The Battle of Kursk (summer 1943) radically changed the course of World War II.

Our army stopped the advance of the fascists and irrevocably took the strategic initiative in the further course of the war into its own hands.

Wehrmacht plans

In spite of huge losses, by the summer of 1943, the fascist army was still very strong, and Hitler intended to take revenge for his defeat in. To restore its former prestige, a major victory was needed at any cost.

To do this, Germany carried out total mobilization, strengthened the military industry, mainly due to the capabilities of the occupied territories Western Europe. This, of course, gave the expected results. And since there was already no second front in the West, German government directed all its military resources to the Eastern Front.

He managed not only to restore his army, but also to replenish it. the latest designs military equipment. The largest offensive operation "Citadel" was carefully planned, which was given a huge strategic importance. To implement the plan, the fascist command chose the Kursk direction.

The task was as follows: to break through the defenses of the Kursk ledge, reach Kursk, surround it and destroy the Soviet troops that defended this territory. All forces were directed to this idea of ​​a lightning-fast defeat of our troops. Break up a million people Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge, it was planned to encircle and take Kursk in just four days.

This plan is detailed in Order No. 6 of April 15, 1943, with a poetic conclusion: "The victory at Kursk should be a torch for the whole world."

On the basis of our intelligence data, the Headquarters became aware of the enemy's plans regarding the direction of his main attacks and the timing of the offensive. Headquarters carefully analyzed the situation, and as a result, it was decided that it would be more profitable for us to start the campaign with a strategic defensive operation.

Knowing that Hitler would attack only in one direction and concentrate the main striking forces here, our command came to the conclusion that it was defensive battles that would bleed the German army and destroy its tanks. After that, it will already be advisable to crush the enemy by breaking his main grouping.

Marshal reported this to Headquarters on 04/08/43: "wear down" the enemy on the defensive, knock out his tanks, and then bring in fresh reserves and go on the general offensive, finishing off the main forces of the Nazis. Thus, the Headquarters deliberately planned to make the beginning of the Battle of Kursk defensive.

Preparing for battle

From mid-April 1943, work began on the creation of powerful defensive positions on the Kursk salient. They dug trenches, trenches and shell magazines, built bunkers, prepared firing positions, observation posts. Having finished work in one place, they moved on and again began to dig, build, repeating the work in the previous position.

At the same time, the fighters were also prepared for the upcoming battles, conducting training sessions close to the real battle. B. N. Malinovsky, a participant in these events, wrote about this in his memoirs in the book “They didn’t choose their fate.” During these preparatory works, he writes, they received combat reinforcements: people, equipment. By the beginning of the battle, our troops here amounted to 1.3 million people.

steppe front

Strategic reserves, consisting of formations that have already participated in the battles for Stalingrad, Leningrad and other battles of the Soviet - German front, were first merged into the Reserve Front, which on 04/15/43. was called the Steppe Military District (commander I.S. Konev), and later - already during the Battle of Kursk - 07/10/43, it became known as the Steppe Front.

It included the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts. The command of the front was entrusted to Colonel General I. S. Konev, who after the Battle of Kursk became an army general, and in February 1944 - Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Battle of Kursk

The battle began on July 5, 1943. Our troops were ready for it. The Nazis made fire raids from an armored train, bombers fired from the air, the enemies dropped leaflets in which they tried to intimidate the Soviet soldiers with the upcoming terrible offensive, claiming that no one would be saved in it.

Our fighters immediately entered the battle, earned "Katyushas", went to meet the enemy with his new "Tigers" and "Ferdinands", our tanks and self-propelled guns. Artillery and infantry destroyed their vehicles in prepared minefields, with anti-tank grenades and simply bottles of combustible mixture.

Already in the evening of the first day of the battle, the Soviet Information Bureau reported that on July 5, 586 fascist tanks and 203 aircraft. Until the end of the day, the number of downed enemy aircraft increased to 260. Until July 9, there were fierce battles.

The enemy undermined his forces and was forced to order a temporary halt to the offensive in order to make some changes in original plan. But then the fighting resumed. Our troops nevertheless managed to stop the German offensive, however, in some places the enemy broke through our defenses 30-35 km deep.

tank battle

A large-scale tank battle played a huge role in turning the Battle of Kursk near Prokhorovka. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns were involved in it from both sides.

General valor was shown in this battle by the general of the 5th Guards. tank army P. A. Rotmistrov, general of the 5th Guards Army A. S. Zhdanov and heroic fortitude - all personnel.

Thanks to the organization and courage of our commanders and fighters, the offensive plans of the Nazis were finally buried in this fierce battle. The enemy's forces were exhausted, he had already brought his reserves into battle, had not yet entered the stage of defense, and the offensive had already stopped.

This was a very convenient moment for the transition of our troops from defense to counteroffensive. By July 12, the enemy was drained of blood, and the crisis of his offensive was ripe. This was crucial moment in the Battle of Kursk.

counteroffensive

On July 12, the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive, on July 15 - the Central Front. And on July 16, the Germans had already begun to withdraw their troops. Then the Voronezh Front joined the offensive, and on July 18, the Steppe Front. The retreating enemy was pursued, and by July 23, our troops restored the situation that existed before the defensive battles, i.e. back to the starting point.

For the final victory in the Battle of Kursk, a massive introduction of strategic reserves was necessary, moreover, in the most important direction. The Steppe Front proposed such a tactic. But the Headquarters, unfortunately, did not accept the decision of the Steppe Front and decided to introduce strategic reserves in parts and not simultaneously.

This led to the fact that the end of the Battle of Kursk dragged on in time. From July 23 to August 3 there was a pause. The Germans retreated to pre-prepared defensive lines. And our command took time to study the enemy defenses and streamline the troops after the battles.

The commanders understood that the enemy would not leave their prepared positions, and would fight to the last, if only to stop the advance of the Soviet troops. And then our advance continued. There were also many bloody battles with huge losses on both sides. The Battle of Kursk lasted 50 days and ended on August 23, 1943. The plans of the Wehrmacht completely failed.

The meaning of the Battle of Kursk

History has shown that the Battle of Kursk was a turning point in the course of World War II, starting point to the transition of the strategic initiative to Soviet army. lost half a million people and a huge amount of military equipment in the Battle of Kursk.

This defeat of Hitler also affected the situation on an international scale, because it gave the prerequisites for Germany to lose allied cooperation with. And in the end, the struggle on the fronts where the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition fought was greatly facilitated.

BATTLE OF KURSK 1943, defensive (July 5 - 23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) operations carried out by the Red Army in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge to disrupt the offensive and defeat the strategic grouping of German troops.

The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad and its subsequent general offensive in the winter of 1942/43 on vast space from the Baltic to the Black Sea, undermined the military power of Germany. In order to prevent the decline in the morale of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal tendencies within the aggressor bloc, Hitler and his generals decided to prepare and conduct a major offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With its success, they linked their hopes for the return of the lost strategic initiative and a turn in the course of the war in their favor.

It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command revised the method of the planned actions. The reason for this was the data Soviet intelligence that the German command plans to conduct a strategic offensive on the Kursk salient. The headquarters decided to wear down the enemy with a powerful defense, then go on the counteroffensive and defeat his striking forces. There was a rare case in the history of wars when the strongest side, owning the strategic initiative, deliberately chose to start fighting not offensive, but defensive. The development of events showed that this bold plan was absolutely justified.

FROM THE MEMORIES OF A. VASILEVSKY ON STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE SOVIET COMMAND OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK, April-June 1943

(...) Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive in the Kursk salient area using the latest tank technology on a massive scale, and then set the time for the enemy to go on the offensive.

Naturally, under the prevailing conditions, when the expected strike by the enemy with large forces was quite obvious, it was necessary to make the most expedient decision. The Soviet command faced a difficult dilemma: to attack or defend, and if defended, then how? (...)

Analyzing numerous intelligence data on the nature of the upcoming actions of the enemy and on his preparation for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and the Headquarters were more and more inclined towards the idea of ​​​​transition to deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief GK Zhukov in late March - early April. The most concrete conversation about planning military operations for the near future took place over the phone on April 7, when I was in Moscow, at the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov was on the Kursk ledge, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, signed by G.K. Zhukov, a report was sent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the situation and considerations on the plan of action in the area of ​​the Kursk salient, in which it was noted: it will be if we wear down the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going over to a general offensive, we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping.

I had to be at when he received G.K. Zhukov's report. I remember well how the Supreme Commander, without expressing his opinion, said: "We must consult with the front commanders." Having given the order to the General Staff to request the opinion of the fronts and obliging to prepare a special meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge, he himself called N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky and asked by April 12 to submit his thoughts on the actions of the fronts (...)

At the meeting held in the evening of April 12 at Headquarters, which was attended by I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, who arrived from the Voronezh Front, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense (...)

After a preliminary decision was made on a deliberate defense and on the subsequent transition to a counteroffensive, comprehensive and thorough preparations were launched for the upcoming actions. At the same time, reconnaissance of enemy actions continued. The Soviet command became precisely aware of the dates for the start of the enemy offensive, which were postponed three times by Hitler. At the end of May - beginning of June 1943, when the enemy’s plan to launch a strong tank attack on the Voronezh and Central Fronts using large groupings equipped with new military equipment for this purpose, the final decision was made on a deliberate defense.

Speaking about the plan for the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize two points. First, that this plan - central part strategic plan throughout the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and, secondly, that the decisive role in the development of this plan was played by higher authorities strategic leadership, and not other command instances (…)

Vasilevsky A.M. Strategic planning of the Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk M.: Nauka, 1970. S.66-83.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2172 aircraft. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District (from July 9 - the Steppe Front), which was the reserve of the Headquarters, was deployed. He was supposed to prevent a deep breakthrough from both Orel and Belgorod, and when going on the counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike from the depths.

The German side introduced 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, into the two strike groups intended for the offensive on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk ledge, which amounted to about 70% of the Wehrmacht's tank divisions on the Soviet-German front. In total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and assault guns, about 2050 aircraft. important place in the plans of the enemy, the massive use of new military equipment was assigned: the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand assault guns, as well as the new Focke-Wulf-190A and Henschel-129 aircraft.

APPEAL OF THE Führer TO THE GERMAN SOLDIERS ON THE EVE OF OPERATION "CITADEL", no later than July 4, 1943

Today you are launching a great offensive battle that may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole.

With your victory, the conviction of the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces will be strengthened stronger than before. In addition, a new cruel defeat of the Russians will further shake the faith in the possibility of the success of Bolshevism, which has already been shaken in many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big war, their faith in victory, no matter what, will disappear.

The Russians achieved this or that success primarily with the help of their tanks.

My soldiers! Now you finally have better tanks than the Russians.

Their seemingly inexhaustible human masses have become so thinned in a two-year struggle that they are forced to call on the youngest and oldest. Our infantry, as always, is superior to the Russians to the same extent as our artillery, our tank destroyers, our tankers, our sappers and, of course, our aviation.

The mighty blow that will overtake the Soviet armies this morning must shake them to their foundations.

And you should know that everything can depend on the outcome of this battle.

As a soldier, I clearly understand what I demand from you. In the end, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and difficult this or that individual battle may be.

German homeland - your wives, daughters and sons, selflessly rallying, meet enemy air strikes and at the same time work tirelessly for the sake of victory; they look with fervent hope at you, my soldiers.

ADOLF GITLER

This order is to be destroyed at divisional headquarters.

Klink E. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation "Zitadelle". Stuttgart, 1966.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. THE EVE

From the end of March 1943, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command worked on a plan for a strategic offensive, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush the enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, on the basis of army intelligence to the leadership of the Red Army, it became clear that the command of the Wehrmacht itself plans to carry out a strike under the bases of the Kursk ledge, in order to surround our troops stationed there.

The idea of ​​an offensive operation near Kursk arose at Hitler's headquarters immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943. The very configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrer to strike in converging directions. In the circles of the German command there were also opponents of such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, being responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, was of the opinion that they should not be used as the main striking force in a big battle - this could lead to a waste of forces . The strategy of the Wehrmacht for the summer of 1943, according to such generals as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, was to be exclusively defensive, as economical as possible in terms of expenditure of forces and means.

However, the bulk of the German military leaders actively supported the offensive plans. The date of the operation, which received the code name "Citadel", was set for July 5, and the German troops received at their disposal big number new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored vehicles were superior in terms of firepower and armor resistance to the main Soviet T-34 tank. By the beginning of Operation Citadel, the German forces of the Army Groups Center and South had at their disposal up to 130 Tigers and more than 200 Panthers. In addition, the Germans significantly improved the fighting qualities of their old T-III and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and putting an 88-mm cannon on many vehicles. In total, in the Wehrmacht strike groupings in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, by the beginning of the offensive, there were about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars. On the southern wing of the ledge, the strike forces of Army Group South under the command of Manstein were concentrated, which included the 4th Panzer Army of General Hoth and the Kempf group. The troops of Army Group Center von Kluge operated on the northern wing; the core of the strike group here was the forces of the 9th Army of General Model. The southern German group was stronger than the northern one. Generals Goth and Kemp had about twice as many tanks as Model.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided not to be the first to go on the offensive, but to take up a tough defense. The idea of ​​the Soviet command was to first bleed the enemy's forces, knock out his new tanks, and only then, having brought fresh reserves into action, go on the counteroffensive. Needless to say, it was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, and other representatives of the Soviet high command remembered well that not once since the beginning of the war had the Red Army been able to organize defense in such a way that a pre-prepared German offensive would fizzle out at the breakthrough stage. Soviet positions(at the beginning of the war near Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 in the Stalingrad direction).

However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals, who advised not to hurry with the start of the offensive. A defense in depth was built near Kursk, which had several lines. It was specially created as anti-tank. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions, respectively, on the northern and southern sections of the Kursk salient, another one was created - the Steppe Front, designed to become a reserve formation and join the battle at the moment the Red Army went on the counteroffensive.

The military factories of the country worked uninterruptedly on the production of tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional "thirty-fours" and powerful self-propelled guns SU-152. The latter could already with great success fight the "Tigers" and "Panthers".

At the heart of the organization Soviet defense near Kursk, the idea of ​​a deep echeloning of combat formations of troops and defensive positions was put forward. 5-6 defensive lines were erected on the Central and Voronezh fronts. Along with this, a defensive line was created for the troops of the Steppe Military District, and along the left bank of the river. Don Prepared state border defense. The total depth of the engineering equipment of the area reached 250-300 km.

In total, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy both in people and in equipment. The Central and Voronezh fronts included about 1.3 million people, and the Steppe Front standing behind them had an additional 500 thousand people. All three fronts had up to 5,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 28,000 guns and mortars at their disposal. The advantage in aviation was also on Soviet side- 2.6 thousand with us against about 2 thousand with the Germans.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. DEFENSE

The closer the launch date of Operation Citadel drew nearer, the more difficult it was to conceal its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy offensive was scheduled for 3 hours. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to carry out artillery counter-preparation on the night of July 5. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 minutes. After the roar of the cannonade subsided, the Germans could not recover for a long time. As a result of the artillery counter-preparation carried out in advance in the areas of concentration of enemy strike groups German troops suffered losses and launched an offensive 2.5-3 hours later than planned. Only after some time, the German troops were able to start their own artillery and aviation training. The attack of German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past six in the morning.

The German command pursued the goal of ramming through the defenses of the Soviet troops and reaching Kursk. In the zone of the Central Front, the main blow of the enemy was taken by the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the troops of the Central Front inflicted a counterattack on the advancing grouping by part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd tank armies and the 19th tank corps. The German offensive here was delayed, and on July 10 it was finally thwarted. In six days of fighting, the enemy penetrated the defenses of the Central Front only 10-12 km.

The first surprise for the German command both on the southern and northern wings of the Kursk ledge was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance on the battlefield of new German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther". Moreover, Soviet anti-tank artillery and guns from tanks buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of German tanks allowed them to break through the Soviet defenses in some areas and wedge into battle formations parts of the Red Army. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, the German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: the entire space between the positions was heavily mined, and the passages in the minefields were well covered by artillery. Till German tankers sappers were waiting, their combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to retain air supremacy. Increasingly, Soviet attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield - the famous Il-2.

Only on the first day of fighting, the Model group operating on the northern wing of the Kursk ledge lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that participated in the first strike. Soviet losses were also large: only two companies of the German "Tigers", advancing against the forces of the Central Front, destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period of July 5 - 6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between the strike units of the 20th, 2nd and 9th German tank divisions with formations of the Soviet 2nd tank and 13th armies. The result of this battle was extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern strike force was forced to stop. Having advanced only 10 - 15 km, Model eventually lost the striking power of his tank units and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.

Meanwhile, on the southern flank of the Kursk salient, events developed according to a different scenario. By July 8, the shock units of the German motorized formations "Grossdeutschland", "Reich", "Dead Head", the Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler", several tank divisions of the 4th Panzer Army of Gotha and the Kempf group managed to penetrate the Soviet defenses up to 20 and over km. The offensive initially went in the direction of the Oboyan settlement, but then, due to the strong opposition of the Soviet 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army and other formations in this sector, the commander of Army Group South von Manstein decided to strike east - in the direction of Prokhorovka . It was near this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War began, in which up to TWO TWO Hundred TANKS and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.

The Battle of Prokhorovka is a largely collective concept. The fate of the opposing sides was not decided in one day and not on the same field. The theater of operations for the Soviet and German tank formations represented an area of ​​​​more than 100 square meters. km. Nevertheless, it was this battle that largely determined the entire subsequent course not only of the Battle of Kursk, but of the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.

On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Rotmistrov from the Steppe Front to help the troops of the Voronezh Front, who was tasked with launching a counterattack on the enemy’s wedged tank units and forcing them to retreat to their original positions. It was emphasized that it was necessary to try to engage German tanks in close combat in order to limit their advantages in armor resistance and firepower of turret guns.

Having concentrated in the Prokhorovka area, on the morning of July 10, Soviet tanks moved to the attack. AT quantitatively they outnumbered the enemy by a ratio of about 3:2, but the fighting qualities of the German tanks allowed them to destroy many "thirty-fours" on the way to their positions. The fighting continued here from morning until evening. The Soviet tanks that broke through met the German ones almost armor to armor. But this is exactly what the command of the 5th Guards Army wanted. Moreover, soon the battle formations of the opponents mixed up so much that the "tigers" and "panthers" began to expose their side armor, which was not as strong as the frontal, to the fire of Soviet guns. When the battle finally began to subside towards the end of July 13, it was time to count the losses. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army has practically lost its combat power. But also German losses they did not allow them to further develop the offensive in the Prokhorovka direction: the Germans had only up to 250 serviceable combat vehicles left in service.

The Soviet command hastily transferred new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that continued in this area on July 13 and 14 did not lead to a decisive victory for one side or the other. However, the enemy began to gradually run out of steam. The Germans had the 24th in reserve tank corps, but sending it into battle meant losing the last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably great. On July 15, the Headquarters decided to deploy the forces of the Steppe Front of General I. Konev on the southern wing of the Kursk ledge - the 27th and 53rd armies, with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps. Soviet tanks were hastily concentrated northeast of Prokhorovka and received an order on July 17 to go on the offensive. But the Soviet tankers no longer had to participate in a new oncoming battle. The German units began to gradually move away from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?

As early as July 13, Hitler invited Field Marshals von Manstein and von Kluge to his headquarters for a meeting. On that day, he ordered the continuation of Operation Citadel and not to reduce the intensity of the fighting. Success near Kursk seemed to be just around the corner. However, just two days later, Hitler suffered a new disappointment. His plans were falling apart. On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk Front went on the offensive, and then, from July 15, the Central and Left Wings of the Western Fronts in the general direction of Orel (Operation ""). The German defense here could not stand it and cracked at the seams. Moreover, some territorial successes on the southern wing of the Kursk salient were nullified after the battle of Prokhorovka.

At a meeting at the Fuhrer's headquarters on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt Operation Citadel. The Fuhrer did not object to the continuation of the attacks on the southern wing of the Kursk salient (although it was no longer possible to do this on the northern wing of the salient). But the new efforts of the Manstein group did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the command of the German ground forces ordered the withdrawal of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps from the Army Group South. Manstein had no choice but to retreat.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. OFFENSIVE

In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle of Kursk began. 12 - 15 July went on the offensive Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, and on August 3, after the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts pushed the enemy back to their original positions on the southern wing of the Kursk salient, they launched the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev). Fighting in all areas continued to be extremely complex and fierce. The situation was further complicated by the fact that in the offensive zone of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the zone of the Central Front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were inflicted not on a weak, but on a strong sector of the enemy defense. This decision was made in order to shorten the time for preparing for offensive operations as much as possible, to catch the enemy by surprise, that is, precisely at the moment when he was already exhausted, but had not yet taken up a solid defense. The breakthrough was carried out by powerful strike groups in narrow sections of the front using a large number of tanks, artillery and aircraft.

The courage of Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, the competent use of military equipment in battles could not but lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Orel and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of the valiant formations of the Red Army that won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, units of the Red Army had pushed the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km and liberated Kharkov for the second time.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. Even greater were the losses of the Soviet troops: 860 thousand people; over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the balance of forces at the front changed in favor of the Red Army. It had at its disposal an incomparably greater number of fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.

The offensive of the Red Army, after the introduction of new formations into battle, continued to increase its pace. On the central sector of the front, the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts began to advance towards Smolensk. This ancient Russian city, considered since the 17th century. gate to Moscow, was released on September 25. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, units of the Red Army in October 1943 reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv region. Capturing several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river on the move, Soviet troops carried out an operation to liberate the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On November 6, a red flag was raised over Kyiv.

It would be wrong to say that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the further offensive of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more difficult. So, after the liberation of Kyiv, the enemy managed to inflict a powerful counterattack in the area of ​​​​Fastov and Zhytomyr on the advanced formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front and inflict considerable damage on us, stopping the offensive of the Red Army in the territory right-bank Ukraine. The situation in Eastern Belarus was even more tense. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, by November 1943, Soviet troops reached the areas east of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. However, the subsequent attacks of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the German Army Group Center, which had taken up a tough defense, did not lead to any significant results. Time was needed to concentrate additional forces in the Minsk direction, to give rest to formations exhausted in previous battles and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for a new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened in the summer of 1944.

And in 1943, the victories near Kursk and then in the battle for the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht suffered a final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were at war with the Axis powers. The collapse of the fascist bloc began. Among the notable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943 of soldiers' and commanders' awards - Orders of Glory I, II, and III degree and the Order of Victory, as well as the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees as a sign of the liberation of Ukraine. A long and bloody struggle still lay ahead, but a radical change had already taken place.

The situation and forces of the parties

In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge ledge was formed on the line of the Soviet-German front between the cities of Orel and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was informally called the Kursk Bulge. At the bend of the arc, the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh fronts and the German army groups "Center" and "South" were located.

Individual representatives of the highest German command circles suggested that the Wehrmacht go on the defensive, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring their own strength and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against: he believed that german army still strong enough to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. Objective analysis situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking on all fronts at once. Therefore, it was decided to limit offensive actions only one segment of the front. Quite logically, the German command chose the Kursk salient for striking. According to the plan, the German troops were to strike in converging directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. With a successful outcome, this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, which received the code name "Citadel", were approved on May 10-11, 1943.

Unravel the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht will advance in summer period 1943, was not great work. The Kursk salient, extending many kilometers into the depths of the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, it was decided to move on to a deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The troops of the Red Army were supposed to hold back the onslaught of the Nazi troops, wear down the enemy, and then go on the counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. After that, it was supposed to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions.

In the event that the Germans decided not to advance in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge, a plan was also created for offensive operations by forces concentrated on this sector of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and the Red Army began its implementation in April 1943.

The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built solid. In total, 8 defensive lines were created with a total depth of about 300 kilometers. Great attention was paid to mining the approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields was up to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front. Anti-tank artillery was not evenly distributed along the front, but gathered in the so-called "anti-tank areas" - localized accumulations of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped each other's sectors of fire. Thus, maximum concentration fire and provided shelling of one advancing enemy unit from several sides at once.

Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20,000 guns and mortars, and 2,800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.

With German side 50 divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10,000 guns and about 2.5 thousand aircraft.

Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, one should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and, consequently, the German command was able to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the desired concentration of troops in the breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943, the German army received a fairly large number of new heavy tanks "Tiger" and medium "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled units "Ferdinand", of which there were only 89 in the troops (out of 90 built) and which, however, , in themselves posed a considerable threat, provided they were competently used in the right place.

The first stage of the battle. Defense

Both commands - the Voronezh and Central Fronts - predicted the date of the transition of the German troops to the offensive quite accurately: according to their data, the attacks were to be expected in the period from 3 to 6 July. The day before the battle Soviet intelligence officers managed to capture the "language", which reported that on July 5 the Germans would begin the assault.

The northern face of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of General of the Army K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the start time German offensive, at 2:30 am the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 4:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this measure has been rather controversial. According to the reports of Soviet gunners, the Germans suffered significant damage. However, apparently, this is still not true. It is precisely known about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the violation of the enemy's wire communication lines. In addition, now the Germans knew for sure that a sudden offensive would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.

At 5:00 a.m., German artillery preparation began. It had not yet ended when the first echelons of the Nazi troops went on the offensive after the barrage of fire. The German infantry, supported by tanks, launched an offensive along the entire defense zone of the 13th Soviet Army. The main blow fell on the village of Olkhovatka. The most powerful onslaught was experienced by the right flank of the army near the village of Maloarkhangelskoye.

The battle lasted approximately two and a half hours, the attack was repelled. After that, the Germans moved the pressure on the left flank of the army. How strong their onslaught was is evidenced by the fact that by the end of July 5, the troops of the 15th and 81st Soviet divisions were partially surrounded. However, the Nazis have not yet succeeded in breaking through the front. In total, on the first day of the battle, German troops advanced 6-8 kilometers.

On July 6, Soviet troops attempted a counterattack with the forces of two tank, three rifle divisions and rifle corps with the support of two regiments of guards mortars and two regiments of self-propelled guns. The impact front was 34 kilometers. At first, the Red Army managed to push the Germans back 1-2 kilometers, but then the Soviet tanks came under heavy fire from German tanks and self-propelled guns and, after 40 vehicles were lost, were forced to stop. By the end of the day, the corps went on the defensive. An attempt at a counterattack, undertaken on July 6, had no serious success. The front was "pushed back" by only 1-2 kilometers.

After the failure of the attack on Olkhovatka, the Germans shifted their efforts in the direction of the Ponyri station. This station was of great strategic importance, covering the Orel-Kursk railway. Ponyri were well protected by minefields, artillery and tanks dug into the ground.

On July 6, Ponyri was attacked by about 170 German tanks and self-propelled guns, including 40 "Tigers" of the 505th heavy tank battalion. The Germans managed to break through the first line of defense and advance to the second. Three attacks that followed before the end of the day were repulsed by the second line. The next day, after stubborn attacks, the German troops managed to get even closer to the station. By 15 o'clock on July 7, the enemy captured the May 1 state farm and came close to the station. The day of July 7, 1943 became a crisis for the defense of Ponyri, although the Nazis still could not capture the station.

At the Ponyri station, German troops used the Ferdinand self-propelled guns, which turned out to be a serious problem for the Soviet troops. Soviet guns were practically incapable of penetrating the 200 mm frontal armor of these vehicles. Therefore, the Ferdinanda suffered the greatest losses from mines and air raids. last day when the Germans stormed the Ponyri station, it was July 12th.

From July 5 to July 12, heavy fighting took place in the zone of action of the 70th Army. Here the Nazis attacked with tanks and infantry under German air supremacy. On July 8, German troops managed to break through the defense, occupying several settlements. It was possible to localize the breakthrough only by introducing reserves. By July 11, Soviet troops received reinforcements, as well as air support. The strikes of dive bombers caused quite significant damage to the German units. On July 15, after the Germans had already been finally driven back, on the field between the villages of Samodurovka, Kutyrki and Tyoploye, war correspondents were filming lined German equipment. After the war, this chronicle was erroneously called "footage from near Prokhorovka", although there were not a single "Ferdinand" near Prokhorovka, and the Germans failed to evacuate two lined self-propelled guns of this type from under Teply.

In the zone of operations of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Vatutin), hostilities began on the afternoon of July 4 with attacks by German units on the positions of the combat guards of the front and lasted until late at night.

On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. On the southern face of the Kursk salient, the fighting was much more intense and was accompanied by more serious losses of Soviet troops than on the northern one. The reason for this was the terrain, more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front command.

The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th guards army. The first attack took place at 6 am on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoye. Two attacks followed, supported by tanks and aircraft. Both were repulsed, after which the Germans shifted the direction of the strike towards the settlement of Butovo. In the battles near Cherkassky, the enemy practically managed to make a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses, the Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% personnel parts.

During July 7-8, the Germans managed, incurring losses, to advance another 6-8 kilometers, but then the offensive on Oboyan stopped. The enemy was looking for a weak point in the Soviet defense and seemed to have found it. This place was a direction to the still unknown Prokhorovka station.

The Battle of Prokhorovka, considered one of the largest tank battles in history, began on July 11, 1943. On the part of the Germans, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 3rd Wehrmacht Panzer Corps took part in it - a total of about 450 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 5th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General P. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards Army of Lieutenant General A. Zhadov fought against them. There were about 800 Soviet tanks in the Battle of Prokhorovka.

The battle at Prokhorovka can be called the most discussed and controversial episode of the Battle of Kursk. The scope of this article does not make it possible to analyze it in detail, so we will limit ourselves to reporting approximate losses. The Germans irretrievably lost about 80 tanks and self-propelled guns, the Soviet troops lost about 270 vehicles.

Second phase. Offensive

On July 12, 1943, on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, with the participation of the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts, Operation Kutuzov, also known as the Orel Offensive Operation, began. On July 15, the troops of the Central Front joined it.

On the part of the Germans, a grouping of troops was involved in the battles, numbering 37 divisions. By modern estimates, the number of German tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in the battles near Orel was about 560 vehicles. The Soviet troops had a serious numerical advantage over the enemy: in the main directions of the Red Army, the German troops outnumbered the German troops six times in the number of infantry, five times in the number of artillery, and 2.5-3 times in tanks.

The German infantry divisions defended themselves on well-fortified terrain, equipped with barbed wire, minefields, machine-gun nests and armored caps. Along the banks of the rivers, enemy sappers built anti-tank obstacles. It should be noted, however, that work on the German defensive lines had not yet been completed by the time the counteroffensive began.

On July 12, at 5:10 am, Soviet troops began artillery preparation and launched an air strike on the enemy. Half an hour later the assault began. By the evening of the first day, the Red Army, waging heavy battles, advanced to a distance of 7.5 to 15 kilometers, breaking through the main defensive line of German formations in three places. offensive battles went until July 14th. During this time, the advance of the Soviet troops was up to 25 kilometers. However, by July 14, the Germans managed to regroup the troops, as a result of which the offensive of the Red Army was stopped for some time. The offensive of the Central Front, which began on July 15, developed slowly from the very beginning.

Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, by July 25, the Red Army managed to force the Germans to begin withdrawing troops from the Orlovsky bridgehead. In early August, battles began for the city of Oryol. By August 6, the city was completely liberated from the Nazis. After that, the Oryol operation moved into the final phase. On August 12, fighting began for the city of Karachev, which lasted until August 15 and ended with the defeat of the group of German troops that defended this settlement. By August 17-18, Soviet troops reached defensive line"Hagen", built by the Germans east of Bryansk.

August 3 is considered the official date for the start of the offensive on the southern face of the Kursk salient. However, the Germans began a gradual withdrawal of troops from their positions as early as July 16, and from July 17, units of the Red Army began to pursue the enemy, which by July 22 turned into a general offensive, which stopped at approximately the same positions that the Soviet troops occupied at the time the Battle of Kursk began. . The command demanded the immediate continuation of hostilities, however, due to exhaustion and fatigue of the units, the date was postponed by 8 days.

By August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had 50 rifle divisions, about 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, and more than 12,000 guns. At 8 o'clock in the morning, after artillery preparation, the Soviet troops launched an offensive. On the first day of the operation, the advance of units of the Voronezh Front ranged from 12 to 26 km. The troops of the Steppe Front advanced only 7-8 kilometers in a day.

On August 4-5, battles were fought to eliminate the Belgorod enemy grouping and liberate the city from German troops. By evening, Belgorod was taken by units of the 69th Army and the 1st Mechanized Corps.

By August 10, Soviet troops had cut the Kharkov-Poltava railroad. About 10 kilometers remained to the outskirts of Kharkov. On August 11, the Germans launched a strike in the Bogodukhov area, which significantly weakened the pace of the advance of both fronts of the Red Army. Fierce fighting continued until 14 August.

The Steppe Front reached the near approaches to Kharkov on August 11. On the first day, the advancing units had no success. Fighting on the outskirts of the city continued until 17 July. Both sides suffered heavy losses. Both in the Soviet and in the German units, companies numbering 40-50 people, or even less, were not uncommon.

The Germans delivered the last counterattack at Akhtyrka. Here they even managed to make a local breakthrough, but this did not change the situation globally. On August 23, a massive assault on Kharkov began; This very day is considered the date of the liberation of the city and the end of the Battle of Kursk. In fact, the fighting in the city completely stopped only by August 30, when the remnants of German resistance were suppressed.

The date of the battle is July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943. This battle entered modern history as one of the bloodiest battles of World War II. It is also known as the largest tank battle in the history of mankind.
Conditionally the Battle of Kursk can be divided into two stages:

• Kursk defensive (July 5 - 23)
• Oryol and Kharkov-Belgorod (July 12 - August 23) offensive operations.

The battle lasted 50 days and nights and influenced the entire subsequent course of hostilities.

Forces and means of the opposing sides

Before the start of the battle, the Red Army concentrated an unprecedented number of troops: the Central and Voronezh Fronts numbered more than 1.2 million soldiers and officers, over 3.5 thousand tanks, 20 thousand guns and mortars and more than 2800 aircraft different types. In reserve was the Steppe Front numbering: 580 thousand soldiers, 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 7.5 thousand guns and mortars. Its air cover was carried out by over 700 aircraft.
The German command managed to pull up reserves and by the beginning of the battle it had fifty divisions total strength over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, 2700 tanks and self-propelled guns, 10 thousand guns and mortars, as well as approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft. For the first time in the history of World War II, the German command used a large number of its latest technology: tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled guns - "Ferdinand".
As can be seen from the above data, the Red Army had an overwhelming superiority over the Wehrmacht, being on the defensive, it could quickly respond to all offensive actions of the enemy.

defensive operation

This phase of the battle began with a pre-emptive massive artillery preparation by the Red Army at 2.30 am, at 4.30 it was repeated. The German artillery preparation began at 5 am, and the first divisions went on the offensive after it ...
During the bloody battles, German troops advanced 6-8 kilometers along the entire front line. The main attack fell on the Ponyri station, a key railway junction of the Orel-Kursk line, and the village of Cherkasskoye, on the section of the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. In these areas, the German troops managed to advance to the Prokhorovka station. It was here that the largest tank battle of this war took place. On the part of the Soviet Union, 800 tanks under the command of General Zhadov participated in the battle, against 450 German tanks under the command of SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser. In the battle near Prokhorovka, Soviet troops lost about 270 tanks - German losses amounted to over 80 tanks and self-propelled guns.

Offensive

On July 12, 1943, the Soviet command launched Operation Kutuzov. In the course of which, after bloody battles of local significance, the troops of the Red Army on July 17-18 squeezed the Germans to the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. The fierce resistance of the German troops continued until August 4, when the Belgorod group of fascists was liquidated and Belgorod was liberated.
On August 10, the Red Army launched an offensive in the Kharkov direction, and on August 23, the city was stormed. City battles continued until August 30, but August 23, 1943 is considered the day of the liberation of the city and the end of the Battle of Kursk.

Battle of Kursk: its role and significance during the war

Fifty days, from July 5 to August 23, 1943, the Battle of Kursk continued, including the Kursk defensive (July 5 - 23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive strategic operations of the Soviet troops. In terms of its scope, attracted forces and means, tension, results and military-political consequences, it is one of the biggest battles World War II.

General course of the Battle of Kursk

Huge masses of troops and military equipment were involved in a fierce clash on the Kursk Bulge from both sides - more than 4 million people, almost 70 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, up to 12 thousand aircraft. The fascist German command threw more than 100 divisions into the battle, which accounted for over 43% of the divisions that were on the Soviet-German front.

The ledge in the Kursk region was formed as a result of stubborn battles in the winter and in early spring 1943. Here the right wing of the German Army Group "Center" hung over the troops of the Central Front from the north, and the left flank of the Army Group "South" covered the troops of the Voronezh Front from the south. During the three-month strategic pause that began at the end of March, the belligerents consolidated on the achieved lines, replenished their troops with people, military equipment and weapons, accumulated reserves and developed plans for further actions.

Considering great importance Kursk ledge, the German command decided in the summer to carry out an operation to eliminate it and defeat the Soviet troops occupying the defense here, hoping to regain the lost strategic initiative, to achieve a change in the course of the war in their favor. He developed a plan for an offensive operation, which received the conditional name "Citadel".

To implement these plans, the enemy concentrated 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized), attracted over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns and over 2 thousand aircraft. The German command had high hopes for the use of new heavy tanks "tiger" and "panther", assault guns "Ferdinand", fighter "Focke-Wulf-190D" and attack aircraft "Henschel-129".

On the Kursk ledge, which had a length of about 550 km, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, who had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, over 3.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 2.9 thousand aircraft, occupied the defense. To the east of Kursk, the Stepnoy Front, which was in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, was concentrated, which had 573 thousand people, 8 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 400 combat aircraft.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having timely and correctly determined the enemy’s plan, decided to switch to a deliberate defense on pre-prepared lines, during which to bleed the shock groups of German troops, and then go on a counteroffensive and complete their defeat. There was a rare case in the history of the war when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for the offensive, chose from several possible the most optimal variant of its actions. During April - June 1943, a defense in depth was created in the area of ​​the Kursk salient.

The troops and the local population dug about 10,000 km of trenches and communication passages, 700 km of wire fences were installed in the most dangerous directions, 2,000 km of additional and parallel roads were built, 686 bridges were restored and rebuilt. Hundreds of thousands of residents of Kursk, Oryol, Voronezh and Kharkov regions participated in the construction of defensive lines. The troops were delivered 313 thousand wagons with military equipment, reserves and supplies.

Having data on the time of the start of the German offensive, the Soviet command carried out pre-planned artillery counter-preparation in the areas where enemy strike groups were concentrated. The enemy suffered tangible losses, his hopes for a surprise offensive were frustrated. On the morning of July 5, German troops went on the offensive, but the enemy’s tank attacks, supported by the fire of thousands of guns and aircraft, crashed against insurmountable stamina. Soviet soldiers. On the northern face of the Kursk ledge, he managed to advance 10 - 12 km, and on the southern - 35 km.

It seemed that in front of such a powerful steel avalanche nothing living can stand. The sky was black with smoke and dust. Corrosive gases from the explosions of shells and mines blinded my eyes. From the roar of guns and mortars, the clanging of caterpillars, the soldiers lost their hearing, but fought with unparalleled courage. Their motto was the words: "Not a step back, stand to death!" German tanks were shot down by the fire of our guns, anti-tank rifles, tanks and self-propelled guns dug into the ground, were hit by aircraft, and were blown up by mines. The enemy infantry was cut off from the tanks, exterminated by artillery, mortar, rifle and machine-gun fire or in hand-to-hand combat in the trenches. Hitler's aviation destroyed by our aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery.

When one of the sections of the 203rd Guards rifle regiment German tanks broke through into the depths of the defense, the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, senior lieutenant Zhumbek Duisov, whose crew was wounded, knocked out three enemy tanks from an anti-tank rifle. The wounded armor-piercers, inspired by the feat of the officer, again took up arms and successfully repelled a new enemy attack.

In this battle, the armor-piercer Private F.I. Yuplankov knocked out six tanks and shot down one Yu-88 aircraft, an armor-piercer Lance Sergeant G.I. Kikinadze knocked out four, and Sergeant P.I. Houses - seven fascist tanks. The infantrymen boldly let enemy tanks through their trenches, cut off the infantry from the tanks and destroyed the Nazis with machine gun and machine gun fire, and the tanks were burned with Molotov cocktails and knocked out with grenades.

A bright heroic feat was performed by the crew of the tank, Lieutenant B.C. Shalandina. The company in which he operated was bypassed by a group of enemy tanks. Shalandin and members of his crew senior sergeants V.G. Kustov, V.F. Lekomtsev and Sergeant P.E. Zelenin boldly entered the battle with numerically superior enemy. Acting from an ambush, they let the enemy tanks into direct range, and then, hitting the sides, burned two "tigers" and one medium tank. But Shalandin's tank was also hit and caught fire. On a burning car, the crew of Shalandin decided to ram and crashed into the side of the "tiger" on the move. The enemy tank caught fire. But our entire crew also died. Lieutenant B.C. Shalandin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. By order of the Minister of Defense, he was forever enrolled in the lists of the Tashkent Tank School.

Simultaneously with the fighting on the ground, there were fierce battles in the air. An immortal feat was accomplished here by the pilot of the guard, Lieutenant A.K. Gorovets. On July 6, as part of a squadron on a La-5 aircraft, he covered his troops. Returning from the mission, Gorovets saw large group enemy bombers, but due to damage to the radio transmitter, he could not inform the leader about this and decided to attack them. During the battle, the brave pilot shot down nine enemy bombers, but he himself died.

On July 12, the largest oncoming tank battle in World War II took place in the Prokhorovka area, in which up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns participated on both sides. During the day of the battle, the opposing sides lost from 30 to 60% of tanks and self-propelled guns each.

On July 12, a turning point occurred in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy stopped the offensive, and on July 18 he began to withdraw all his forces to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 19 and the Steppe Front, began to pursue and by July 23 they threw the enemy back to the line that he had occupied on the eve of his offensive. Operation "Citadel" failed, the enemy failed to turn the tide of the war in their favor.

On July 12, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts launched an offensive in the Oryol direction. On July 15, the Central Front launched a counteroffensive. On August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. The scale of hostilities expanded even further.

Our troops during the battles on the Oryol ledge showed mass heroism. Here are just a few examples.

In the battle for a stronghold southwest of the village of Vyatka on July 13, the commander of a rifle platoon of the 457th rifle regiment of the 129th rifle division, Lieutenant N.D. Marinchenko. Carefully disguised, he unnoticed by the enemy led a platoon to the northern slope of the height and from close range brought down a shower of fire from machine guns on the enemy. The Germans began to panic. They ran, dropping their weapons. Capturing two 75-mm cannons at a height, Marinchenko's men opened fire on the enemy. For this feat, Lieutenant Nikolai Danilovich Marinchenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On July 19, 1943, in the battle for the settlement of Troena, Kursk Region, a heroic feat was accomplished by the gunner of a platoon of 45-mm guns of the 896th Infantry Regiment of the 211th Infantry Division, Sergeant N.N. Shilenkov. The enemy here repeatedly went over to counterattacks. During one of them, Shilenkov let German tanks 100 - 150 meters away and set fire to one of them with cannon fire and knocked out three of them.

When the cannon was smashed by an enemy shell, he took the machine gun and, together with the arrows, continued to fire at the enemy. Nikolai Nikolaevich Shilenkov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On August 5, two ancient Russian cities, Orel and Belgorod, were liberated. On the evening of the same day, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow for the first time in honor of the troops that had liberated them.

By August 18, the Soviet troops, having inflicted a heavy defeat on the Army Group Center, completely liberated the Oryol bridgehead. The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts at that time were fighting in the Kharkov direction. Having repulsed the strong counterattacks of the enemy's tank divisions, our units and formations liberated Kharkov on August 23. Thus, the Battle of Kursk ended with a brilliant victory for the Red Army.

The date of August 23 is now celebrated in our country as the Day military glory Russia - the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk (1943).

At the same time, it should be noted that the victory in the Battle of Kursk went to the Soviet troops very high price. They lost over 860 thousand people killed and wounded, more than 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 5.2 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.6 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, this victory was joyful and inspiring.

Thus, the victory at Kursk was new convincing evidence of the loyalty of Soviet soldiers to the oath, military duty and combat traditions of our Armed Forces. Strengthening and multiplying these traditions is the duty of every soldier of the Russian army.

The historical significance of the victory at Kursk

The Battle of Kursk is one of the most important stages on the way to victory in the Great Patriotic War. The crushing defeat of fascist Germany on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power Soviet Union. feat of arms soldiers merged with the selfless work of home front workers, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. What is the world-historical significance of the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk?

Firstly, the Nazi army suffered a severe defeat, huge losses, which the fascist leadership could no longer make up for with any total mobilizations. The grandiose battle of the summer of 1943 on the Kursk Bulge demonstrated to the whole world the ability Soviet state defeat the aggressor on their own. The prestige of German weapons was irreparably damaged. 30 were destroyed German divisions. Total losses Wehrmacht consisted of more than 500 thousand soldiers and officers, over 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft. By the way, pilots of the French Normandie squadron fought selflessly together with Soviet pilots in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, who shot down 33 German aircraft in air battles.

The enemy's armored forces suffered the heaviest losses. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. Chief Inspector tank troops Wehrmacht General Guderian was forced to admit: “As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to heavy losses in people and equipment ... The initiative finally passed to the Russians.

Secondly, in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy's attempt to regain the lost strategic initiative and take revenge for Stalingrad failed.

offensive strategy German troops suffered a complete collapse. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces on the front, made it possible to finally concentrate the strategic initiative in the hands of the Soviet command, and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive of the Red Army. The victory near Kursk and the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper ended in a radical change in the course of the war. After the Battle of Kursk Hitler's command was forced to finally abandon the offensive strategy and go on the defensive on the entire Soviet-German front.

However, at present, some Western historians, shamelessly falsifying the history of the Second World War, are trying in every possible way to belittle the significance of the victory of the Red Army near Kursk. Some of them argue that the Battle of Kursk is an ordinary, unremarkable episode of the Second World War, others in their voluminous works either simply keep silent about the Battle of Kursk, or speak about it sparingly and unintelligibly, other falsifiers seek to prove that the German The fascist army was defeated in the Battle of Kursk not under the blows of the Red Army, but as a result of Hitler's "miscalculations" and "fatal decisions", due to his unwillingness to listen to the opinion of his generals and field marshals. However, all this has no basis and is in conflict with the facts. The German generals and field marshals themselves recognized the groundlessness of such assertions. “Operation Citadel was the last attempt to keep our initiative in the east,” admits the former Hitlerite Field Marshal, who commanded the group ar
Miy "South" E. Manstein. - With its termination, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. In this regard, the Citadel is a decisive turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.

Thirdly, the victory in the Battle of Kursk is a triumph of Soviet military art. During the battle, the Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics once again proved their superiority over the military art of the Nazi army.

The Battle of Kursk enriched the national military art EXPERIENCE in organizing a deeply echeloned, active, stable defense, in carrying out flexible and decisive maneuvers of forces and means in the course of defensive and offensive operations.

In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command creatively approached the planning of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. The originality of the decision was expressed in the fact that the side that had the strategic initiative and overall superiority in forces went on the defensive, deliberately giving up active role enemy in initial phase campaigns. Subsequently, within the framework of a single process of conducting a campaign, after the defense, it was planned to switch to a decisive counteroffensive and develop a general offensive. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully solved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts large quantity mobile troops. It was achieved by conducting artillery counter-preparation on the scale of two fronts, extensive maneuvering of strategic reserves to reinforce them, and delivering massive air strikes against enemy groupings and reserves. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command skillfully determined the plan for conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching
choosing the directions of the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. Thus, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric strikes in converging directions, followed by fragmentation and destruction of the enemy grouping in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation main blow was inflicted by adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured a quick break-in of the enemy’s strong and deep defenses, cutting his grouping into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the enemy’s Kharkov defensive area.

In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully solved, strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts participating in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions.

Soviet operational art in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional insurmountable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep.

During the counteroffensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy's defense in depth was successfully solved by decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough sectors (from 50 to 90% of their total), the skillful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, close cooperation with aviation, which carried out an air offensive in full on the scale of fronts, which to a large extent ensured high rates ground forces offensive. Valuable experience was gained in conducting oncoming tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and in the course of an offensive when repulsing counterattacks by large enemy armored groupings.

The active actions of the partisans contributed to the successful conduct of the Battle of Kursk. Striking at the rear of the enemy, they fettered up to 100 thousand soldiers and officers of the enemy. The partisans made about 1.5 thousand raids on railway lines, disabled more than 1 thousand steam locomotives and defeated over 400 military trains.

Fourthly, the defeat of the Nazi troops during the Battle of Kursk was of great military-political and international significance. He significantly increased the role and international prestige of the Soviet Union. It became obvious that fascist Germany was faced with inevitable defeat by the might of Soviet weapons. The sympathy of ordinary people for our country increased even more, the hopes of the peoples of the countries occupied by the Nazis for an early liberation were strengthened, the front of the national liberation struggle of resistance movement fighters in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway expanded, the anti-fascist struggle intensified both in Germany itself and and other countries of the fascist bloc.

Fifthly, the defeat at Kursk and the results of the battle had a profound effect on german people, undermined the morale of the German troops, faith in the victorious outcome of the war. Germany was losing influence on its allies, disagreements within the fascist bloc intensified, which later led to a political and military crisis. The disintegration of the fascist bloc was laid - the Mussolini regime collapsed, and Italy withdrew from the war on the side of Germany.

The victory of the Red Army near Kursk forced Germany and its allies to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II, which had a huge impact on its further course. The transfer of significant enemy forces from the west to the Soviet-German front and their further defeat by the Red Army facilitated the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and predetermined their success.

Sixth, under the influence of the victory of the Red Army, cooperation between the leading countries of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened. She had a great influence on ruling circles USA and UK. At the end of 1943, the Tehran conference, where the leaders of the USSR, USA, Great Britain I.V. Stalin; F.D. Roosevelt, W. Churchill. At the conference, it was decided to open a second front in Europe in May 1944. Assessing the results of the victory at Kursk, the head of the British government, W. Churchill, noted: "Three huge battles - for Kursk, Orel and Kharkov, all carried out within two months, marked the collapse of the German army on the Eastern Front."

The victory in the Battle of Kursk was achieved thanks to the further strengthening of the military and economic power of the country and its Armed Forces.

One of decisive factors that ensured the victory near Kursk was the high moral, political and psychological state of the personnel of our troops. AT fierce battle such powerful sources of victories for the Soviet people and their army as patriotism, friendship of peoples, faith in one's own strength and success, manifested themselves with all their might. Soviet fighters and the commanders showed miracles of mass heroism, exceptional courage, stamina and military skill, for which 132 formations and units received the title of guards, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov. More than 100 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The victory near Kursk was also won thanks to a powerful economic base. Increased Opportunities Soviet industry, the heroic feat of home front workers, made it possible to provide the Red Army with huge quantities perfect samples of military equipment and weapons, surpassing in a number of decisive indicators military equipment fascist Germany.

Highly appreciating the role and significance of the Battle of Kursk, the courage, resilience and mass heroism shown by the defenders of the cities of Belgorod, Kursk and Orel in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Fatherland, by Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation of April 27, 2007, these cities were awarded the honorary title "City of Military Glory ".

Before a lesson on this topic and during its conduct, it is advisable to visit the museum of a unit or unit, organize a viewing of documentary and feature films about the Battle of Kursk, and invite veterans of the Great Patriotic War to speak.

In the opening remarks, it is worth emphasizing the importance of such historical event, like the Battle of Kursk, to emphasize that a radical turning point in the course of the war ended here and a mass expulsion of enemy troops from our territory began.

When covering the first issue, it is necessary, using a map, to show the location and balance of forces of the opposing sides on different stages Battle of Kursk, emphasizing that it is an unsurpassed example of Soviet military art. In addition, it is necessary to tell in detail about the exploits, give examples of the courage and heroism of the soldiers of their kind of troops committed in the Battle of Kursk.

In the course of considering the second question, it is necessary to objectively show the significance, role and place of the Battle of Kursk in the national military history, to consider in more detail the factors that contributed to this great victory.

At the end of the lesson, you need to brief conclusions, answer questions from the audience, thank the invited veterans.

1. Military Encyclopedia in 8 volumes. V.4. - M.: Military publishing house. 1999.

2. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945: A Brief History. - m., 1984.

3. Dembitsky N., Strelnikov v. Critical Operations Red Army and Navy 1943//Landmark. - 2003. - No. 1.

4. History of the Second World War 1939 -1945 in 12 volumes. T.7. - M., 1976.

Lieutenant colonel
Dmitry Samosvat,
Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Lieutenant Colonel
Alexey Kurshev