There is an idea that the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century was an exceptionally successful state, perhaps the most successful in the world, outpacing almost all European countries in terms of development rates - and only the 1917 revolution prevented Russia from realizing its full potential and becoming a superpower, ahead of the US.

According to this view, the revolution of 1917 was caused not economic reasons, not by a low standard of living, but provoked by revolutionaries who wanted big changes at any price.

Let's turn to the economic and financial indicators of the Russian Empire and try to understand whether the version of exceptional success is correct Russian state before the First World War.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Russia ranked first in the world in terms of gross grain harvest (92.5 million tons), first place in grain exports (10.6 million tons), first place in the production and export of butter, high places for other categories of agricultural production.

For 20 years from 1894 to 1914, coal mining increased by 306%, gold mining by 43%, copper mining by 375%, iron production by 250%, iron and steel production by 224%.

As of 1914, the Russian Empire had the world's largest gold reserves, which amounted to 1.7 billion rubles.

State income in the period from 1900 to 1913 doubled from 1.7 to 3.4 billion rubles.

The national income in 1913 was 11.8 billion rubles. GDP calculations were not made at the beginning of the 20th century; the "national income" indicator was used, which is not an exact analogue of GDP. By modern estimates Russian GDP was 20.2 billion rubles (P. Gregory's estimate), and the national income (an indicator close to GDP) was 16.4 billion rubles. Internal trade turnover - 18.5 billion rubles (E.A. Gershanovich).

The national income of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century was 7-8% of the world, and its growth rate - according to various estimates, from 3% to 7% per year.

The above indicators really look good and speak in favor of the idea of ​​the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century as a completely successful state, at least from an economic point of view.

However, the picture compiled from the above indicators is very incomplete and does not give a holistic view of the state of the Russian economy.

The national income, which was 7-8% of the world, looks good only until you compare it with the population, which was 10.2% of the world.

An income of 7-8% of the world income with a population of 10.2% means that the per capita income in the Russian Empire was below the average for the whole world. Not in Europe, but all over the world, taking into account all the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.

According to one of contemporary research The per capita GDP of the Russian Empire in 1913 was $1,488 (in terms of the 1990 Geary-Khamis international dollar), and the world average income was $1,524 in the same units.

GDP per capita in the United States of the same year - 5301 (3.5 times higher than in the Russian Empire), in England - 4921 (3.3 times higher), in Germany and France - 3648 and 3485 respectively (2. 4-2.3 times).

In terms of per capita income, the Russian Empire was inferior to all European countries, except Portugal. At the same time, England, Germany and France were 2-3 times inferior.

The volume of industrial production in Russia in 1913 is 6.5-6.9 billion rubles. The figures look impressive, but this is only 5.3% of global industrial production, which is a rather modest figure for a country with a population of 10.2% of the world's population.

In terms of industrial production, Russia was again inferior to the United States, Germany, France and England, which together provided 71.9% of world industrial production (10-20% each).

Thus, in terms of industrial production, Russia lagged behind the United States, Germany, France and England by 2-3 times, and in terms of per capita - even more, 3-5 times.

Backlog in industrial production from the leading European countries and the USA was just main reason low level GDP per capita, because at the beginning of the 20th century industry became the main factor in the development of the economy and the generator of income, while Russia remained a predominantly agrarian country.

No matter how good the first place in the world in the collection of grain and the production of butter, the export of eggs and other agricultural products, these achievements no longer ensured overall economic success and did not compensate for the lag in industrial development.

AT Russian cities in 1913, only 16% of the population lived, while in Germany - 43.7%, in England - 51.5%.

Germany, England and France, even yielding to Russia in total strength of the population outnumbered the workers, due to which they had both a higher share of industrial production and a higher per capita income.

The number of workers in the Russian Empire in 1913 - about 4.2 million people - is only 2.5% of the population.

The small number of workers and the impossibility of its rapid increase due to low urbanization led industrialists to lengthen the working day, introduce night shifts and use child labor to increase production.

The duration of the working day could reach 11.5 hours during the day and 10 hours at night, for children from 12 to 15 years old - 8 hours. And it's legal!

Wherein average earnings workers in 1913 was 25 rubles a month, and the cost of living in Petrograd was estimated at 20-30 rubles.

Such was the factory reality of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century - working 10-11 hours a day with a salary at the subsistence level.

Under such working conditions in the factories, the peasants were in no hurry to leave their farms and their usual way of life in order to move to the cities and get up to the machines. Therefore, Russia remained a rural country with a low level of industrial production and a growing lag behind European countries both in terms of industrial development and per capita income, which were increasingly dependent on the level of production.

But back to the economic and financial indicators.

As shown above, the national income in 1913 was 11.8 billion rubles, and according to the results of modern research, GDP is estimated at 16-20 billion rubles.

At the same time, the public debt in 1913 amounted to 8.8 billion rubles, that is, 75% of the national income or 45-55% of the country's GDP.

Is it a lot or a little?

For example, Russia's external debt today is 70.3 billion dollars (4% of GDP), the external debt of the private sector (banks and corporations) is 448.6 billion dollars (28% of GDP). Internal debt - 7.2 trillion rubles or 110 billion dollars (7% of GDP). The total public debt (internal and external) - 180 billion dollars (11.4% of GDP), together with the external debt of the private sector - 629 billion dollars (40% of GDP).

The US national debt, which has long become the talk of the town and the subject of economic jokes due to its astronomical size and dubious prospects for repayment, in 2016 amounted to 18.7 trillion dollars, that is, 106% of GDP.

It is believed that a public debt exceeding 100% of GDP is practically hopeless, because the funds that a country can pay relatively painlessly (about 3-5% of GDP) are only enough for interest on the debt (debt servicing), and its full repayment becomes unpredictably long. If creditors require the country to repay at least a tenth of such debt within a year, this will actually lead to default (bankruptcy) and undermine the economy.

Now back to the indicators of the Russian Empire:

The level of public debt of the Republic of Ingushetia, which was about 50% of GDP, was not yet critical, but already quite high. However, with the outbreak of the First World War, the state debt of the Russian Empire began to grow rapidly:

1915 - 10.5 billion rubles (52-65% of GDP)
1916 - 18.9 billion rubles (95% -118% of GDP)
1917 Jan - 33.6 billion rubles (170-210% of GDP)
1917 July - 43.9 billion rubles (220-275% of GDP)

From the above data it can be seen that already in 1916 the state debt of the Russian Empire reached critical level, and in January 2017, that is, even before the February revolution, it reached the level of 200% of GDP, thus becoming hopeless for repayment. And by July, the debt had grown even stronger.

The main reason for the rapid growth of public debt is military spending.

Only for 2 years 1915-1916 direct expenses for the war amounted to 14.5 billion rubles. If we add this amount to the 10.5 billion rubles of debt at the beginning of 1915, we get 25 billion rubles. But in addition to direct military spending, there were also indirect ones. And there was also lost income as a result of the war, caused by both mobilization and the gap economic ties in Germany.

Germany, which became Russia's adversary, was its main economic partner before the war. Germany accounted for neither more nor less - 29.8% of Russian exports and as much as 47.5% of Russian imports. What happened to these exports and imports after the start of the war is not difficult to guess. What this led to is also easy to understand - to a decrease in income and an increase in expenses.

All military spending, both direct and indirect, as well as budget holes associated with income lost due to mobilization and severance of economic ties with Germany, were covered by borrowing, internal and external, which led to a rapid increase in public debt to supercritical values.

At the same time, most of the state debt was internal, external debt amounted to about 10 billion rubles. But this is also a very significant amount, about 50% of GDP. Yes, and domestic debt required servicing, otherwise it would have been necessary to declare a default with all the ensuing consequences for financial system and the country's economy.

A vivid example of a default caused by the inability of the state to service domestic loans is the 1998 default on GKOs, which led to the collapse of the ruble and the economic crisis.

It is obvious that after the state debt of the Russian Empire reached 200% of GDP, the state expected an inevitable default, hyperinflation and a deep economic crisis.

And the gold reserves of the Russian Empire would not have helped to pay off debts, because although it was the largest in the world, it was only 1.7 billion rubles, and even before the war the debt reached 8.8 billion rubles and grew by 1917 up to 33.6 billion

Russia's gold reserves in 1913 made it possible to repay only 20% of the public debt, and at the beginning of 1917 - only 5%.

In addition, if Russia gave away all the gold to pay off or service the debt, then the ruble would lose its gold backing, with all the ensuing consequences in the form of inflation.

Actually, without inflation in 1914-1917, it could not have done.

After the outbreak of the First World War, to cover the growing costs, the issue of money not backed by gold began, and on July 27, 1914, the exchange of paper rubles for gold was canceled.

The gold backing of the ruble was constantly decreasing:

1914 - 98%
1915 - 51,4%
1916 - 28,7%
1917 - 16,2%

This led to inflation (relative to the first half of 1914):

1914-2 - 6%
1915-1 - 46%
1915-2 - 99%
1916-1 - 159%
1916-2 - 236%

By the beginning of 1917, prices increased 3.36 times compared to 1914. Wherein average salary only doubled.

Now let's remember the ratio of wages of workers and the cost of living in the pre-war year: the average salary was 25 rubles, the level of the cost of living in Petrograd was estimated at 20-30 rubles.

According to inflation data, by the end of 2016, the cost of living in Petrograd rose to 60-100 rubles. At the same time, the average salary of workers increased only to 50 rubles and was below the subsistence level.

Particular attention should be paid to the fact that the salary of 25 rubles per pre-war period was average and differed greatly in different industries - in mechanical engineering it reached 45 rubles, in light and Food Industry- about 15 rubles.

Accordingly, with a 2-fold increase in wages, the worker machine-building plant received 90 rubles and his salary was still within the subsistence minimum (60-100 rubles), but the salary of workers in the light and food industries, which amounted to 30 rubles, turned out to be 2-3 times lower.

Attention question:

Are you sure that with salaries 2-3 times lower than the subsistence level and an 11-hour working day, the people went to the demonstrations solely under the influence of the Bolsheviks?

Would you definitely not go to rallies if you had to work 11 hours a day with a salary of 3,000 to 9,000 rubles?

So who caused the revolution?

Precisely because of the Bolsheviks?

It has been shown above that back in 1913, before the start of the war, the economic situation in the Russian Empire was not as perfect as some articles try to show it.

The average per capita income in Russia was lower than the world average, 2-3 times lower than in such countries as England, France, Germany and the USA, where the workers, in general, did not show off either. The salaries of Russian workers were completely at the subsistence level, the working day reached 11 hours, practiced night work, the work of children from the age of 12 was officially allowed.

During the war years, the economic situation deteriorated sharply, prices rose more than 3 times, wage growth began to lag far behind prices - is it any wonder that by 1917 the patience of the workers ran out?

The economic situation in the countryside during the war also deteriorated, for several reasons at once. Firstly, inflation did not bypass the peasants, who were paid for their products with unsecured gold rubles, and they quickly lost value, as a result of which the proceeds from the sale of the crop by the time of the sowing campaign noticeably lost purchasing power. Secondly, in the course of mobilization, not only fighters were recruited into the army, but also horses, because at the beginning of the 20th century, almost all military transport was horse-drawn. As a result, the village lost not only millions of workers called to the front, but also millions of horses, on which the peasants plowed and carried food.

And this, of course, is far from the complete picture. economic condition Russian Empire on the eve and during the First World War. But in the most in general terms I think the state of the economy from the given data is understandable.

The economic state of the Russian Empire on the eve of and during the First World War was, so to speak, very contrasting.

On the one hand - the first place in the collection and export of grain, the first place in the production and export of butter, whole line first or second places. But these places were mainly in agriculture, while the 20th century began - the century of rapid industrialization, in which only industrialized countries achieved success, and Russia at the beginning of the 20th century was not one yet, it was inferior to England, France , Germany and the USA in industrial production by 2-3 times - and this was a completely different side of the Russian economy.

While Russia was increasing coal mining and pig iron production, other countries, along with this, were increasing the production of machines that Russia bought from them, because it did not produce itself or produced very little due to the low level of industrial production, the growth of which rested on the low percentage of urban population.

The successes of the Russian Empire in agriculture are explained large areas fertile land and the rural population, which accounted for 84%. But a high proportion rural population, which ensured success in agriculture, was at the same time a limiting factor in the development of industrial production, which in the era of rapid industrialization, in the coming age of machines, turned into a lag.

With the beginning of the First World War, all the problems of the Russian economy sharply worsened. The war required the production of more guns, shells, machine guns, locomotives and other equipment. There were tanks and planes. And the one who had more of them, who had better ones, won, and Russia, due to the low level of industrial production, could not quickly increase output. new technology and weapons, so purchase prices rose, a lot had to be bought from abroad, and all this caused an increase in borrowing.

What this led to - we know very well.

The Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century was a dynamically developing and very promising state - this is true.

A huge population, accounting for 10% of the world, was the most valuable resource, and a high proportion of the rural population was a gigantic reserve for the development of industrialization - neither England, nor France, nor Germany had such a reserve.

If the Russian Empire could train at least 10% of the rural population in working professions and send them to factories, the number of workers would increase by 3-4 times, which means that Russia would not only catch up, but also surpass Germany, England and France in terms of production volume. And at the same time, Russia would still have 75% of the rural population, which means there would be an opportunity to increase production more and more.

But all this was possible only in Peaceful time, for this it was necessary another 10-20 years of peace.

Russia has entered into a difficult world war, yielding at the same time to its other participants in the level of industrial production and per capita income, with workers who already worked 11 hours and barely made ends meet.

Russia entered a difficult and protracted war, being technically and economically unprepared for this. And broke down.

Was the Russian Empire successful?

Before the outbreak of the First World War, Russia was successful in its own way - with large population, strong agriculture, an emerging industry. In terms of industrial production, although Russia was not the first in the world, it was far from the last and confidently ranked 5th, which is not so bad.

But Russia in the early 20th century was not as successful as some make it out to be. Not so successful as to withstand 4 years of hard, bloody and, most importantly, completely unnecessary war for the people.

Gold reserves of the Russian Empire- gold owned by the state of the Russian Empire in the vaults of the financial departments of the Treasury and the State Bank in the form of Russian and foreign coins (including the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries), circles without obverse and reverse, stripes, ingots, as well as gold nuggets from the vaults of St. Petersburg Gorny institute.

In 1914 Russia's gold reserves were the largest in the world.

background

Units

Until August 1914 (the beginning of World War I), the gold standard operated in the Russian Empire. One ruble contained 0.774235 g of gold, respectively, 1 million rubles was 774 kg of gold. In 1913, the exchange rate of the ruble against other currencies was 9.46 rubles per pound sterling, 1.94 rubles per US dollar, 0.46 rubles per German mark, 0.37 rubles per French franc.

Gold reserves during World War I

At the beginning of the First World War, Russia's gold reserves were the largest in the world and amounted to 1 billion 695 million rubles 1311 tons of gold (more than 60 billion dollars at the rate of the 2000s).

During the war, significant sums of gold were sent to England as a guarantee for war loans. In 1914, 75 million gold rubles (8 million pounds) were sent via Arkhangelsk to London. On the way, the ships of the convoy (cruiser Drake and transport Mantois) were damaged by mines and this route was considered dangerous. In 1915-1916, 375 million gold rubles (40 million pounds) were sent by railway to Vladivostok, and then on Japanese warships transported to Canada (part of british empire) and placed in the vaults of the Bank of England in Ottawa. In February 1917, another 187 million gold rubles (20 million pounds) were sent via the same route through Vladivostok. These gold sums became a guarantee of British loans to Russia for the purchase of military equipment in the amount of 300 and 150 million pounds, respectively. In total, by the time the banks were seized by the Bolsheviks, taking into account the gold mined during the war, Russia's gold reserves amounted to 1,101 million rubles.

With the outbreak of the First World War, the question arose about the safety of the state gold reserves of the Russian Empire, located in Petrograd. To ensure safety, the evacuation of state treasures was planned.

The evacuation began in early 1915. From Petrograd the valuables were taken by train to Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod.

After February Revolution gold was also transported there from other cities: Voronezh, Tambov (in May 1918, gold stored in the Tambov branch of the State Bank arrived in Kazan), Samara (in June 1918), Kursk, Mogilev and Penza. As a result, more than half of the gold reserves of the Russian Empire were concentrated in Kazan. Literally a few days before the October armed uprising, gold bullion worth 5 million rubles was loaded onto a train " special purpose"and sent through Petrograd and Finland to Stockholm, the Swedish Riksbank. After October 1917, the gold went to the Bolsheviks who seized power in the country. On behalf of V.I. Lenin, the chief commissioner of the People's Bank of the Republic T.I. Kazan Bank to prepare for a possible evacuation of valuables.On June 27, in the midst of the work of the manager of the Kazan branch of the People's Bank, Maryin, commander-in-chief Muravyov called in. He accused financial workers in panic and cowardice.

The next morning, a reinforced detachment from Muravyov's personal guard stood at the bank building. In early July, Muravyov tried to seize power in Kazan and take possession of the storerooms of the Kazan Bank. On July 27, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars created a group for the evacuation of gold reserves from Kazan as part of K.P. Andrushkevich (head), N.V. Nakonechny, S.M. Izmailov. On the evening of July 28, 1918, the group was in Kazan. She had at her disposal several barges and steamers equipped in Nizhny Novgorod. It was necessary to withdraw about 80 thousand pounds of jewelry. Work was accelerated on laying access roads from the bank to the pier, transport was being established, and gold packaging was being checked. To protect the gold on the way, a convoy of 20 people was formed, headed by A.I. Bochkov. During civil war, in August 1918, under pressure from volunteers General Staff Colonel V. O. Kappel and the Czech units, the Bolsheviks who kept the Gold Reserve of the Russian Empire in Kazan, decided to evacuate the gold from the city, but the swift attack of Kazan by Kappel mixed plans Soviet leadership, who managed to take out only 4.6 tons of gold (100 boxes) from Kazan: “Having started moving from Simbirsk on August 1, the flotilla people's army“Having previously defeated the Red flotilla that had come out to meet at the mouth of the Kama, on August 5 it already created a threat to Kazan by landing troops on the pier and the opposite bank of the Volga.”

Gold taken by Kappel during the storming of Kazan

By noon on August 7, 1918, Kazan was completely cleared of the Reds by a detachment of Colonel Kappel. Colonel Kappel reported in a telegram to Colonel S. Chechek: “The trophies cannot be counted, Russia’s gold reserves of 650 million have been captured ...”. In addition, from the Kazan part of the Gold Reserve of the Russian Empire, the whites got 100 million rubles in credit marks, gold bars, platinum and other valuables). Subsequently, Colonel Kappel did everything to take out the Gold Reserve of Russia from Kazan in time and save it for the White Cause.

Ten days later, on August 16, part of the gold and silver reserves of the Russian Empire seized in Kazan and in the amount of more than five hundred tons of gold and at least 750 boxes of silver were sent on two ships under guard to Samara, the capital of KOMUCH. For some time, gold was transported from Samara to Ufa, and at the end of November 1918, the gold reserves of the Russian Empire were moved to Omsk and placed at the disposal of the government of Admiral Kolchak.

The gold was deposited in the local branch of the State Bank. In May 1919, a group of bank employees began counting gold. The seals and seals were checked on all the boxes, after which it was found that in total there was gold in Omsk in the amount of 650 million rubles (505 tons). In addition, gold that was not included in the state stock was stored here - the gold parts of the instruments belonging to the Main Chamber of Weights and Measures. October 31, 1919 gold reserves under heavy guard officers was loaded onto wagons. Gold and guards were placed in 40 wagons, and accompanying personnel were in 12 wagons.

Trans-Siberian Railway along the entire length from Novo-Nikolaevsk (now Novosibirsk) to Irkutsk, it was controlled by the Czechs, whose attitude towards the admiral deteriorated greatly after the dispersal of the Ufa directory and the subsequent repressions. Besides main task Czechs had their own evacuation from Russia. Only on December 27, 1919, the headquarters train and the train with gold arrived at the Nizhneudinsk station, where representatives of the Entente forced Admiral Kolchak to sign an order to renounce the rights of the Supreme Ruler of Russia and transfer the echelon with gold reserves under control Czechoslovak Corps. On January 15, 1920, the Czech command handed over Kolchak to the Socialist-Revolutionary Political Center, which a few days later handed over the admiral to the Bolsheviks. On February 7, the Czechoslovaks returned Soviet authorities 409 million rubles in gold in exchange for guarantees of unhindered evacuation of the corps from Russia. The People's Commissariat of Finance of the RSFSR in June 1921 compiled a certificate from which it follows that during the reign of Admiral Kolchak, Russia's gold reserves decreased by 235.6 million rubles, or 182 tons. Bricks and stones were found in some boxes where gold bars were once stored. For the purchase of weapons and uniforms for Russian army Supreme ruler spent 68 million rubles. 128 million rubles were placed by him in foreign banks, their further fate remains unclear.

Another 35 million rubles from the gold reserve disappeared after it was transferred to the Bolsheviks, during transportation from Irkutsk to Kazan.

Ataman Semyonov's Gold

In September 1919, in Chita, Ataman Semyonov captured a train with 42 million rubles of Kolchak's gold bound for the United States. Of these, 29 million Semenov spent on the needs of his army and government, settlements with suppliers and local population, including payment wages railway workers and other employees of state institutions. The American representatives demanded that Semyonov send the gold to the United States, but Semyonov, relying on the Japanese, refused them.

In March 1920, in the port of Dalniy, Ataman Semenov handed over Japanese side 33 boxes of gold coins. According to the Japanese embassy in Russia, the money was deposited with the Chosen Ginko bank. 1 million 400 thousand yen from the above deposit as payment for military products were transferred to the Yokohama Shokin Ginko bank account of General M.P. Podtyagin, who was the military attache of the Far Eastern Army at the Russian Embassy in Tokyo. In 1922-1929 in Japanese courts a dispute was considered between Semenov and Podtyagin about which of them should be returned approximately 1 million 60 thousand yen, which remained after the payments made. Ultimately Supreme Court Japan decided the case in favor of Podtyagin and Podtyagin's representative received funds from the said deposit.

In November 1920, Major General Pavel Petrov, the head of supply of the Semenov Far Eastern Army, transferred 20 boxes of gold coins and 2 boxes of ingots worth 1.2 million rubles to the head of the Japanese military mission, Colonel Isome, under receipt for temporary storage. Subsequently, this gold was never returned by the Japanese to Petrov, although he tried many times to return it.

In 1934, Petrov filed a lawsuit in a Tokyo court against the Japanese Ministry of Defense. The trial, which lasted until 1940, was a factor in the internal Japanese politics, in court case Petrov was supported by the Japanese liberals, who thus wanted to reduce political significance military from Kwantung Army. Finally, in 1940, the court ruled against Petrov. The court pointed out that although the fact that the Japanese received gold was established, but since Far East Army Semyonov no longer exists, then Petrov is a private individual and cannot be the successor of the Russian Empire and the Romanovs, who originally owned the gold.

The Japanese press expressed the opinion that in addition to the amounts mentioned above, some amount of gold seized Japanese troops in Siberia was hidden by Japanese officers from Japanese government and appropriated by them as personal property, went into the secret funds of army intelligence and to bribe officials and members of parliament in Tokyo.

Gold in the hands of the Czechoslovak Legion

In Kazan, according to preliminary data, more than 657 million rubles in gold (about $330 million) were seized. This gold was transported to Samara, and then, under the protection of the Czechoslovak Corps, it was sent from Samara to Omsk. When re-counting in Omsk, only 651 million rubles were found. Some historians, on this basis, argue that the missing 6 million were stolen by the Czechs. In addition, there is a discrepancy of 4-5 million rubles between the amount remaining with Kolchak after the purchase of weapons, and the amount received by the Bolsheviks in Irkutsk. According to one version, the Czechs also stole these 4-5 million when the gold was again under their protection on the way from Omsk to Irkutsk. Correspondence of leaders is given in support of this version. Czech army and the state, in particular, there was, according to the Vladivostok local historian Buyakov, a secret letter from Benes to the command of the legion, in which he expresses interest in "purchasing gold and other precious metals." Another reason for this version is that the legionnaires who returned to their homeland founded their own bank - Legiabank, which became one of the largest banks in Czechoslovakia. However, according to updated data, the missing Kolchak gold could not be enough to establish a bank.

Former deputy. Minister of Finance in the government of Kolchak Novitsky in 1921, in a publication in a London Russian-language magazine, claimed that the Czechs had embezzled 63 million rubles. Opposition representatives German parties in the pre-war parliament of Czechoslovakia, the government was accused of stealing 36 Russian millions. Neither Nowitzki's figures nor those of the German parties are documented or supported by serious historians. According to modern data, an amount corresponding to approximately 63 million was secretly transferred by the Ministry of Finance to the accounts of proxies white movement abroad to secure the gold from possible confiscation by the Bolsheviks.

In connection with the issue of Russian gold in Czechoslovakia, it is sometimes noted that after the Civil War, the Czech government invited several thousand Russian emigrants to the country and actively helped them financially. Only from 1921 to the middle of 1927, 489 million crowns (approximately $ 170 million) were allocated for their support - that is, a significantly larger amount than what the legionnaires could take out of Siberia even according to the most daring estimates.

In 1936, at the request of Stalin, the Soviet government turned to Czechoslovakia with a demand to return the gold, but did not receive an intelligible answer from President Benesatak.

After the conclusion on March 3, 1918 in Brest-Litovsk Brest Peace representatives Soviet Russia, on the one hand, and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) - on the other, a secret additional protocol to it, according to which the Bolsheviks undertook to send to Germany 250 tons of gold (320 million rubles in gold), 320 million rubles in paper "Romanov" money and industrial goods and raw materials for a huge amount. In September 1918, two echelons with 98 tons of gold were sent to Germany. The rest of the gold was not sent - Germany lost the war.

After the signing of the Armistice of Compiègne Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was torn apart. Under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty, signed by Germany, all financial consequences of the Brest peace were canceled, and the gold delivered to Germany from Soviet Russia, under Article 259 Treaty of Versailles passed under the control of the Entente, although its further fate was not determined. Russian gold was delivered to the Bank of France, where it was placed in storage.

Under the 1997 Russo-French Financial Claims Settlement Agreement, Russia waived claims on gold left in France and claims related to the 1918-1922 intervention and paid France $400 million in compensation, while France waived debt repayment claims. on loans and bonds of the tsarist government.

Under the terms of the Tartu Peace Treaty signed on February 2, 1920 between the RSFSR and Estonia, Estonia was paid 11.6 tons of gold in the amount of about 15 million rubles. According to the Soviet-Lithuanian peace treaty, signed on July 12, 1920, Lithuania was paid 3 million rubles in gold. According to the Riga Peace Treaty of 1920, Latvia was paid 4 million rubles in gold.

According to the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, 30 million gold rubles were to be transferred to Poland, but according to different reasons this provision of the treaty was never implemented.

In 1920-1921, 5 million gold rubles were allocated as assistance to "Kemal" Turkey, waging war with the Entente.

More than two hundred tons of gold was spent by the Bolsheviks in the early 1920s on the purchase of steam locomotives in Sweden and England. There is an opinion that this was done at repeatedly inflated prices. However, the accusation that the locomotives were bought at twice the pre-war price was made without taking into account inflation. A simple check shows that there was no overpayment. The cost of locomotives was twice as high as compared to the pre-war, however, due to war inflation, the real value of gold fell by half.

Filmography

• Golden Echelon (film) (1959)
• m / f "Corto Maltese: Chasing the Golden Train" (2002)
• d / f “Ghost train. The Secret of Kolchak's Gold (2010)

I tried to make several charts on the gold reserves and gold mining of the USSR. It turned out to be not so simple: the early data is still back and forth (you can take it from Osokina), but the sources differ between 1933-1957.
Here is what happened as a result of gold mining.

Pre-revolutionary data are taken from Sharago's statistical collections and from the "Commercial and Industrial World of Russia". The data inside the collections also differ, but not too much - mainly due to the extraction / handing over to the laboratory / receiving chemically pure gold. He took data that fit with Osokina. (*note - the same chart http://golden-inform.ru/dobycha-zolota/rossija-skupaet-zoloto-2014/)
The gold reserve looks like this.

The last (highest) point for the gold reserves of the Republic of Ingushetia is here on March 23, 1916 - 2672 million gold rubles (2069 tons). Next - November 1, 1917 - 1101.7 million gold rubles (853 tons).
The cessation of the fall of the gold reserve in 1965 is not "they threw off the corn and immediately healed." Just before 1964. The USSR did not give long loans ( maximum term 5 years). And in 1964, England opened a credit line to the USSR with a repayment period of up to 15 years, and the rest followed after England: "here the card flooded us" (c). As a result, at the end of 1982, the gold reserve was 437.9 tons, but in addition to this, there was another 17 billion dollars of debt, which, translated into gold, means about 1,500 tons. With this result, we have come to the end of stagnation and the beginning of an era low prices for oil.
It is also worth noting that at the time of the post-war famine we had 1.5 thousand tons of gold, in the United States the maximum area under wheat, and besides, in 1946, 1947 we managed to export 2.5 million tons of grain, 80 thousand tons of flour and a bunch of products put into strategic reserves. In this sense, the sale of gold in 1963-64 for food, I like it much more than Stalin's hoarding.
Data, in addition to the sources mentioned above, are taken from:
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 **- (** note these links are not working)

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Russia's gold reserves for 2018

This is one of the country's foreign exchange reserves controlled by the Central Bank and Russia's gold reserves today (March 1, 2018) are 1880 tons, which is slightly more than last year, i.e. stocks are growing. These indicators put the Russian Federation on a par with other countries in the world that have the largest gold reserves.

Growth and decline in gold reserves

Russia's gold reserve never arrives in a static state. On the contrary, its quantity is in in constant motion. So in 1940 year, the highest mark of the gold and foreign exchange reserve was recorded - 2 800 t, while in 2000 its volumes were already equal to 384 tons.

Where is Russia's gold reserves stored?

Two-thirds of the total gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Russian Federation are kept in the main vault of the Central Bank of our country. It is located in the city of Moscow, and its area is about 17,000 m2, of which 1,500 m2 is reserved for storing gold reserves. Another 608 divisions of the Central Bank are also involved in the storage of state gold.

The safety of the valuable metal in Russia is represented by ingots, the weight of which ranges from 14 to 10 kg. There are also ingots of smaller sizes, weighing from 0.1 to 1 kg.

Positions of Russia in the world

Today, Russia's gold reserve in terms of volume (1,476.63 tons) is in sixth place among other countries in the world. The top five include the following states:

1. United States of America - 8 133.5 tons. America pretty long time ranks first among other golden powers. However, there were times (1952) when its gold and foreign exchange reserves amounted to about 20,663 tons of precious metal. Since then, the US has begun to gradually lose its reserve.


2. Germany - 3,381 tons. Germany is one of the few countries with the most constant amount gold reserves, which have remained virtually unchanged since 1961. However, since 2015, it also began to actively accumulate its gold and foreign exchange reserves.


3. Italy - 2 451.8 t. Italy's gold reserves have been virtually static since 1999.


4. France - 2 435.7 tons. This State cannot boast of the same stability of the gold and foreign exchange reserves as Germany or Italy. Central Bank of France during a large number time suffered serious losses, due to the severe economic situation in the country. However, since the end of 2015, there has been a significant increase in French gold reserves, which allowed the country to reach fourth place among other gold powers.


5. China - 1 808.3 tons In the period from 2015 to 2016, a significant jump in the gold reserves of the Middle Kingdom was recorded, which allowed it to bypass Russia in the ranking of the gold powers of the whole world. However, it is worth noting the fact that China's gold reserve is only 1.8% of its total foreign exchange reserves, estimated at this moment at 3,000,000,000,000.33 dollars.

Also, the countries leading in the amount of yellow metal for 2016 include Switzerland (1040.1 tons), Japan (765.2 tons), the Netherlands (612.5 tons) and India (557.8 tons). It is worth noting that most India's gold and foreign exchange reserves are privately owned precious metals.

Status today

The Russian Federation today is rapidly accumulating its gold reserves. So at the time of 1992, total gold in the country, together with private storage, amounted to only about 290 tons.

Russia's gold reserves experienced ups and downs, historical events, decisions of the country's leadership, left their mark on its quantity. In this article, we will talk about the gold reserves of Russia from the beginning of the 20th century to the present day, including where you will find out where the gold reserves of Russia are stored and how much it is in 2014. Let's start from the beginning of the 20th century, when Emperor Nicholas 2 was in power. Gold reserves in the Russian Empire before Russo-Japanese War were estimated at 1.7 billion rubles, this was the maximum, which, together with the approach of events for Far East began to decrease.

As a result, instead of 1400 tons of gold, by 1917, that is, in the year of the revolution in Russia, it was already 1100 tons. Further, the gold of Russia began its journey. First, he was taken to Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan, then the gold after the battles turned out to be with Kolchak's army. After his army was defeated at the disposal Soviet government it turned out to be already 323 tons, but part of the gold went to Germany for reparation payments, then purchases of the necessary equipment abroad began, prices were in gold. A simple example, for the supply of more than fifty steam locomotives, manufacturers in England and Sweden were paid 200 tons of gold from the gold reserve.

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Of course, it was not easy for a young country, but there were no other options. They bought everything they needed, until by 1928 the country's gold reserves amounted to 150 tons. At the same time, gold mining was at a low level of 20 tons per month, which of course was minuscule. At that time, Stalin was practically gaining power in the country, who carried out a number of measures to increase the country's idle reserve. Firstly, the Soyuz Zoloto state trust was created, which had the task of becoming the first in the world in gold mining, that is, to extract more than 300 tons every year. The second measure was the creation of shops where rare and valuable goods were sold for gold.

The third is the confiscation of gold, upon detection of cases of its speculation. All these measures have borne fruit. As a result, the USSR approached the Great Patriotic War with a gold reserve of 2800 tons. By the way, today this is the maximum figure in history in terms of the amount of gold in Russia's gold reserves. The war, the restoration of the economy, a lot of purchases of weapons, the construction, in fact, from scratch of the entire western part of the country, the restoration of economic facilities. Even with all this, by 1954 the USSR had a gold reserve of 2,500 tons of gold. One of the largest in the world. This was the legacy of Stalin. Further, the new leaders spent rather than increased.

After the end of the reign of Nikita Khrushchev, there were 1600 tons of gold in the country, during the reign of Brezhnev and the end of his era, 437 tons of gold remained in reserve. In fact, it was a very low mark. A lot has been spent on supporting friendly countries. But Andropov and Chernenko are literally short term raised the level of gold reserves to 720 tons. Then came the time of Gorbachev, after which 290 tons of gold remained in Russia.

The entire gold reserve remained in Russian Federation, together with the debts of the USSR. As a result, for 10 years, until 2000, it did not practically change. In 2000, the size of the gold reserve was 384 tons of gold. After 2000, the Russian Federation was headed by President Putin, under which the level of gold reached 883 tons in 2013. This is not enough, and it should be further increased its level. The gold reserve of Russia in 2014 is about 900 tons. For example, the figures for the gold reserves of others developed countries: USA (8.133 thousand tons), Germany (3.396 thousand tons), Italy (2.451 thousand tons), France (2.435 thousand tons) and China (1.054 thousand tons). Of course, today gold is not the main source of solvency and value. monetary circulation in the country and therefore the gold reserve is stored in Russia to ensure general condition economy, as one of the factors providing the value of the ruble, but not the main one.