The history of Poland is closely connected with the history of Russia. Peaceful periods in relations between the two countries were interspersed with frequent armed conflicts.
In the XVI-XVII centuries. Russia and Poland waged numerous wars among themselves. The Livonian War (1558-1583) was fought by Moscow Rus against the Livonian Order, Polish Lithuanian state, Sweden and Denmark for hegemony in the Baltics. In addition to Livonia, the Russian Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible hoped to conquer the East Slavic lands that were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. For Russian-Polish relations, the unification of Lithuania and Poland during the war into a single state - the Commonwealth (Unia of Lublin in 1569) became important. The confrontation between Russia and Lithuania was replaced by the confrontation between Russia and Poland. King Stefan Batory inflicted a number of defeats on the Russian army and was stopped only under the walls of Pskov. According to the Yam Zapolsky (1582) peace treaty with Poland, Russia renounced its conquests in Lithuania and lost access to the Baltic.
During the Time of Troubles, the Poles invaded Russia three times. For the first time, under the pretext of helping the supposedly legitimate Tsar Dmitry - False Dmitry I. In 1610 Moscow government, the so-called Seven Boyars, itself called the Polish prince Vladislav IV to the Russian throne and let the Polish troops into the city. AT 1612. Poles were expelled from Moscow militia under the command of Minin and Pozharsky. In 1617, Prince Vladislav made a campaign against Moscow. After an unsuccessful assault, he entered into negotiations and signed the Deulin truce. The Poles got Smolensk, Chernigov and Seversk lands.
In June 1632, after the Deulino truce, Russia tried to recapture Smolensk from Poland, but was defeated ( Smolensk war, 1632-1634). The Poles failed to build on the success, the borders remained unchanged. However, for the Russian government, the most important condition was the official renunciation of the Polish king Vladislav IV from his claims to the Russian throne.
New Russo-Polish War ( 1654-1667 ) began after the adoption of the Hetmanate of Bohdan Khmelnitsky into Russia under the Pereyaslav agreements. According to the Andrusovsky peace treaty, Smolensk and Chernigov land and Left-bank Ukraine, and Zaporozhye was declared under a joint Russian-Polish protectorate. Kyiv was declared a temporary possession of Russia, but according to the "Eternal Peace" on May 16, 1686, it finally passed to it.
Ukrainian and Belarusian lands became a “bone of contention” for Poland and Russia until the middle of the 20th century.
Termination Russian-Polish wars contributed to the threat to both states from Turkey and its vassal of the Crimean Khanate.
AT northern war v. Sweden 1700-1721 Poland was an ally of Russia.
In the 2nd half of the XVIII century. gentry of the Commonwealth, torn apart internal contradictions, was in a state of deep crisis and decline, which made it possible for Prussia and Russia to interfere in its affairs. Russia participated in the War of the Polish Succession 1733-1735.
Sections of the Commonwealth in 1772-1795 between Russia, Prussia and Austria passed without big wars, because the state, weakened due to internal turmoil, could no longer offer serious resistance to more powerful neighbors.
As a result of the three divisions of the Commonwealth and the redistribution into Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 tsarist Russia most of the Warsaw principality was transferred (the Kingdom of Poland was formed). Polish national liberation uprisings of 1794 (led by Tadeusz Kosciuszko), 1830-1831, 1846, 1848, 1863-1864 were suppressed.
In 1918 The Soviet government annulled all the treaties of the tsarist government on the partitions of the country.
After the defeat of Germany in the First World War, Poland became an independent state. Its leadership made plans to restore the borders of the Commonwealth in 1772. The Soviet government, on the contrary, intended to establish control over the entire territory of the former Russian Empire, making it, as officially declared, a springboard for world revolution.
Soviet-Polish war 1920 began successfully for Russia, Tukhachevsky's troops stood near Warsaw, but then followed the rout. According to various estimates, from 80 to 165 thousand Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner. Polish researchers consider documented the death of 16,000 of them. Russian and Soviet historians put the number at 80,000. According to the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were ceded to Poland.
August 231939 The Non-Aggression Pact was signed between the USSR and Germany, better known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. A secret additional protocol was attached to the treaty, which determined the delimitation of the Soviet and German spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. On August 28, an explanation was signed to the "secret additional protocol", which delimited the spheres of influence "in the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Polish State." The zone of influence of the USSR included the territory of Poland east of the line of the rivers Pissa, Narev, Bug, Vistula, San. This line roughly corresponded to the so-called "Curzon Line", along which it was supposed to establish the eastern border of Poland after the First World War.
1 September 1939 attack on Poland Nazi Germany unleashed World War II. Having defeated the Polish army for several weeks, she occupied most countries. September 17, 1939 In accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Red Army crossed the eastern border of Poland.
Soviet troops captured 240,000 Polish soldiers. More than 14 thousand officers of the Polish army were interned in the fall of 1939 on the territory of the USSR. In 1943, two years after the occupation German troops western regions of the USSR, there were reports that NKVD officers shot Polish officers in the Katyn forest, located 14 kilometers west of Smolensk.
In May 1945 the territory of Poland was completely liberated by units of the Red Army and the Polish Army. More than 600 thousand died in the battles for the liberation of Poland Soviet soldiers and officers.
By the decisions of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of 1945, Poland was returned to its western lands, and the border along the Oder-Neisse was established. After the war, the construction of a socialist society was proclaimed in Poland under the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). In recovery and development national economy was of great help Soviet Union. In 1945-1993. the Soviet Northern Group of Forces was stationed in Poland; in 1955-1991 Poland was a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
Manifesto of the Polish Committee national liberation July 22, 1944 Poland was proclaimed the Polish Republic. From July 22, 1952 to December 29, 1989 - the Polish People's Republic. Since December 29, 1989 - the Republic of Poland.
Diplomatic relations between the RSFSR and Poland were established in 1921, between the USSR and Poland - from January 5, 1945, the assignee is the Russian Federation.
May 22, 1992 Russia and Poland signed the Treaty of Friendly and Good Neighborly Relations.
The legal foundation of relations forms an array of documents concluded between former USSR and Poland, as well as over 40 interstate and intergovernmental treaties and agreements signed over the past 18 years.
During the period 2000-2005 political ties between Russia and Poland were maintained quite intensively. President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin had 10 meetings with President of the Republic of Poland Aleksander Kwasniewski. Contacts were regularly made between the heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs, through the parliamentary line. There was a bilateral Committee on the Strategy of Russian-Polish Cooperation, meetings of the Russia-Poland Public Dialogue Forum were held regularly.
After 2005 the intensity and level of political contacts have decreased significantly. This was influenced by the confrontation line Polish leadership expressed in the maintenance of a socio-political atmosphere unfriendly to our country.
formed in November 2007 the new government of Poland headed by Donald Tusk declares its interest in the normalization of Russian-Polish relations, readiness for open dialogue in order to find solutions to the accumulated problems in bilateral relations.
August 6, 2010 Bronisław Komorowski, the newly elected President of Poland, was inaugurated. In his solemn speech, Komorowski said that he would support the process of rapprochement with Russia that had begun: "I will contribute to the process of rapprochement and Polish-Russian reconciliation that has begun. This is an important challenge facing both Poland and Russia."
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Poland was part of the Russian Empire from 1815 to 1917. It was a turbulent and difficult period for the Polish people - a time of new opportunities and great disappointments.
Relations between Russia and Poland have always been difficult. First of all, this is a consequence of the neighborhood of the two states, which for many centuries gave rise to territorial disputes. It is quite natural that during major wars Russia has always been drawn into the revision of the Polish-Russian borders. This has profoundly affected the social, cultural and economic conditions in adjacent areas, as well as way of life Poles.
"Prison of Nations"
The "national question" of the Russian Empire caused different, sometimes polar opinions. Thus, Soviet historical science called the empire nothing more than a “prison of peoples,” while Western historians considered it a colonial power.
But in the Russian publicist Ivan Solonevich, we find the opposite statement: “Not a single people in Russia was subjected to such treatment as Ireland was subjected to in the times of Cromwell and the times of Gladstone. With very few exceptions, all the nationalities of the country were perfectly equal before the law.”
Russia has always been a multi-ethnic state: its expansion gradually led to the fact that the already heterogeneous composition of Russian society began to be diluted with representatives different peoples. This also applied to the imperial elite, which was noticeably replenished with immigrants from European countries who came to Russia "to catch happiness and ranks."
For example, the analysis of the "Discharge" lists late XVII century shows that in the boyar corps there were 24.3% of people of Polish and Lithuanian origin. However, the vast majority of "Russian foreigners" lost their national identity, dissolving in Russian society.
"Kingdom of Poland"
Following the results of the Patriotic War of 1812, having joined Russia, the “Kingdom of Poland” (since 1887 - the “Privislinsky Territory”) had a twofold position. On the one hand, after the division of the Commonwealth, although it was a completely new geopolitical entity, it still retained ethno-cultural and religious links with its predecessor.
And on the other hand, national self-consciousness grew here and the sprouts of statehood made their way, which could not but affect the relationship between the Poles and the central government.
After joining the Russian Empire, the "Kingdom of Poland" undoubtedly expected changes. There were changes, but they were not always perceived unambiguously. During the entry of Poland into Russia, five emperors were replaced, and each had his own view of the westernmost Russian province.
If Alexander I was known as a "polonophile", then Nicholas I built a much more sober and tough policy towards Poland. However, you will not refuse him the desire, in the words of the emperor himself, "to be as good a Pole as a good Russian."
On the whole, Russian historiography positively evaluates the results of Poland's centenary entry into the empire. Perhaps it was Russia's balanced policy towards its western neighbor that helped create a unique situation in which Poland, not being an independent territory, for a hundred years retained its state and national identity.
Hopes and disappointments
One of the first measures introduced by the Russian government was the abolition of the "Napoleon Code" and its replacement by the Polish Code, which, among other measures, provided peasants with land and financial position the poor. The Polish Sejm passed the new bill, but refused to ban civil marriage, which grants freedom.
This clearly marked the orientation of the Poles to Western values. There was someone to take an example from. So in the Grand Duchy of Finland already at the time of entry Polish kingdom part of Russia was canceled serfdom. Enlightened and liberal Europe was closer to Poland than "peasant" Russia.
After the “Alexandrov freedoms”, the time of the “Nikolaev reaction” came. In the Polish province, almost all office work is translated into Russian, or into French for those who did not speak Russian. The confiscated estates are complained to by persons of Russian origin, and all the highest positions are replaced by Russians.
Nicholas I, who visited Warsaw in 1835, feels a protest brewing in Polish society, and therefore forbids the deputation to express loyal feelings, "in order to protect them from lies."
The tone of the emperor's speech strikes with its uncompromisingness: “I need deeds, not words. If you persist in your dreams of national isolation, of the independence of Poland and similar fantasies, you will bring upon yourself the greatest misfortune ... I tell you that at the slightest disturbance I will order to shoot at the city, turn Warsaw into ruins and, of course, I'll fix it."
Polish riot
Sooner or later, empires are replaced by national-type states. This problem also affected the Polish province, in which, in the wake of the growth of national consciousness, political movements gain strength and have no equal among other provinces of Russia.
The idea of national isolation, up to the restoration of the Commonwealth within its former boundaries, embraced ever wider sections of the masses. The dispersal force of the protest was the students, who were supported by workers, soldiers, as well as various strata of Polish society. Later, part of the landlords and nobles joined the liberation movement.
The main points of the demands made by the rebels are agrarian reforms, democratization of society and eventually the independence of Poland.
But for the Russian state it was a dangerous challenge. The Russian government responded sharply and harshly to the Polish uprisings of 1830-1831 and 1863-1864. The suppression of the riots turned out to be bloody, but there was no excessive harshness that Soviet historians wrote about. The rebels preferred to be sent to remote Russian provinces.
The uprisings forced the government to take a number of countermeasures. In 1832, the Polish Sejm was liquidated and the Polish army was disbanded. In 1864, restrictions were placed on the use Polish and movement of the male population. AT lesser degree the results of the uprisings affected the local bureaucracy, although among the revolutionaries there were children of high-ranking officials. The period after 1864 was marked by an increase in "Russophobia" in Polish society.
From dissatisfaction to benefits
Poland, despite the restrictions and infringement of freedoms, received certain benefits from belonging to the empire. So, under the reign of Alexander II and Alexander III, Poles began to be more often appointed to leadership positions. In some counties their number reached 80%. The Poles had the opportunity to advance along public service no less than the Russians.
Even more privileges were given to Polish aristocrats, who automatically received high ranks. Many of them oversaw the banking sector. Profitable places in St. Petersburg and Moscow were available for the Polish nobility, and they also had the opportunity to open their own business.
It should be noted that, in general, the Polish province had more privileges than other regions of the empire. So, in 1907 at a meeting State Duma 3rd convocation, it was announced that in various Russian provinces taxation reaches 1.26%, and in the largest industrial centers Poland - Warsaw and Lodz, it does not exceed 1.04%.
Interestingly, the Privislinsky Krai received 1 ruble 14 kopecks back in the form of subsidies for each ruble given to the state treasury. For comparison, the Middle Black Earth Territory received only 74 kopecks.
The government spent a lot in the Polish province on education - from 51 to 57 kopecks per person, and, for example, in Central Russia this amount did not exceed 10 kopecks. Thanks to this policy, from 1861 to 1897 the number of literate people in Poland increased 4 times, reaching 35%, although in the rest of Russia this figure fluctuated around 19%.
AT late XIX century, Russia embarked on the path of industrialization, backed by solid Western investment. Polish officials also received dividends from this, participating in railway transportation between Russia and Germany. As a consequence, the appearance huge amount banks in major Polish cities.
The year 1917, tragic for Russia, ended the history of “Russian Poland”, giving the Poles the opportunity to establish their own statehood. What Nicholas II promised has come true. Poland gained freedom, but the union with Russia so desired by the emperor did not work out.
The topic of this article is somewhat unusual. As a rule, much is written about the long and uncompromising struggle of Polish patriots against Russia they hate. A long and bloody struggle. The purpose of this article is to tell about the Poles, who did not see Russians as existential enemies.
It was believed that the Poles have an ineradicable antipathy to everything Russian. This is partly true. Even pardoned or amnestied participants in the Polish-Russian battles and Polish uprisings of the 18th-19th centuries. were certainly taken locally for anti-Russian propaganda. “So young, and already a Pole!” - this is how the Siberian people reacted in the 19th century. on the appearance of young men in snowy Siberia, who introduced themselves when meeting the local population of the Poles. In the Russian mind, the words "Pole" and "rebel" were synonymous.
In those days, many hundreds of Poles were sent into exile for anti-government activities. Some of them were pardoned, and, instead of Siberia, they were assigned to Kharkov educational establishments, away from western borders Russia. But even there, the Polish professors continued to gradually inspire the students with the idea of Polish nobility, Ukrainian separatism and Russian barbarism. Today Kharkov is sometimes called the Russian-speaking capital. Ukrainian nationalism. Indeed, of all the cities so close to Russian border(only 26 km!), it is in Kharkov that there are even proportionally small, but aggressive groups of Russian-speaking Ukrainian national-particularists. Idle rumor claims that these are echoes of the propaganda work of the Polish intelligentsia of the 19th century.
Polish journalist Piotr Skverchinsky, considering the problems of Polish-Russian relations, admitted that the Poles would only be satisfied with Russia, which had shrunk to the size of Garden Ring. But even then, he assured, most Poles would be unhappy. And if the Russians commit collective suicide at once, the Poles would be incredibly happy, although they still would not miss the opportunity to call the Russians "barbarians" for such a strange act. Indeed, Russia and Poland have been bound by whole centuries of difficult and often extremely conflicting relations, which could not but be reflected in the Polish mass consciousness. Polish historical consciousness, unlike Russian, is more emotionally colored. Everything that was tragic in Polish-Russian relations is absolutized in the Polish consciousness, takes on large-scale forms and incessantly dominates our common history. Politics historical memory Considered by other countries as unproductive and overly pessimistic, in Poland it is the dominant form of relations with its largest eastern neighbor.
Ethnosociologist Wilhelm Mühlmann introduced such a concept as ethnocentrum. An ethnocentrum is an ethnos' awareness of itself within the framework of the space where this ethnos lives. This is a form of ethnic thinking, where the ethnos includes everything that surrounds it: from the terrain (mountains, rivers, forests) to highly differentiated concepts (state idea, wars, unions, economic ties, cultural and diplomatic contacts). Each ethnocentrum strives to remain intact. The ethnocentrum is afraid of a conceptual split, bifurcation, because the split of the ethnocentrum would mean a split of ethnic self-consciousness and modification inner life people. Relations between Poles and Russians can also be described in ethno-sociological terms. The Polish ethnocentrum subconsciously feels the power of the Russian ethnocentrum, as a more numerous imperial people, moreover, not Catholic.
The Polish ethnocentrum is not inclined towards peaceful relations with the Russians for the reason that it is afraid to “let in” someone who is more powerful, more energetic and numerous. As an ethnocentrum less numerous people, the Polish ethnocentrum is afraid to “sink” and dissolve in the Russian ethnocentrum, afraid to be absorbed by it or split in two, i.e. accept both Catholic and Orthodox identity. Therefore, a considerable number of Orthodox Poles or Poles who served the Russian Empire, and then the USSR, are taken out of brackets by Polish historiography itself, are considered by it as ideological antibodies, as something that carries the danger of inoculating elements of the ethnic consciousness of the neighboring people (Russians), and contributes to a split monopoly -Catholic anti-Russian consciousness, characteristic of the Poles. The ethnocentrum of the Poles sees only one salvation - building such relations with the Russians, in which it would be absolutely impossible for an excessive amount of Russian, non-Catholic influence to penetrate into the Polish ethnocentrum. This is a subconscious mechanism of ethnic defense, under which everything else is already being adjusted - politics, culture, religion, the media. The Poles feel safe only under the condition of maximum cultural and political distance from the vast Russian people, and in order to establish and consolidate this paradigm, they actively use anti-Russian propaganda. In fact, the contribution of the Poles, who until 1917 were the second largest people of the empire, after the Russians, to the strengthening and formation Russian statehood quite significant. It is regrettable that Polish historiography itself is silent about this, tightly squeezing lips that have turned white with annoyance. So let's try to talk about it.
Relatively often, Poles began to appear in Russia under Tsar Ivan the Terrible. Some Polish warriors voluntarily came to the service of the Russian Tsar. In that era, condottieri were commonplace. The thin "Polish brook" did not stop later. Jozef Tausch - that was the name of the Polish diplomat who was at the court of Peter I. Colonel Tausch was trusted Russian monarch and his retinue. This is sparingly mentioned even by contemporary Polish sources. Next to Peter the Great, Taush went through many battles, and in 1709 he was allowed to observe the course of the Poltava battle, while the ambassadors of other powers were removed away due to fear of espionage. But Tausch was not the only Pole in Peter's entourage. Recall, for example, Pavel Yaguzhinsky, who began with a career as a tsar's batman and ended as an adjutant general who received from Peter I an island on the Yauza River near the German Quarter in Moscow for perpetual possession.
Patriotic War of 1812 Poles join the ranks en masse Napoleonic army to participate in the campaign against Russia. In Napoleon's retinue are Polish generals, waiting only for orders to lead their legions east. But in Russian headquarters the same Pole generals are waiting for them: Field Marshal M. Kamensky, General M. Kakhovsky, Lieutenant General I. Przhibyshevsky, Gen. from the cavalry A. Ozharovsky, gene. from the cavalry, N. Raevsky (the same famous Raevsky, who marched towards the French cores along with his teenage sons, taking them by the hand!) and many others, ready to lead their Russian soldiers against the French regiments. Sometimes whole battles were played out between two Polish generals: one led the French into battle, the other the Russians. By the way, at that time the number of Pole generals in the Russian army was greater than the number of Poles among the French generals. Among the junior officers and rank and file of the Russian army, there were even more Poles than among the generals. History knows the volunteer lancers of the Polish regiment under the command of Lieutenant K. Biskupsky, who partisand along with the Russian peasants, attacking the Napoleonic warriors, and the Poles as part of the Cossack formations.
Many Poles converted to Orthodoxy, especially those who were heading deep into Russia. There was not even a shadow of hatred left between the Orthodox Pole and the Russian. This gave gen. M. Muravyov has a reason to declare that "Orthodox Poles are even more Russian than the Russians themselves." The history of the Carpatho-Russian movement in Galicia knows the name of Ippolit Terletsky, a Pole who converted to Orthodoxy and advocated the cleansing of not only Western Ukrainian Orthodoxy, but even Greek Catholicism from the layers of the Latin faith. And today in Belarus, many Poles receive Orthodox baptism. By default, their Catholic compatriots cease to consider them Poles, writing them down as Russians.
In subsequent wars, the Poles also not so rarely found themselves on the side of Russia. General Adam Rzhevuski is one of such glorious names. Member of the Turkish (1828-1829) and Crimean Wars (1853-1856). In 1830, the Pole Rzhevuski, as a supporter of Poland's orientation towards Russia, was an active participant in the suppression of the Polish uprising. Russia faithfully served not only Adam, but also many other representatives of this glorious family.
In general, the theme of the Polish uprisings runs like a red thread through the entire official Polish historiography. And undeservedly little attention is paid to this Polish generals and officers who remained faithful to the oath that they gave to the Russian Emperor and the Polish King Nicholas I. In 1841. in Warsaw, a monument was solemnly opened in honor of the dead Polish officers who did not violate their loyal oath to the Russian sovereign: Count Stanislav Potocki, generals Jozef Nowicki, Thomas Sementkovsky, Stanislav Trebitsky, Ignatius Blumer, Maurice Hauke and Colonel Philip Mechiszewski. By order of Nicholas I, the inscription on the monument read: “To the Poles who died in 1830. for your loyalty to your Monarch." Now this monument does not exist. It was destroyed in 1917, because it did not fit in with the official interpretation of Polish history, where "the entire Polish people rose in unison to fight the Russian oppressors."
During Caucasian War many Poles were especially noted state awards for personal courage on the battlefield. Major General Felix Krukovsky is one of them. In the 1840s, he participated in the pacification of the Chechens and in skirmishes with the Kabardians. He commanded the Khoper Cossack Line Regiment, then the Nizhny Novgorod Dragoon Regiment, with which he made a number of dangerous expeditions to Chechnya and Dagestan. In 1848, F. Krukovsky (oh, the horror for Polish historiography!) was appointed chief ataman of the Caucasian linear army. Being a Catholic, Krukovsky (oh, horror for the Polish religious feeling!) went to the Orthodox Church every Sunday together with the Cossacks. Unfortunately, in one of the battles F. Krukovsky received severe wound. The Cossack orderly (Russian) rushed to his aid. F. Krukovsky ordered the orderly to save himself, but the Cossack disobeyed and was cut down by checkers along with his commander.
The story of a whole Polish captive detachment, which received freedom from the hands of the highlanders, is also noteworthy (they thought that the liberated Poles, and even with weapons in their hands, would immediately rush to partisan and shoot Russian soldiers). But the detachment in full strength returned to duty and continued to fight so devotedly for Mother Russia that some of the former captured Poles were awarded St. George's Crosses.
Thousands of Poles shed their blood for Russia in Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905, when Józef Piłsudski was already negotiating with Japanese government on the formation of battle groups from among the Polish soldiers Russian army to participate in the war on the side of Japan. Admiral Heinrich Tsivinsky, a Pole, then lost one of his sons in the battle of Tsushima. The second son of the admiral will die later, in the First World War, and also for Russia.
By the way, in World War I, there were plenty of generals of Polish origin in the Russian General Staff: Vladislav Klembovsky, Anatoly Kelchevsky, Nikolai Kashtalinsky, Mikhail Kvetsinsky, Kazimir Ketlinsky, Pyotr Kondzerovsky and dozens of others.
Felix Dzerzhinsky is not loved in modern Poland. His life path does not fit into the narrow framework of official Polish patriotism. Dzerzhinsky was a supporter of territorial integrity Russian state and categorically opposed the signing of the Brest peace, the purpose of which was the dismemberment of Russia by the countries of the Quadruple Union, which included Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. Coming from an aristocratic family, he studied at the same gymnasium with the famous Russophobe Józef Pilsudski. When Jozef went to war in 1920 Soviet Russia, Felix was just in Russia and is appointed to the post of head of the rear guard and order. After the war, in 1921. he took the post of People's Commissar of Railways, where he immediately set to restoring order: “On our roads, in the area of theft and mismanagement, there is one continuous horror ... Theft from wagons, theft at the box office, theft in warehouses, theft during contracts, theft during procurement. One must have strong nerves and will to overcome this sea of revelry. Then there was the fight against homelessness, when millions of small citizens were provided with shelter and free food, and activities as heads of the Cheka. Therefore, it is Dzerzhinsky who is considered his ancestor Russian special services as the Soviets thought before. Historians give an ambiguous assessment of Dzerzhinsky's activities in revolutionary Russia, but, abstracting from ideological assessments, one cannot fail to mention his sincere service to the cause, which he considered the main thing for himself. It is interesting that many years later Dzerzhinsky admitted: “As a child, I dreamed of putting on an invisibility cap, sneaking into Moscow and killing all the Muscovites.” Dzerzhinsky's successor as head of the OGPU was also a Pole - a descendant of an aristocratic family, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky. As a seriously ill man, with a long list of illnesses and injuries, he continued to work hard, holding meetings of operatives at home, resting on the couch.
Formation Soviet power in general, and on the lands that previously belonged to Poland (Western Ukraine, Western Belarus), in particular, is presented by Polish historians as a complete nightmare. Of course, it is difficult to call that time prosperous days. For some reason, it is forgotten that at the beginning of the 1930s, the proportion of ethnic Poles in the Communist Party of Ukraine was approximately twice as large as among the entire population Soviet Ukraine, and the Pole Stanislav Kosior was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine.
There is no place in the modern pantheon of Polish heroes and Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky. In 1914, 18-year-old Konstantin, having added two more years to his age, volunteered to join the 6th squadron of the 5th Kargopolsky dragoon regiment 5th Cavalry Division of the 12th Army and went to the fronts of the First World War. In battles with the German invaders, he distinguished himself with courage and ingenuity, for which he was awarded the St. George Cross. Then in his life there was the Second World War and service as a minister national defense Poland. In 1950, Polish nationalists from among the supporters of the Home Army twice attempted on the life of Rokossovsky. During the battles with the Nazis in Poland, the executioners from the AK cut out a platoon Soviet women- anti-aircraft gunners who served in the army of Rokossovsky. Intelligence found out that the killers came from a neighboring village, where they hid after committing a crime, using all possible support. local population. Upon learning of this, Rokossovsky ordered to deploy the guns in the direction of the Polish village and cover it with several volleys. It is not surprising that the Polish nationalists could not forgive Rokossovsky, that he faithfully served not only Poland, but also Russia, which became his second homeland. In 1962, Khrushchev asked Konstantin Rokossovsky to write a "blacker and thicker" article against Joseph Stalin. According to Air Chief Marshal Alexander Golovanov, Rokossovsky replied: “Nikita Sergeevich, Comrade Stalin is a saint for me!”, And at the banquet he did not clink glasses with Khrushchev.
You can still list for a long time those of the Poles who contributed to the prosperity of Russia and the growth of its power. Grigory Potemkin was of Polish origin (his grandfather had the surname Potempkovsky and spoke Polish), mathematician Nikolai Lobachevsky, classics of Russian literature Nikolai Gogol ( real name Gogol-Yanovsky) and Ivan Bunin, poet Robert Rozhdestvensky, artist Kazimir Malevich ("Black Square"), philosophers Nikolai Lossky and Vasily Zenkovsky, travelers and explorers of Central Asia Nikolai Przhevalsky and Leon Barshchevsky, founder Russian cosmonautics Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, national idol of the 1930s pilot Sigismund Levanevsky, academician Gleb Krzhizhanovsky. The idols of Soviet children and teenagers, Yanina Zheymo, who played the role of Cinderella, and Vladislav Dvorzhetsky, who played Captain Nemo, are also Poles.
The Russian scientist Nikolai Danilevsky noted the amazing "similarity power" of Russia. Many foreigners who came here and stayed for a long time, in a short period, ceased to hate everything Russian and gradually began to feel sympathy for him. "Digesting" foreign ethnic elements, Russia considered them its own, did not reject them and did not push them to the sidelines of historical science. Unfortunately, in Poland the opposite is true. In Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk there is a monument to the ethnographer Bronislaw Pilsudski, brother of the odious Jozef Pilsudski, who dreamed of breaking Russia into a dozen small pseudo-state fragments. There are practically no similar monuments erected in honor of Russians in Poland. Monuments in memory of the Soviet soldiers who died in 1944-1945 for the liberation of Poland from Nazism are still standing thanks to a small number of activists from among the elderly Poles who remember the feat of the Soviet soldier. Yes, and the Polish elite is still afraid to shamelessly demolish monuments to the fighters against Nazism. But he tries a little.
At one time, there was even a song among the Poles with the words “The Polish Army took Berlin, and the Soviet helped.” The innocent children's film "Four Tankmen and a Dog" was also banned from showing in independent Poland, because it promoted unthinkably seditious things - Polish-Soviet friendship. It is hard for the Polish ethnic consciousness to admit to itself that without the Russian Ivan, Poland probably would not have been on the world map. Therefore, the Polish ethnocentrum is “tensing up”, squeezing out any hint of affection for Russia.
Our victory in the battle for Warsaw on August 15, 1920 was proclaimed the "Miracle on the Vistula". When it seemed that the offensive of the Red Army to the West could no longer be stopped, an unexpected maneuver Polish troops wedged between Western Front Mikhail Tukhachevsky and the Southwestern Front of Alexander Yegorov, and the Red Army men who came in from the flank, allowed them to be thrown back from the capital, and later squeezed out of Poland. Young independence was saved, and Józef Piłsudski strengthened the image of the most outstanding Polish military strategist of the 20th century.
Next week we will celebrate the 92nd anniversary of these events. Fortunately, we can celebrate this date in free country which is not in danger. But since our country is free, we can use this freedom and play a little "political fiction". What would a Polish-Russian war look like today? Below we outline three hypothetical scenarios.
War of Influence
It is difficult to expect that at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, Russia would suddenly decide to fulfill its age-old dreams of creating a huge pan-Slavic state ruled from Moscow and march with its army towards the Vistula. Not those times and not those opportunities. The most likely plane of conflict these days seems to be a struggle for influence. A conflict whose role is not to seize control over an enemy country, but to strengthen one's position in it and, possibly, weaken its power. Russia does not shy away from such incidents. The proof is the 2008 war with Georgia. Moscow's goal was not to take control of this former Soviet republic, but only to weaken it: the Kremlin was irritated by the defiantly pro-American and consistently anti-Russian policy of President Mikheil Saakashvili, so Moscow decided to curb it. However, the clash that lasted several days did not end with Russia's occupation of Georgia. The Kremlin had enough of secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, he decided that such a flick on Saakashvili's nose would be enough and completely withdrew his troops from Georgian territory.
The Polish-Russian war for spheres of influence would certainly have had a different character than the 2008 clash. The Russians moved to Georgia in tanks, sent an army there and heavy equipment. “In the case of Poland, we would most likely encounter sabotage actions Russian special forces or with surgically accurate missile strikes against strategic targets in our country, for example, "Neftekhimiya" in Płock," General Bolesław Balcerowicz, an employee of the University of Warsaw, believes. Such actions would be aimed solely at weakening Poland, their goal would not be to seize our country.
Territory War
Robert Kaplan, an analyst at Stratfor, recently published the book "The Revenge of Geography", in which he presented the thesis that changes in the map are the main driving force behind world conflicts. In other words, if a border has been moved once, sooner or later its new location may cause a military clash. In turn, Kaplan's boss at Stratfor, George Friedman, in his book The Next 100 Years, which thundered three years ago, wrote that in 2020-2050 the economic situation in Russia would become completely hopeless, and it would have to launch an armed strike against its neighbors, since the Kremlin would not be able to otherwise ensure the functioning of this vast state. If both these theses turned out to be true, war between Poland and Russia would be inevitable, and it would be real war, that is, such as we dealt with in previous centuries - with battles and attempts to occupy enemy territory.
If we analyze the potential of the Russian army, we can conclude that such a classic war would not be too different from the conflicts of the 20th century. Under President Medvedev, Russia announced a radical modernization of its army, but so far everything has ended on promises. The most modern Russian weapons are Antey-class submarines, but they would not be very useful in the war with Poland.
Apart from the Antey, Russia does not have any technology that would allow it to move away from the strategy that brought success in World War II: throwing such a large number a soldier that the enemy would be unable to stop.
Geography helps the Russians in this. They could hit our country from two sides: from Kaliningrad region and from the territory of friendly Belarus. We could only hope that we could hold out for two or three weeks, and then NATO allies would come to the rescue. teaches that the best thing to do with allies is in joint photographs taken at the next summit, but still, there is reason to believe that they remember what happened in 1939, when they did not help us.
Offensive war
Let me remind you that all these reflections are from the category of political fiction. And since this is a game, why not consider in it a scenario in which Poland itself attacks Russia? This option is as likely as the one that we will have to defend against the Russian army. A Polish invasion could happen, for example, if the Kremlin tried to carry out a military invasion of the Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia. These three countries are members of NATO, and at the time of such a strike, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty would come into force, stating that an attack on one of the members of the Alliance obliges the rest to help him. Poland is in this case the nearest neighbor, who, due to natural circumstances, could come to the rescue faster than anyone else.
What do we have? Firstly, 48 F-16 aircraft, which conduct regular training over the Baltic countries and can be very effective in such a war, especially since the Russians have aircraft similar class few. But we have not so many other offensive means. The strategy of the Polish armed forces provides for the purchase of equipment that improves the mobility of our army: there will be more Wolverines and other armored personnel carriers known from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as unmanned aircraft (they are already in service with NATO) and helicopters. Perhaps, subdivisions of superbly trained military units dynamically moving throughout the arena of hostilities would be able to tie down the numerous forces of the Russians.
And yet, the game of inventing scenarios for a hypothetical Polish-Russian war does not set one in an optimistic mood. We have too few advantages to contemplate such a conflict without fear. If it happened, we would have to rely on the same advantages as in 1920: higher morale, determination in battle, the best strategy and a certain amount of happiness. First of all, it is worth hoping that the times of traditional confrontations are irrevocably a thing of the past. “Every civilization has its own wars. In the Age of Civilization information war will turn around for information,” emphasizes General Balcerowicz. The miracle on the Vistula became possible also because we managed to decipher the Soviet ciphers, and, thanks to this, we knew in advance about the movements of the Red Army. During World War II, the Poles were able to open the Enigma. So maybe the war for information would not be so terrible for us?
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Official state relations Poland and Russia remain cool. On the state level there is a kind of freezing of contacts. Despite tactful and rare meetings that touch on the most pressing issues, Polish-Russian relations have been bad for many years. This, however, does not mean that such a state should be accepted and left indifferently against the backdrop of the evolution of a ruthless geopolitical conjuncture, impulses in which are sent by the leading world powers, and sometimes just for the usual case. Hence the need to start a discussion and dialogue regarding relationships.
Undoubtedly, cooperation between Poland and Russia in the field of culture, science and youth exchange should be expanded. This is especially important at a time when Polish and Russian young elites, brought up in completely different political and cultural conditions than their parents and grandparents, are deprived of real knowledge about the neighboring country, the political situation, history, or even society itself. The Poles (despite the circle of numerous experts) are not familiar with Russia, and the Russians are still more not familiar with Poland. This does not mean, however, that the latter are somehow particularly prejudiced against the Poles. A multi-ethnic Russian Federation returning to imperialism (albeit with varying results) cannot afford unwarranted ethnic chauvinism on a broad political scale.
Currently, a Polish-Russian "war" is being waged in the economic dimension. The main face of this clash, in addition to sanctions, is, first of all, the “war” for the “white man”, that is, workers from Ukraine and Belarus. There is no doubt that without cheap labor from Ukraine it would be very difficult to achieve and maintain the economic growth of the Polish economy, which we have been seeing for two or three years now. For the Russian Federation, a multinational state, a significant part of Ukrainians are culturally, linguistically and mentally close. They are definitely closer than workers from Central Asia or the Caucasus. Their participation in the Russian economy, although not as significant as in Poland, also plays a significant role in the application softpower in relation to Ukraine and allows for rapid Russification.
Thus, the Polish-Russian conflicts acquire an economic character, which is ignored by many experts and observers. Another bone of contention, integrally related to the above topic, is the civilizational and political-cultural affiliation of Belarus and Ukraine. In Warsaw and Moscow, the boundaries of these values are perceived differently, which creates more and more conflicts, misunderstandings and raises questions about the intentions of the parties. Especially the question of real intentions and their scope is of serious concern to both sides.
The tasks that need to be solved are complex historical problems. For us, the majority of Poles, the Red Army, the NKVD, the USSR security apparatus and the like since 1944 and their presence on Polish lands since then is associated with the fight against Catholic Church, landowners, entrepreneurship and patriotic population. For Poland and most Poles, the most important thing is what happened after 1944, that is, from the moment the Red Army appeared on Polish territory. The period after 1944 typified the absolute loss of independence, subjugation and a complete break with the culture of the broadly understood West, of which Polish culture. Unfortunately, which is the most tragic feature of many years of bloody armed conflicts, the soldiers of the Red Army in Poland committed a number of deeds that still cause Poles to negative emotions. Thus, the memory of the soldiers of the Red Army in Poland has many dimensions and is not based only on cooperation with the Guard / People's Army and the so-called "People's Polish Army".
In my opinion, the liberation of the Polish territories by the Red Army (both those that remained within the borders of Poland in 1945, and those that were taken from us as a result of Stalin's political decision) and its struggle against the forces of the Third Reich remain an indisputable fact. No one should bring arguments to deny it. Due to the fact that this is an integral element of Christian civilization, the cemeteries of Soviet soldiers in Poland must be preserved and looked after. At the same time, everyone should remember that one side should not try to impose its perception of history on the other side. In speeches current authorities both Poland and Russia, one can feel that only their vision remains the only correct one, and the other side must not only accept it, but also implement it. That is why the Poles must renounce the fact of imposing on the Russians how the role of the Red Army and communism in general should be understood, and the Russians must refuse to impose on the Poles their military mythicity, the climax of which falls on May 9th.
Both the Polish and Russian authorities, wishing to begin work on rapprochement, must recognize the fact of completely different national and social characteristics of the inhabitants of Poland and Russia. Post-Soviet nostalgia, which is an expression of various tendencies in Russia, will most likely never be accepted in Poland even in in full. Of course, the fact remains clear that the formation of foreign policy by the authorities and individual political forces of Poland and Russia as important element impact on the domestic electorate, but this should have certain limits. Both sides should try to find elements that link Poles and Russians in history.
Authorities in Warsaw, namely political classes who rule in Poland should look at Russia as a state, perhaps a rival at certain levels, but not as a "mystical enemy". On the other hand, the authorities in Moscow should consider Poland as an independent entity international law having strong ties with the EU and NATO, and not as a "passive executor of the orders of these entities." Unacceptable mutual generalizations and slander further increase the hostility. The disaster near Smolensk in 2010 Polish authorities should stop using for internal impact, and the Kremlin must return the remains of the presidential plane. Implementation details of this latest project we will give it to the discretion of the authorities of the Kremlin and Warsaw.
About the author: Michal Patrik Sadlowski (Michał PatrykSadł owski) - specializes in the study of the history of the Russian Empire, security post-Soviet space. Member of the Board of the Shershenevich Institute of Oriental Law Foundation, post-graduate student of the Faculty of Law and Administration of the University of Warsaw. Collaborates with the military-political magazine RAPORT: Wojsko-Technika-Obronność.
