A lot has been said about the factors that contributed to the victory of the USSR over Germany, much less attention is paid to the reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht. We note the main mistakes of the Third Reich, which are referred to German historians and generals.

Hitler's incompetence

Most German historians claim that the defeat of Germany was not so much due to individual strategic mistakes, but because of the adventurism of political and military plans.

Hans Adolf Jacobsen notes that "pursued by Hitler political goal far exceeded the effectiveness of the military and economic means at his disposal.

Hitler, as the main culprit of the defeat in his memoirs, is also called by German military leaders. So, General Walter Challe de Beaulieu writes about the “uncertainty of the strategic goal at the beginning of the war” and about the “flurence of the Fuhrer between Moscow and Leningrad”, which did not allow building on the success of the first months of the war.

On the one hand, the desire of the German generals to absolve themselves of all responsibility for the lost war is understandable, but on the other hand, one cannot ignore the role that Hitler played in the preparation and deployment of the war against the USSR. Note that after the failure near Moscow, the Fuhrer assumed sole command of the Wehrmacht.

Muds and frosts

Military historian and Major General Alfred Filippi noted that the German generals foresaw the likelihood of hostilities in off-road conditions and mudslides and prepared divisions for this. For example, in the infantry division of the first wave, horses were the main traction force: according to German data, their number was approaching 5 thousand.

But at the same time, the degree of motorization was high - 394 cars and 615 trucks, 3 armored personnel carriers and 527 motorcycles.

The plans of the German armies were already violated by the first thaw, which, based on Guderian's notes, lasted from October 7 to November 4, 1941. German generals note that after the success near Kyiv, they were ready to go to Moscow, but "many formations got stuck in a quagmire, which allowed the Russians to strengthen the defense."

In not lesser degree the advance of the Wehrmacht was slowed down by unusually severe frosts for the Germans, which engulfed the European part of the USSR already at the end of November 1941. The cold affected not only the soldiers, but also weapons and equipment. Guderian noted in his memoirs that grease froze in rifles, machine guns and machine guns, hydraulic fluid thickened in the recoil devices of guns, and the brake system of cars did not function in the cold.

Human resources

Already in August 1941, General Franz Halder wrote that Germany had underestimated the strength of Russia. This is not about superiority in manpower - it did not exist at the beginning of the war - but about the unparalleled dedication with which the Red Army fought and the Soviet rear worked.

The great miscalculation of the German command was that it could not foresee the ability of the USSR, under the conditions of the most severe pressure of the war, to mobilize human resources and in a matter of months restore the losses of almost half of the agricultural and two-thirds of the industrial capacities.

It is important that Soviet Union he threw all his resources into the fight against the enemy, which Germany could not afford to do. True, Guderian noted that the High Command of the Third Reich made a miscalculation in the distribution of divisions in theaters of war. Of the 205 German divisions, only 145 were sent to the East. According to the German general, in the West, primarily in Norway, Denmark and the Balkans, 38 divisions turned out to be superfluous.

During the war, another mistake of the German command came to light in the distribution of armed forces. The number of the Luftwaffe contingent was over 20% of total soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht. Moreover, out of 1 million 700 thousand Luftwaffe military personnel, approximately 1 million 100 thousand people were directly related to aviation - the rest are auxiliary personnel.

Scale of the war

A distinctive feature of the military conflict between Germany and the USSR is its huge scale. From the autumn of 1941 to the autumn of 1943, the length of the Soviet-German front was never less than 3800 km, while the German armies had to go through the territory of the Soviet Union about 2 thousand km. Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist admitted: “We did not prepare for a protracted struggle. Everything was built on the achievement decisive victory even before autumn comes. The reason for the failures in the East, according to the field marshal, was that the German troops "were forced to overcome vast spaces, not having the proper flexibility of command."

Von Kleist is echoed by a military historian, formerly Major General Kurt von Tippelskirch, who is the main reason for the defeat german army sees in the fact that her forces were "meanly squandered by useless resistance in an unnecessary place and at an inconvenient time, as well as fruitless attempts to seize the impossible."

Mistakes of the German generals

Albeit with great reluctance, but still the German military leaders admit their grossest strategic miscalculations, which ultimately led to a failure on the Eastern Front. Let's take a look at four of the most important.

1. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt calls the choice of the initial disposition of the German troops the first strategic mistake. We are talking about the gap between the left and right flanks of Theodor von Bock's armies, formed due to the impenetrable Pripyat swamps. As a participant in the First World War, Rundstedt was well aware of such a danger, but neglected it. Only the fragmentation of the Red Army units then saved Army Group Center from a flank attack.

2. The German command admits that summer campaign 1941 began without a clearly defined goal and a unified view of the offensive strategy. The General Staff did not determine the direction of the main attack, as a result of which Army Group North got bogged down near Leningrad, Army Group South slowed down its advance near Rostov, and Army Group Center was completely thrown back from Moscow.

3. Catastrophic mistakes, according to German historians, were made during the attack on Moscow. Instead of moving to a temporary defense of the positions reached in November 1941 in anticipation of reinforcements, the Wehrmacht sent the main forces to capture the capital, as a result of which, in three winter months German troops lost more than 350 thousand people. The offensive impulse of the Red Army was nevertheless stopped, but at the same time the German army significantly reduced its combat capability.

4. In the summer of 1942, the German command sent its main forces to the Caucasus, thus underestimating the possibility of resistance Soviet troops near Stalingrad. But the city on the Volga is the most important strategic goal, capturing which Germany would cut off the Caucasus from " big land"and would block access for the military industry of the USSR to Baku oil. Major General Hans Doerr noted that "Stalingrad should go down in the history of wars as the greatest mistake ever made by the military command, as the greatest disregard for the living organism of its army, ever shown by the leadership of the state."

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A lot has been said about the factors that contributed to the victory of the USSR over Germany, much less attention is paid to the reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht. We note the main mistakes of the Third Reich, which are referred to by German historians and generals.

Hitler's incompetence

Most German historians claim that the defeat of Germany was not so much due to individual strategic mistakes, but because of the adventurism of political and military plans.

Hans Adolf Jacobsen notes that "the political goal pursued by Hitler far exceeded the effectiveness of the military and economic means at his disposal."
Hitler, as the main culprit of the defeat in his memoirs, is also called by German military leaders. So, General Walter Challe de Beaulieu writes about the “uncertainty of the strategic goal at the beginning of the war” and about the “flurence of the Fuhrer between Moscow and Leningrad”, which did not allow building on the success of the first months of the war.

On the one hand, the desire of the German generals to absolve themselves of all responsibility for the lost war is understandable, but on the other hand, one cannot ignore the role that Hitler played in the preparation and deployment of the war against the USSR. Note that after the failure near Moscow, the Fuhrer assumed sole command of the Wehrmacht.

Muds and frosts

Military historian and Major General Alfred Filippi noted that the German generals foresaw the likelihood of hostilities in off-road conditions and mudslides and prepared divisions for this. For example, in the infantry division of the first wave, horses were the main traction force: according to German data, their number was approaching 5 thousand.

But at the same time, the degree of motorization was high - 394 cars and 615 trucks, 3 armored personnel carriers and 527 motorcycles.
The plans of the German armies were already violated by the first thaw, which, based on Guderian's notes, lasted from October 7 to November 4, 1941. The German generals note that after the success at Kyiv they were ready to march on Moscow, but "many formations got stuck in a quagmire, which allowed the Russians to strengthen the defense."

To no lesser extent, the advance of the Wehrmacht was slowed down by unusually severe frosts for the Germans, which engulfed the European part of the USSR already at the end of November 1941. The cold affected not only the soldiers, but also weapons and equipment. Guderian noted in his memoirs that grease froze in rifles, machine guns and machine guns, hydraulic fluid thickened in the recoil devices of guns, and the brake system of cars did not function in the cold.

Human resources

Already in August 1941, General Franz Halder wrote that Germany had underestimated the strength of Russia. This is not about superiority in manpower - it did not exist at the beginning of the war - but about the unparalleled dedication with which the Red Army fought and the Soviet rear worked.

The great miscalculation of the German command was that it could not foresee the ability of the USSR, under the conditions of the most severe pressure of the war, to mobilize human resources and in a matter of months restore the losses of almost half of the agricultural and two-thirds of the industrial capacities. [С-BLOCK]

It is important that the Soviet Union devoted all its resources to the fight against the enemy, which Germany could not afford to do. True, Guderian noted that the High Command of the Third Reich made a miscalculation in the distribution of divisions in theaters of war. Of the 205 German divisions, only 145 were sent to the East. According to the German general, in the West, primarily in Norway, Denmark and the Balkans, 38 divisions turned out to be superfluous.

During the war, another mistake of the German command came to light in the distribution of armed forces. The number of the Luftwaffe contingent was over 20% of the total number of soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht. Moreover, out of 1 million 700 thousand Luftwaffe military personnel, approximately 1 million 100 thousand people were directly related to aviation - the rest are auxiliary personnel.

Scale of the war

A distinctive feature of the military conflict between Germany and the USSR is its huge scale. From the autumn of 1941 to the autumn of 1943, the length of the Soviet-German front was never less than 3800 km, while the German armies had to go through the territory of the Soviet Union about 2 thousand km.
Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist admitted: “We did not prepare for a protracted struggle. Everything was built on achieving a decisive victory before the onset of autumn. The reason for the failures in the East, according to the field marshal, was that the German troops "were forced to overcome vast spaces, not having the proper flexibility of command."

Von Kleist is echoed by a military historian, former Major General Kurt von Tippelskirch, who sees the main reason for the defeat of the German army in the fact that its forces were "meanly wasted by useless resistance in an unnecessary place and at an inconvenient time, as well as fruitless attempts to capture the impossible."

Mistakes of the German generals

Albeit with great reluctance, but still the German military leaders admit their grossest strategic miscalculations, which ultimately led to a failure on the Eastern Front. Let's take a look at four of the most important.

1. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt calls the choice of the initial disposition of the German troops the first strategic mistake. We are talking about the gap between the left and right flanks of Theodor von Bock's armies, formed due to the impenetrable Pripyat swamps. As a participant in the First World War, Rundstedt was well aware of such a danger, but neglected it. Only the fragmentation of the Red Army units then saved Army Group Center from a flank attack.

2. The German command admits that the summer campaign of 1941 began without a clearly defined goal and a unified view of the offensive strategy. The General Staff did not determine the direction of the main attack, as a result of which Army Group North got bogged down near Leningrad, Army Group South slowed down its advance near Rostov, and Army Group Center was completely thrown back from Moscow.

3. Catastrophic mistakes, according to German historians, were made during the attack on Moscow. Instead of switching to temporary defense of the positions reached in November 1941 in anticipation of reinforcements, the Wehrmacht sent the main forces to capture the capital, as a result of which German troops lost more than 350 thousand people in three winter months. The offensive impulse of the Red Army was nevertheless stopped, but at the same time the German army significantly reduced its combat capability.

4. In the summer of 1942, the German command sent its main forces to the Caucasus, thus underestimating the possibility of resistance by the Soviet troops near Stalingrad. But the city on the Volga is the most important strategic goal, capturing which Germany would cut off the Caucasus from the "Great Land" and block access for the USSR military industry to Baku oil.
Major General Hans Doerr noted that "Stalingrad should go down in the history of wars as the greatest mistake ever made by the military command, as the greatest disregard for the living organism of its army, ever shown by the leadership of the state."

On the same topic:

Why did Hitler lose the war? " german look» Why Hitler was defeated in the war: what do the Germans think

Why did Hitler lose the war? German view Petrovsky (ed.) I.

THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA IS THE "CORRECT" WAR

In 1940 and 1941, Hitler had no reason to fear or complain about the Soviet Union. The non-aggression pact concluded in August 1939 functioned satisfactorily. Despite some friction, the Soviet Union adhered to Germany exclusively defensive tactics and was quite loyal. The attitude of the USSR towards England was more than cold. Significant and timely deliveries of raw materials and food from the East made Germany invulnerable in the event of a blockade. The desire, through benevolent neutrality towards Germany, not to be drawn into the war was also fully in line with the interests and position of the Soviet Union. The USSR was still far from completing its industrialization, and it could not expect anything good from the war with Germany, on the contrary, it could only fear the worst. And it was not for nothing that in August 1939, when Russia was being lured by both sides, it settled on Germany. And Major General Erich Marx wrote quite correctly, who on August 5, 1940, on the instructions of Hitler, presented the first development General Staff campaign to the East: "The Russians will not render us a friendly service - they will not attack us."

And yet, in the second half of 1940, Hitler decided to attack Russia. This decision, which turned out to be suicidal, makes a completely inexplicable impression. How could Hitler, weighed down by the war with England (and the threat of war with America), unnecessarily start a war with Russia? It was he who, as a prerequisite for a war with Russia, always preached partnership with England? And yet, in these arguments, in which inevitable war with England seemed to Hitler now an additional argument for a war with Russia, there is a certain paradoxical logic. It is expedient with all impartiality to follow the course of Hitler's thoughts.

The war with England reached the autumn of 1940 dead center. The invasion of England with the available means proved to be impracticable. The air war remained inconclusive from a strategic point of view. By at least at this time, Hitler could not approach England. But England, too, could not get close to Germany for the time being. She lagged behind Germany in armaments by at least two years, and even with the full mobilization of all her forces, they would never have been enough for a successful invasion of the continent. She had to wait for America, which was at least three years behind Germany in armament.

Thus, the war in the West was to remain for the next two or three years. trench warfare and accompanied by an arms race. However, such a prospect did not suit Germany at all for two reasons.

Firstly, the combined Anglo-American military potential was greater than the German one and, if fully deployed, would inevitably surpass it. Germany could not win the arms race unless she greatly expanded her own potential.

Secondly, due to its superiority in armament, Germany reached at that time just the climax in military superiority, which even in best case could not happen again.

Arming a modern industrial state is a process that takes four years. Once Churchill very figuratively described it: “In the first year - almost nothing; in the second - very little; in the third - a significant amount; starting with the fourth - as much as needed. In 1940, England was stuck in the second year of its armament (“very little”), America even in the first (“almost nothing”), while Germany was in the fourth (“as much as needed”).

Thus, for at least another two years, Germany was guaranteed against a major offensive by the West and had free hands. If she used these two years to significantly expand her own potential, she might hope that she would not succumb to her Western opponents later. However, Germany did not use this opportunity and therefore had to expect that from about 1943 more fall behind. So she had to use those two years. But how and where?

Germany was preparing for a war not against England and America - it did not have a large fleet and long-range bombers - but in accordance with Hitler's foreign policy concept - for a war on land against France and Russia. Its strength lay in the army and aviation, which was created as an auxiliary weapon for ground forces like flying artillery. However, this instrument of war could only be used on the continent, and there was only one target on the continent - Russia.

Hitler could not approach England (especially America), but he could approach the USSR. And if he succeeded during these two years in subordinating this country to his will and making its people and machines work for Germany, then he could hope that in 1943 or 1944 he would be ready for the final showdown with England and America and successfully repulse the attempt Anglo-American invasion.

Such is the logic that guided Hitler in 1940, when he ultimate goal, namely the conquest of the Soviet Union, turned into a necessary intermediate stage for the war with England. If Germany wanted to use these two years of undisturbed freedom of action created by her predominance in the field of armaments, then this could only happen through a victorious war against the Soviet Union, even if the USSR did not give any reason or pretext for such a war. Other aggressive plans, such as Fleet Commander Raeder's plan for a deep invasion of the Middle East or penetration into West Africa through Spain, did not correspond to the nature of Germany's armaments. Such plans exposed the German army, abandoned across the ocean, to the danger of being cut off by the prevailing English fleet and did not promise, even in case of success, any results that could have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war. It was necessary to decide: Russia or nothing.

Two other considerations strengthened Hitler in his decision to start a war against the USSR, which had always been and remained his true intention, and not to postpone the campaign to the East until the end of the war with the West. First moment wore psychological character and consisted in this case to postpone meant, apparently, to refuse altogether. Hitler repeatedly stated that after the victorious war with the West and the conclusion of peace, he would hardly be able to "overworked by two major wars» german people"raise again against Russia". Now, however, there was a war going on, and therefore at the same time it was possible to solve this problem.

It was precisely to justify the war with the USSR that Hitler often resorted to lies, only some of his statements on this set of issues can be taken at face value. But even they are plausible only because they make it possible to see that the war against the Soviet Union has always remained his cherished goal.

The second moment was extremely unpleasant thought about the growing dependence in which Hitler would inevitably fall from the USSR during the war with the West, if he abandoned his plan. True, since 1939 the USSR behaved as a completely loyal partner and supplier, and the difference between what this country voluntarily did for Germany and what could be obtained by force from a defeated, war-torn and embittered Russia, at least in the first the decisive years of the war would not have been so big at all. There was also no reason to believe that Stalin would have stabbed Germany in the back when she was fighting the decisive battle with the Western powers on the Atlantic coast. Stalin could not seriously desire the defeat of Germany, since he needed it as a counterbalance and barrier from the Western powers, which inspired him with even greater fear and distrust than Germany. However, Stalin could be expected to raise the political price of his benevolence and support as Germany got into trouble in the West.

The partnership between Hitler and Stalin was not an amicable union, including on the part of Stalin. If it were possible to turn a wayward and self-willed partner - the USSR - into a defenseless and subjugated, at least compliant, Russia, then Hitler would always prefer this option.

But was it even possible? It is at this point that we encounter Hitler's mistake.

Hitler endured the war with the Soviet Union, which he now wanted to wage to a certain extent only as an intermediate stage in the war with the West, without checking and changing the ideas that he had formed for himself from the very beginning on this case. At that time, he hoped that he would be able to wage war without any deviations and complications, in in full agreement with England, with a solid rear support and a concentrated use of all forces German Empire and will have unlimited time for this.

The previously planned war was to become a colonial war, which means especially cruel. The defeat of the Russian armed forces would be only the first act, which was to be followed by the total occupation of this vast country, the complete elimination state power of the Soviet Union, the extermination of a link of leading cadres and the intelligentsia, the creation of a mobile German colonial apparatus, and, finally, the enslavement of a population of 170 million. It is doubtful whether such a plan was even feasible under the most favorable circumstances. In any case, it was a plan for the fulfillment of which the life of a whole generation was needed.

Now Hitler had only two years to go to war with the USSR. But even in these two years a quarter German army and a third air force were connected in the West. By the end of this period, Hitler would have been forced to redeploy most of its troops on the Atlantic coast, and Russia, apart from the insignificant occupying troops, would be left to her own devices.

Under these changed conditions, however, Hitler could only hope at best to win against the Soviet Union a "European normal war" with limited objectives - a kind of extended version of the blitzkrieg against France. This was also consistent with military plans, which provided for an offensive only as far as the Volga-Arkhangelsk line. A prolonged occupation also of the Asian part of the Soviet Union beyond the Urals, even in the event of a military victory, would completely exhaust the German forces and make it impossible to continue the world war.

With limited time and resources, Hitler's plans could only succeed if the Russians did him a favor and, like the French in 1940, engaged with the whole force of their mobilized armies in a decisive struggle near the border, instead of using the expanses of Russian territory . Only in this case it would be possible to win the decisive battle. In addition, there should have been a Russian government that would recognize such military solution unchanged and, like the government of Pétain in France, would prefer a quick military truce to a long desperate struggle.

But even in this case, Hitler would have had to, as in France, show readiness to put forward acceptable, "normal" conditions for such a truce. He should at least recognize the authority of this Russian government in his country and create more or less for the Russian population in the occupied areas normal conditions life. Only in this case could Hitler hope to force the defeated Russia to "collaborate", just as it was with the defeated France. Only in this case could he think that after two, at most three years, he would again turn to the defeated

back to Russia, without fear of immediate unleashing by the Russians liberation war, which would mean a war on two fronts at the time of the Anglo-American invasion.

This was the dilemma that confronted Hitler in the event of a war with the USSR. Even fast military victory, which was far from self-evident, threatened to worsen rather than improve Hitler's position in the decisive phase of the world war, if it were not possible to immediately transfer victory in the East to the world - moreover, to establish friendly relations between defeated Russia and Germany.

But any thought of such a policy was very remote for Hitler. He was still captivated by his fixed idea of ​​a German living space in the East. He did not admit or did not want to admit that this idea now breaks the boundaries of his strategic possibilities. Due to lack of time, which excluded colonial war with Russia, from the very first day of the war he set in motion colonial measures of extermination and enslavement. Thus, from the very beginning, he showed the people and the army of the enemy what awaits them in case of defeat, and plunged them into despair, not yet victorious.

Even in a European, "normal" war, Russia would obviously have been the winner: its population was more than twice that of Germany. The USSR then had rich military traditions, a high degree weapons, and for defense - such an almost insurmountable weapon as space. The Soviet Union was not at all "ripe for the fall" - it was a young, powerfully developing state that was going through a stage of extensive modernization and industrialization.

From the moment that Russian combat morale was no longer questioned, Russia, with her military-technical balance and her numerical and territorial superiority, could no longer lose the war, and Germany could not win it. Even major Russian retreats on southern front in the war year 1942 did not change the state of affairs. During these retreats, there were no more mass captures, as was the case during major defeats in the first months of the war. In 1942, Russia deliberately used its space as a weapon, the long retreat ended with Stalingrad.

The war against the USSR, started in 1941, had no diplomatic background. Unlike the war with England, it was not preceded by a dispute, a tense situation, a disagreement, or an ultimatum. Apart from its existence, the USSR did not give Hitler any reason to start a war. It was Hitler's sole decision to start a war against the USSR and wage it as a colonial war. However, it should be emphasized that there was not the slightest sign of resistance against this decision in Germany, as was still the case in the crises that preceded Munich Agreement 1938, the outbreak of the war in 1939 and the campaign against France in 1940. Never before had Hitler had such a cohesive German Empire behind him as in his murderous and suicidal war against the Soviet Union.

The war with the USSR does not have, despite big number bloody battles, own military history. Not once in a war did its outcome depend on a better or worse plan. individual operations, the courage of the battle project, the strategic talent of one or another leading general. The subsequent dispute over Hitler's decision to carry out an attack in September 1941 first on Kyiv and not on Moscow is useless. The opposite decision, even if it led to the capture of Moscow, would not change the course of the war. From the moment when it became clear to the Russian people true intentions Hitler German strength the strength of the Russian people was opposed. From that moment on, the outcome was also clear: the Russians were stronger not only because they were outnumbered, but primarily because the issue of life and death was decided for them, but not for the Germans.

For the Germans, it was only about victory or defeat. The victory was lost from the moment when the Russians pulled themselves together, that is, already in December 1941. However, defeat by the Russians did not mean for the Germans that their country would be transformed into what Russia would have become had it been defeated by Hitler.

In addition, the Germans could still prevent the Russians from becoming their only victors. After December 1941, when the Russian counter-offensive near Moscow proved their newfound will to fight, Germany could no longer win the war, but it could drag it out for years until the Western powers were ready to enter the war. The Germans could, to a certain extent, choose whom they would like to be defeated and whom they would help to win - the East or the West. They might even hope to use East against West or West against East. From now on, however, they would put the unity of their state at stake.

From that time on, the Western powers played a different role for Germany, and the war in the West changed its face. While Germany was fighting for victory in the East, it was interested in delaying as long as possible the intensification of hostilities in the West, and especially America's entry into the war. But since Germany in the East could fight only to delay defeat, she should have been interested in hastening as much as possible the entry of the Western powers into the war, and hence the entry of America into the war. After all, only the active performance of England and America in the European theater of operations gave Germany a chance to replace the defeat in the East with a defeat in the West, or even cause big war between East and West as a continuation of the war with the Soviet Union, during which to speak on one side or another (on which one - there was almost no doubt) and thus still turn defeat into victory.

Hitler realized this new position on December 6, 1941, when the Russians launched an unusually powerful counter-offensive near Moscow. “When the winter catastrophe of 1941-1942 began,” says the war diary of the Wehrmacht’s main headquarters, “it became clear to the Fuhrer and Colonel General [Jodl] that the climax had been passed and ... victory could no longer be achieved.”

Five days later, And December 1941, Hitler declared war on America. There is a relationship between these two events.

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As far as it was possible for one country, even with allies, to win world war?

If we're talking about the Third Reich, then I don't think he had any chance of winning the world war as a whole.

When you say "generally", does that mean that success in certain regions: in Europe, in North Africa, in the Middle East - were possible?

Yes, Germany had the opportunity to win in specific theaters of war and achieve operational success. I must immediately clarify that the concept of "operational level" in Germany means what in Russia is called the "strategic level", that is, major military operations. The strategic level in Germany is called an even higher level, which also includes political, economic and other decisions. So, a great example of operational success is France. It was a real military triumph. However, this is very different from the war won as a whole. De Gaulle understood this very well when he said in the summer of 1940: "France lost the battle, but not the war." Germany, in turn, won the campaign, but did not win the war. Looking at the complexity of the processes that took place, I am sure that Germany had no chance of winning the war as a whole. total war you can't win only in the theater of war. This is a war waged by the whole country, the whole society. The military component is only part of this war. Industry, economics, propaganda, politics are its other components. And in these areas Germany was doomed to failure, because it was not able to wage a protracted complex war.

And yet, what did Germany lack in the spheres of total war you listed?

The main reason Germany lost the war was undoubtedly the Allies. And first of all, the Soviet Union - I have always adhered to the point of view that the war was won mainly by the USSR. Unfortunately, this fact has been lost in the historiography of the Cold War.

But the war was won by the Allies, partly because the Third Reich suffered from a number of structural deficits. Germany did not have a stable strategic military-political concept of warfare. It sounds unexpected, but Germany fought most of the war in improvisational mode. Germany was incapable of creating stable alliances, of perceiving its allies as equal partners. Finally, there was a lack of rationality in decision making. In Nazi Germany, foreign policy decisions were made haphazardly. For example, the declaration of war on the United States was the sole decision of Hitler. The Barbarossa plan, as well as the Blau plan - the German offensive of 1942 in the Caucasus - were not systematically prepared. To a greater or lesser extent, they were created by Hitler on an intuitive level, and the headquarters were faced with the need to subsequently substantiate these plans. Another structural deficit was Nazi ideology. Ideology did not allow an early peace, and it was ideology that pushed the Germans to systematically underestimate the enemy, especially the Soviet Union, and to overestimate own forces up until 1943.

But Germany still regularly demonstrated success in certain theaters of war. Was it impossible to profit from these successes?

Winning is a very dangerous thing. Wins are deceiving. They tempt to believe in the illusion that success is a foregone conclusion. This especially affected the German military leadership. The German generals were obsessed with old idea a decisive battle, dating back to the German military tradition. The generals were sure that the war was won by a decisive battle, after which the troops occupied the enemy's capital, and now - victory. That is, they thought that everything would be as in time Franco-Prussian War, the battles of Sedan and so on. Incidentally, Hitler belonged to a minority that did not share this illusion. His views on the war were more modern than those of most of his generals. However, in general, such views led the German generals to overestimate their capabilities. And most of all they overestimated them after the victory over France in the summer of 1940. In just six weeks, an army that was considered the most powerful in the world, at least among ground armies, was convinced. Who else has the power to stop the Wehrmacht? The Nazis imagined that they could do anything, and with this mindset they began planning a war against the USSR, which they regarded as a much weaker opponent than France.

However, one must understand that until the spring of 1941, blitz victories were only operational victories. They were achieved due to the fact that the German army more successfully used such modern aspects of warfare as mobility, surprise, superiority in firepower. The war against the Soviet Union was completely different. For this war, German industry again had to prepare the army for the offensive.

It must be understood that in the Third Reich there was a very close connection between military industry and military planning. And here we run into the most important factor shortage of human resources. Germany simply did not have enough people. By May 1, 1941, Germany planned to field 180 fully equipped divisions. But first it was necessary to produce weapons and ammunition for this army. Therefore, in the summer of 1940, the idea of ​​a military-industrial blitzkrieg was put forward. Part of the army was demobilized. These soldiers were sent home, where they turned into workers and began to forge weapons, which they themselves then had to use in 1941. Ideologically, this was a great move for the Third Reich, as it demonstrated the unity of front and rear, worker and soldier. However, this first strategically planned german blitzkrieg was very risky. After all, it was necessary to make plans in advance and calculate everything. How long will the campaign last? It was supposed to be a maximum of six months. How much weapons and ammunition will be required in all branches of the armed forces? How much fuel? How many soldiers? How much ammo will be used up? What proportion of weapons will break? How many will be killed and wounded?

Exactly. And at the same time, the results of the campaign against France were taken as the basis for the calculations. When the strategic blitzkrieg failed by the autumn of 1941, it meant a strategic disaster. The fall of 1941, a turning point near Moscow, was not just an operational defeat for the Wehrmacht. Much worse was what became clear: the German military concept lost its foundation. The losses were much greater than expected. The consumption of materials, wear and tear of weapons, the amount of ammunition used also turned out to be much higher than planned. And Germany did not have the opportunity to make up for the losses. As a result, by the end of 1941, the war was already almost lost: the only war strategy available had failed, and Germany had no contingency plan.

Let's get back to the battle near Moscow. In the autumn of 1941, German troops stood a step away from Moscow, the city came to a panic. It can be assumed that if the winter were not so cold or the supply of the Wehrmacht was slightly better, then the German troops would have a chance to capture the Soviet capital. Would the war have been won in this case? Indeed, with a high probability Soviet government would have been deposed after that, or it would have been decided to capitulate.

Obviously, with a slightly more fortunate set of circumstances, German troops could enter Moscow. When I say that the Third Reich could not win the war as a whole, I do not mean that Germany was unable to succeed in the military campaign against the USSR. The Soviet Union barely survived the German attack. In 1941-1942, the USSR was on the verge of collapse. But even a victory over the USSR, even the collapse of the centralized leadership would not mean the end of the war in Russia. It seems to me much more likely that hostilities in the occupied territory would have continued in a decentralized way. A significant mass of German troops would continue to remain in Russia. In addition, Germany, even in this case, would not have been able to plunder the USSR as successfully as planned. In general, the economic benefits from the occupation of the USSR were consistently well below German expectations. This means that Germany, as I have already said, could have succeeded in this military foothold, but this would not have predetermined the outcome of the war - the war with the Western allies would not have gone anywhere. And although I say that the USSR was the power that crushed Germany, we must not forget that the United States was the best guarantee of the impossibility of a global victory for Germany. If Germany had defeated the USSR, the war would not have ended. And atomic bomb, perhaps, would have fallen on Berlin.

How obvious was the inevitability of Germany's defeat to German generals in the fall of 1941?

Despite the losses, the generals remained optimistic. They believed that the war had become more difficult, but few people in Germany then understood how bad things were. Perhaps Hitler understood this, since he generally understood the total nature of the war better than his generals. I admit that at the turn of 1941 and 1942, he began to realize that there were no chances to win the war. Of course, he had to exude optimism. He even hoped that the 1942 campaign would help secure the resources needed for a long war and turn the tide. You see, Germany was forced - if she wanted to continue the war - to seize as quickly as possible more resources to be able to counter allies.

Therefore, in the wars that Hitler waged, economic goals always played a leading role. It was part of the ideology. In the campaign of 1942 - in the rush to the Caucasian oil and to Stalingrad - economic goals were absolutely prevailing. Without the capture of resources, primarily Caucasian oil, waging a protracted war was simply impossible. It would be impossible to produce fuel for the army - and therefore to wage war on vast expanses of land. It would also be impossible to maintain those who demanded huge amount fuel operations at sea, it is impossible to conduct air war. This fact hardly found understanding among the military. Already after the war, Halder wrote with amazing frankness that "the capture of oil fields was an unusual thing." That is, this is again the same old military tradition: you need to defeat the enemy army, capture the city, parade through it. And fighting for an oil refinery is somehow unusual. But for Hitler it was more than obvious. It was a conflict between old and new thinking.

How did it happen that Germany, which had a sufficient number of allies, primarily in the form of European dictatorships, was forced to wage war almost alone and, moreover, was left without vital resources, with the possible exception of Romanian oil?

Throughout the war, the Third Reich was never able to build a working system of allies. There were two reasons for this. First, a real military alliance with any country was impossible for the National Socialists. After all, a military alliance presupposes the existence of more or less equal partners. In the National Socialist view, equality between countries did not exist. The Allies were perceived only as helper peoples, bringing the victory of National Socialism closer. For some time, Mussolini was perceived as an equal partner - but, rather, it was Mussolini as a person, and not Italy as a country.

The second problem was the lack of strategic planning in choosing allies. Germany did not plan to wage a protracted war, and, accordingly, the ability of these countries to wage a protracted war was not taken into account when choosing allies. All of Germany's allies - except the USSR - were even more resource poor than Germany itself. Take Japan - it's a disaster! Finland, Italy - these countries themselves needed industrial support from Germany. The only country that was truly sustainable in terms of resources and industry was the Soviet Union, and it was eventually attacked by Germany.

Germany's allies did not have any general plans, nor the general goals of the war. Japan was at war with the United States, but did not consider it its duty to attack the Soviet Union. Italy also did not consider the USSR to be its main adversary. Romania and Hungary - both allies of Germany - viewed each other as opponents! Such an alliance could last only as long as Germany was strong and her troops were victorious. The Western Allies, on the other hand, had common goal: victory over Hitler. From this point of view, the Soviet term " anti-Hitler coalition”is absolutely true - he names exactly the goal that united the allies.

Let's get back to the practical side of warfare. You have already touched on the subject of increased wear and tear of equipment in the Russian campaign. How effective was the German supply system?

The German army had two major shortcomings regarding the material side of the hostilities. First - German weapons were extremely complex and often not adapted to a particular theater of operations. Armament German division assembled from German, Czech, French, Dutch and other types of equipment. All this equipment required millions of different unique spare parts. Technique, weapons were too complex and difficult to apply in the conditions of the Russian winter or Russian mudslides. The leadership of the Wehrmacht did not assume at all that it was possible to fight in winter. The Red Army has repeatedly demonstrated how this is done. The armament of the Red Army was in many cases the best.

The second weakness of the Wehrmacht was the underestimation of the role of supply and logistics, traditional for the German military tradition. Gifted and ambitious officers of the German General Staff sought to engage in operational planning- but not supplies. Less gifted, second-class, third-class officers were assigned to supply. Procurement was a duty: someone had to do it, but you won’t achieve glory here. Hitler also did not fully understand the role of supply. It was the deepest mistake. For example, in american army it was the other way around: logistics were key.

German industry has not always responded flexibly to changing requirements for technology. In addition, often due to lack of time and resources, equipment samples entered the troops without proper running. Of course, the Red Army had the same problem - the tanks went to the army directly from the assembly line. However, if we recall the superiority of the USSR over Germany in manpower, in resources, in production volumes, then we can understand that the price of a mistake Soviet leadership was lower than the price of a mistake by the German leadership, and far from being so often disastrous consequences. On average, the production of the allies for the main types of equipment since 1941 exceeded the similar production in Germany by three to four times. And this gap could not be compensated by any operational successes.

By the way, didn’t the German military plans differ precisely in that the German generals constantly planned operations at the limit of their capabilities, each time proceeding from the fact that the result would be the most beneficial for the Wehrmacht?

This is another structural deficiency of the Third Reich - what I call the "tabooization of defeatism." The German generals in every possible way avoided the very thought of the possibility of a negative outcome of the operation and did not create plans for this case. If the general wanted to maintain this influence, he was bound to exude optimism.

Of course, the officer must remain optimistic. But optimism should not be reckless. And among the Nazi leadership, even realism fell under suspicion. As a result, the planners gave an optimistic forecast even when they realized that the operation was not well prepared, that it could end in failure. The leadership created illusions that replaced reality.

It can be clearly seen that, starting from 1941, planning was carried out based on the best of possible scenarios development of the situation. While responsible planning also requires thinking worst case. I remember working in London with British documents and was surprised to find that Churchill was asking his generals: what happens if we lose the battle of El Alamein? What options will we have in this case? Imagine what Hitler sends to his General Staff similar question, is simply impossible. The very idea that the battle might be lost had already been declared taboo. The decision-making process in Germany was, in this sense, completely irrational.

The victory of the Soviet army at Stalingrad turned the tide of the war. The battle lasted almost 200 days and nights, the battles took place on a large sector of the front, over 2 million people from both sides simultaneously participated in them. Both Russian and Western historians still write about the Battle of Stalingrad. One of the main questions to which individual works Why did the German army fail?

Why did the Germans lose the Battle of Stalingrad?

Magazine: History from the "Russian Seven", almanac No. 2, summer 2017
Category: Middlegame

In the summer of 1942, the German army set its sights on the south. It was assumed that the troops would reach the Caucasus, capture oil fields and enter the territory of Iraq and Iran. The Stalingrad direction was auxiliary. But it soon became clear that Stalingrad was a powerful transport hub. There was also a crossing over the Volga, they evacuated along it industrial enterprises and their employees. Stalin understood the danger of the Germans breaking through to the Caucasus and directly stated to the Deputy People's Commissar oil industry Baibakov: if the Germans capture at least one well, he will be shot.
In August 1942, the Germans broke through to the Volga, Stalingrad was attacked from the air. The panic began.
To combat it, order No. 227 "Not a step back!" Was issued. Despite all the ambiguity, the order played a big role in the battle.
Geoffrey Roberts wrote of his goal thus: “It would be a call for a disciplined, organized retreat and for the defense of the last line at the cost of their lives, if circumstances so require; main goal document was to take control of the strategic retreat of the Red Army. And at the same time, the order psychologically prepared the troops for the defense of Stalingrad and staunch resistance at other similar lines.
However, it is precisely during Battle of Stalingrad in the fall of 1942, a ban was issued to political officers to interfere in the decisions of commanders. And the effectiveness of military operations has increased significantly.

Counterattack plan. Romanian units

In September, Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky were summoned to see Stalin. The situation at Stalingrad was difficult. Stalin offered to delay the advance with counterattacks, but the marshals proposed the option of targeted strikes against the weakest parts of the German army - these were the Romanian units. The Germans relied on their allies, believing that the flanks were well covered, and the Soviet army did not have enough reserves to resist. This turned out to be a mistake.
Russian historian Alexei Isaev, however, believes that the lack of resilience of the Romanian soldiers was not the fault of the catastrophe that befell the German army. The Romanian units were too dispersed - there were three kilometers of front for one infantry division. This was twice the recommended defensive line. The Romanians also lacked tanks and anti-tank guns.

Cauldron Creation

In November 1942, Soviet troops managed to gather in the steppe, in the dark, without headlights, so that the Germans thought that another reinforcement was coming. Were established air defense and air cover - enemy aircraft were quickly shot down. As a result, it was possible to concentrate about three hundred guns per kilometer of the front.
In the encirclement ring, which closed on November 23, there seemed to be about 330 thousand soldiers and officers.
Erich Manstein, who commanded the Don Army Group, wrote that the outcome of the battle was practically a foregone conclusion: "The German command itself prepared it for the Russians themselves, moving on to positional combat operations on the lines reached by the end of the summer offensive."
The German and Romanian units, which found themselves in the entry zone, could not offer serious resistance. Soviet army concentrated the best weapons in this area.
There were funny cases. So, von Millenthin wrote in his memoirs that the 48th tank corps could not speak in time, because “the mice gnawed through the wires of the external lighting on the tanks”, the tanks, however, were light, Czech-made, and would not have helped to delay the offensive.

Ring compression

The encircled resisted for several months, but were defeated. The price of victory was also high for the Soviet troops.
Modern historians write that the decision to attack from the east and west was not the best - they had to overcome the long-term fortifications of the German army. An advance from the north and south would help to cut the ring faster.
While the fighting was going on, the situation of the encircled was getting worse: the fighting spirit almost disappeared, all the horses were eaten, cases of cannibalism were recorded.
« Air bridge”, through which the supply of the encircled was carried out, could not fulfill its functions to the extent that Hitler promised. BUT harmonious work Soviet aviation and anti-aircraft guns completely destroyed it.
The best German commanders could not come up with good plan combat operations in the environment. And the very fact of being encircled cast a shadow on the Wehrmacht strategists. Many German historians later wrote that Stalin wanted more than Stalingrad. However, this is a wrong opinion: Stalin himself did not expect such a large group of troops to be in the ring.
Historian Geoffrey Jukes believed that the outcome of the battle was determined by "the superiority of the military skill of the Soviet command, and not the balance of power." Many other researchers adhered to a similar point of view, for example, Fernand Gambiez: "The Fuhrer and his generals largely underestimated the skill of the Soviet command, the courage, perseverance and patriotism of the Red Army soldiers."

Hitler's ban as the main reason for the defeat

Most historians and memoirists believe that Hitler's army was defeated because of the Fuhrer's ban on the withdrawal of troops from the boiler. If he had given permission in the first days, the chance to break through would have been great.
British historian Anthony Beevor wrote: "Hitler was obsessed with the idea that the retreat of the 6th Army from Stalingrad would mark the final withdrawal of German troops from the banks of the Volga." Paulus was awarded the rank of field marshal, and this was a clear hint: field marshals do not give up.
However Russian historians dispute this opinion. Alexei Isaev believes that German command not so much "was afraid to retreat", but did not believe that there was no way out of the cauldron. German troops were already leaving the encirclement, for example, near Rzhev. A few weeks later, when the seriousness of the situation became clear, it was too late to make a breakthrough. It became clear that the 6th Army was finished: its only task was to pin down enemy forces for as long as possible.
Some scholars, such as Jochen Hellbeck, believe that after the Battle of Stalingrad, the initiative in the war passed to the Red Army. This is not so - ahead was, for example, the German offensive near Kursk. But for the first time, with the equality of forces (and at times with the superiority of the Germans), the defeat was inflicted on many the best generals Reich.