundaries between their semantics and conceptual meaning are practically blurred. In linguistics, this blurring is manifested in the fact that in semantic syntax conceptual concepts are often called semantic roles (actants). Another type of conceptual categories - parameters, signs, characteristics - such as type, tense, pledge, mood, gender, number, case. For these conceptual categories, there is most often no unambiguous correlation with form. The third type is relative, or operational, conceptual categories, that is, those that underlie concept organization schemes. The most characteristic feature of a relative conceptual category is a grid of concepts reflecting the correlation of such referents as an action or event with the objects of thought involved in them. This ratio is a figurative reflection real situation, and it turns into a proposition after the relational predicate is chosen at the semantic level and all “places” of the relational schema are filled.
Second. The thesis that conceptual categories are a necessary prerequisite for the adequate functioning of the entire language system needs clarification. Language, as is known, has a level and aspect organization, and each level and aspect relates to the conceptual sphere in different ways. If the number and nomenclature of units of the phonetic level are determined by the physiological capabilities of the articulation apparatus and, in general, do not correlate with the units of the conceptual sphere, then the units of the lexical system of the language regularly correlate with the fund of concepts. The grammatical system most obviously “reacts” to the conceptual sphere due to its proximity to general laws organization of thought.
There are reflections between the extralinguistic reality and the logical-psychological level - the external world acts through the human receptors on his brain, resulting in the emergence of ideal correlates of the phenomena of reality. In general, the relationship between extra-linguistic reality and the logical-psychological sphere is isomorphic (we are distracted from particular cases of distortion of the perception of reality, the causes of which vary from the specific nature of the reflected object to the individual pathology of the consciousness of the reflecting subject).
The conceptual sphere organizes the phenomena of the logical-psychological level. The classifying activity of the human mind discretizes, structures and groups these phenomena on the basis of their most general and most relevant features for a person. The conceptual sphere is the sphere of conceptual analogues of entities at the logical-psychological level. The relations between these levels are thus characterized as relations of systematization, and they are characterized by homomorphism.
The essence of the next stage (the transition from concepts to the sphere of language) is the formalization of conceptual categories, giving them a linguistic meaning, their “linguistics”. There is a transition from universal phenomena to idioethnic phenomena, therefore, these interlevel relations are allomorphic. It should be noted that on this stage there is also a structuredness of the system of conceptual categories, their various types are revealed.
The last step is the connection of semantics with the surface structure. Since this is a connection between the two sides of a linguistic sign, its consideration is a separate linguistic problem and is beyond the scope of this work. We will confine ourselves to stating the existence of different points of view on it (cf. the idea of ​​F. de Saussure about the unambiguous correspondence between the signifier and the signified and the theory of S. O. Kartsevsky about the asymmetric dualism of the linguistic sign).

Conclusion

Unlikely modern science sets itself tasks more global and complex than the study of the laws and properties of human consciousness. Linguistics also makes a significant contribution to the analysis of the properties of this unique object. And looking at language otherwise than as “the materialization of human consciousness” inevitably entails increased attention to the conceptual foundations of linguistic constructions. The description of conceptual categories, therefore, not only helps to adequately understand and interpret the facts of the language, but also helps
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