3. ABOUT FREEDOM OR LIBERTY Slavenskaya. SLAVES In their COURAGE and COURAGE, day by day, strenuously striving, fighting also against the ancient Greek and Roman Caesars, and always glorious receptive victory, living in all freedom; help the great King

Chapter 37 Unacceptable Liberties "My good friend, - wrote Francis Walsingham to Robert Dudley on September 29, 1584. - Yesterday I received from the Lord Mayor, along with a letter, a printed book in which there is a slander against your lordship, and more vicious writings have not been since

He is important, he dyes his hair. He is out of his mind.

A.S. Pushkin

The period of the 18th century, beginning with the heirs of Peter I, is characterized by serious changes in the social structure of Russia. This mainly concerns the expansion of rights and privileges nobility. A special place in this process is occupied by the reform of Peter III of February 18, 1762. The Manifesto on the Liberty of the Nobility of 1762 exempted the nobles from compulsory military and public service. The article is devoted to the history of the compilation of the Manifesto, a description of its main provisions, as well as an analysis of the main historical consequences its acceptance.

Improvement in the positions of the nobility in the 18th century

During the period of "Palace coups", the rulers regularly signed decrees that gave the nobility more and more privileges. The reason - the power belonged to noble families, including the nobles, who wanted to maximize their own privileges. The only exception is the years of the reign of Peter 2. The emperor ruled from 1727, and he was then only 11 years old, and he died at 14. He had no real interest in politics. The real power at that time was in the hands of the old boyar aristocracy, which tried in every possible way to prevent the strengthening of the role of the new nobility. However, already in the 1730s, laws were again passed giving the nobility additional rights. The following groups of decrees can be distinguished, which prepared the Manifesto on the Liberty of the Nobility:

• Strengthening the control of the landowners over the peasants. This process began in the 17th century, with the formation of serfdom, but in the 1730s the landowners received the right of judicial and police custody of the peasants. For example, in 1736 the landowner was allowed to determine the punishment for the guilty peasant himself, and in 1760 the nobles could own will send peasants to Siberia. By the way, each peasant sent to Siberia was equated with a recruit, for the formation of which the nobility was also responsible.
• Recognition of the rights of the nobility to land and estates. Now the nobles could transfer the estate to the inheritance at their discretion.
• Transfer of various monopoly rights to the nobles, for example, distillation.
• Obtaining the right to borrow money from the state.

However, despite significant privileges, the nobility had one important duty - to perform military service. But the very improvement of their position in Russia went in two directions: the expansion of the powers and rights of the nobles and the strengthening of serfdom.

Main provisions of the Manifesto of 1762

Emperor Peter 3 ruled less than a year, however, during this period he managed to go down in history thanks to the Manifesto on the liberties of the nobility, adopted by him on February 18, 1762. The contents of this document include the following main points:

1. The main point is the abolition of the obligation for the nobles to carry out military service. If earlier this duty was the basis for the formation of this estate, now it has become a voluntary option for obtaining fame, but not nobility. In addition, all nobles in military service were given the opportunity to retire and return to managing their estate.
2. The nobility received the right to visit abroad. Now the nobility did not need to obtain special permission. However, the obligation to return to his homeland remained, otherwise the estate and lands were taken away from him.
3. Decreased control over the education and upbringing of noble children. Until 1762, to educate noble children was one of the duties of the noble head of the family; after the Manifesto, education became optional. As a result, this led to sad consequences, which famous writer Fonvizin described in the work "Undergrowth". Main character, Mitrofanushka, a bright representative of the generation of the nobility without knowledge and education. In 1780, the directors of the gentry corps complained that they were not accepted into educational establishments many children of nobles, since they are not literate.

But it should be understood that this idea is not at all revolutionary and innovative. About cancellation compulsory service they spoke for the nobles since the 1750s, therefore its authorship does not belong to Peter 3. Some historians believe that the main provisions of the Manifesto were prepared back in the years of Elizabeth Petrovna.

It should also be noted that not all representatives of the nobility were happy with this Manifesto. Not every nobleman had large estates, and not many had hundreds and thousands of serfs under their control. Part of the nobility - these were noble, but not rich people, for whom the salary for military service was the only significant source for the existence of the family. For this category of the population, the Manifesto of Peter 3 on the freedom of the nobility for a long time was a burden.

Manifesto on the Liberty of the Nobility - table

Nobles and civil service before the Manifesto of 1762

Since the 14th century, there has been a category of "Serving people" in Russia. These included boyars, okolnichy, duma clerks and nobles. They had to do military service. For this, they received privileges and lands from the Sovereign Emperor. As you can see, this system goes back to the Middle Ages, when chief feudal lord(ruler) could distribute lands and rights to his wars. However, after the formation of serfdom in the 17th century, landowners began to more attention to pay to the management of the estate, which means they are trying to achieve a reduction in the service life.

Against the backdrop of the decrees of the period of "Palace coups" on the additional rights of the nobility, in 1736 a new law on the terms of service was adopted. During this period, the empress was Anna Ioannovna, who reduced the period of compulsory service to 25 years. Every nobleman, upon reaching the age of 20, had to undergo public service. It could be not only military, but sometimes clerical service, as well as study in military corps. In addition, it was possible to leave one of the sons as a manager on the estate.

Curious is the fact that often the nobles recorded their children in the regiments in infancy so that by the age of 30-32 they can retire. This fact suggests that the state has less and less monitored real fact implementation of public service by the nobility. That is why, since the 1750s, the number of applications from the nobility addressed to the sovereign-emperor with a proposal to eliminate the obligation to perform military service has increased.

Historical Consequences of the Manifesto

The manifesto on the liberties of the nobility of 1762 completed the formation of the nobility as an estate occupying special place in the social structure Russian Empire. The nobility was released from the biggest duty - to carry out military service. Some statesmen they said that such a reform would significantly weaken Russia militarily. However, the won war of 1768-1774 with Ottoman Empire symbolized the correctness of the chosen path.

After the Manifesto of 1762, the nobility retained only a few duties: paying taxes and supplying recruits. At the same time, the nobility received a number of privileges, turning into the top social hierarchy Russian society. It was at this time that the nobility became the main support of the autocracy in the Russian Empire. Catherine 2 in the "Charter to the nobility" of 1785 finally secured all the privileges of the nobility.

Thus, the nobility as a privileged social group The Russian Empire was formed during the XVIII century, especially after the Manifesto of Peter 3. A similar position of the nobility persisted until 1917, when the Bolsheviks adopted a decree "On the destruction of estates and civil ranks", which was the end of the existence of the nobility in Russia. This is the manifesto of Peter 3 on the liberties of the nobility of February 18, 1762 from the point of view of national history.

Author and Document Manifesto on the Liberty of the Nobility of 1762: Reconstruction of the History of the Text Mikhail Kiselev The Manifesto on the Liberty of the Nobility to Serve and Not to Serve (hereinafter referred to as the Manifesto), signed on February 18, 1762 by Peter III, occupies a special place in the history of the Russian nobility. It was this document that became the first legislative act in which the privileges of the nobility were officially fixed. At the same time, the history of the writing and adoption of this legislative act has not been fully elucidated. As rightly noted by V.P. Naumov, “only the direct participation of the emperor in the adoption of the manifesto is a reliable fact, and other circumstances of his appearance still remain an unresolved mystery”1. E.N. Marasinova similarly notes that “in historiography, there are different points of view about the reasons for the publication, real implementation and results of this mysterious document in its own way. Russian monarchy, which was signed during an extremely short and vague reign, but had colossal consequences"2. The mysteriousness of the Manifesto, noted by Naumov and Marasinova, is largely a consequence of the fact that preparatory draft materials that are reliably associated with its creation have not yet been discovered. Of the documentary sources of this kind, researchers have at their disposal only an entry from the journal of the Senate dated January 17, 1762, which recorded the permission of Peter III “to continue serving the nobles of their own free will”3, and the text signed by the senators on February 8, 1762. to be presented to the emperor4, which was no different from the text of the Manifesto, approved by him on February 18, 1762.5 Of course, researchers have the opportunity to turn to the testimonies of contemporaries. However, the problem is that these evidences do not quite agree with each other. Since the determination of the place and significance of this legislative act in the history of the nobility and its self-consciousness directly depends on the reconstruction of the circumstances of the creation of the Manifesto, historians have undertaken © 2014 М.А. Kiselev The article was prepared as part of the implementation of a grant from the Government of the Russian Federation to attract leading scientists to Russian educational institutions higher professional education, scientific institutions state academies Sciences and State Research Centers of the Russian Federation (Laboratory of Edition Archaeography, Ural Federal University). Agreement No. 14.A12.31.0004 dated June 26, 2013. The author is grateful to E.S. Korchmina for help in preparing the article. 1 Naumov V.P. An amazing autocrat: the mysteries of his life and reign // On the Russian throne: Russian Monarchs after Peter the Great. M., 1993. S. 312. 2 Marasinova E.N. Liberty of the Russian nobility (the manifesto of Peter III and the estate legislation of Catherine II) // Russian history. 2007. No. 4. S. 21. 3 RGADA, f. 248, d. 3426, l. 283. 4 Ibid., d. 3427, l. 134–138. 5 RGIA, f. 1329, op. 1, d. 96, l. 99–103 rev. PSZ-I. T. 15. No. 11444. S. 912–915. 37 attempts to find documents that could clarify the history of its creation. In search of new sources, they also turned to the materials of the Legislative Commission. This was due to the fact that some contemporaries (Catherine II, Prince M.M. Shcherbatov) pointed to gr. R.I. Vorontsov, head of the commission in 1761–1762, as a person involved in the creation of this legislative act. In addition, in the Legislative Commission in 1761-1762. chapter 22 “On the nobles and their advantage” of Book III of the draft Code was being prepared, so the researchers suggested that the commission could have been involved in the creation of the Manifesto. It should also be noted that historians who turned to the papers of the Legislative Commission, in search of the origins of the Manifesto, tried to find evidence that the freedom of the nobility to serve and not to serve was discussed even under Elizabeth Petrovna, and did not become an improvisation of Peter III or his entourage. He was the first to attempt to trace the relationship between the activities of the commission and the adoption of the Manifesto by G.V. Vernadsky in his student article of 1914. After reviewing the papers of the commission in the Codification Department of the Archives of the State Council (nowadays they are stored in the Russian State Antimonopoly Academy), the historian came to the conclusion that “the provisions of the manifesto itself were not ... worked out in advance by the commission; apparently, not even a conversation was raised about them. At the same time, he nevertheless considered it possible to conclude that "the spirit of the ideas of the manifesto, of course, hovered over the work of the commission." Based on the testimonies of his contemporaries, Vernadsky pointed to Prosecutor General A.I. Glebov and R.I. Vorontsov as the main persons who received under Peter III participation in the creation of the Manifesto. In addition, he drew attention to the fact that Peter III, in his statement of January 17, 1762, referred in relation to the service to the example of the Livonian nobility. The fact that the latter was mentioned in the Legislative Commission in 1761, when the issue of allowing Russian nobles to travel to study in foreign lands, was discussed, allowed him to draw the following conclusion: “Obviously, the freedom to travel to study in foreign lands is one of the main points in the circle of noble liberties - was discussed in the commission as early as 1761 and was caused precisely by the example of the Livonian nobility. Consequently, the main conductors of the manifesto on the liberty of the nobility also acted in the legislative commission”6. The controversy of such an observation lies in the fact that in the Legislative Commission in 1761, the opportunity to leave Russia was assumed only for minors of the nobility and only as one of the options for completing compulsory education, after which they had to enter the civil service7. The manifesto of Peter III gave such a right to the nobles who had already retired. However, the historian found it possible to ignore these discrepancies. At the same time, Vernadsky still had to somehow explain why in the papers of the Legislative Commission under Elizabeth Petrovna the freedom of the nobles to serve and not to serve was never mentioned. The historian found an explanation in Vorontsov's unwillingness to conflict with the favorite of Elizabeth Petrovna I.I. Shuvalov, 6 Vernadsky G.V. Manifesto of Peter III on the Liberty of the Nobility and the Legislative Commission of 1754–1766. // Historical review. T. 20. Pg., 1915. P. 55. 7 See: Kiselev M.A. The problem of the rights and obligations of the Russian nobility in the Legislative Commission at the turn of the 1750s and 1760s: on the history of the Manifesto on the Liberty of the Nobility // Uralsky historical messenger. 2013. No. 3 (40). pp. 35–36. 8 PSZ-I. T. 15. No. 11444. S. 913. 38 who was a supporter of compulsory civil service for the nobility. Considering that the commission under Elizabeth Petrovna did not work fast enough on the chapter on the nobility, Vernadsky put forward the following assumption: “You can think that Count. P.L. Vorontsov deliberately delayed the discussion of the chapter on the rights of the nobility. Elizaveta Petrovna from the beginning of 1761 was already ill. One could expect her death and connect the well-known calculations with the accession of her successor. R.L. Vorontsov did not want to sanction the project of noble privileges under Elizabeth and the Shuvalovs by the opinion of the commission, because under Peter III he hoped to achieve much more. These calculations were not erroneous, the commission extended the chapter on the rights of the nobility until the death of Elizabeth - and the Petrovsky manifesto appeared on the freedom of the nobility»9. Thus, Vernadsky associated the creation of the Manifesto primarily with the position of Vorontsov, which had already been formed under Elizaveta Petrovna. To explain why this position did not receive expression until 1762, the researcher, on the basis of a free interpretation of the laconic testimonies of contemporaries and indirect data from the papers of the Legislative Commission, constructed the confrontation between Vorontsov and the Shuvalovs. Stating that “the spirit of the ideas of the Manifesto, of course, hovered over the work of the commission,” he was never able to provide documentary evidence of the involvement of the commission and Vorontsov in the creation of the text of the legislative act. AT Soviet time N.L. turned to the problem of creating the Manifesto. Rubinstein. Analyzing the papers of the Legislative Commission, he came to the conclusion that "the program noble liberty from the service gets into the text of the project (chapter 22. - M.K.) even under Elizabeth Petrovna (at the very end of her reign), despite ... the Shuvalovs' negative attitude to this issue”10. Accordingly, the main author of the text, which was taken as the basis for the creation of the Manifesto, according to Rubinstein, also turned out to be R.I. Vorontsov, head of the commission. In the spirit of Soviet Marxism, the historian focused on the economic rights of the nobility contained in Chapter 22. According to Rubinstein, the struggle between the economic programs of Vorontsov and P.I. Shuvalov, and not the question of the service of the nobility11. If G.V. Vernadsky considered I.I. to be the main antagonist of Vorontsov. Shuvalov, then Rubinstein - P.I. Shuvalov, associated with him A.I. Glebov, as well as D.V. Volkov. Such a position Soviet historian contributed to the maintenance of the concept of wrestling in the early 1760s. court groups. Based on Rubinshtein's observations, already S.O. Schmidt wrote that “the struggle between the Shuvalov and Vorontsov groups was especially tense”12. However, the problem was that, like Vernadsky, Rubinstein did not provide direct evidence of this struggle. The very fact of the existence of the Shuvalov and Vorontsov groups was not obvious. For example, the English historian R.N. Byne, based on the analysis of reports foreign diplomats from St. Petersburg, 9 Vernadsky G.V. Decree. op. P. 57. 10 Rubinshtein N.L. Laid Commission 1754–1766 and her draft of the new Code "On the state of subjects in general" (To the history social policy 50s - early 60s of the 18th century) // Historical Notes. T. 38. M., 1951. S. 238. 11 Ibid. pp. 239–240. 12 Schmidm S.O. Domestic policy of Russia in the middle of the XVIII century // Questions of history. 1987. No. 3. S. 55. 39 wrote about the existence in the early 1760s. united party Vorontsov–Shuvalov13. In 1991, V.P. expressed his doubts about the existence of a struggle between the Shuvalovs and the Vorontsovs. Naumov14. Rubinstein's observations about documentary sources are far from indisputable. The historian ignored the history of editing chapter 22 "On the Nobles and Their Advantage". In his work, he used only the first and last editions of this chapter, not paying attention to its intermediate versions. As a result, as S.V. Polskaya, Rubinshtein, on the basis of insignificant stylistic corrections, attributed the text created at the end of the reign of Peter III - the beginning of the reign of Catherine II, i.e. already after the adoption of the Manifesto, by the time of Elizaveta Petrovna15. As a result, historians, referring to Rubinstein, built their reasoning on the wrong conclusion that the main provisions of the Manifesto were prepared at the end of the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna16. Entering in scientific circulation several new sources, S.V. Polskoy showed, as did G.V. Vernadsky that in the papers of the Legislative Commission of the Elizabethan time there is no direct evidence of a discussion of the freedom of the nobility to serve and not serve until 1762. At the same time, starting from indirect evidence, he believes that “the project on the freedom of the nobility was created by R.I. . Vorontsov at the end of the reign of Elizabeth. Probably, this project did not get into the Elizabethan edition of the 22nd chapter due to the opposition of the Shuvalovs and the position of the empress herself, who did not want to deviate from the principles of her father. The accession to the throne of Peter III opens before R.I. Vorontsov the opportunity to return to the discussion of his idea”17. Here Polsky actually reproduces Vernadsky's assumptions, although he goes a little further: if Vernadsky wrote about the "spirit of the manifesto", then Polsky writes about the project. This hypothesis does not appear to be justified. The first indirect evidence in its favor is an undated note by I.I. Shuvalov, addressed to a certain empress. It was published by P.I. Bartenev in 1867 among Shuvalov's papers under number III. Polsky, based on the fact that the note mentions the war, dates it to the "epoch of the Seven Years' War"18. However, there is no evidence that the mentioned war is the Seven Years' War, and the empress, to whom the note was addressed, is Elizaveta Petrovna, 13 Bain R.N. Peter III. Emperor of Russia. The Story of a Crisis and a Crime. N.Y., 1902. P. 39. 14 Naumov V.P. Organization and internal political activity of the Conference at the Highest Court (1756–1762). Diss. ... cand. ist. Sciences. M., 1991. P. 190. See also: Kiselev M.A. Decree. op. pp. 32, 34. 15 Polskoy S.V. “Dividing your people into different ranks...”: legislative consolidation of the class status of the Russian nobility in mid-eighteenth century // Cahiers du Monde Russe. 2010 Vol. 51. Nos. 2–3. P. 321. 16 See, for example, Raeff M. The Domestic Policies of Peter III and his Overthrow // The American Historical Review. 1970 Vol. 75. No. 5. P. 1291-1292; Anisimov E.V. Russia in the middle of the 18th century: Struggle for Peter's heritage. M., 1986. S. 66; Schmidt S.O. Decree. op. S. 56; Leonard C.S. Reform and Regicide: the Reign of Peter III of Russia. Bloomington, 1993. P. 49; Faizova I.V. "Manifesto of Liberty" and the service of the nobility in XVIII century. M., 1999. S. 42; Kamensky A.B. From Peter I to Paul I: reforms in Russia XVIII century (the experience of a holistic analysis). M., 2001. S. 303; Eliseeva O.I. Catherine the Great. M., 2013. P. 119. 17 Polskoy S.V. “Dividing your people into different ranks...”... P. 322. 18 Polskoy S.V. Political projects of I.I. Shuvalov in the late 1750s - early 1760s // Philosophical Age. Almanac. Issue. 13. Russian utopia of the Enlightenment and the traditions of world utopianism / Ed. ed. T.V. Artemyeva, M.I. Mikeshin. SPb., 2000. S. 230. 40 does not cite toric. Thus, the mention of “great care for the nobility” on the part of the empress, because of which “many nobles could retire”19, can be considered as a reference to the Letter of Complaint to the nobility of 1785. It is precisely according to this legislative act that “noble, being in the service”, it was allowed “to continue the service from service or dismissal according to the rules made for that” (paragraph 18)20. In this regard, a note containing Shuvalov’s proposal that “it is now necessary to establish that no one from the service should go without extreme need, instructing those who signed up for the service to serve for several years, and in the future to encourage21, can be attributed to the times of the Russian-Turkish war of 1787– 1791 The limitation of resignations made sense only after they were allowed, i.e. after publication Letter of commendation 1785. The second (and last) indirect confirmation of the hypothesis is the testimony of M.M. Shcherbatov, who, according to Polsky, “indicates that Roman Vorontsov constantly talked about the freedom of the nobility”22. However, in this case the historian is clearly inaccurately retelling the text of Shcherbatov's pamphlet "On the Corruption of Morals in Russia". In it, Shcherbatov wrote that D.V. Volkov told him how, before writing the text of the Manifesto, “he recalled the frequent statements to the sovereign (Peter III. – M.K.), from Count Roman Larionovich Vorontsov, about the freedom of the nobility”23. As this passage makes clear, this was not Shcherbatov's direct testimony, but evidence of evidence, which, moreover, did not directly indicate the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna. Thus, such indirect evidence does not allow us to state with certainty that before the accession of Peter III, the idea of ​​freedom of the nobility was generally expressed by members of the Legislative Commission, not to mention the preparation of any projects. This is also confirmed by the analysis of the papers of the Legislative Commission24. It is necessary to point out one by no means indirect evidence, which was ignored by G.V. Vernadsky, H.L. Rubinstein and S.V. Polish. Jakob Stehlin, teacher and later librarian led. book. Peter Fedorovich, in his notes he reported: “The most remarkable thing that he (Peter III. - M.K.) did in the first days of his reign was ... the destruction of the Secret Chancellery ... and the granting to the Russian nobility of the freedom to serve or do not serve, leave the state, etc. He often spoke about these two main subjects and religious tolerance when he was a Grand Duke”25. Thus, there is direct, credible evidence that does not require conspiracy explanations that the idea of ​​the freedom of the nobility to serve and not to serve was put forward by Peter himself even before his accession. Moreover, this explains why Peter, not having reigned for even a month, decided to give the nobility such freedom. Most likely, for the emperor, this was already a well-considered decision. 19 Papers by I.I. Shuvalova // Russian archive. 1867. No. 1. Stb. 70–71. 20 Legislation of Catherine II. T. 2. M., 2001. S. 34. 21 Papers by I.I. Shuvalov. Stb. 71. 22 Polskoy S.V. “Dividing your people into different ranks...”... R. 322. 23 Shcherbatov M.M. Works. T. II. Articles are historical-political and philosophical. SPb., 1898. Stb. 224. 24 Kiselev M.A. Decree. op. 25 Shtelin Ya. Notes on Peter III // Ekaterina. Path to power. M., 2003. P. 35. This circumstance, although without reference to J. Shtelin, was also noticed by A.S. Mylnikov (Mylnikov A.S. Peter III // Questions of History. 1991. No. 4. P. 51). 41 On the evening of January 16, 1762, the court servants were told that they “should be at the Court” by 8 o’clock in the morning, since Peter III “deigns to have the highest exit, at which these persons should be.” The emperor planned a solemn visit to government institutions, including the first official visit to the Senate26. There is a memoir evidence of Catherine II, dedicated to Peter's exit on the morning of January 17th. She recalled that "after three weeks after the death" of Elizaveta Petrovna "walking through the anteroom, I found here Prince Mikhail Ivan [ovich] Dashkov, crying and beside himself with joy." Dashkov told her that Peter III “is worthy to erect a golden staff; he gave freedom to all the nobility, and with that he goes to the Senate to announce it there. Catherine herself replied to this Dashkov: “Were you serfs and have you been sold until now? What is this freedom?" Catherine found it necessary to enter into a correspondence discussion with an enthusiastic assessment of Peter's act of "giving liberties." She noted that the granted liberty was "to serve and not serve according to the will of everyone." In this regard, the empress remarked: “This was before, for they retired, but it remained of old that the nobility, from the estates and estates, serving everything, except the decrepit and underage, were recorded in the service of the empire; instead of people of the nobility, Peter I began to collect recruits, and the nobility remained in the service. From chevo decided that in captivity. Roman Vorontsov and the Prosecutor General (A.I. Glebov. - M.K.) thought to do a great deed, reporting to the sovereign in order to give free rein to the nobility, but in fact they begged for nothing other than the free to serve or not to serve. Thus, Catherine tried to present the most popular act of Peter as the result of some misunderstanding by the nobles of their position. Moreover, according to Catherine's commentary, it was due to the requests of Vorontsov and Glebov, and not the opinion of Peter himself. In her interpretation, it turned out that Peter, succumbing to the persuasion of those close to him, whom he also misunderstood, gave the nobles the freedom that they already had. Taking into account Catherine's interest in discrediting the activities of her deposed husband,28 the credibility of her comments raises some doubts. The Senate was preparing for the arrival of the emperor. Prosecutor General A.I. Glebov arrived before seven in the morning, senators I.I. Neplyuev, gr. R.I. Vorontsov and Prince. P.N. Trubetskoy - during the eighth hour, I.I. Kostyurin, A.G. Zherebtsov, Prince. N.Yu. Trubetskoy and gr. A.I. Shuvalov - during the ninth hour. Peter III himself arrived at 10 o'clock. After the “aprobation” of the Senate reports, the emperor, among other things, “from his Highest to the loyal subjects of the paternal mercy, deigned the nobles to continue their service of their own free will, how much and where they wish, and when war time if it happens, then they should all appear on such a basis, as in Livonia the nobles are treated, about which, when writing a form, bring it to His Highest imperial majesty signed 26 Journals of cameras-Fourier, 1762. [B.m. and g.] pp. 9–10. 27 Catherine II. Notes. SPb., 1907, p. 532. Some historians sometimes erroneously attribute the meeting with M.I. Dashkov by the time the Manifesto was approved on February 18, 1762. See, for example: Kamensky A.B. "Under Catherine's shade...": The second half of the 18th century. SPb., 1992. P. 66. 28 See, for example: Leonard C.S. The Reputation of Peter III // The Russian Review. 1988 Vol. 47. No. 3; Kalashnikov G.V. Notes on the Education of the Future Emperor Peter III // Archeographic Yearbook for 2003. M., 2004. S. 131–132. 42 nii”29. The substantive part of Peter's speech is covered in more detail in the dispatch of the Austrian diplomat Count. F. Mercy Argento. February 1 n.s. (January 21 O.S.) 1762, he wrote to Vienna: by a formal decree or state order, the nobility of Russia is henceforth free on the same grounds as the nobility of Livonia. Thereby imperial decree The Russian nobility is allowed: to freely leave for foreign countries, to refuse civil and military service, to take places at foreign courts, and in general to enjoy all the same rights of freedom that are given to subjects of other monarchical states”30. Also, a note from secret expedition Collegium of Foreign Affairs, sent from St. Petersburg on January 18, 1762 to one of the Russian diplomats. In it, Secretary M. Ek reported that Peter “deigned to announce to the entire Senate about the unrest complained by His Majesty to all the Russian nobility, on the very basis that European states creeps"31. Taking into account the above information, a number of norms of the Manifesto can be directly related to Peter's speech in the Senate. This is, first of all, the “liberty and freedom” itself for the Russian nobles, who could continue serving “as long as they wish, and their condition will allow them” (p. 1), i.e. guided by their own desire, then - permission for the nobles to travel freely to European states (paragraph 4), as well as the possibility stated in paragraph 6 to call non-serving nobles if "special need calls for"32. After Peter's decree on January 17, 1762, on the preparation of the form, the relevant work was to begin in the Senate. G.V. Vernadsky, relying on the testimonies of his contemporaries, when analyzing the process of creating the Manifesto, as the direct author, pointed to the Prosecutor General A.I. Glebov, and also identified R.I. Vorontsov, "as a person who ... was especially busy with the manifesto"33. As for the Legislative Commission, he noted that “the manifesto published on February 20 and received by the commission on February 22 was immediately included in its entirety in the draft of the future Chapter 22 of Part III of the Code”34. Thus, in his opinion, even under Peter III the commission had no direct relation to the Manifesto. H.L. Rubinstein presented a more complex picture of the creation of the Manifesto. He believed that “the Vorontsov draft of Chapter 22 put forward in the first place precisely the complex of socio-economic privileges of the nobility and continued to defend it in the future. Exemption from compulsory service was only a further development of this program. In this regard, the historian asked next question : “Why did this question, which continued to interest certain circles of the nobility even later, did not find a place in the manifesto?” The answer to this question was found in the struggle of the courtiers of Peter III: “There is every reason to believe that it was Volkov’s opposition to 29 RGADA, f. 248, d. 3426, l. 277–277v., 283. Journals of cameras-Fouriers, 1762. pp. 9–10. 30 Collection of the Imperial Russian Historical Society (hereinafter - the IRIS Collection). T. 18. St. Petersburg, 1876. P. 94. 31 RGADA, f. 1263, op. 1, d. 415, l. 1. 32 PSZ-I. T. 15. No. 11444. C. 913–914. 33 Vernadsky G.V. Decree. op. P. 54. 34 Ibid. pp. 57–58. 43 and Glebov should have led to the actual curtailment of the draft privileges of the nobility in the manifesto of 1762”35. This formulation of the question, as well as the conclusions, became possible on the basis of two arbitrary assumptions. First of all, that the freedom to serve stemmed from economic privileges. Another assumption is the refusal of Peter himself in his own views, the perception of the emperor as a kind of puppet, controlled exclusively by those close to him. However, these assumptions were not substantiated by Rubinstein in any way. S.V. Polsky largely followed the same path: “So, the idea of ​​“freedom of the nobility” came out of Vorontsov’s Legislative Commission. However, the Liberty Manifesto itself appeared a month after the Emperor's visit to the Senate. Why was the Manifesto published so late? Finally, why did the Manifesto not include all those broad rights and privileges of the nobility that had already been described by the Legislative Commission, but limited itself to the abolition of compulsory service? Like Rubinstein, Polsky looks for answers in the struggle of the courtiers and claims that “R.I. Vorontsov presented his project of expanding the rights of the nobility with the approval of the monopolies of the nobility on land and serfs, wine production and trade. Proteges P.I. Shuvalova - Prosecutor General A.I. Glebov and the Emperor's secretary D.V. Volkov - could not allow the establishment of such a monopoly. Probably, Peter III himself shared their opinion. To prove the existence of such a project, Polskoy turns to the Legislative Commission. In her papers, a white copy of the edition of the 22nd chapter “On the nobles and their advantages”, dating back to the time of Peter III, has been preserved. At the same time, the Petrine edition had a very interesting difference from the projects of chapter 22 of the period of the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna known to date. The second Elizabethan edition of the chapter, introduced into scientific circulation by Polsky, consisted of 16 articles37. The white paper of the Petrine edition already consisted of 12 articles, but the eighth article “On the advantages of the nobility” was divided into ten sub-articles, each of which was devoted to a specific advantage of the nobility. At the same time, “liberty”38 is designated as the first advantage. On the basis of such differences, Polskoy builds the following chain of reasoning, which should justify the existence of a certain Vorontsov project: “Firstly, the very structure of the document (Peter’s Belovik. - M.K.) indicates that Article Eight is clearly a “foreign body ” in relation to the entire text, it violates the logical construction of the document, its structure ... Secondly, with the simplest comparison, it becomes obvious that certain provisions of Article Eight formed the basis of the text of the Manifesto. This allows us to assume that the inserted article is exactly the same project of R.I. Vorontsov "On the advantages of the nobility", or the first version of the Manifesto, which was rejected by Peter III. Thirdly, all articles of Chapter 22, except for the eighth, directly go back to the Elizabethan edition, while the eighth article does not have any drafts or drafts in the papers of the Legislative Commission, which also indicates its extraneous origin”39. 35 Rubinstein N.L. Decree. op. pp. 239–240. 36 Polskoy S.V. “Dividing your people into different ranks...”... R. 324. 37 See about them: Ibid. R. 317–320; Kiselev M.A. Decree. op. pp. 36–37. 38 RGADA, f. 342, op. 1, d. 63, part II, l. 378. 39 Polskoy S.V. “Dividing his people into different ranks...”... R. 325. 44 In such reasoning, the historian steps on a rather shaky ground of conjecture. The problem is that assumptions that are not adequately supported by the testimony of sources often turn out to be erroneous, and what seems illogical to the historian could be quite logical for a particular actor. I managed to find among the papers of Catherine II a document related to the editing of chapter 22 in 1761–1762: this is another edition of the chapter, written in the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna and corrected already under Peter III40. The following corrections make it possible to date it: in one place, “sire parent” was transferred to “sovereign grandfather”, and in another, “our motherly complacency” to “our fatherly complacency”41. The document itself is a draft, in the text of which not only stylistic, but also semantic corrections were made. It is important that this edition consists of 12 articles, and its eighth article “On the advantages of the nobility” is divided into seven sub-articles, each of which is devoted to a specific “noble advantage”, and the freedom of the nobility does not appear among them. Consequently, the eighth article, divided into sub-articles, appeared already at the very end of the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna and was not connected with the Manifesto, and the 8th article of the Petrovsky belovik chapter 22 had, with the exception of the sub-article about liberties, an Elizabethan protograph. Thus, the hypothesis of S.V. Polsky about the creation of R.I. Vorontsov under Peter III of the draft Manifesto, which included not only the freedom to serve and not to serve, but also other rights, is not confirmed. I will offer my reconstruction of the history of the creation of the text of the Manifesto after Peter's visit to the Senate on January 17, 1762, taking into account new archival materials. Among the papers of Catherine II, I also found draft materials of the editorial board of the chapter “On the nobles and their advantages” of the III book of the Code, or rather, its eighth article, devoted to the “advantages of the nobility”. This draft version of the eighth article dates from the reign of Peter III. I note that the article, like the draft version of the end of the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna mentioned above, was divided into sub-articles - “advantages”. However, it is noteworthy that the first “advantage” in it was the permission “to all the noble Russian nobility to enjoy liberty and freedom ... granted for eternity and in hereditary generations so that a nobleman can serve in his fatherland for as long as he wishes.” and his condition will permit him.”42 The text of this "advantage" in its main provisions coincided with the Manifesto. Already after this draft version of the eighth article was written, editorial changes were made to it, including the text of the first “advantage”. If we compare the original text of the first "advantage", the changes made, as well as the Manifesto, we can make the following observations. In the original text, the norm was fixed: “It is forbidden for the military to ask for leave or resignation from service during the campaign, below three months before the start of it.” As a result of the editing, another text should have appeared: “Military men inside and outside the state, neither during the campaign, nor before the start of it, ask for resignation from the service three months in advance, but do not dare to ask for it.” 40 As O.A. Omelchenko, part of the papers of the Legislative Commission 1754–1766. was taken to the office of Catherine II, as well as N.I. Panin (Omelchenko O.A. “Legitimate monarchy” of Catherine II: Enlightened absolutism in Russia. M, 1993. P. 44, note 64). 41 RGADA, f. 10, op. 1, d. 15, part II, l. 288 rev., 294 rev. 42 Ibid., l. 296.45 yut, but at the end. In the Manifesto (paragraph 1), this text looks like this: “The military, neither during the company, below before starting it, three months before the dismissal from the service, or the absheed, do not dare to ask, but at the end, both inside and outside the state." Also, in the original text, the prescription was recorded: “Russian nobles who served with other European sovereigns, returning to their fatherland, at their will and ability, will be taken to low places in our service, who were in the service of the crowned heads by the same ranks.” During the editing, the following addition was made to the words "by the same ranks" - "for which patents will be announced." In paragraph 5 of the Manifesto, this instruction looked like this: “Russian noblemen who continue to serve, besides ours, with other European sovereigns, may, returning to their fatherland, according to their desires and ability, enter our service for vacancies; who are in the services of the crowned heads by the same ranks for which patents will be announced”43. Several more comparisons could be made, but they all lead to the conclusion that the Manifesto was written on the basis of the text that coincides with the original text of the first “advantage”. A separate question is the origin of the edit, which literally coincides with the phrases of the Manifesto. It can be assumed that this revision preceded the Manifesto and became one of its sources. However, the opposite effect is more likely: when the text of the Manifesto was approved, the draft of the "first advantage" was edited in accordance with it. This is indicated by the following. In the original text there was a phrase about the need to keep at the Senate and its office several people "from retired nobles for all sorts of occasional needs." During the editing, the expression “by decree of Mr.[os]d[a]r Peter Pervago” appeared, and then it turned out to be crossed out. This expression is present in the Manifesto44. At the same time, it was not included in the text of Petrovsky’s white draft of the chapter “On the nobles and their advantage”, unlike other, not crossed out edits45. Thus, on the basis of the given data, it can be argued that the text I discovered contains a draft version of the Manifesto, which, then taken as the basis for the white version of the Manifesto, ended up in the Legislative Commission and was used in the creation of the Petrine version of Chapter 22. R.I. Vorontsov, most likely, was involved in the creation of such a draft of the Manifesto. It is possible that the draft was directly created in the commission under his leadership. At the same time, taking into account the hypothesis of S.V. Polsky that Vorontsov was preparing an extended draft of the Manifesto, one can ask the question: is not the entire draft version of the eighth article of Chapter 22 that I found a draft of the Manifesto? The answer to this is given by the "seventh advantage" of this draft, dedicated to the right of nobles to freely dispose of their real estate. It contained the norm that the nobles could “establish mining and other factories in their villages, as well as start all sorts of manufactories, as the last two are explained at greater length in the following advantages and articles” (emphasis mine. – M.K.)46. If we assume that the text about "advantages" was written not as an article from the 22nd chapter of the III book of the Code, but as a separate legislative act , steel 43 PSZ-I. T. 15. No. 11444. S. 913. 44 RGADA, f. 10, op. 1, d. 15, part II, l. 297; PSZ-I. T. 15. No. 11444. S. 914. 45 RGADA, f. 342, op. 1, d. 63, part II, l. 380. 46 Ibid., f. 10, op. 1, d. 15, part II, l. 298 rev. 46 it seems unclear in which "articles" this noble advantage should have been "explained more extensively". If we assume that the text of the eighth article continued to be considered as part of the Code, everything becomes clear: the ninth and tenth articles of the 22nd chapter on the nobility were devoted to noble entrepreneurship47. In addition, as noted earlier, the idea of ​​the eighth article containing sub-articles with "benefits" is not related to the Manifesto. Thus, this entire text cannot be regarded as a draft Manifesto. Of course, one should understand why this text was included in the eighth article of the chapter "On the nobles and their advantages" before the publication of the Manifesto. As V.N. Latkin, from the beginning of 1762, elected deputies from the nobility and merchants began to gather in St. Petersburg, who were supposed to start hearing the draft Code48. As early as December 1761, the commission itself began hearing the fourth book of the Code, i.e. the third book, which contained chapter 22, was largely completed. However, the decree of Peter III on the liberty of the nobility on January 17, 1762 required that appropriate amendments be made to the draft Code. Trying to complete the work on this chapter as quickly as possible, a certain author created a text that should have become the basis of the Manifesto, and also be included in the Code at the same time. After the Manifesto was signed by the senators, or after it was approved by Peter III in the commission, the draft created for the Code is amended accordingly and a white version of the 22nd chapter is drawn up. This is also evidenced by such a feature of the design of the first sub-article (“first advantage”) of the eighth article in the white paper, as its division into sub-sub-articles in accordance with the Manifesto50, although this was not initially provided for by the Code. It can be assumed that after January 17, R.I. Vorontsov, as one of the senators, as well as the head of the Legislative Commission, was entrusted with preparing the basis for the text of the Manifesto, which he did. On the one hand, this text included the main prescriptions of Peter III, on the other hand, the resignation procedure was prescribed in more detail, including “with an award for impeccable service with a clean resignation from all affairs in one rank, if with which they are going to retire, they have been for more than a year, ”as well as returning to service after retirement. However, the author of the text still retained several elements of obligatory service for the nobility. Firstly, this is the prescription “under the Senate and the ongo cantor there should be several people from retired nobles for all kinds of occasional needs ... from now on, always thirty, and under the ongo cantor twenty people, for which the Heralds annually according to the preportion of those living in the provinces , and not in the services of the nobles, repair the outfit, not naming anyone, but leaving these choices among themselves to the nobles in the provinces and provinces. In this regard, I note that on March 25, 1762, the members of the Legislative Commission, being in the house of R.I. Vorontsov, considered the first book of the Code, dedicated to the organization of public administration. When considering the fifth article of Chapter 1, the following was introduced: “To determine the help of the governors and governors of the deputies of those cities from the nobility of the province, three people each, two of that province from 47 Ibid., l. 293 vol.–294. 48 Latkin V.N. Legislative commissions in Russia in the XVIII century. T. I. SPb., 1887. S. 101–124. 49 Rubinstein N.L. Decree. op. P. 227. 50 RGADA, f. 342, op. 1, d. 63, part II, l. 378–381 rev. 51 Ibid., f. 10, op. 1, d. 15. part II, l. 296–297 rev. 47 governors, and the third of that province from all the governors, and in the governorate of the same governor, two people each, and in the voivodeship, the townsmen, one person each with a change in the weather. And to sit in turn on those deputies, one at a time, both in the provinces and in the provinces, and other magistrates, only in those cities where someone is elected from the court and from the nobility. Thus, proposals to involve retired nobles in governance through the organization of noble elections in the provinces and provinces were quite in tune with the ideas that were discussed in 1762 in the Legislative Commission. Secondly, it was the norm, according to which it was forbidden to give resignation from service to those nobles who “in the sallads and other lower chief officer ranks ... unless someone continued military service for more than twelve years.” Thirdly, the author of the draft proposed the introduction of compulsory education for the children of the nobility, "behind whom there are no more than a thousand souls of peasants." Such nobles should “announce their children directly in our gentry cadet corps, where they will be trained with all diligence, and after studying every rank with an award, they will graduate, and therefore they can enter and continue service according to the above-mentioned establishment”53 . Let me remind you that in 1761 the Legislative Commission developed norms on the introduction of compulsory education for the entire nobility. At the same time, the commission believed that a nobleman should begin his service, having received the chief officer rank as a result of such education. In the same way, poorly educated nobles were to be defined as soldiers “up to length of service”54. Consequently, by proposing a ban on the resignation of nobles who did not rise to the rank of chief officer, as well as the introduction of compulsory education for the poor and middle nobility, the author of the draft followed in line with the ideas of the Legislative Commission of 1761. However, it should be taken into account that in 1761. The Legislative Commission drew up its projects under the influence of the ideas of I.I. Shuvalov, who was not a supporter of noble liberty to serve and not to serve55, but Shuvalov’s educational ideas, as K.S. Leonard, had a certain influence on the policy of Peter III56. Based on the sources at our disposal, we can conclude that with the Legislative Commission and R.I. Vorontsov, as its leader, was connected not with the idea of ​​the freedom of the nobility to serve and not to serve, but rather the elements of limiting this freedom. However, attention should be paid to next message Austrian diplomat F. Mercy Argento: “The general joy of the Russian nobility about the benefits granted in the future was greatly reduced by the difficulties that were encountered in the required detailed explanation of the main manifesto announcing this royal favor because, although the sovereign was presented with two various projects, according to which the Russians were already granted much lesser rights than those enjoyed by the Livonian nobility, nevertheless both of them were rejected by the sovereign, even for the reason that the freedom granted by them is too great”57. Reported about something similar to Paris 52 Ibid., f. 342, op. 1, d. 42, l. 176. 53 Ibid., f. 10, op. 1, d. 15, part II, l. 297. 54 See: Kiselev M.A. Decree. op. P. 36. 55 Ibid. pp. 32–35. 56 Leonard C.S. Reform and Regicide: the Reign of Peter III of Russia. P. 58–59, 174. 57 IIS Collection. T. 18. S. 116. 48 French Ambassador Baron L.-O. Breteuil58. In these reports, attention should be paid to information about the active position of Peter III, who had certain ideas about the possible limits of liberties for the Russian nobility. Thus, the preservation of the elements of compulsory service could be associated not only with the Legislative Commission, but also with the position of the emperor. Of course, the question of possible content projects rejected by Peter III. As noted above, S.V. Polsky believes that one of them was a hypothetical project of “expanding the rights of the nobility with the approval of the monopolies of the nobility on land and serfs, wine production and trade”, allegedly drawn up by R.I. Vorontsov. However, F. Mercy Argento did not write anything about the property rights of the nobles. In this regard, the following message from the Austrian diplomat Count. V. Kaunica, written after the signing of the Manifesto by Peter III: “Your Excellency, probably, deigned to notice from my most respectful letter of February 1, how the emperor, immediately after accession to the throne, gave permission and the right to the local nobility to enter into service to foreign European powers, just as it is customary in other European states and as it is granted to the Livonian and Estonian nobles under the peace concluded with Sweden in 1721 ... The Russian nobility, before fully understanding the content of the decree, expressed excessive joy about granted freedom, but now it is all the more distressed, seeing that the essence of this decree and especially the end of it leaves no hope that it will use these privileges at will. As can be seen from this message, the surviving elements of compulsory service turned out to be the subject of dissatisfaction for the Russian nobility. Most likely, the rejected projects, unlike the Manifesto, did not contain such restrictions. After the draft version of the Manifesto was prepared, most likely with the participation of the Legislative Commission represented by its leader R.I. Vorontsov, it entered the Senate, where it was edited by Prosecutor General A.I. Glebov. There are several testimonies of contemporaries about the role of the latter in the creation of the Manifesto. First of all, one should point to the message of F. Mercy Argento dated February 1 (January 21 O.S.), 1762, that the “main culprits” of the new orders, which could “win ... love for Peter III and devotion of the entire Russian people”, including the granting of liberties to the nobility, “we can unmistakably count: Field Marshal Trubetskoy, Prosecutor General Glebov and Senator Vorontsov”60. It was just a guess, albeit a confident one. However, in a report dated February 26 (February 15 O.S.), when the Manifesto had already been signed by the senators, but Peter III had not yet approved, Mercy Argento reported that “the greatest participation in these affairs”, among which was the granting of liberty to the nobility, “ received by the Prosecutor General of the Senate Glebov due to the confidence he enjoys”61. Therefore, 58 Leonard C.S. Reform and Regicide: the Reign of Peter III of Russia. P. 57. 59 IIS Collection. T. 18. S. 238–239. 60 Ibid. P. 82. Note that S.V. Polsky, when quoting this message, omitted the mention of the book. N.Yu. Trubetskoy, probably in order to more convincingly substantiate the roles of R.I. Vorontsov and A.I. Glebov in initiating the Manifesto (Polsky S.V. “Dividing your people into different ranks ...”, P. 323). 61 IIS Collection. T. 18. S. 140. 49 if Mercy Argento only assumed the role of Trubetskoy and Vorontsov, then he wrote about the participation of Glebov as a fact. In addition, J. Shtelin noted in his memoirs that it was Glebov who “composed” the Manifesto “on the freedom of the Russian nobility”62. If we compare the norms of the draft draft, prepared with the participation of the Legislative Commission, and the norms of the final version of the Manifesto, it should be recognized that the revision was mainly of a stylistic rather than substantive nature. Also, the author of the white version wrote a preface and divided the normative part into paragraphs. On February 8, 1762, the senators, in pursuance of Peter's command, signed the text of the Manifesto63 presented by him, after which Peter, without making any changes, approved it on February 1864. In connection with the proposed reconstruction, a well-known anecdote by M.M. Shcherbatov about the history of the Manifesto, which D.V. Volkov: “Peter the Third, in order to hide from Countess Elisaveta Romanovna that he would have fun all night with the newly imported woman, told Volkov in her presence that he had to spend that night with him in the performance of an important matter known to him in discussing the improvement of the state. The night has come; the sovereign went to have fun with princess K[urakina], telling Volkov to write some noble legalization by tomorrow, and was locked in an empty room with a Datskaya dog. Volkov, not knowing the reasons or intentions of the sovereign, did not know what to write about, but one must write. But, as he was a quick-witted man, he remembered the frequent rebuking of the sovereign, from Count Roman Larionovich Vorontsov, about the freedom of the nobility. Sedshi, wrote a manifesto about this. In the morning he was released from prison, and the manifesto was tested by the sovereign and made public”65. As shown above, the text of the Manifesto had at least two editions - draft and white. In addition, the creation of these editions was preceded by the speech of Peter III in the Senate on January 17. Thus, the stated version about the simultaneous writing of the text of the Manifesto cannot be recognized as reliable. It is possible that this anecdote was invented by M. M. Shcherbatov from beginning to end. By at least, Ya.E. Vodarsky reasonably suggested that Shcherbatov might have forged a historical document in order to use it to support his own political views66. In addition, it can be assumed that Shcherbatov did not quite correctly understand and present Volkov's story. If we assume that this anecdote was not a fiction, then it can be inscribed in the following way in the context of the creation of the Manifesto. First, it is worth noting that the senators signed the text of the Manifesto on February 8, and Peter III, without making the slightest change, only 10 days later. Secondly, it should be taken into account that some documents for Peter were translated from Russian into German67. In this regard, it can be assumed that R.I. Vorontsov reminded Peter III not just of “freedom”, but of the need to sign the Manifesto. In a similar way, one can interpret and mention 62 Shtelin Ya. Decree. op. P. 48. 63 RGADA, f. 248, d. 3427, l. 134–138. 64 RGIA, f. 1329, op. 1, d. 96, l. 99–103 vol.; PSZ-I. T. 15. No. 11444. S. 912–915. 65 Shcherbatov M.M. Decree. op. Stb. 224. 66 See: Vodarsky Ya.E. Puzzles Prut campaign Peter I. M., 2004. S. 151–156. 67 RGADA, f. 203, op. 1, d. 3, l. 23. One of these translations: Ibid., f. 178, op. 1, d. 27, l. 52–56 rev. 50 a passing reminiscence of Catherine II that Vorontsov and A.I. Glebov reported to Peter, "in order to give free rein to the nobility." D.V. Volkov, being “locked in an empty room with a Danish dog”, did not create the original text of the Manifesto, but translated it into German68. The next day this translation was read by Peter and approved. The chamber-furier journal for 1762 allows us to indicate a possible night when the described by M.M. Shcherbatov events. On February 16, the court servants were informed that the next day “both in the morning and in the afternoon, there would be no arrival”; On February 17, Peter "deigned to eat lunch and evening meals in the dining room"69. It is possible that the night of February 16-17 was chosen by Peter III to visit Prince. Kurakina, in connection with which the court servants were ordered not to appear at the court on the morning of February 17. Already on February 17, Peter could familiarize himself with the prepared Volkov translation and approve it in order to sign the official Russian text of the Manifesto on February 18. Summing up, it should be stated that all the arguments of historians (primarily G.V. Vernadsky, N.L. Rubinstein and S.V. Polsky) about the confrontation between representatives of the imperial elite (R.I. Vorontsova, I.I. Shuvalov, P.I. Shuvalov, A.I. Glebov, D.V. Volkov) around the freedom of the nobility to serve and not to serve, as well as the Manifesto, which proclaimed it, turn out to be based on not always correct interpretations of the evidence of contemporaries and indirect data from documentary sources. Direct evidence of such a struggle on this moment not provided by historians. The constructions about the existence of court groups (“Shuvalovs” and “Vorontsovs”), which waged such a struggle, also turn out to be very doubtful. Moreover, historians have not yet cited a single source that would unequivocally testify that before the speech of Peter III in the Senate on January 17, 1762, this liberty was discussed by the nobility. Accordingly, concepts hang in the air, considering the Manifesto as the result of the struggle of the nobles for their class rights. These, in particular, include the opinion of B.N. Mironov that “February 18, 1762, Peter III partly because of fear of the nobility, partly because of the threat palace coup, and also guided by state and dynastic considerations, he issued a Manifesto on the freedom of the nobility”70, as well as the position of A.B. Kamensky that “the result of the struggle of the nobility for the registration of their privileged status was the Manifesto on the Liberty of the Nobility of 1762”71. State in Russia in the 18th century. was rather a place of interaction of nobles with each other and with ruling house than an antagonist of the nobility. When analyzing sources related to the history of the Manifesto, attention is drawn to active role Peter III, who, according to J. Shtelin, even before his accession to the throne, spoke about the desire to give freedom to serve and not serve the Russian nobility. Before Peter III, representatives of the nobility only 68 As noted back in 1754, D.V. Volkov in French and German "writes with a very fair hand" (Archive of Prince Vorontsov. Book 2. M., 1871. P. 630). 69 Camera-Furier magazines, 1762. pp. 37–38. 70 Mironov B.N. social history Russian empire period ( XVIII beginning XX century). T. 1. St. Petersburg, 2003. P. 378. 71 Kamensky A.B. Formation of the Russian Empire // The World History. T. 4: World in the 18th century. M., 2013. S. 564. 51 co discussed the possibility of limiting the service life72. It is possible that the very idea of ​​releasing the nobility from service looked so bold that it could only be expressed by the heir to the throne, in order to be realized later, having received imperial power. It is indicative that a number of provisions of the Manifesto can be associated with the activities of Peter III's associates, however, they were aimed more at limiting the proclaimed liberty, and not at its development. Consequently, the Manifesto should be considered in the context of the class policy of Peter III, and not as a result of the struggle of the nobles for their class rights. At the same time, the question of the ideological context of the Manifesto, which made its adoption possible, remains relevant. And here an important role could be played by the development of ideas that the Russian noble nobility was equal in position to the noble estates of European states and, accordingly, could have similar rights and liberties. In this regard, not only the references to the rights of the Livland nobility are indicative, but also the quoted note by M. Ek that the “wave” was given to the Russian nobility by Peter III “on the very basis that is crawling in European states”. In this sense, in my opinion, it is promising to analyze the ideas about the social hierarchy and the nobility as an estate in Russia in the 18th century, which will make it possible to understand the ideological context not only of the Manifesto, but also of other legislative acts that determined the status of the nobility. 72 See: for example: Kurukin I.V. The era of "court storms": Essays political history post-Lepetrine Russia, 1725–1762 Ryazan, 2003, pp. 263–264; Babich M.V. Manifesto on the limitation of terms of service of the nobility of 1736 in the system of politics, administrative practice and social values in Russia in the 18th century. // The ruling elites and the nobility of Russia during and after the Petrine reforms (1682–1750). M., 2013. 52